The study conducted raises the research problem and issue regarding the debate about the six-day war in year 1967, and the asymmetric part of air warfare. The aim of the study is to answering the research question; How can the air warfare under the six-day war be understood trough The Underdog´s Model and SPOT-bombing? The study is also aiming to increase the understanding of air warfare and its asymmetry as well as address the crucial factors for an inferior part. The study uses two theories focusing on asymmetry and small states, The Underdog´s Model and SPOT-bombing. An analysis of the six-day war is conducted with the usage of the two theories to explain, through a text analysis.  The analysis presents the understanding of how Israel acted in line with The Underdog´s Model regarding most of the theories factors, to a better level then its opponent. By looking at the six-day war trough SPOT-bombing the analysis enables an understanding of the case but also how Israel’s actions for the most part was not in line with the theory. The overall conclusion is that Israel’s actions and success in the six-day war can, to a better extent, be understood and was more in line with The Underdog´s Model then SPOT-bombing. This study contributes to the understanding of the six-day war as well as the understanding of an inferior part in an asymmetric air warfare, relevant for today’s air warfare.

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against the Egyptian Air Force and started what was to be known as the Six Day War. The Six Day War is a good example of when a small nation manages to singlehandedly defeat a superior adversary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the success of the Israeli Air Force and their contribution to the victory. The use of air power in the Six Day War will be analyzed, using John Warden’s Five Ring Model and Shaun Clarke’s theories about risk-based coercion and SPOT-bombing. Research findings indicate that Shaun Clarke’s theories about coercion may to some extent explain the success of the Israeli Air Force. Attacking the armed forces created the threat of further violence against more valuable and vulnerable targets causing the Arabic leaders to choose peaceful solutions instead of continued fighting. Furthermore, the SPOT-bombing analyzes show that the psychological effect that the Israeli Air Force had on their adversary played a significant role in the campaign against Egypt. However, Warden’s model could not explain the reasons behind the outcome of the war.

This study aims to test the strength of Shaun Clarkes air theory SPOT-bombing for small nations, to see if the theory could be of good use for all the small states around the world which are not able to master the capacity needed for large nation air theories. The British use of airpower during the Falkland war serves as case which is compared to the SPOT-bombing theory. The British task force, although much smaller than the Argentine military force, succeeded to win the war through extensive use of airpower. The studies analytic results reveal that the indicators taken from the air theory are not found to any greater extent in the British use of airpower during the war. Therefore this study is not able to strengthen or falsify Clarkes air theory as a whole, but reaches the conclusion that using unconventional methods are useful for a smaller state to get effect on strategic level against a larger opponent. Still, after this study there is more work to be done to test the relevance of the SPOT-bombing for small nations air theory, to be able to state if it is worth for small states to base their airpower doctrines upon it.