Le nationalisme peut-il être envisagé comme un simple instrument de légitimation ?Cette thèse répond à cette question en se penchant sur un nationalisme particulier à une époque donnée, celui du moldovénisme du Parti des Communistes de République de Moldavie au pouvoir dans ce pays entre 2001 et 2009.<p><p>Sur base d’un cadre théorique mettant en avant les théories de Hermet, Greenfeld, Brass, Breuilly, Hobsbawm, Calhoun et Brubaker, le nationalisme est envisagé comme un discours et la réponse à la question centrale de recherche a été donnée suivant une méthode influencée par l’Analyse critique de Discours, telle qu’élaborée notamment par Wodak. Après une mise en contexte problématisée, reprenant les divers projets nationaux ayant été historiquement mis en place en Moldavie, une recherche empirique a été effectuée :la construction discursive de la nation a été étudiée, premièrement, dans les discours des présidents de la république, Vladimir Voronine entre 2001 et 2009 et Mihai Ghimpu entre 2009 et 2010 ;deuxièmement, dans les discours des partis politiques à l’occasion d’une campagne électorale en 2009 ;et troisièmement, dans les articles de presse qui traitent de la participation du pays au Concours Eurovision de la Chanson entre 2004 et 2010.<p><p>Cette recherche montre empiriquement que le nationalisme est principalement une affaire de « politique », selon l’expression de Breuilly, qu’il est utilisé par les acteurs en fonction d’un intérêt de préserver ou de conquérir le pouvoir. Les acteurs créent une nation ad hoc et en usent en fonction du contexte dans lequel leur lutte s’inscrit et en fonction de l’électorat à convaincre. Néanmoins, cet usage politique de la nation n’est pas le fait de l’ensemble des acteurs étudiés :les journalistes, même proches des acteurs politiques étudiés, esquissent une conception « primordiale » de la nation. Par ailleurs, la recherche montre empiriquement que le moldovénisme, comme tout nationalisme, est forcément exclusif, le « nous » se construisant implicitement et explicitement contre un « autre ». <p><p><p><p>Can nationalism be seen as a mere instrument of legitimation? The dissertation addresses this issue by focusing on a particular nationalism in a given period, the ‘Moldovanism’ of the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova in power in this country between 2001 and 2009.<p><p>The theoretical framework of the research takes into account the theories of Hermet, Greenfeld, Brass, Breuilly, Hobsbawm, Calhoun, and Brubaker. Following these authors, nationalism is considered as a discourse, and the answer to the main research question has been given by using a methodology inspired by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis. Before proceeding to the empirical research, the dissertation shows the various national projects that have historically been implemented in Moldova. On this basis, the discursive construction of nationhood has been studied among three different sources :first, the speeches of two presidents of the republic, Vladimir Voronin between 2001 and 2009 and Mihai Ghimpu between 2009 and 2010 ;second, the speeches of political parties during an election campaign in 2009 ;and third, press articles dealing with the country's participation to the Eurovision Song Contest between 2004 and 2010.<p><p>The dissertation shows empirically that nationalism is primarily a matter of ‘politics’, to quote Breuilly. Nationalism is used by actors trying to preserve or gain power. These actors create an ad hoc nation and make use of it depending on the context in which they struggle and depending on the need to convince an electorate. Nevertheless, all the actors taken into consideration in the research do not exhibit this political use of the nation: the journalists, even close to the political actors who were studied, prove a ‘primordial’ conception of the nation. Moreover, the research shows empirically that Moldovanism, like any other nationalism, is necessarily exclusive. ‘We’ is indeed implicitly and explicitly constructed against an ‘other’.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

« Résistances à l’Europe. La représentation sociale de l’Union européenne et les compétences politiques étudiées dans le milieu des entreprises tchèques » analyses political attitudes, social representations of Europe and European Union as well as a level of political competency among persons working in Czech entreprises (from workers to the top management). The first volume emphasizes a theoretical discussion about a concept of « Resistances to European Union » as it has been discussed since the late nineties of the twentieth century up to the 2010. We set a link between individual perceptions of political and social change as well as the importance of cultural differences to apparition of phenomena of resistance. A political competency plays a major role in an individual capacity to deal with cultural difference in changing political environment.<p>The second volume describes principal results of analysis of interviews issued from qualitative research between 90 individuals. We focus on explication of cultural and individual context that contributes to the formulation of Czech political attitudes toward Europe. A very detailed individual analysis helps to understand the reason of Czech reticences toward a process of the European integration at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We show four groups of tensions (antinomies) in social representations that actually constitute dynamic elements for political attitudes. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Dans notre thèse de doctorat, nous avons cherché à tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’enjeu européen constituerait, en France, l’épicentre d’une "actualisation" — pour partie assumée, pour partie occultée — de la pensée du juriste allemand Carl Schmitt. Les réflexions politico-philosophiques de Schmitt représentent en soi un assemblage rhétorique et systématique puissant, aisément mobilisable dans le cadre des débats théoriques sur la construction européenne, afin de battre en brèche les affirmations néo-cosmopolitiques, que l’on soit de droite ou de gauche. Il s’est agi, pour nous, de vérifier jusqu’à quel point la pensée politique du juriste se retrouvait "recyclée" dans le débat français contemporain relatif à l’idée d’Europe. Était ainsi ouverte l’opportunité d’évaluer, de manière systématique, la facticité ou la pertinence d’une antinomie :une Europe schmittienne contre une Europe kantienne. Dans un premier temps, nous avons tâché de reconstruire ce que fut la position schmittienne concernant la gestion de l’espace européen, avant d’évaluer, dans un second temps, l’impact causé par une telle pensée sur les réflexions qui animent le débat français contemporain.<p>La première partie de la thèse visait à rendre compte de la vision schmittienne de l’Europe. Schmitt a pensé la décision politique en des termes statonationaux :l’ordre juridique étatique serait modelé sur la base de la nature axiologique et culturelle de l’amitié politique, de la communauté des citoyens soudés par un seul et même critère d’appartenance, souvent religieux ;critère qui précéderait la nationalité et la réalisation "politique". Il s’ensuit que l’ordre mondial ne peut se présenter que sous la forme d’un pluriversum d’États, animés dans leurs relations mutuelles par la dynamique de l’ami et de l’ennemi. Le libéralisme et le pluralisme provoqueraient des regroupements fonctionnels, dont le pan-européisme serait l’une des manifestations les plus visibles, à l’origine d’un sapement du politique et de l’unité souveraine de l’État. Quatre points analytiques permettent d’expliquer l’appréhension schmittienne de la gestion juridico-politique du Vieux Continent :l’indissociabilité du couple conceptuel État-politique, l’idée que la nation demeure l’horizon indépassable de la démocratie, la critique de la notion d’humanité et de toute morale universelle, et l’idée que le droit serait nécessairement d’origine politique, donc particulariste.<p>En France, l’intérêt pour l’œuvre de Schmitt s’est largement accru ces dernières années. Le débat théorique actuel autour du problème de la construction européenne offre d’ailleurs une place particulière à la réactivation de l’argumentaire schmittien statocentré, antilibéral et culturaliste. À gauche comme à droite de l’échiquier politique, intellectuels et philosophes mobilisent raisonnements et schémas discursifs, tantôt réclamés de Schmitt, tantôt très proches des arguments du juriste de Plettenberg. En passant en revue les réflexions d’auteurs aussi différents qu’Étienne Balibar et Pierre Manent, Alain de Benoist et Marcel Gauchet, Daniel Bensaïd et Pierre-André Taguieff, nous avons tenté d’approcher et de rendre compte de la pluralité des emprunts à la pensée de Schmitt et à son appréhension de l’ordre européen, dans le cadre des discussions françaises relatives à l’intégration régionale européenne. Chez certains de ces auteurs, la construction européenne apparaît comme la manifestation avancée d’un phénomène général de dilution du politique. Autrement dit, elle incarnerait un idéal de société qui ramène le politique au niveau du marché. Pour d’autres, Carl Schmitt aurait diagnostiqué mieux que quiconque la mort du droit des gens européen et les travers de l’universalisme abstrait que brandirait l’Union européenne en expansion. Par ailleurs, la théorisation schmittienne de la souveraineté constituerait une référence incontournable pour éclairer les thématiques actuelles relatives à une mutation des niveaux de pouvoir.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse se propose de répondre à la question suivante: quels sont les facteurs qui influencent les décisions stratégiques de la politique étrangère roumaine? Il y a trois séries de facteurs qui ont été considérées. La première concerne les facteurs liées aux héritages historiques, qui sont examinés sous le double aspect des évènements concrets et des mentalités. La deuxième série de facteurs se réfère aux influences internes sur la prise des décisions: architecture institutionnelle et légale, partage des compétences, relations informelles entre les détenteurs des fonctions relevantes pour la politique étrangère roumaine, partis politiques et opinion publique. Finalement, la troisième série de variables concerne les facteurs externes au système politique. Deux dimensions sont ici examinées: une dimension géopolitique, qui vise la distribution de la puissance, et une dimension institutionnelle, qui détermine le poids des organisations internationales et régionales dans la prise des décisions. / Doctorat en sciences politiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse envisage la mondialisation de l'espace artistique sous l'angle des représentations et des valeurs de l'art qui soutiennent le phénomène et lui donnent forme. Cette problématique est abordée au travers du cas de l' "art contemporain africain", des disputes et des controverses dont il est l'objet. Parce que ces dernières se manifestent principalement à l'occasion de grandes expositions et de biennales d'art contemporain en Europe comme en Afrique, elles constituent les terrains d'enquête de la recherche. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The internationalisation of society over the last century has promoted the idea of a global community aspiring to common human rights and values. It is in this context of evolution of human rights that "child trafficking" was consolidated as an international legal category through the United Nations Palermo Protocol (2000). The majority of countries in the world have adapted this definition in their national law, and regional regimes have emerged, with the aim of harmonising legislation and fostering cooperation between states. However, 20 years after this effervescence in favour of anti-trafficking policies, we are largely faced with a failure: while many laws and public policies have been created, few children have been "rescued" from trafficking. Even less in a sustainable way. This raises the question of what is at work for these "victimized" children, as they become subjects of governance and objects of control. What effects does the legal norm of child trafficking, and the policies and institutions that flow from it, have on the children they are supposed to protect?Drawing on research conducted in the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the results of this research suggest that child traffickees are caught in cycles of increasing vulnerability, with little hope of escaping from them in the current state of affairs. Indeed, the economic, political and social structures on which our institutions are based produce structural violence against these children, even though they are targeted by protective measures. Paradoxically, the governments and international bodies that are most active in eliminating child trafficking are also the most powerful drivers of the system that produces the machinery of structural violence and child trafficking. Part 1 of the thesis examines the construction of the child trafficking norm. How do governance structures at the international, regional and national levels constitute, support and disseminate the norm of child trafficking (Section 1)? We will analyse the construction of an international prohibition system based on multiple legal categories and old and disparate moral, political and social norms (Chapter 1). While “child trafficking” is generally read as a norm with fixed content with minimal variations related to the legal context, we argue here that the complexities and subtleties of the norm and the policies that flow from it can only be understood when child trafficking is seen as a cluster of norms. This cluster is subject to adaptations by international, transnational, regional and local actors, who make it an object of negotiation and cooperation, constantly transforming the boundaries of the concept as they use it (Chapter 2).As such, discourses, institutions, and the performances of stakeholders have a determining importance in the constitution of the child trafficking apparatus. Part 2 therefore seeks to examine what happens to trafficked children when, in the name of their protection, they become subjects of governance. Through an analysis of specific the two apparatus that govern anti-trafficking - migration and protection - we will demonstrate the mechanisms of structural violence at work and the inherent contradictions that block effective protection of trafficked children (Section 2). Drawing on Foucaultian analyses of biopower, Chapter 3 will show the functioning of mechanisms that ”let die” child victims of trafficking within the protection system. Despite the existence of elaborate protection systems to protect minors from all forms of exploitation and abuse, in the case of child victims of human trafficking, it must be noted that the system is often powerless to lift them out of these situations, even often unwittingly increasing their vulnerability (Chapter 4). Section 3 examines the role of the private sector in the dynamics of child trafficking, whether as a trafficking actor or as a partner of public authorities through the delegation of anti-trafficking powers. These migrant children are caught up in global migration flows, largely orchestrated according to North-South distributive logics, which are partly linked to production models. Some trafficked children are caught up in these market logics, and at the same time are confronted with a criminalisation of migration, which places them in a doubly victimizing position (chapter 5). In order to be effective in combating child trafficking, an increasing number of countries are moving from incentive systems (e.g. the UN Global Compact) to legal frameworks that require companies to take part in anti-trafficking policies in their production chains. Some initiatives are promising, and progress is to be welcomed at the level of " Tier 1 " providers in some MNEs (Chapter 5). However, further down the supply chains, there is evidence of a levelling down or even a risk of accelerated operations due to "blue washing" practices and increased pressure being transferred to suppliers (Chapter 6).The thesis concludes that there is structural violence against exploited children in the EU and ASEAN by the very institutions dedicated to their protection. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Electoral systems have an enormous importance on how political power is distributed, on governability and the dynamics of representation of any given democratic society. Political science has traditionally considered electoral systems to be stable institutions and has paid more attention to understand how political parties adapt to the electoral rules than to how “electoral institutions themselves are adapted by political parties” (Benoit 2004). However, given their importance, unveiling the factors that influence the change and the choice of electoral rules is crucial and an increasing number of studies has addressed the issue since the 1990s. <p>This dissertation lies at the crossroads between traditional explanations of the stability of electoral systems and the more recent interpretations of electoral system change. Through three empirical parts, this thesis shows how these literatures are reconcilable and complementary. This study encompasses a comprehensive set of explicative factors at the micro, meso and macro levels that shed light on the incentives and barriers to reform electoral systems. Methodologically, the large-N approach of this thesis goes beyond the usual case studies and small-N analyses that characterize the field of electoral system change. Besides, the consideration of cases of reforms and cases of stability contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of electoral system change. While traditional accounts of electoral system change are predominantly based on political parties’ self-interest, this study demonstrates that the context matters. In this regard, this dissertation has three main findings. <p>Firstly, this study calls into question the body of literature addressing the change of electoral institutions by analyzing the impact of different barriers in the success of reform debates. At the party level, it shows how intraparty division can constitute an important factor to explain institutional inertia. The analysis is based on the responses of Irish Members of Parliament (Teachtaí Dala, or TDs) to a number of survey items designed to measure their evaluations of the current electoral system. The study discusses how the heterogeneity of preferences within parties over this issue may act as a barrier for reform. Besides, at the micro level, it sheds light on the determinants of individuals’ incentives to support reform. Beyond the classical power-seeking motivations, individual legislators also appear to be driven by values and attitudes about the quality of democracy.<p>Secondly, this thesis focuses on institutional contexts. This study analyzes the capacity of institutions to deter reforms using empirical evidence of the occurrence of reforms and the duration of electoral systems in 17 European countries. Drawing on Lijphart’s framework of the patterns of democracy, this research analyzes the extent to which the elements that differentiate between majoritarian and consensus democracies can hinder electoral reforms. On the one hand, it shows the impact of individual institutions on the occurrence of reform and the duration of electoral systems. It demonstrates that higher numbers of veto players, more proportional electoral systems, limited vested interests of the incumbent parties, constitutional rigidity and the existence of judicial review can reduce the likelihood of reform. On the other hand, this study demonstrates that the different combinations of institutional elements provide important explanatory leverage on the duration of electoral systems. In this regard, contrary to what is often assumed, it is shown that the occurrence of electoral reforms is linked to the incumbents’ capacity to develop their preferred policies. Those systems in which power is more concentrated, that is majoritarian systems, appear to be those in which electoral systems reforms are more frequent. <p>Finally, the thesis explores the impact of external shocks on the likelihood of reform. On the basis of an analysis of a dataset of electoral reforms that have been enacted in Europe since 1945, this study demonstrates that economic crises and citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy are related to the introduction of electoral reforms. However, the mechanism is mediated by the existence of new parties that capitalize on this dissatisfaction and that can threaten the established parties. In these circumstances, restrictive reforms – those that aim at hindering the entry of new parties - are more likely to be introduced, though too late to prevent the entry of these newcomers.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Within the literature devoted to the study of political parties, scholars have recently directed more attention towards intraparty dynamics. The ‘party as a unitary actor’ assumption seems to have withered away in the last decades. The party is increasingly viewed as a heterogeneous entity, in which dissenting attitudes are frequent. Yet the causes of intraparty dissensions remain quite obscure. This dissertation aims at providing a better understanding of the causes of dissent within parties, especially within parliamentary party groups. <p><p>Intraparty conflicts, dissent or ‘voice’ phenomena have been studied through different literatures that have developed independently from each other: studies dealing with party factionalism, social-psychological and economic theories of organizations (e.g. Hirschman’s trilogy of exit, voice and loyalty), and legislative studies dealing with parliamentary party voting unity. The dissertation attempts to (re)conciliate these separate literatures, and shows how legislative studies, factionalism literature and theories of organizations can help to rethink the concept of dissent, and to grasp why parliamentarians are more or less likely to dissent from their party line. <p><p>The dissertation defines dissent in the parliamentary party as a two-dimensional concept, and operationalizes it as the MP’s frequency of disagreement with her/his party and the MP’s attitude of (non)loyalty in case of such disagreement. At the theoretical level, the dissertation draws on several theoretical approaches –institutional, rational and sociological– and formulates a broad set of hypotheses linking system-, party- and individual-level factors to these two dimensions of dissent. At the empirical level, the dissertation analyzes the causes of dissent within parliamentary parties in a comparative perspective. The analysis examines parliamentarians’ attitudes across 15 European national parliaments and tests the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical part by using the PARTIREP MP Survey dataset. <p><p>The results first show that, while European parliamentary parties are usually viewed as united blocks in terms of voting behavior, looking at MPs’ attitudes provides a more nuanced picture: European parliamentary parties show important variations in their MPs’ frequency of disagreement and attitudes of non-loyalty. Among the factors that explain these variations, both institutional (electoral rules, state structure, effective number of parties, intraparty organization) and sociological (gender, age, socialization, ideological preferences) factors need to be considered. In addition, the research shows that the two dimensions of dissent, though they are connected by a sequential relationship, should be studied distinctly, as different factors affect them respectively. The frequency of disagreement is best explained by the MP’s gender and previous elected office at a lower level than the national one, by the ideological distance between the MP and her/his party’s position in interaction with the party ‘family’, and by intraparty organizational factors (candidate selection procedures and EPO-PPO power balance). Non-loyalty depends more on the institutional structure (multilevel vs. unitary state, ENP) and on the candidate-centeredness of the electoral system; but is also affected by individual-level factors (age and length of incumbency) and by the party ‘family’. On the whole, by contrast to what is usually argued, ‘the party’ matters’ in determining the level of intraparty cohesion: the impact of intraparty organizational structure and party ideology or family is determinant, but more research is definitely needed in order to disentangle the ‘organizational’ vs. the ‘ideological’ effects.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Most recent literature that analyzes parties from an organizational perspective focuses often on the concepts of intra-party democracy and party organizational democratization (Scarrow, 1999a; Scarrow and Kittilson, 2003; LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2002; Bosco and Morlino, 2007). Le Duc (2001) and Rahat and Hazan (2007) underline that the most used instrument for implementing this ‘democratization’ process is the enhancement of the inclusiveness of the methods for candidate and party leadership selection. The actors endowed with candidate and leader selection powers are the central actors in the functioning of the party according to many authors (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Marsh 1993; Massari, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). At the moment, the most inclusive method identified by the literature for selecting candidates for elections or the party leader is represented by party open or closed primaries, i.e. internal direct elections by party members and, in the case of open primaries, supporters and voters (Cross and Blais, 2011; Kenig, 2009b).<p>In this study, we explore two specific dimensions of party politics: membership and internal activisms, on the one hand, and on the other hand the internal democratization processes and in particular those dealing with broadening the inclusiveness of leadership selection procedures. Therefore, this study integrates in particular the debate on the nature and consequences of party organizational democratization. The debate finds its origins both in the influential work of Michels on the “iron law of oligarchy” thesis but has been more recently boosted by the theories of May (1973), Mair (1994) and also the studies on intra-party democracy in the British Labour (Shaw, 1994; Russell, 2005).<p>However, we are interested in the point of view of members themselves on the consequences of internal democratization. We are interested on how members perceive these organizational changes, in whether they are frustrated form the actual consequences on their role and powers and whether they perceive them as a potential threat that could undermine their organizational position within the party. In order to respond to the debate on the consequences of intra-party democracy at individual level, we rely mainly on three questions. The main research questions of this study are thus the following: to what extent party organizational changes in the sense of greater democratization affect the membership role at individual level? How are these organizational changes perceived by members? To what extent members’ perceptions of their own role affect their behaviors and in particular their internal activism?<p>The aim of this study, thus, is to empirically assess the impact on members’ activism of party internal democratization and in particular of the perception of membership role. We are interested in whether party members’ attitudes are changing as a result of parties’ organizational changes, particularly if these changes are giving members more say over outcomes. This is a study of how (and whether) perceived roles affect behaviour. The independent variable is constituted by the members’ perception of their own role within party organizational structures and in particular with regard to the leadership selection methods, whilst the dependent variable is represented by the level of activism of party members, in terms of participation to party activities in general. In fact, the impact of party rules at individual level will be addressed, as well as how the perception of organizational rules affects individual attitudes and behaviors. In particular, the focus is on leadership selection methods that integrate party members at some point in the overall process (Lisi, 2009), such as direct elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). The case selection is thus implemented on the basis of the research question: the comparison is developed across parties (and not across time) using different instruments for enhancing intra-party democracy.<p>Therefore, we analyze the role perception, attitudes and behaviors of grass-roots members of three contemporary Western European parties: the Belgian French-speaking socialist party (Parti Socialiste, PS), the British Labour and the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). Among the selected parties, one (PD) holds primaries open to all voters for selecting their leader and one (Belgian PS), on the contrary, has chosen the closed primary (OMOV) system. The British Labour Party uses an electoral college for electing its leader since 1981. The Electoral College method refers to a system in which specific groups are allocated a specific share of the leadership vote. In the case of the UK Labour, the votes are equally divided among its constituency members, the parliamentary caucus and the trade union members.<p>Concerning the first research question of our study, our empirical results underline that in the three selected cases organizational changes affect indeed the membership role at individual level and that grass-root members perceive very clearly this impact on their status and organizational rights, obligations and privileges. When grass-roots members evaluate their role within the party, in particular with regard to the procedure for selecting the leader and the involvement of non-members and passive members within party organization, their perceptions take into account their organizational power as defined, among other factors, also by their share of votes in leadership selection. Thus, we expect that PD members perceive their role as more blurred than Labour members and particularly than PS members. In the case of parties, such as the PS, adopting direct elections of the party leader only by the affiliates, the majority of the members are expected to perceive clearly the distinction of the position, privileges and functions between members and non-members and the extensive role reserved for the affiliates.<p>Our data show that the perception of own role vary among members, but also that many members perceive their own role as being rather blurred. They display in fact nuanced but generally negative attitudes towards the integration of voters and supporters within the selection of party leader. On the basis of our survey data, the observed variation in the perception of membership role within and between the three parties seems to correspond to what we expected. A higher proportion of PD surveyed members declare to perceive their role as blurred, while smaller proportions of PS and particularly labour respondents share this evaluation. In general, our data confirm that party members do not evaluate positively the fact that these formal privileges are extended not only to all individual members, not only to activists but even to passive ones, but also to party voters and supporters. Mair’s “activists’ disempowerment” thesis (Mair, 1994) seems to be supported by our data, at least in terms of individual perceptions.<p>Moreover, our data show that the degree of satisfaction with intra-party democracy significantly vary among parties and is generally not nearly as high as could be expected on the basis of party politics literature. If in the British Labour survey the responses of grass-roots members seem to form a more positive picture, with a great majority of member declaring that the party leader is not too powerful, the level of dissatisfaction with party functioning is rather higher in the other two parties. Nevertheless, PS members are fairly more convinced than PS members that the party internal decision-making is democratic. This is what we expected to find on the basis of our first hypothesis. In fact, our first hypothesis postulated that the perception of the role of party membership by affiliates in terms of (lack of) distinction between members and non-members affects inversely their level of satisfaction with the internal functioning of the party and their degree of perceived political efficacy. The stronger the perception of the blurred role of membership, the lower will be the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party. According to our data, among PD members the perception of the blurred, undefined role of members is rather high and so is the degree of dissatisfaction with intra-party functioning. On the contrary, within the other two parties and especially within the Labour, the role perception by grass-roots members is rather positive and well-defined and the level of specific support for the party is also higher.<p>The expectations formulated on the basis of our first hypothesis appear to be supported by the empirical data also with regard to the variations in the sense of external political efficacy of members. Our data seem consistent with the hypothesis, developed by several scholars (Katz and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2009), that expanding the leadership selectorate and granting formal powers to party members and supporters may hide, on the other hand, the perception by enrolled members to be actually loosing power. On the basis of our data, it is possible to assert that grass-roots members seem to be aware of the possibility of a trade-off between extreme inclusiveness of decision-making procedures and actual centralization of organizational power in the hands of party elites.<p>With regard to the third research question of this study, our results confirm that indeed members’ perceptions of their own role, in relation to internal democratization, affect their behaviors and in particular their internal participation. The three parties appear to have different features in terms of internal activism, at aggregate but in particular at individual level. Secondly, not only the overall level of intra-party activism of grass-roots members vary between and within the three selected parties, but appears to be influenced by members’ attitudes towards the party. In fact, our second hypothesis postulated that the levels of specific support for the party and political efficacy of party members impact directly on their level of activism. The lower the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party, the lower will be the degree of activism of all members (as well as the quality of the activities they perform) and vice-versa. In a party holding open and direct elections to choose its leader, party membership is thought to be divided between a highly active avant-garde and a larger mass of inactive affiliates, feeling inefficacy, frustrated with intra-party democracy and perceiving their own role as blurred and undefined. Consequently, dissatisfied or low efficacy members are argued to participate less.<p>Our data only partially support the expectations. In fact, the impact of the sense of external efficacy is clear and strong in all the three cases, while on the contrary the relationship between specific support and intra-party activism is less clear-cut than expected. The results are therefore nuanced with regard to the expectations formulated in the second hypothesis of this study. The explanatory power of external efficacy and specific support in terms of internal mobilization is only partially supported by our data. Therefore, the evaluation of the consequences of the implementation of party organizational changes such as the adoption of open primaries depends on what party elites are interested in: if the goal is to assure membership loyalty, adopting open primaries is not a good way to strengthen membership involvment in the party.<p>We believe that real intra-party democracy is normatively impossible with regard to the position of members. Organizational power cannot be too dispersed among different units without jeopardizing not only effective functioning of the party, as the old debated on the trade-off between democracy and efficacy asserted (Duverger, 1951; Panebianco, 1988), but also the incentives for internal participation of the party base. Party members are well aware that internal power cannot be too dispersed. From the point of view of members, a party should have a clear chain of command and should be composed by elites, activists and members. Each one of them should also be endowed with clearly defined tasks and responsibilities. In conclusion, we believe that intra-party democracy is a symbolic element of party organization but not as actually implementable.<p>In sum, intra-party democracy does not mean the same for different party units. For party elites, it represents a process for either legitimizing the party, changing party image, mobilizing electoral support, managing internal faction or even indirectly increasing their own organizational room for manoeuvre. For party members, intra-party democracy represents an incentive for mobilizing and a political identification tool until a certain point. After that, it becomes a threat to their rights and their status. For grass-roots affiliates, intra-party democracy is not a value per se, but it depends on its real intensity and actual implementation. In conclusion, at theoretical level, we can conclude that party organization theories should increasingly take into account membership’s point of view. On the contrary, at practical level, we can conclude that parties should adapt their strategies with regard to intra-party democracy according to their goal. If party elites are interested in tightening their grip on internal decision-making while increasing their room for manoeuvre and legitimizing party image at the same time, increasing intra-party democracy could be the best organizational strategy. On the contrary, if the leadership’s aim is to mobilize members and guarantee a stable and loyal membership, then it should be noted that increasing intra-party democracy is not always the best choice. To this regard, it might be useful for party elites to find other and more effective ways to loyalize member.<p><p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Notre recherche a consisté à poser la politique internationale du climat comme une politique publique et à montrer quelles étaient les dynamiques et les acteurs étant intervenus dans sa construction. Nous nous sommes en particulier attelé à mettre en exergue l'univers de sens ( "référentiel") à partir duquel les dispositifs de cette politique ont été élaborés, ainsi que la manière dont la dynamique d'opposition des intérêts propre aux négociations internationales s'y articulait. / Doctorat en sciences politiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished