xii, 259 p. Print copy also available for check out and consultation in the University of Oregon's library under the call number: B105.L45 A76 2008 / The question of freedom has been a present and constant concern since the inception of the occidental philosophical tradition. Yet after a certain point the manner in which this question is to be asked has been canonized and sedimented: do humans (subject) have the capacity (predicate) for free and spontaneous action? The third antinomy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I argue, demonstrates the necessary failure, the perpetual aporia, of continuing to discuss whether humans conceived of as subjects possess the predicate freedom. I argue that if we do not want to fall either into the Third Antinomy, we must steer away from thinking of freedom as a predicate of a subject and reconfigure it as an experience or a comportment. Following suggestions from Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community, Being Singular Plural, and The Experience of Freedom, my dissertation argues that re-thinking of freedom as an experience simultaneously requires a re-thinking of identity, in terms of ecstasy, ek-stases, or ex-position, and accordingly a re-thinking of the activity of thinking itself. Nancy cites Schelling and Heidegger as the thinkers who have made an attempt to think about ecstasy seriously as a fundamental ontological fact about the constitution of things. This reconfiguration of the constitution of things as either parts of organic structures (Schelling) or beings in a world (Heidegger), demands that we recognize how our identities are perpetually being constituted in all of our acts of relating with the world. We are constituted and constituting by our engagement with the things that environ us, and this environing is active and alive. If this is accepted as an ontological fact, this requires that we reconsider what it would mean to think, as all of our engagements with the world would be creative-both of ourselves and of what it is that we encounter. This would also mean that the meaningfulness of all things is wildly contingent, in fact necessarily, so. Accordingly, I defend that freedom, as the experience of possibility through our awareness of this contingency due to the lack of an origin, emerges for us in the experience of thinking. / Adviser: Peter Warnek

Art is the final product of the system and the ground can gain a complete intuition of itself through works of art. Art therefore becomes the final destination of the system. Schelling thinks that only the works of art can completely unify thinking and reality, the infinite and the finite, the universal and the particular, the subjective and the objective, give equal respect to each opposing pole, completely reflect the original identity and fulfill the primordial demand. What Schelling in his philosophy of art reveals is that philosophizing or reflection is not sufficient to solve the ultimate questions asked by itself. Thinking or rationality is not the foundation of world and reality. In fact, thinking and reality are equally the products of the ground. Hence, it is unreasonable and one-sided to make any one product the dominant factor and even the first principle of the unification and the whole system. / Before Schelling, Kant has already placed aesthetics in a system of philosophy, but he is not genuinely concerned about the question of art. Schelling is the first philosopher who places art within a system of philosophy and endows art a paramount role in the system. For Schelling, at least in his early thinking, art is not only a necessary question in philosophy, but is also its very origin and final destination. This position is quite extraordinary to for philosopher. Why does Schelling, as a philosopher, make such claim? How can art become the origin and destination of philosophy and sciences? What is the true essence and significance of art? These are the major questions of this dissertation. Schelling's discourse on art in his System of Transcendental Idealism and Philosophy of Art will be explicated. In order to make Schelling's contention more apparent, the discussions on art in Hegel and the early German romantic such as Friedrich Schlegel, Holderlin and Novalis will be included as well. / From the discourse on art, we see that Schelling, who is known as a German idealist, pays much attention to the question of existence and gives much respect to reality as such. Hence, Schelling's intellectual identity is quite ambivalent and should be re-examined. The second major task of this dissertation is to deliberate whether Schelling is an early German romantic or a German idealist, and whether there is a transition from romanticism to idealism in Schelling's philosophy. In order to answer these questions, the general positions of early German romanticism and German idealism should be first articulated. Then, the consistency of Schelling's thought will be verified. This dissertation argues for consistency of Schelling's system throughout his life and for Schelling's reconciliation of romanticism and idealism. Instead of being a preparation to Hegel's system, this dissertation will show that Schelling's fundamental concern and position are incompatible with that of Hegel. Despite his affinity with the romantic thought, the position of the demand of the ground and the final anticipation of future development are different in Schelling and the romantics. / The ground is for Schelling nothing else but the original One and the primordial demand. In order to explain and attain the unity of everything, the ground is posited as original identity; in order to explain the origin of existence and thinking, the ground is posited as a primordial demand. This demand is the demand for intuiting or knowing itself. Since the first principle is a demand, the system therefore becomes a dynamic and dialectical one. The whole system of Schelling is thus constructed according to two basic activities originated from the primordial demand: separation and unification. / Unlike contemporary aesthetic discussions, Schelling's discourse on art is never detached from the context of philosophy or metaphysics. For Schelling, what philosophy or metaphysics ultimately questions about are the unity and the ground of existence and thinking. Following Kant, Schelling, like his romantic and idealistic contemporaries, recognizes that the problem of unity is the fundamental question of philosophy. But diverging from Kant, Schelling thinks that there is no way to attain and explain the unity unless the ground is first investigated. / Wong, Wing Yuen. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0210. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-322). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5517.pdf: 2939809 bytes, checksum: 8eaa0095527bc6ab7198d67022872090 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-09 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The aim of this work is to examine some of the psychic aspects of the process of acquisition of verbal language in the theory of Freud. In a psychoanalytical perspective, this process takes place in the individual itself as well as in culture as a whole. Accordingly we examine it in its different stages, up to the point when the individual has acquired the use of verbal language. Even then, traces can be located of the process that led to language as such in verbal wit, in works of art, and in psychoanalytic therapy as conceived by Freud. Special emphasis is given to the mutual dependence, stated by Freud, between the physiological and psychological processes involved in the formation of language. Given that for Freud language arises in the individual at a moment when consciousness and the unconscious are yet to be completely separated from each other, it is only natural that he conceives the mechanisms that operate in grammatical languages to be absent and the symbols of expression to signify nothing beside themselves. Freudian conception of primeval language can then be said to be symbolic in the strong, philosophical acceptation of the term, as defined by Schelling: in this transitory form of language, words are not signs of conceptions nor do they point to external things, they are rather taken as things in themselves, complete and independent from all external reference. For Freud, their use prepares the individual for the advent of indirect, allegorical use of words that is typical of languages in their plain, grammatical form. But symbolic language does not disappear completely and without trace from the psyche, once verbal language has settled. Verbal wit, works of art, psychoanalytical therapy are instances of the permanence of the symbolic use of words in the realm of culture, and are as such to be taken as means of access to the unconscious. / Este trabalho tem como propósito apresentar alguns aspectos psíquicos do processo de aquisição da linguagem verbal na teoria freudiana. Abordamos esse processo no indivíduo e na cultura, bem como a retomada de aspectos psíquicos envolvidos nessa aquisição, quando a linguagem verbal já se consolidou, por meio do chiste, da obra de arte e da clínica psicanalítica freudiana. Ao tomarmos os processos psíquicos como encadeados e em situação de dependência dos processos fisiológicos, temos que a aquisição da linguagem faz parte de um processo de tradução dos estímulos incidentes no sistema nervoso, até a representação psíquica desses estímulos sob a forma de ligação entre representações-coisa e representações-palavra. Na primeira tópica da teoria freudiana, o aparelho psíquico é composto por diferentes sistemas e o processo de aquisição da linguagem ocorre justamente no período em que consciência e inconsciente ainda não se encontram completamente diferenciados. Indicamos esse período como sendo um período simbólico conforme a concepção schellinguianna de símbolo. Desse modo a linguagem erigida nesse período é chamada por nós de linguagem simbólica. Uma linguagem transitória em que palavras são tomadas como coisas e que abrange as características tanto consciência quanto do inconsciente, até que sobrevenha a ligação entre representações-coisa e representações-palavra e haja uma total separação entre os sistemas. O chiste, a obra de arte e a sessão analítica seriam situações em que esse período é retomado por haver, nessas situações, uma suspensão da barreira da censura e, como que, um mergulho da consciência no inconsciente.

viii, 189 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / The question of the present study concerns the relationship between language and nature as it has been taken up in the history of Western philosophy. The goal of this study is to show how language and nature are held together by thinking the transition between them, through the figure of silence. I will show this by drawing primarily on the work of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the body, and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language and nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the hinge of this passage, in which language, in its emergence from the silence of nature, turns back to disclose nature as already expression. Merleau-Ponty's late interrogation into how philosophical language might both emerge from and return to silence turned on the example of Proust's literary language. This study will also draw on Proust's meta-novelistic awakening to his literary calling, as it is recounted near the end of Le Temps Retrouvé, which discusses explicitly how Proust's language makes a turn through silence in order to emerge as literature. This provides an example of the emergence which Merleau-Ponty describes. I will then make the case that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy can be read as the thinking of being as nature, and that it begins to think how language roots human beings in nature as it blossoms out of nature's soil. I will show how Merleau-Ponty repeats a structure of thought traversed by Schelling in his essay on freedom, which will further show how philosophical attention to language discloses nature as a radical excess. Finally, I will discuss how the negotiation between language, nature, and silence, as it is practiced by Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is another turn in a long story of the human place in language and in nature, a story which is at least as old as the mythical thought of ancient Greece. / Committee in charge: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy; Naomi Zack, Member, Philosophy; Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy; Jeffrey Librett, Outside Member, German and Scandinavian

Zugl.: Augsburg, Univ., Diss., 2006

Esta tese objetiva investigar a questão do mal a partir da visão hegeliana, schellinguiana e kierkegaardiana, tomando como referência principal o tema da queda a qual pressupõe um estado original de felicidade e perfeição do ser humano no paraíso (Gn 3) e que foi perdido em vista da transgressão à norma estabelecida por Deus de não se poder comer do fruto da árvore do bem e do mal. Para Hegel, nunca houve esse estado originário de felicidade, e por isso, tanto o bem quanto o mal devem ser estudados a partir da visão no qual o homem está inserido, a história universal. O homem, segundo Hegel, é espírito e como tal, na sua origem ainda não é o que deve ser, não tem consciência de si, não se sabe como espírito, assim, nesse registro, é mau, e deve fazer o seu percurso na história para efetivar esse seu dever ser, na dualidade bem e mal, e chegar ao estado de reconciliação. Para Hegel, se se quiser ficar no âmbito da metáfora do paraíso, este é uma conquista alcançada pelo próprio homem que se alça de seu estado de animalidade para efetivar-se como espírito. Hegel não tem uma obra especifica sobre o tema do mal e da conciliação, mas ele é tratado em diversas de suas obras, principalmente na “Fenomenologia do espírito”, “Lições sobre a filosofia da história” nos cursos berlinenses de 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compilados na obra “Lições sobre filosofia da religião”. O mal está entrelaçado com o livre arbítrio (Willkür). Schelling investiga a questão do mal em muitas de suas obras, mas esta tese se centraliza em “Filosofia e religião” (1804), “Investigações filosóficas sobre a essência da liberdade humana e os objetos a ela conexos” (1809) e “Preleções privadas de Stuttgart” (1810). Nessas obras, o mal está imbricado com as questões do fundamento, da liberdade e do livre arbítrio. A redenção humana se efetiva na relação amorosa do homem com Deus. O tema do mal, em Kierkegaard, é abordado, principalmente em “O conceito de angústia” a partir da perspectiva do observador psicológico que adentra na alma humana e ali analisa a possibilidade e a efetivação do mal (pecado hereditário) que acessa em cada indivíduo do mesmo modo como ingressara em Adão, isto é, por meio de um salto. O mal, portanto, se pressupõe a si mesmo. Nesse livro e na obra kierkegaardiana, percorre, do início ao fim, o indivíduo, categoria essencial no pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês. O homem, como indivíduo que é, diante de Deus é sempre culpado. É responsável, por tanto, pelo bem e pelo mal que faz. Sua tarefa será a de edificar-se a partir do fundamento do amor. Nesses três autores, o mal é uma transgressão do homem à sua própria humanidade, transgressão à ordem que deveria ser harmoniosa e que será superada, essa transgressão, em Hegel, pela reconciliação, em Schelling e Kierkegaard, pelo amor que é a prática do bem. / This thesis aims to investigate the question of evil from hegelian, schellinguian and kierkegaardian’s vision, with main reference to the theme of the fall which presupposes an original state of happiness and perfection of human being in Paradise (Gen 3) ) and that was lost in view of transgression to the norm established by God not to eat of the fruit of the good and evil tree. To Hegel, there has never been such original state of happiness and, therefore, both good and evil must be studied from the perspective in which man is inserted, the universal history. The man, according to Hegel, is the spirit and as such, in his origin is still not what he should be because he has no self-consciousness, he is not known as a spirit, so in this record, he is bad, and should make his journey in history to make this, his duty to be, in duality good and evil, and reach the State of reconciliation. For Hegel, if want to stay under the metaphor of paradise, this is an achievement attained by man himself who rises from his state of animality to become effective as spirit. Hegel does not have a specific work on the subject of evil and conciliation, but it is treated in several of his works, most notably in "Phenomenology of Spirit," "Lectures on the philosophy of history" in the Berliners courses of 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compiled in the book "Lectures about philosophy of religion." The evil is entwined with the free will (Willkur). Schelling investigates the question of evil in many of his works, but this thesis centers on "Philosophy and Religion" (1804), "Philosophical Investigations about the essence of human freedom and the objects related to it" (1809) and "Stuttgart private Lectures" (1810). In these works, evil is interwoven with the issues of the plea of freedom and free will. The human redemption is realized in the love relationship with God. The theme of evil, in Kierkegaard, is discussed, especially in "The Concept of Dread," from the perspective of psychological observer that enters in the human soul and there analyzes the possibility and realization of evil (inherited sin) that accesses on every individual in the same way as he started in Adam, i.e. through a jump. Evil, therefore, assumed to himself. In this book and in the Kierkegaardian works, it goes, from beginning to the end, the individual, essential category in Danish philosopher's thought. Man as an individual, in the presence of God is always guilty. He is responsible, consequently, for the good and for the evil that he does. His task will be to build from the basis of love. In these three authors, the evil is a transgression of the man to his humanity itself, transgression to the order that should be harmonious and that will be surpassed. This transgression, in Hegel, for the reconciliation, in Schelling and Kierkegaard, for the love that is the practice of the good.

Esta tese objetiva investigar a questão do mal a partir da visão hegeliana, schellinguiana e kierkegaardiana, tomando como referência principal o tema da queda a qual pressupõe um estado original de felicidade e perfeição do ser humano no paraíso (Gn 3) e que foi perdido em vista da transgressão à norma estabelecida por Deus de não se poder comer do fruto da árvore do bem e do mal. Para Hegel, nunca houve esse estado originário de felicidade, e por isso, tanto o bem quanto o mal devem ser estudados a partir da visão no qual o homem está inserido, a história universal. O homem, segundo Hegel, é espírito e como tal, na sua origem ainda não é o que deve ser, não tem consciência de si, não se sabe como espírito, assim, nesse registro, é mau, e deve fazer o seu percurso na história para efetivar esse seu dever ser, na dualidade bem e mal, e chegar ao estado de reconciliação. Para Hegel, se se quiser ficar no âmbito da metáfora do paraíso, este é uma conquista alcançada pelo próprio homem que se alça de seu estado de animalidade para efetivar-se como espírito. Hegel não tem uma obra especifica sobre o tema do mal e da conciliação, mas ele é tratado em diversas de suas obras, principalmente na “Fenomenologia do espírito”, “Lições sobre a filosofia da história” nos cursos berlinenses de 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compilados na obra “Lições sobre filosofia da religião”. O mal está entrelaçado com o livre arbítrio (Willkür). Schelling investiga a questão do mal em muitas de suas obras, mas esta tese se centraliza em “Filosofia e religião” (1804), “Investigações filosóficas sobre a essência da liberdade humana e os objetos a ela conexos” (1809) e “Preleções privadas de Stuttgart” (1810). Nessas obras, o mal está imbricado com as questões do fundamento, da liberdade e do livre arbítrio. A redenção humana se efetiva na relação amorosa do homem com Deus. O tema do mal, em Kierkegaard, é abordado, principalmente em “O conceito de angústia” a partir da perspectiva do observador psicológico que adentra na alma humana e ali analisa a possibilidade e a efetivação do mal (pecado hereditário) que acessa em cada indivíduo do mesmo modo como ingressara em Adão, isto é, por meio de um salto. O mal, portanto, se pressupõe a si mesmo. Nesse livro e na obra kierkegaardiana, percorre, do início ao fim, o indivíduo, categoria essencial no pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês. O homem, como indivíduo que é, diante de Deus é sempre culpado. É responsável, por tanto, pelo bem e pelo mal que faz. Sua tarefa será a de edificar-se a partir do fundamento do amor. Nesses três autores, o mal é uma transgressão do homem à sua própria humanidade, transgressão à ordem que deveria ser harmoniosa e que será superada, essa transgressão, em Hegel, pela reconciliação, em Schelling e Kierkegaard, pelo amor que é a prática do bem. / This thesis aims to investigate the question of evil from hegelian, schellinguian and kierkegaardian’s vision, with main reference to the theme of the fall which presupposes an original state of happiness and perfection of human being in Paradise (Gen 3) ) and that was lost in view of transgression to the norm established by God not to eat of the fruit of the good and evil tree. To Hegel, there has never been such original state of happiness and, therefore, both good and evil must be studied from the perspective in which man is inserted, the universal history. The man, according to Hegel, is the spirit and as such, in his origin is still not what he should be because he has no self-consciousness, he is not known as a spirit, so in this record, he is bad, and should make his journey in history to make this, his duty to be, in duality good and evil, and reach the State of reconciliation. For Hegel, if want to stay under the metaphor of paradise, this is an achievement attained by man himself who rises from his state of animality to become effective as spirit. Hegel does not have a specific work on the subject of evil and conciliation, but it is treated in several of his works, most notably in "Phenomenology of Spirit," "Lectures on the philosophy of history" in the Berliners courses of 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compiled in the book "Lectures about philosophy of religion." The evil is entwined with the free will (Willkur). Schelling investigates the question of evil in many of his works, but this thesis centers on "Philosophy and Religion" (1804), "Philosophical Investigations about the essence of human freedom and the objects related to it" (1809) and "Stuttgart private Lectures" (1810). In these works, evil is interwoven with the issues of the plea of freedom and free will. The human redemption is realized in the love relationship with God. The theme of evil, in Kierkegaard, is discussed, especially in "The Concept of Dread," from the perspective of psychological observer that enters in the human soul and there analyzes the possibility and realization of evil (inherited sin) that accesses on every individual in the same way as he started in Adam, i.e. through a jump. Evil, therefore, assumed to himself. In this book and in the Kierkegaardian works, it goes, from beginning to the end, the individual, essential category in Danish philosopher's thought. Man as an individual, in the presence of God is always guilty. He is responsible, consequently, for the good and for the evil that he does. His task will be to build from the basis of love. In these three authors, the evil is a transgression of the man to his humanity itself, transgression to the order that should be harmonious and that will be surpassed. This transgression, in Hegel, for the reconciliation, in Schelling and Kierkegaard, for the love that is the practice of the good.

Esta tese objetiva investigar a questão do mal a partir da visão hegeliana, schellinguiana e kierkegaardiana, tomando como referência principal o tema da queda a qual pressupõe um estado original de felicidade e perfeição do ser humano no paraíso (Gn 3) e que foi perdido em vista da transgressão à norma estabelecida por Deus de não se poder comer do fruto da árvore do bem e do mal. Para Hegel, nunca houve esse estado originário de felicidade, e por isso, tanto o bem quanto o mal devem ser estudados a partir da visão no qual o homem está inserido, a história universal. O homem, segundo Hegel, é espírito e como tal, na sua origem ainda não é o que deve ser, não tem consciência de si, não se sabe como espírito, assim, nesse registro, é mau, e deve fazer o seu percurso na história para efetivar esse seu dever ser, na dualidade bem e mal, e chegar ao estado de reconciliação. Para Hegel, se se quiser ficar no âmbito da metáfora do paraíso, este é uma conquista alcançada pelo próprio homem que se alça de seu estado de animalidade para efetivar-se como espírito. Hegel não tem uma obra especifica sobre o tema do mal e da conciliação, mas ele é tratado em diversas de suas obras, principalmente na “Fenomenologia do espírito”, “Lições sobre a filosofia da história” nos cursos berlinenses de 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compilados na obra “Lições sobre filosofia da religião”. O mal está entrelaçado com o livre arbítrio (Willkür). Schelling investiga a questão do mal em muitas de suas obras, mas esta tese se centraliza em “Filosofia e religião” (1804), “Investigações filosóficas sobre a essência da liberdade humana e os objetos a ela conexos” (1809) e “Preleções privadas de Stuttgart” (1810). Nessas obras, o mal está imbricado com as questões do fundamento, da liberdade e do livre arbítrio. A redenção humana se efetiva na relação amorosa do homem com Deus. O tema do mal, em Kierkegaard, é abordado, principalmente em “O conceito de angústia” a partir da perspectiva do observador psicológico que adentra na alma humana e ali analisa a possibilidade e a efetivação do mal (pecado hereditário) que acessa em cada indivíduo do mesmo modo como ingressara em Adão, isto é, por meio de um salto. O mal, portanto, se pressupõe a si mesmo. Nesse livro e na obra kierkegaardiana, percorre, do início ao fim, o indivíduo, categoria essencial no pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês. O homem, como indivíduo que é, diante de Deus é sempre culpado. É responsável, por tanto, pelo bem e pelo mal que faz. Sua tarefa será a de edificar-se a partir do fundamento do amor. Nesses três autores, o mal é uma transgressão do homem à sua própria humanidade, transgressão à ordem que deveria ser harmoniosa e que será superada, essa transgressão, em Hegel, pela reconciliação, em Schelling e Kierkegaard, pelo amor que é a prática do bem. / This thesis aims to investigate the question of evil from hegelian, schellinguian and kierkegaardian’s vision, with main reference to the theme of the fall which presupposes an original state of happiness and perfection of human being in Paradise (Gen 3) ) and that was lost in view of transgression to the norm established by God not to eat of the fruit of the good and evil tree. To Hegel, there has never been such original state of happiness and, therefore, both good and evil must be studied from the perspective in which man is inserted, the universal history. The man, according to Hegel, is the spirit and as such, in his origin is still not what he should be because he has no self-consciousness, he is not known as a spirit, so in this record, he is bad, and should make his journey in history to make this, his duty to be, in duality good and evil, and reach the State of reconciliation. For Hegel, if want to stay under the metaphor of paradise, this is an achievement attained by man himself who rises from his state of animality to become effective as spirit. Hegel does not have a specific work on the subject of evil and conciliation, but it is treated in several of his works, most notably in "Phenomenology of Spirit," "Lectures on the philosophy of history" in the Berliners courses of 1821, 1824, 1827 e 1831, compiled in the book "Lectures about philosophy of religion." The evil is entwined with the free will (Willkur). Schelling investigates the question of evil in many of his works, but this thesis centers on "Philosophy and Religion" (1804), "Philosophical Investigations about the essence of human freedom and the objects related to it" (1809) and "Stuttgart private Lectures" (1810). In these works, evil is interwoven with the issues of the plea of freedom and free will. The human redemption is realized in the love relationship with God. The theme of evil, in Kierkegaard, is discussed, especially in "The Concept of Dread," from the perspective of psychological observer that enters in the human soul and there analyzes the possibility and realization of evil (inherited sin) that accesses on every individual in the same way as he started in Adam, i.e. through a jump. Evil, therefore, assumed to himself. In this book and in the Kierkegaardian works, it goes, from beginning to the end, the individual, essential category in Danish philosopher's thought. Man as an individual, in the presence of God is always guilty. He is responsible, consequently, for the good and for the evil that he does. His task will be to build from the basis of love. In these three authors, the evil is a transgression of the man to his humanity itself, transgression to the order that should be harmonious and that will be surpassed. This transgression, in Hegel, for the reconciliation, in Schelling and Kierkegaard, for the love that is the practice of the good.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdorales, 2015-2016 / Le présent mémoire a pour objet la métaphysique du mal sous-jacente au système de la liberté élaboré par Schelling en 1809 dans son dernier traité intitulé Recherches philosophiques sur l’essence de la liberté humaine et les sujets qui s’y rattachent. Il sera question, dans un premier temps, pour pouvoir aborder ces Recherches dans leur juste perspective, d’une reconstruction du problème de l’identité de l’identité et de la différence basées sur les principaux textes de la philosophie de l’Identité de Schelling, et ce dans la mesure où ce problème sous-tend les enjeux liés au système de la liberté. Dans un second temps, nous aborderons le système de la liberté en montrant que la différence finie est pensée en 1809 comme liberté humaine pour le bien et pour le mal. Cette détermination de la différence nous acheminera enfin, dans un troisième temps, vers la métaphysique du mal que Schelling conçoit alors comme une théodicée. L’enjeu sera dès lors de rapporter cette différence, la liberté humaine comme pouvoir du bien et du mal, à l’Identité, au système, à Dieu.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1716.pdf: 531315 bytes, checksum: 80ad12e3b9add2d71c45a8170d033728 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / In the Destruction of Reason, from 1953, Georg Lukács plays several thinkers as philosophics idealizers of german way to Hitler. This work has as purpose to show such reading as a mistake. Another moment, through a deviation about the Hungarian author s trajectory, shows also that there is a transformation in the writing style after his convertion on the communist party in 1918, wich emphasires mainly after the thirties, in it s soviet period. On the other hand, shows also that during Lukács last years there is an effort to revise mistakes of the past / Em A Destruição da Razão, de 1953, Georg Lukács interpreta diversos pensadores como idealizadores filosóficos do caminho alemão até Hitler. Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar tal leitura como um equívoco. Noutro momento, através de uma digressão sobre a trajetória do autor húngaro, mostra também que há uma transformação no estilo da escrita após sua conversão ao partido comunista em 1918, que se acentua principalmente após os anos 30, em seu período soviético. Por outro lado, mostra também que nos últimos anos de vida de Lukács há um esforço para corrigir os erros do passado