Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1943. / Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 212-220.

Este trabalho se propõe a remontar a dissolução ocorrida no tempo em que a Economia Política buscava limitar seu campo de estudo, particularmente no que se refere a percepção sobre a conduta humana e a assunção de que os homens são intrinsecamente egoístas. Para tanto, é desenvolvida a visão do homem moralmente condicionado em Adam Smith e também as modificações subsequentes originadas nas diferentes concepções dos autores da escola clássica e da neoclássica. Sendo que estas mudanças enfatizam o egoísmo do agente econômico. Neste intento, é retraçado o caminho da consolidação do postulado do egoísmo, assim como os percalços, controvérsias e conflitos desta caracterização. São explorados os elementos que auxiliaram na transformação do homem smithiano em homo economicus, tais como a leitura descontextualizada de Smith, o individualismo, o utilitarismo, o individualismo metodológico, o positivismo e a própria necessidade de abstração teórica. Adicionalmente, é verificado que a confusão de conceitos presente nesta construção metodológica traz a referência de que a ciência econômica faz apologia ao egoísmo. Esta percepção é um subproduto do desenlace da economia com as questões morais. / This research is proposed to reassemble the dissolution occurred when the Political Economy sought to limit their field of study, particularly in the perception of humann behavior and the assumption that men are inherently selfish. To do that, it is developed the perception of Adam Smith about human behavior, and the subsequent changes resulting from different conceptions of classical and the neoclassical authors. These changes emphasize the selfishness of the economic agent. In this attempt, is showed the way of the consolidating of self-interest premise, the mishaps and controversies of this path. It explores the the elements that collaborated in the transformation of Smithian man in homo economicus, such as decontextualized reading of Smith, individualism, utilitarianism, methodological individualism, positivism and the very necessity of theoretical abstraction. Additionally, it is observed that the confusion of concepts present in this methodological construction suggests that economics salutes the egoism. This is a result of the distinction between moral and economic aspects.

Este trabalho se propõe a remontar a dissolução ocorrida no tempo em que a Economia Política buscava limitar seu campo de estudo, particularmente no que se refere a percepção sobre a conduta humana e a assunção de que os homens são intrinsecamente egoístas. Para tanto, é desenvolvida a visão do homem moralmente condicionado em Adam Smith e também as modificações subsequentes originadas nas diferentes concepções dos autores da escola clássica e da neoclássica. Sendo que estas mudanças enfatizam o egoísmo do agente econômico. Neste intento, é retraçado o caminho da consolidação do postulado do egoísmo, assim como os percalços, controvérsias e conflitos desta caracterização. São explorados os elementos que auxiliaram na transformação do homem smithiano em homo economicus, tais como a leitura descontextualizada de Smith, o individualismo, o utilitarismo, o individualismo metodológico, o positivismo e a própria necessidade de abstração teórica. Adicionalmente, é verificado que a confusão de conceitos presente nesta construção metodológica traz a referência de que a ciência econômica faz apologia ao egoísmo. Esta percepção é um subproduto do desenlace da economia com as questões morais. / This research is proposed to reassemble the dissolution occurred when the Political Economy sought to limit their field of study, particularly in the perception of humann behavior and the assumption that men are inherently selfish. To do that, it is developed the perception of Adam Smith about human behavior, and the subsequent changes resulting from different conceptions of classical and the neoclassical authors. These changes emphasize the selfishness of the economic agent. In this attempt, is showed the way of the consolidating of self-interest premise, the mishaps and controversies of this path. It explores the the elements that collaborated in the transformation of Smithian man in homo economicus, such as decontextualized reading of Smith, individualism, utilitarianism, methodological individualism, positivism and the very necessity of theoretical abstraction. Additionally, it is observed that the confusion of concepts present in this methodological construction suggests that economics salutes the egoism. This is a result of the distinction between moral and economic aspects.

In einem wichtigen Beitrag „on self-interest and greed“ hat Gebhard Kirchgässner im Journal of Business Economics die zu beobachtende Verhaltensvielfalt von Wirtschaftssubjekten hinterfragt. Die ökonomische Standardannahme rationalen, egoistischen Verhaltens trifft die Realität nicht immer. Menschen handeln auch irrational, teils sozialorientiert und teils sozial desinteressiert, teils unmoralisch-gierig, teils aber auch altruistisch-großzügig. Welches Modell erklärt die Vielfalt? In diesem Beitrag wird die von Kirchgässner aufgezeigte Verhaltensvielfalt mit den Erkenntnissen abgeglichen, die sich aus der Hamiltonschen Fitnessthese und den Ergänzungen durch Trivers, Fiske und de Botton ergeben. Damit kann gezeigt werden, dass sich je nach Gruppe, in welcher sich ein Mensch bewegt, Verhaltensweisen einstellen, die von extrem prosozialem Verhalten (z.B. zur Statussicherung durch Vorbild oder aus Angst vor Sanktionen) bis zu sehr unsozial „gierigem“ Verhalten reichen. Der Nutzen dieser Sichtweise für die Ökonomik wird aufgezeigt. Es sind nur drei exogene Mechanismen nötig, die Verhaltensvielfalt zu erzeugen. / In an important article „on self-interest and greed” in the Journal of Business Economics, Gebhard Kirchgässner questioned the variety observed in the behavior of economic subjects. The economic standard assumption of rational, egoist behavior does not comply with reality in many cases. People act irrationally, socially oriented as well as socially uninterested, immorally-greedy as well as altruistically-generously. The variety is immense. The question occurs: which model is capable of explaining the diversity? In this article, the variety of human behavior is being compared to findings that emerge from Hamilton’s Fitness Thesis and extensions by Trivers, Fiske and de Botton. The Fitness Thesis lays the ground. Depending on the social group to which an individual belongs in a certain situation, behavior can vary from extremely prosocial (e. g. to maintain status or to avoid sanctions) to very unsocial-greedy. As any individual is part of many groups he or she can act prosocially with respect to one group and unsocially-greedy with respect to another, will say: greed and altruism is not a question of character but a consequence of the specific situation in which an individual acts. Merely three exogenous mechanisms are required to create the observed variety in behavior.

This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problem - self-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of selfinterest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.

Objective: In this thesis, we assume that the organizations' interests are governing their behavior/positions. It seems possible to draw conclusions about organizations'interests on the basis of the behavior / positions that will appear in the givenopinions on Swedish Public Investigations. The purpose of this thesis is toidentify self-interests of the studied organizations as they appear in their givenopinions. Method: The authors have made a qualitative and quantitative study of the opinions. Theoretical perspective: The basis of the study is the organization theories that focus the self-interest oforganizations. Empiric: Information is taken from four Swedish Public Investigations: the New Company Act, International Accounting for Swedish companies, Abolition of the audit requirement for small and medium sized enterprise and Simplified accounting. Altogether 310 opinions have been given on these, out of which we have studied 59. Furthermore, we have collected information on tasks, activities and objectives from the websites of the opinion giving organizations. Conclusions: In the literature, we found, as mentioned, that organizations havet hree self- interests which we define as general self-interests. They are the interest in survival, resources and power. We have found - what we believe – an additional general self-interest of organizations, namely the interest to avoid accountability and transparency. It was possible to divide the organizations intogroups with high community of interest within each group while the community between the groups was low. This provides an empirical support to Dimaggio’s and Powell’s theory which says that organizations in specific areas are similar. This means that it is possible to study the interest of organizations, without studying the individuals in an organization. We found that the owner's interests expressed in tasks, activities and objectives of the organization are important factors affecting the organization's interest structure. We also found indications - however unclear - that the public interest has an impact on the organizations' self interests. We also found an interest to protect its own market which can be related to the general interest of resource influx under Pfeffers and Salanciks theories of resource dependence.

Rights today are a jumble of conflicting and incompatible claims. Without correction, the concept of rights will be eroded and eventually abandoned. The loss would be tragic, because rights are essential to our long-term planning and success. Incompatible claims have arisen from incommensurable conceptual foundations. Historically and essentially, rights are egoistic. Attempts to justify rights according to other criteria - divine command, human dignity, altruism, utilitarianism - fail on their own terms. Egoism or self-interest is fully compatible with social responsibility and with regard for the interests of others. The nature of rights is examined and ethical diversity is defended. The evolution of rights is traced from Roman antiquity through medieval developments through modern refinements, with particular attention paid to the rights theories of Gerson, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. A will theory of rights is proposed based on contract rather than on natural law and teleology. This will theory is explained using state of nature theory, with reference to Olson's logic of collective action. It is contrasted with the egoistic theories of Rand and Smith, with the utilitarian will theories of Hart and Wellman, and with the interest theories of MacCormick and Kramer. / Philosophy

Resource sharing is a common collaborative strategy used in practice. It has the potential to create synergistic value and leads to higher system efficiency. However, realizing this synergistic value can be challenging given the prevalence of decentralization in practice, where individual operators manage resources based on their own benefits. Hence, optimizing a decentralized system requires understanding not only the optimal operational strategy in terms of the overall system efficiency, but also the implementation of the strategy through proper management of individual incentives. However, traditional network optimization approaches typically assume a centralized perspective. The classic game theory framework, on the other hand, addresses incentive issues of decentralized decision makers, but mainly takes a high-level, economic perspective that does not fully capture the operational complexity involved in optimizing systems with resource sharing. The purpose of this thesis is to bridge this gap between practice and theory by studying the design of tools to manage and optimize the operations in decentralized systems with resource sharing using approaches that combine optimization and game theory. In particular, we focus on decentralized network systems and analyze two research streams in two application domains: (i) implementation of environmental legislation, and (ii) managing collaborative transportation systems. These applications are characterized by their decentralized multi-stakeholder nature where the conflicts and tension between the heterogeneous individual perspectives make system management very challenging. The main methodology used in this thesis is to adopt game theory models where individual decisions are endogenized as the solutions to network optimization problems that reflect their incentives. Such an approach allows us to capture the connection between the operational features of the system (e.g., capacity configuration, network structure, synergy level from resource sharing) and the individual incentives thus the effectiveness of the management tools, which is a main research contribution of this thesis. In the first research stream, we consider designing effective, efficient and practical implementation of electronic waste take-back legislation based on the widely-adopted Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) concept that mandates the financial responsibility of post-use treatment of their products. Typical implementations of EPR are collective, and allocate the resulting operating cost to involved producers. In this thesis, we demonstrate the complexity of collective EPR implementation due to the tension among different stakeholder perspectives, based on a case analysis of the Washington implementation. We then perform analytical studies of the two prominent challenges identified in current implementations: (i) developing cost allocation mechanisms that induce the voluntary participation of all producers in a collective system, thus promoting implementation efficiency; and (ii) designing collective EPR so as to encourage environmentally-friendly product design, thus promoting implementation effectiveness. Specifically, we prescribe new cost allocation methods to address the first challenge, and demonstrate the practicality and economic impact of the results using implementation data from the state of Washington. We then analyze the tensions between design incentives, efficiency and the effectiveness of the cost allocation to induce voluntary participation under collective EPR implementation. We show there exists a tradeoff among the three dimensions, driven by the network effects inherent in a collective system. The main contribution of this research stream is to demonstrate how the implementation outcomes of an environmental policy is influenced by the way that the policy ``filters' through operational-level factors, and to propose novel and implementation mechanisms to achieve efficient and effective EPR implementation. Hence, our study has the potential to provide guidance for practice and influence policy-making. In the second research stream, motivated by the practice of transportation alliances, we focus on a decentralized network setting where the individual entities make independent decisions regarding the routing of their own demand and the management of their own capacity, driven by their own benefits. We study the use of market-based exchange mechanisms to motivate and regulate capacity sharing so as to achieve the optimal overall routing efficiency in a general multicommodity network. We focus on the design of capacity pricing strategies in the presence of several practical operational complexities, including multiple ownership of the same capacity, uncertainty in network specifications, and information asymmetry between the central coordinator and individual operators. Our study in this research stream produces two sets of results. First, we demonstrate the impact of the underlying network structure on the effectiveness of using market-based exchange mechanisms to coordinate resource sharing and to allocate the resulting synergistic benefit, and characterize the network properties that matter. Second, we propose efficient and effective pricing policies and other mechanism design strategies to address different operational complexities. Specifically, we develop duality-based pricing algorithms, and evaluate different pricing strategies such as commodity-based price discrimination, which is shown to have an advantage in coordinating networks under uncertainty.

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