A central question of political philosophy is this: What does justice demand of us, politically and economically? What is the just way to select our political leaders, arrange the institutions of government, and distribute wealth and income? I argue that justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve, and in the political and economic realms these deserts are usually grounded in merit. This foundational principle of meritocracy can command support across ideological lines and is deeply intuitive--as empirical research demonstrates. When it comes time to distribute a scarce resource, so long as we are free of merit-distorting biases and fair equality of opportunity has prevailed, it is hard to see, ultimately speaking, what principle other than merit could possibly guide us. Meritocracy is an alternative to the theories of justice that have dominated the debate. Egalitarians tend to think that the "fortune" of our genetic and social circumstances precludes the possibility of deserving anything at all. Libertarians rely on the free market to distribute wealth and income, but the market produces gargantuan inequalities which fail to give people what they deserve. The egalitarian and the libertarian are wrong. There is a third, better way to arrange political society--a way in which merit is the centerpiece. In Chapter One I lay the conceptual foundation for my meritocratic theory of justice. Chapter Two is my argument for meritocratic politics. Political influence ought to be wielded by people on the basis of their political knowledge--not on the basis of their popularity, or their wealth, or other irrelevant factors. In Chapter Three I consider the compatibility of meritocracy and public reason. Chapter Four is devoted to distributive justice. I argue that economic reward ought to turn on merit-based contributions to productivity, and that we should commit ourselves to establishing equality of opportunity and fighting the pernicious influences of inherited wealth, pedigree, nepotism, and cronyism. Chapter Five is an independent, epistemic argument for meritocracy. I conclude, in Chapter Six, by considering whether there are fundamental principles of justice other than desert and by providing some public policy recommendations. / acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

My thesis is a series of 9 compositions. Pieces include the following solos: cello (Passage), piano, viola (Elegy), and flute (Stream Solo). The ensemble pieces are as follows: Vale - Flute, viola, cello, Piano; Stream Ensemble - Flute, Violin, Cello, Piano, Soprano; Around the Bend Percussion Trio - 3 snare drums, bass drum, floor tom, conga, crotales, wood block, cymbal; Steps - Clarinet and Piano; Pierrot Ensemble - clarinet, flute, piano, soprano, cello, violin / acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

This thesis explores the current divide in the LGBTI or queer social movement industry in Santiago de Chile. Based on field interviews with Chilean activists in June 2013, it argues that the deployment and maintenance of hegemonic masculinity is ultimately at the root of the fissure. The introduction provides a brief history of the movement in Chile since the 1970's, as well as short introductions to each of the six social movement organizations in the study. Chapter 1 problematizes the recent rapid lexical change in which the term diversidad has come to mean `gay,' as well as it impact on social movement framing tactics, providing evidence of a nascent diversidad frame that has been coopted by hegemonically masculine actors. Chapter 2 explores the politics surrounding the passage of Chile's Ley Antidiscriminación and the murder of Daniel Zamudio, arguing that certain social movement actors deployed hegemonic masculinity to seize and maintain control of both the media frenzy and the passage of the law. Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes the ongoing fight for same-sex partnership recognition in Chile by problematizing the fight for the proposed Acuerdo de Vida en Pareja as well as marriage equality, arguing that these issues represent the interests of hegemonically masculine voices within the movement above all others. / acase@tulane.edu

Scholars have often viewed nation and diaspora as opposing concepts. Such a binary perception is not useful for the establishment of a harmonious nation where multi-diasporic groups are compelled to cohabit. This study attempts to reconcile nation and diaspora. Reading Earl Lovelace’s fiction, I argue that in ethnically diverse countries like Trinidad, migrant populations can maintain their specific diasporic identities and still come together as a nation. Trinidad is inhabited by diasporas and its various people should be seen as such. In this study, the main diasporas in Trinidad include Afro-Trinidadians, Indo-Trinidadians, and white Creoles. Other minor diasporic groups include the Chinese, the Lebanese, and Syrians. The diasporic conception of Trinidad, where the original natives are a small minority, helps to ward off any autochthonous, indigenous and tribal territorial claims that potentially disrupt the social fabric. I argue that the promotion of diasporic consciousness can be a sine qua non pathway towards the formation of a consolidated multi-ethnic island of Trinidad. In practical terms, this means that the different diasporas in Trinidad are likely to come together if they are allowed to revitalize homeland cultures as they contribute to the national space. This study traces the evolution of Lovelace’s nationalist discourse, which progresses from a focus on the Afro-Caribbean male diaspora to an incorporation of other diasporas as well as women, as he imaginatively figures the future of the Trinidadian nation. This shift underscores Lovelace’s growing self-consciousness about the imperative to negotiate and reconstruct ethnic and gender identities in order to create a diverse Trinidadian nation. / acase@tulane.edu

While "philosophical counseling" emerged in the 1980's as a new form of caretaking practice, it can be understood as an attempt to re-embrace a tradition that goes back to the ancients, with their conception of philosophy as a "way of life." This study discusses elements of that tradition in order to provide a theoretical-historical framework for the modern practice of philosophical counseling. The central figure for this philosophic tradition is Socrates. The present study focuses on his notion of the "the examined life," while considering some doctrines in Hellenistic philosophy as further expressions of the Socratic tradition. As represented in the Platonic dialogues, Socrates exhibits "the examined life" by engaging in the practice of philosophy as some kind of "care of the soul." Though he speaks on occasion of the "conversion" that may be required for the commitment to this philosophic practice, it is carried out, in dialogical settings, through the rational-cognition dimension of reason and argument, undertaken with a basic critical stance. This is fundamental for differentiating philosophy from psychotherapeutic practices and highlights the unique value that philosophy may be able to contribute to caretaking practices. This dissertation has a synoptic character: it seeks to integrate a self-reflection on the philosophic tradition with a concern for issues present in the contemporary field of caretaking. For those broad purposes, the interpretation of ancient philosophy relies mainly on the scholarly work by G. Vlastos, M. Nussbaum, M. Foucault, and P. Hadot. With their guidance, the dissertation addresses one question in general: What was present in classical philosophy as a way of life with therapeutic aims that is absent in today's dominant practices of care for the person? / acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu