Habilitationsschrift--Fachbereich 11--Mainz--Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2005. / Bibliogr. p. 271-283.

Zugl.: Osnabrück, Univ., Diss., 2006

Le présent ouvrage souhaite montrer que la création de l’esthétique philosophique par Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, ainsi que la multiplication des écrits théoriques sur l’art orientés à partir de la problématique du goût, sont deux tentatives différentes de répondre à la question métaphysique du dualisme des substances ainsi qu’aux problèmes posés par leurs interactions réciproques. L’enjeu de cette recherche est double. Il s’agit, d’une part, de donner la réplique à Kant qui, dans un note devenue célèbre de la CRP, affirme qu’« esthétique » et « critique du goût » sont des termes synonymes. Il sera démontré que ces deux termes ne sont pas synonymes, qu’esthétique philosophique et critique du goût ne sont pas deux manières équivalentes de questionner l’art, bien qu’elles partagent, sur le plan ontologique, un certain nombre de présupposés. D’autre part, et c’est là que l’enjeu historiographique croise l’enjeu philosophique, nous verrons que ces présupposés ne sont pas propres au 18e siècle mais proviennent d’une longue tradition des rapports texte-image, du statut théologique et ontologique de l’image, de la représentation sculptée, de la mímêsis. Aussi, l’intérêt des questions formulées à partir du constat de l’échec patent de la métaphysique de l’Art et du caractère très largement insuffisant des esthétiques du goût dépasse largement le cadre du siècle des Lumières. / This book intends to demonstrate that the creation of philosophical aesthetics by A. G. Baumgarten, as well as the multiplication of theoretical writings about art guided by the problematics of taste, are two different ways to propose a solution to solve the metaphysical question of the dualism of substances and the problem of theirs mutual interactions. The stake is double. First, it is a response to Kant, who says in a CPR’s note which became famous that « aesthetics » and « critics of taste » are the same thing. It will be shown that it is not the case, although those two approaches share similar presuppositions. We will also see, and on that point the historiographic stake meets the philosophical one, that those presuppositions are not specific to the 18th century but came from the long tradition of text-image relations, of theological and ontological status of image, of carved representation, of mímêsis. So, the interest of the questions which are formulated because of the evident failure of metaphysics of Art and the failings of aesthetics of taste exceeds widely the framework of Enlightenment.

Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau. / The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles.

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The Anglo-Dutch philosopher Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) was among the most controversial figures writing in English in the eighteenth century. His satirical exploration of the nature of human sociability and economic prosperity infuriated his contemporary critics and deeply influenced the ideas of later Enlightenment philosophes. One of the most persistent questions about Mandeville's work concerns the sincerity of his declarations of Christian piety. Mandeville is commonly identified as a deist. This thesis explores the possibility that he was an atheist. The question is examined through an analysis of Mandeville’s major influences, most notably French Jansenism, Epicureanism, Scepticism, erudite libertinism, and Dutch republicanism. Key figures that Mandeville engaged with in his writings include Pierre Bayle, René Descartes, Shaftesbury, Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Nicole, and Pierre Gassendi. In the process of discussing Mandeville’s putative atheism, the methodological problem of researching and identifying atheism in early-modern Europe is explored. / Graduate

This study explores the rediscovery and development of a tradition of Ciceronian academic scepticism in British philosophy between c.1660-c.1760. It considers this tradition alongside two others, recently recovered by scholars, which were recognised by contemporaries to offer opposing visions of man, God and the origins of society: the Augustinian-Epicurean, and the neo-Stoic. It presents John Locke, Conyers Middleton and David Hume as the leading figures in the revival of the tradition of academic scepticism. It considers their works in relation to those of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, and Bernard Mandeville, whose writings refashioned respectively the neo-Stoic and Augustinian-Epicurean traditions in influential ways. These five individuals explicitly identified themselves with these late Hellenistic philosophical traditions, and sought to contest and redefine conventional estimations of their meaning and significance. This thesis recovers this debate, which illuminates our understanding of the development of the ‘science of man’ in Britain. Cicero was a central figure in Locke’s attempt to explain, against Hobbes, the origins of society and moral consensus independent of political authority. Locke was a theorist of societies, religious and civil. He provided a naturalistic explanation of moral motivation and sociability which, drawing heavily from Cicero, emphasised the importance of men’s concern for the opinions of others. Locke set this within a Christian divine teleology. It was Locke’s theologically-grounded treatment of moral obligation, and his attack on Stoic moral philosophy, that led to Shaftesbury’s attempt to vindicate Stoicism. This was met by Mandeville’s profoundly Epicurean response. The consequences of the neo-Epicurean and neo-Stoic traditions for Christianity were explored by Middleton, who argued that only academic scepticism was consistent with Christian belief. Hume explored the relationship between morality and religion with continual reference to Cicero. He did so, in contrast to Locke or Middleton, to banish entirely moral theology from philosophy.