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En el marco del análisis de redes sociales, estudiamos la red chilena de accionistas, una red dinámica cuyos actores son empresas y accionistas, y cuya relación es de propiedad. En particular, damos especial énfasis a una subred de ésta, la red de inversiones entre empresas, cuyos actores son empresas solamente. Para modelar la red de accionistas, recuperamos y procesamos la información disponible en el sitio Web de la Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros. Usando la proporción de propiedad de cada accionista en cada empresa, y los estados financieros de las últimas, modelamos esta red dirigida, dinámica y multivariable, desde Diciembre de 2003 hasta Junio de 2007. Para estudiar redes dirigidas multivariadas, diseñamos métodos empíricos y analíticos. Los métodos empíricos consisten en dos visualizaciones: perfiles de correlación de arcos y scatter-plots de redes. El método analítico consiste en reducir la topología del grafo a distribuciones de probabilidad (una para las relaciones y otra para los actores). Incluimos estas técnicas de análisis en una aplicación de software. Finalmente, estudiamos la red con las metodologías desarrolladas. Primero, buscamos propiedades generales de la red (encontrando, por ejemplo, que las empresas más grandes tienden a poseer o participar en las empresas más pequeñas). Luego, nos enfocamos en simular la red de inversión entre empresas, usando las distribuciones de probabilidad obtenidas de la red original. Concluimos que, aunque el modelamiento a nivel relacional, como la reducción de la topología a distribuciones de probabilidad, funciona relativamente bien al reproducir la red, no lo hace completamente ya que la red muestra propiedades emergentes, más allá del ámbito relacional.

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Financial supervision department has loosened restrictions on insurance company’s holdings on capital market, aiming to give full play to the insurance funds which typically have the strengths of large scale, long investment horizon and stable supply. Nevertheless, some insurance companies carry out unfriendly behaviors through capital superiority, which may cause volatility of stock prices. Based on this, the paper mainly studies the insurance funds and volatility spillover of individual stocks as well as the entire capital market. This paper uses a framework of econometric methods based on vector autoregressive mode, and selects the 2016—2020 quarterly data from the SSE A-share disclosure. The results reveal that on one hand, price fluctuation has a unidirectional spillover effect on insurance companies’ changes in ownership. On the other hand, insurance companies’ changes in ownership also have a unidirectional spillover effect on volatility of the SSE index. / Business Administration/Finance

The purpose of this analytical study is to determine the degree of application of Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy and practices in the industrial corporations in Jordan. Through detailed examination of primary and secondary empirical data from these corporations, the study examines the link between TQM and labour productivity. The population of the study consists of all Jordanian shareholding corporations listed under the industrial category in Amman Stock Exchange. In late 1998, this consisted of a total of 90 companies. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analysed in investigating the relationship between TQM implementation and labour productivity. Detailed survey responses from 76 participating companies were classified into two groups: high-level TQM implementation and low-level TQM implementation. About 60% of these companies were classified as companies with high-level TQM. Descriptive analysis of the survey responses plus company report data found that mean labour productivity measurements for companies with high-level TQM were significantly higher than for those with low-level TQM over the years (1993-1998). Also mean growth rates of labour productivity measurements for companies with high-level TQM were higher than for those with low-level of TQM during this period. Regression analysis demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship between TQM and labour productivity. This relationship showed a high positive slope in companies with ISO 9000 certification, and considerably lower (but still positive) slope in companies without ISO 9000 certification. / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This paper uses survey data by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) from 1991-2013 to test the role that institutional ownership has on the relative informational efficiency of stock prices in the Hang Seng Index, using the R2 of stock prices as a measurement of efficiency. This paper finds that on the aggregate level, the presence of institutional ownership is positively associated with R2, reflecting a negative effect on the level of information incorporated into stock prices. However, in isolating foreign institutions, the relationship with R2 reverses, and I find a positive correlation with the informational efficiency of stock prices. Moreover, this paper finds that a period characterized by high growth in institutional shareholding does not necessarily correspond to a greater level of improvement in the informational environment of stock markets. The results however, lack significance, perhaps due to the shortcomings of the survey data which is limited to 21 annual observations when incorporating a t-1 year lag. With more observations we would expect a substantial increase in the significance of the coefficient on our explanatory variables.

Literature on the divorce of ownership from control has emphasised the declining proportion of shares owned by salaried managers who control large companies. Because these salaried managers have negligible proprietarial interest in the companies they manage, some writers have suggested that they will have different motives to owner-managers. In particular, managers' direct pecuniary interests may cause them to pursue company growth at the expense of profit, for managers' salaries tend to be related to the size of the companies which they manage rather than the profitability of those companies. These alternate motivations were incorporated in various managerial theories of the firm developed in the late 1960's which emphasised company growth as a key objective. An investigation of the shareholdings and salaries of the directors of major British companies confirms that the proportion of total shares held by company directors has fallen over the years, though it is argued that shareholdings are still large enough to allow directors to exercise effective control over their companies. In addition, while the proportion of total shares held by directors is small, these shareholdings are often large in absolute terms and constitute a significant source of directors' income, though the size of directors' shareholdings varies considerably between industries. Combined dividend income and capital appreciation of shareholdings match the remuneration which directors receive as salary income. It is argued that these profit-related income elements are sufficiently large to cause directors to attach priority to profitability goals. This proposition is explored through statistical analysis of the relationship between directors' remuneration and company performance. Regression results show that as the definition of directors' remuneration is broadened to include dividends and capital appreciation as well as salary, company size variables diminish in importance as determinants of remuneration and profitability variables predominate. Managers do have an incentive to pursue profitability.

Literature on the divorce of ownership from control has emphasised the declining proportion of shares owned by salaried managers who control large companies. Because these salaried managers have negligible proprietarial interest in the companies they manage, some writers have suggested that they will have different motives to owner-managers. In particular, managers' direct pecuniary interests may cause them to pursue company growth at the expense of profit, for managers' salaries tend to be related to the size of the companies which they manage rather than the profitability of those companies. These alternate motivations were incorporated in various managerial theories of the firm developed in the late 1960's which emphasised company growth as a key objective. An investigation of the shareholdings and salaries of the directors of major British companies confirms that the proportion of total shares held by company directors has fallen over the years, though it is argued that shareholdings are still large enough to allow directors to exercise effective control over their companies. In addition, while the proportion of total shares held by directors is small, these shareholdings are often large in absolute terms and constitute a significant source of directors' income, though the size of directors' shareholdings varies considerably between industries. Combined dividend income and capital appreciation of shareholdings match the remuneration which directors receive as salary income. It is argued that these profit-related income elements are sufficiently large to cause directors to attach priority to profitability goals. This proposition is explored through statistical analysis of the relationship between directors' remuneration and company performance. Regression results show that as the definition of directors' remuneration is broadened to include dividends and capital appreciation as well as salary, company size variables diminish in importance as determinants of remuneration and profitability variables predominate. Managers do have an incentive to pursue profitability. / Bradford University Research Committee

Tidigare studier har undersökt relationen mellan utdelning och olika typer av ägande, till exempel utländskt ägande, familjeägande och koncentrerat ägande. Undersökningarna har väckt en del intressanta frågor inom området och därför är syftet med denna studie att undersöka om ägarstrukturen har någon påverkan på utdelningen. Ägarstrukturen definieras som den ägaren med största procentuella aktiepost med hänsyn till både kapital- och röstandel. Undersökningen inkluderar 168 börsnoterade bolag och behandlar perioden 2012– 2022. Arbetets ekonometriska tillvägagångssätt innefattar två delar. I första delen utförs olika typer av paneldataregressioner avseende hela perioden. Därefter delas undersökningsperioden in i två olika tidsperioder, ett genomsnitt för varje bolag och period tas ut för att kunna behandlas som två tvärsnittsregressioner. Regressionerna utvärderas och tolkas främst utifrån signifikansnivå, koefficientvärden och determinationskoefficienter. Studien påvisar en positiv relation mellan största röstandel och utdelningsnivån, största kapitalandel har dock en negativ relation till utdelningsnivån. Dessa värden är statistiskt signifikanta men förklaringsgraden är låg och det bör tas i beaktning vid tolkning av resultaten. / Prior research has looked at the connection between dividends and various ownership structures, including family, foreign, and concentrated ownership. The goal of this study is to determine whether ownership structure affects dividends, as some intriguing questions in this area have been brought up by surveys. The owner holding the highest percentage of shares in this scenario, for both capital and voting shares, will be in the ownership structure. The survey spans the years 2012–2022 and comprises 168 listed companies. There are two components to the work's econometric approach. Several panel data regressions are carried out with respect to the full period in the first section. After splitting the survey period into two distinct time periods, an average is calculated for each company and period, which are then used to create two cross-sectional regressions. The significance level, coefficient values, and coefficients of determination are the main criteria used to evaluate and interpret the regressions. The study shows a positive relationship between the largest voting share and the dividend level; however, the largest capital share has a negative relationship with the dividend level. These values are statistically significant, but the degree of explanation is low, and this should be considered when interpreting the results.

本研究以2001年至2005年為研究期間，從股權結構及董事會監督功能分別探討公股角色對投資標的公司經營績效之影響。本文之研究結果顯示：(1)股權結構變數中，公股投資標的公司之經營績效較無公股投資之公司為佳。(2)公股持股比率愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效則愈差。(3)董事會組成變數中，由公股代表出任董監之公股投資標的公司之經營績效較未派任公股代表之公司為佳。(4)當公股代表的席次比率愈高時，公股之投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。(5)公股持股比率偏離公股代表席次比率之程度愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。 / This research from 2001 to 2005 as research period, aim to explore the role of government ownership in the relationship between board composition and firm performance in the enterprises with government ownership. The empirical results document that from ownership structure variables, the effect of government shareholding on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance decreases with an increased size of government shareholding. From board composition variables, the effect of the board with the government shareholding represents on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance is worse with an increased size of government shareholding represents in the corporate board composition. Finally, when the government shareholding and the government shareholding represents’ seat ratio deviation degree is bigger, the firm performance would be worse.