Abstract The aim of a company¡¦s legal system is to harmonize the conflict interests among stakeholders for pursuing the company¡¦s maximum value. However, in the recent years, we have seen that a lot of enterprises happened abuses one after another. Securities authority and investors therefore deem the corporate governance necessary to enhance. Facing the insufficiency of corporate governance, Taiwan added the Articles 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-5 of Securities and Exchange Act when the Act was amended in January 2006. These added articles introduced the system of independent directors, but they caused the disputes in the domestic industries and academic circles. This article is trying to find the ways of improvement for each problem in order to promote the efficiency and competence of independent directors, as well as induces the following major conclusions and suggestions. 1. Conclusions (1) The topic of independent directors is still a difficult issue. (2) It has to meet six elements for promoting the efficiency and competence of independent directors. They are: a. independency; b. professional and time input; c. proper incentive of monitor and control; d. freely acquire the needed data and information for monitoring and controlling; e. economic cost of monitor and control, or efficient monitor and control; f. adequate limits of authority for controlling and balancing. (3) Only legal system and honest and trusted operation are working at the same time, can the efficacy of corporate governance be brought into fully play. (4) The fulfillment of corporate governance needs the implement of all members in the company. 2. Suggestions (1) The facet of legal regulations: a. amend the Article 27 of Company Law; b. independent directors occupies 50% of the number of all board directors; c. the shareholders with holding rate less than 1% in the company are elected as independent directors. (2) The facet of systems: a. whether the company sets up the independent directors or not is the company¡¦s free selection; b. the solutions or opinions of the independent directors for the items on the agenda should be bulletined on the Market Observation Post System and the company¡¦s website; c. appropriate rewards; d. compelling standards for setting up other functional committees.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cesar de Alencar Leme de Almeida.pdf: 655055 bytes, checksum: f39f9ce0ebf4e900239c0acb570a56ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-09 / More and more, Brazilian companies have offered their securities to the investment public at international stock exchanges, especially the New York Stock Exchange. However, financially attractive to issuers as compared to other fund-raising sources, a public offering abroad calls for compliance with other regulatory requirements. In the case of the US, the financial scandals publicized early in this decade led to changes in money market regulations, with more stringent requirements on listed companies. Among the various requirements then imposed is the strengthening of Audit Committees for improvement of Corporate Governance practices. Because Audit Committees are not legally required under the Brazilian corporate legislation, the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) together with authorities from other countries which do not have such commission agreed with the Securities & Exchange Commission SEC to replace Audit Committees with similar agencies; e.g., the Fiscal Council, in the case of Brazil. According to the SEC, as it is independent of the Administrative Council, the Fiscal Council might perform an Audit Committee s functions, providing that some of the latter s attributions are also taken over. Against this background, there are currently two groups of Brazilian, non-financial companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange, namely: one which voluntarily formed its Audit Committee, and one which maintained its Fiscal Council with expanded functions, now known as "Conselho Fiscal Turbinado" (Powered Fiscal Council). The study was primarily designed to identify the Brazilian companies listed at the NYSE New York Stock Exchange, and among them, those which formed their Audit Committee and those which maintained their Fiscal Council. A bibliographic survey was conducted to identify the differences between the Brazilian and the US capital markets, the attributions assigned to Audit Committees, and their compliance with the respective agencies´ Internal Regulations. Thus, it was possible to check for compliance with these attributions and the similarity of functions established by the Audit Committees and Fiscal Councils researched. The research findings prove that the attributions of these two agencies are homogeneous. Lastly, possible new academic studies on this subject are presented / Cada vez mais, empresas brasileiras têm lançado seus papéis nas bolsas de valores internacionais, em especial na Bolsa de Valores de New York. Ao mesmo tempo em que é atrativo financeiramente para as empresas o lançamento de seus papéis no exterior, comparativamente com outras fontes de recursos, algumas exigências estabelecidas pelos órgãos reguladores precisam ser atendidas. No caso norte-americano, os escândalos vividos no início desta década fizeram com que a legislação que regulamenta o funcionamento do mercado de capitais fosse alterada, introduzindo normas mais rígidas para as empresas de capital aberto. Entre as diversas exigências impostas, está o fortalecimento do Comitê de Auditoria no processo de melhoria das práticas de Governança Corporativa. O Comitê de Auditoria, por não estar previsto na legislação societária brasileira, fez com que a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, com outros países que também não possuem esse órgão, negociasse com a Security Exchange Commission SEC, a substituição do Comitê de Auditoria por órgãos assemelhados, no caso do Brasil, o Conselho Fiscal. A SEC entendeu que, por possuir independência em relação ao Conselho de Administração, o Conselho Fiscal poderia exercer as funções do Comitê de Auditoria, desde que algumas atribuições fossem a ele incorporadas. Diante desse cenário, existem atualmente dois grupos de empresas brasileiras, não financeiras, listadas na Bolsa de Valores de New York, aquele que constituiu o Comitê de Auditoria voluntariamente e o outro grupo que manteve o Conselho Fiscal com funções ampliadas, passando a ser conhecido como Conselho Fiscal Turbinado. O estudo consistiu primeiramente em identificar quais são as empresas brasileiras listadas na NYSE New York Stock Exchange. Entre essas empresas, quais instituíram o Comitê de Auditoria e quais mantiveram o Conselho Fiscal. Foi efetuado levantamento bibliográfico com o objetivo de apresentar as diferenças entre o mercado de capitais no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos da América, além de identificar as atribuições impostas aos Comitês de Auditoria, bem como a aderência dessas atribuições aos Regimentos Internos desses dois órgãos. Foi possível verificar não só o grau de atendimento em relação a essas atribuições, mas também o nível de similaridade de funções estabelecidas pelos Comitês de Auditoria e Conselhos Fiscais pesquisados. Os resultados da pesquisa comprovam, de forma inequívoca, que não há homogeneidade nas atribuições destes dois órgãos. Finalmente apresenta-se possíveis novos estudos acadêmicos que poderiam advir deste tema

銀行是商業金融活動中不可或缺的一環，其經營管理的良窳直接與經濟、財政之穩定息息相關。近年來，銀行經營環境丕變，業務日趨龐雜，不論是金融界或監理機關，都已意識到作業風險管理的重要性。對於銀行業這樣一個關乎國計民生的重要產業，深入了解其作業風險應有之程序，以及其進行作業風險管理時之內控作為，應有見微知著之管理意義。 新版巴塞爾資本協定(The New Basel Capital Accord，亦稱”Basel II”)已於2004年6月底正式定案，預計2006年底開始實施，其中進階方法將在2007年底適用，Basel II的修訂範圍頗大，將對各國銀行業及金融監理機關產生重大影響，各國為因應新巴塞爾資本協定的實施也早已開始進行各項研究評估及法案研擬。我國金管會為使國內銀行資本適足性管理及風險管理能力符合國際水準，已於民國九十三年九月二十一日發函通知銀行，參照國際規範修訂我國「銀行資本適足性管理辦法」及「銀行自有資本與風險性資產計算方法說明」等規定，預定將與國際同步於民國九十五年底正式實施新巴塞爾資本協定，因此各家銀行必須及早規劃以因應新巴塞爾資本協定相關措施，並建立妥善風險管理機制，以確保法規遵循及提昇競爭力。 而美國國會為強化證券市場之監控及公司治理，亦已於2002年7月30日公布SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002(沙氏法案)，為美國自30年代推行公司治理架構以來，影響最為重大之財經改革法案。沙氏法案針對公司治理提出一系列的要求，為避免企業在資訊揭露方面造假或扭曲，特別針對內部控制的建立、維持及其有效性，要求企業管理階層必須負起責任，同時亦要求企業必須出具對有關財務報導之內部控制有效性的評估報告。 Basel II與沙氏法案有其相異之處，前者係對全世界銀行業者之規範，後者則係美國針對公開發行等級以上公司所作之規範，舉凡已屬公開發行之公司，其任何資訊揭露均足以影響投資人決策，而發行公司任何不實或虛偽資訊揭露，均可能影響資本市場，使廣大投資人權益受損。雖然Basel II著眼在銀行，沙氏法案重點在證券市場公司之治理，然則兩者均著重有系統的由內而外、由上而下的控制機制，不獨要求業者必須建立良好之控制機制，同時在各項控制機制上亦必須有書面做為佐證，而兩項規範亦均導入外控機制，在Basel II為第三支柱之市場紀律，在沙氏法案則為會計師對企業內控有效性之意見，兩者自有其神似之處。 作者任職於美商銀行從事後台管理工作多年，擬藉本論文之撰寫及探討，補強銀行業者對銀行作業風險及控制自評全貌之了解。