Depuis les années 1970, le développement territorial est mis en exergue en aménagement et en sciences économiques dans une perspective qui est celle de la création d’activités et d’emplois liés. La valorisation des ressources territoriales devient dès lors cruciale. Toutefois, la littérature n’interroge pas l’identité des acteurs alors que ceux-ci constituent la ressource territoriale centrale. La thèse qui est défendue est que ce ne sont pas les mêmes types d’acteurs qui sont mobilisés par les proximités dans les différentes étapes du développement territorial. Plusieurs hypothèses sont émises au sujet des modes de mobilisation des acteurs, de leur nature et de leurs interdépendances. Le raisonnement est structuré en trois parties. La première est consacrée à l’étude du Système Productif Local (SPL) Mecanic Vallée. L’objectif est de comprendre comment le développement local a été structuré dans cet espace physique, social et productif. Une deuxième partie est consacrée à l’étude, dans la littérature, du mode de mobilisation et de coordination des acteurs ; particulièrement dans le cadre territorial (proximités, gouvernance, développement territorial). Plusieurs faits stylisés sont construits pour faire le lien entre systèmes d’acteurs, proximités et étapes du développement. Ces faits sont appliqués au SPL Mecanic Vallée afin de produire une relecture de sa dynamique de développement. Ces faits portent sur deux projets productifs particuliers : les relations d’affaires et le financement des activités. Une troisième partie est consacrée aux résultats de la recherche. Ces résultats confirment une très forte interdépendance des acteurs ainsi que la particularité des modes de mobilisation dans la construction de la dynamique territoriale. / Since the 1970s, territorial development has been highlighted in planning and economic sciences from the perspective of the creation of related activities and jobs. The development of territorial resources therefore becomes crucial. However, the literature does not question the identity of the actors even though they constitute a central territorial resource. The thesis argues that the proximity in the different stages of territorial development does not mobilize the same types of actors.Several hypotheses are put forward about the modes of mobilization of actors, their nature and their interdependencies. The reasoning is structured in three parts. The first is devoted to the study of the Mecanic Valley Local Production System (SPL). The objective is to understand how local development has been structured in this physical, social and productive space. A second part is devoted to the study, in the literature, of the way actors are mobilized and coordinated; particularly in the territorial framework (proximity, governance, territorial development). Several stylized facts are constructed to make the link between systems of actors, proximity and stages of development. These facts are applied to the SPL Mecanic Vallée in order to produce a re-reading of its development dynamics. These facts relate to two specific productive projects: business relations and activity financing. A third part is devoted to research results. These results confirm a very strong interdependence of the actors as well as the particularity of the modes of mobilization in the construction of territorial dynamics.

本研究經過分析台灣股市中三大法人的持股率與買賣超對於公司財務變數與市場變數的的關係，藉由法人的持股選擇觀點，進而組成具有法人選股特性的投資組合，並驗證其是否具有較佳的績效表現與是否具有擊敗大盤的能力。實證結果發現，外資偏向投資於較大報酬波動率與規模的公司，以及較低負債比率與股利殖利率的公司；投信具有偏好較高的股利殖利率、股東權益報酬率、移動平均報酬率之標準差與規模的公司，以及淨價市值比較低的公司；自營商喜歡較高的負債比率、淨值市價比、移動平均報酬率與規模的公司，以及報酬波動率較低的公司。在驗證經由法人的投資特性組成之投資組合表現中，發現投信之投資組合雖具有較高的平均報酬率，但是考量風險因子後，自營商的績效表現較佳，而且都具有擊敗大盤的績效表現。 / The study analyzed the relationship between Taiwanese institutional investors’ shareholding ratio or net buy-and-sell and the company's financial variables and market variables. Using the result of regression to compose a portfolio with the characteristics of institutional investors, and verification whether it has a better performance than the stock market index. The empirical results show that foreign investors tend to invest in the company with larger volatility and size, and also lower debt ratio and dividend yield; Investment trust investors with a preference for high dividend yields, return on equity, the long-term volatility and size of the company, and tend to invest in lower book-to-market ratio of the company; Dealers like high debt ratio, book-to-market ratio, size and momentum, and also preference for the company of lower volatility. The performance of the portfolio with institutional investors’ characteristics, we found that the investment trust's portfolio had highest average rate of return, but after consideration of risk factors, dealers had better performance. Both of the portfolio beat the stock market index’s performance.

Este trabalho tem por objeto a análise dos critérios de submissão de atos de concentração envolvendo fundos de investimento para apreciação pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), com enfoque nos fundos de private equity. Nos últimos anos os fundos de investimento têm adquirido crescente importância na economia brasileira em setores estratégicos. No entanto, o tratamento pela autoridade antitruste brasileira das operações destes veículos se revela instável resultando em certa insegurança sobre quais devem ser submetidas ao controle de concentrações. Assim, este trabalho propõe uma forma de se acessarem essas operações que ao mesmo tempo atenda aos objetivos visados com o controle das estruturas no Direito Concorrencial brasileiro e não crie obstáculos à atuação destes importantes veículos para a economia moderna. Para tanto, buscou-se respaldo na experiência de países onde a tradição antitruste e o fenômeno analisado são muito mais antigos do que no Brasil. No entanto, uma vez que nem mesmo nestes países a questão está livre de revisões periódicas e alguma controvérsia, este trabalho não tem como pretensão apresentar uma solução definitva para o problema. O primeiro capítulo expõe o objeto de estudo, seu funcionamento e sua importância para a economia. No segundo capítulo são abordados os objetivos do controle de estruturas no Brasil, os critérios de conhecimento de operações pela autoridade concorrencial brasileira e a sua interpretação pelo CADE, notadamente no que toca aos fundos de investimento. No terceiro capítulo são abordadas as ligações estruturais entre concorrentes mais relevantes do ponto de vista concorrencial quando se trata de aquisições perpetradas por fundos de investimento: participações minoritárias e interlocking directorates. / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the requirements a transaction involving investment funds, notably private equity funds, shall meet to be subject to merger control by the Brazilian antitrust authority (CADE). In recent years, investment funds have gained increasing importance for the Brazilian economy in strategic sectors. However, the treatment of transactions involving these entities by the Brazilian antitrust authority is unstable resulting in uncertainty about which transactions should be subject to merger control. Therefore, this work proposes a way to access such transactions that both meets the objectives pursued with the merger control under the Brazilian antitrust law and does not create obstacles to the functioning of these important vehicles for the modern economy. To this end, we sought support in the experience of countries where the tradition of antitrust and investment funds is much older than in Brazil. However, since even in these countries the issue is subject to periodic review and some controversy, this work does not claim to present a definitive solution to the problem. Chapter one aims to present the subject matter, its operation and importance to the economy. Chapter two sets out the objectives of merger control in Brazil, the applicable thresholds and their interpretation by CADE, especially with regard to investment funds. Chapter three deals with the the most relevant structural links among competitors under the competitive point of view when it comes to investment funds: minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates.

Este trabalho tem por objeto a análise dos critérios de submissão de atos de concentração envolvendo fundos de investimento para apreciação pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), com enfoque nos fundos de private equity. Nos últimos anos os fundos de investimento têm adquirido crescente importância na economia brasileira em setores estratégicos. No entanto, o tratamento pela autoridade antitruste brasileira das operações destes veículos se revela instável resultando em certa insegurança sobre quais devem ser submetidas ao controle de concentrações. Assim, este trabalho propõe uma forma de se acessarem essas operações que ao mesmo tempo atenda aos objetivos visados com o controle das estruturas no Direito Concorrencial brasileiro e não crie obstáculos à atuação destes importantes veículos para a economia moderna. Para tanto, buscou-se respaldo na experiência de países onde a tradição antitruste e o fenômeno analisado são muito mais antigos do que no Brasil. No entanto, uma vez que nem mesmo nestes países a questão está livre de revisões periódicas e alguma controvérsia, este trabalho não tem como pretensão apresentar uma solução definitva para o problema. O primeiro capítulo expõe o objeto de estudo, seu funcionamento e sua importância para a economia. No segundo capítulo são abordados os objetivos do controle de estruturas no Brasil, os critérios de conhecimento de operações pela autoridade concorrencial brasileira e a sua interpretação pelo CADE, notadamente no que toca aos fundos de investimento. No terceiro capítulo são abordadas as ligações estruturais entre concorrentes mais relevantes do ponto de vista concorrencial quando se trata de aquisições perpetradas por fundos de investimento: participações minoritárias e interlocking directorates. / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the requirements a transaction involving investment funds, notably private equity funds, shall meet to be subject to merger control by the Brazilian antitrust authority (CADE). In recent years, investment funds have gained increasing importance for the Brazilian economy in strategic sectors. However, the treatment of transactions involving these entities by the Brazilian antitrust authority is unstable resulting in uncertainty about which transactions should be subject to merger control. Therefore, this work proposes a way to access such transactions that both meets the objectives pursued with the merger control under the Brazilian antitrust law and does not create obstacles to the functioning of these important vehicles for the modern economy. To this end, we sought support in the experience of countries where the tradition of antitrust and investment funds is much older than in Brazil. However, since even in these countries the issue is subject to periodic review and some controversy, this work does not claim to present a definitive solution to the problem. Chapter one aims to present the subject matter, its operation and importance to the economy. Chapter two sets out the objectives of merger control in Brazil, the applicable thresholds and their interpretation by CADE, especially with regard to investment funds. Chapter three deals with the the most relevant structural links among competitors under the competitive point of view when it comes to investment funds: minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates.

Anand M. Goel and Anjan V Thakor 於最近的財務學刊中提出理性且風險趨避的經理人會放棄部分正報酬但風險高的投資，造成投資不足問題，使得公司價值未能極大化。然而，極端過度自信的經理人投資正負報酬皆有的計畫，造成過度投資，使得公司價值遞減。只有中度自信的經理人能為公司價值帶來極大化效果。本篇研究採用台灣上市櫃公司近二十年資料，以公司經理人對公司持股的變化來衡量其過度自信的程度，探討公司經理人自信程度對公司獲利能力與公司價值的影響。實證研究發現，極端過度自信的經理人與極端保守的經理人使公司的績效與成長性減少，降低公司價值。此研究增加我們了解經理人自有特徵對公司價值的影響，並為公司理財課題帶來新的貢獻。 / Former literature theorized that excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs reduce the firm value for underinvestment and overinvestment problems and moderate overconfident CEOs willing to take risky but positive NPV projects increase the firm value. This paper conducts an empirical research by using the change of purchase and sale on own company stocks took by CEOs to measure CEO overconfidence level in Taiwanese listing companies and find that the profitability and stock performance of firms led by excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs decrease compared to by moderate overconfident CEOs. The result contributes to the understanding of the impact on firm valuation by CEO idiosyncratic characteristics and offers new evidence to behavior finance on corporate management.

On July 1 2010 new rules regarding cross-border group deductions came into force in Sweden. The rules are based on a series of judgements which were delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union and subsequent rulings deriving from the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. The new set of rules is supposed to make the Swedish group consolidation system in line with EU law in the area of cross-border group consolidations. The new rules allow a resident parent to deduct the losses stemming from its non-resident subsidiary but only if the subsidiary has exhausted all the possibilities to take those losses into account in its own state of origin and the losses cannot be utilized in the future by the subsidiary or a third party. Furthermore, the non-resident subsidiary needs to be liquidated for the parent to be able to show that the possibilities have been exhausted. However, before even considering whether the subsidiary has exhausted the losses there is one criterion that need to be fulfilled; the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary. The criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary requires a resident parent to directly own its non-resident subsidiary without any intermediate companies and that shareholding must correspond to more than 90 percent. It is the requirement of a direct shareholding which post a concern to whether that criterion can be seen as in compliance with the case-law stemming from The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. After revising and analysing the case-law stemming from the Court of Justice and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court it is the author’s belief that the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary, due to the requirement of a direct shareholding, is not in conformity with EU law and cannot be justified by the justification grounds put forward by the Swedish government.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:52:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5225.pdf: 1116958 bytes, checksum: dcbccf867d0ca0f26168d7a63bc527d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-21 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / In the last two decades there has been a lot of changes in organizational dynamics in Brazil, because the principles of financial capitalism went into effect on the national economy. The starting point of these changes were the mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the 1990s. Through these ones, international companies came to Brazil and brought with them financial principles that dominated the international economy. Among these principles, the Corporate Governance and Industry Venture Capital (venture capital and private equity) are outstanding. In this new Brazilian scenario an actor of extreme relevance is the State; it acts directly on financial markets through BNDESPAR, which is a subsidiary of the National Development Bank (BNDES). This action occurs through industry venture capital (venture capital and private equity), and its goal is to promote the development of domestic enterprises. The empirical data of this study indicate that BNDESPAR can act in Brazilian companies through venture capital industry due to corporate governance, this tool enables the monitoring of BNDES subsidiary in corporations which it owns. Thus, the Corporate Governance being a tool that attends to the interests of the State, it is disseminated via BNDESPAR in Brazilian companies. For BNDESPAR, promoting the company in the segment of venture capital involves raising it to go public on the stock exchange. On the other hand, through the private equity segment, it involves establishing the main indices of corporate governance in the investee companies. It also verified the performance of the actors responsible by BNDESPAR. The data indicate that these actors have primarily political experience and expertise in finance. We analyzed also the actors who occupied the positions of elite at BNDES in the last 10 years, it was mainly realized that these actors, in fact, after they have passed through the state bank, they are founded private equity funds or they are acting as CEO on boards of companies. / Nas últimas duas décadas aconteceram mudanças na dinâmica organizacional brasileira, pois os princípios de capitalismo financeiro passaram a vigorar na economia nacional. O ponto de partida dessas mudanças foram os movimentos de fusões e aquisições ocorridos na década de 1990. Através deles as empresas internacionais chegaram ao Brasil e trouxeram consigo os princípios financeiros que dominavam na economia internacional. Dentre esses princípios, destaca-se a Governança Corporativa e a Indústria de Capital de Risco (venture capital e private equity). Nesse novo cenário brasileiro um ator de extrema relevância é o Estado, ele atua diretamente nos mercados financeiros através da BNDESPAR, subsidiária do Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES). Essa atuação ocorre por meio da indústria de capital de risco (venture capital e private equity) e por meio de participação acionária em empresas com capital aberto, e seu objetivo é fomentar o desenvolvimento das empresas nacionais. Os dados empíricos desse trabalho indicam que a BNDESPAR consegue atuar nas empresas brasileiras por meio da Indústria de Capital de Risco devido a Governança Corporativa, essa ferramenta viabiliza o monitoramento da subsidiária do BNDES nas corporações que ela possui participação. Dessa forma, a Governança Corporativa por ser uma ferramenta que atende aos interesses do Estado, é difundida através da BNDESPAR nas empresas brasileiras. Para a BNDESPAR, fomentar a empresa no segmento de capital de risco envolve elevá-la a abrir capital em bolsa de valores. Já por meio do segmento de participação em empresas de capital aberto envolve instituir os principais índices de Governança Corporativa nas empresas investidas. Também se verificou os atores responsáveis pela atuação da BNDESPAR. Os dados indicam que esses atores possuem principalmente experiência política e experiência em finanças. Analisaram-se também os atores que ocuparam os cargos de elite no BNDES nos últimos 10 anos, percebeu-se, principalmente, que esses atores, depois que passaram pelo banco estatal, fundaram fundos de private equity ou estão atuando como CEO em conselhos de administração de empresas.

Les différences constatées entre les droits et obligations financiers, patrimoniaux et politiques d’un salarié actionnaire et ceux des autres actionnaires suscitent un légitime questionnement juridique. Il apparaît nécessaire de les expliquer car elles interrogent sur la cohérence d’ensemble du droit de l’actionnariat salarié. Les justifications classiquement avancées ne paraissant pas pleinement satisfaisantes, il convient donc de les dépasser.Le particularisme du statut du salarié actionnaire est ainsi attribué à l’existence d’un modèle de l’actionnariat salarié, soigneusement élaboré par le législateur et par la pratique, afin de répondre à plusieurs défis contemporains. La vérification de cette hypothèse implique d’identifier ce modèle. Une recherche en ce sens met en évidence la « double instrumentalisation » de ce type d’actionnariat partagé entre mode de rémunération et mode de gouvernance. Il est ensuite démontré que ces deux traits caractéristiques du modèle de l’actionnariat salarié ont influencé, au niveau individuel, le statut du salarié actionnaire. Son statut est alors construit autour de la volonté de transformer le principal intéressé, essentiellement, en bailleur de fonds de la société qui l’emploie et, subsidiairement, en actionnaire de contrôle. Cette conclusion offre une autre grille de lecture éclairant d’un jour nouveau le droit de l’actionnariat salarié. Cette nouvelle approche permet de fonder des propositions visant à limiter les risques financiers supportés par le salarié actionnaire et à rénover sa participation à la démocratie actionnariale. / The noticed differences between the financial, patrimonial and political rights and duties of an employee shareholder and those of the other shareholders arouse a legitimate legal questioning. It seems necessary to explain them because they question about the coherence of the whole salaried shareholding law. The justifications classically advanced don’t seem completely satisfactory, it is thus advisable to exceed them.The sense of identity of the status of the employee shareholder is so awarded to the existence of a model of the salaried shareholding, carefully elaborated by the legislator and by the practice, to answer several contemporary challenges. The check of this hypothesis implies to identify this model. A research in this way brings to light the " double instrumentalization " of this type of shareholding shared between method of payment and mode of governance. It is then demonstrated that these two characteristic features of the model of the salaried shareholding influenced, at the individual level, the status of the employee shareholder. His status is then built around the will to transform the main person interested, essentially, in financier of the company who employs him and, additionally, on shareholder of control. This conclusion offers another railing of reading enlightening in a new way the salaried shareholding law. This new approach allows establishing propositions to limit the financial risks supported by the employee shareholder and to renew its participation in the shareholder democracy.

本論文主要目的係探討政府持股與企業避稅間之關係。本文以2005年至2014年台灣公開發行以上公司為樣本，分析政府持股比例、代表政府董監事席次比例對租稅規避的影響，並檢視公股主導企業之避稅程度。 實證結果顯示，政府持股比例對企業避稅無顯著影響，然而，當代表政府的董監事席次比例愈高，企業會減少避稅行為。此外，研究結果亦指出公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低。進一步分析公股主導之企業和雙權偏離互動對企業避稅之影響。實證分析發現，當股份盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較高，隱含公股主導之企業會透過避稅行為將財富移轉至企業本身；反之，當席次盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低，表示政府掌握董事會席次時，能有效監督企業遵循稅法規定，採用較保守的租稅政策。 / The purpose of this study is to examine the association between government shareholding and tax avoidance. This study uses the data of Taiwan public companies from 2005 to 2014 to analyze whether government shareholding percentage and the ratio of directors held by the government have impact on tax avoidance, and investigate the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies. The empirical results reveal that government shareholding does not significantly affect corporate tax avoidance. However, when the ratio of directors held by the government increases, companies would reduce the level of tax avoidance. In addition, the results also indicate that government-controlled companies are less tax avoidance compared with family-controlled companies. This study conducts further analysis on the influence of the interaction of government-controlled companies and the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights on tax avoidance. The results show that the higher the level of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies than family-controlled companies. It implies that government-controlled companies might transfer fund to themselves through tax avoidance. On the contrary, when the deviation between the ratio of controlled board seats and cash flow rights increases, the government-controlled companies engage in less tax avoidance than family-controlled companies. It represents that when the board of directors is controlled by the government, it could effectively supervise the company to comply with tax regulations, and the company would adopt conservative tax strategies.

L’article 1844 C. civ. suggère que seuls les associés sont titulaires du droit de vote. Une telle affirmation suscite cependant des interrogations. Elle laisse insatisfait, de prime abord, au vu de l’imprécision des contours de la notion d’associé. Elle invite, en outre, à s’interroger sur sa justification. Une analyse attentive des textes montre que pour déterminer le titulaire du droit de vote, ceux-ci se réfèrent indifféremment, à la qualité d’associé ou à la qualité de propriétaire de parts sociales ou d’actions – les deux étant censées se confondre. Et cela s’explique par le fait que les associés sont supposés supporter l’aléa social, aléa inhérent à la propriété de parts sociales ou d’actions. Mais seule la propriété dotée de l’absolutisme que les rédacteurs du Code civil voulaient lui conférer permet de présumer l’aléa social. Or le développement de propriétés temporaires ou pour autrui a conduit à attribuer le droit de vote à des associés ne le supportant pas, ébranlant ainsi la construction sociétaire. A cela, s’ajoutent des pratiques permettant à un non-associé de voter, sans garantie qu’il agisse pour le compte d’un associé. La recherche d’une solution cohérente et complète invite à redéfinir la notion d’associé en la fondant sur l’aléa social. Le droit de vote bénéficierait ainsi aux seuls acteurs courant un tel aléa. Cette solution peut être aisément mise en oeuvre moyennant quelques aménagements des modalités de reconnaissance de la qualité d’associé et des prérogatives sociales. Un encadrement spécifique des mécanismes d’accès au vote par un non-associé reste cependant nécessaire. / Article 1844 of the Civil Code suggests that only shareholders hold voting rights. Such an assertion gives rise to several questions. It leaves dissatisfied, prima facie, considering the vagueness of the concept of shareholder. In addition, it leads to a question about the justification of the allocation of voting rights to shareholders. A careful analysis of the texts shows that, in view of defining the holders of voting rights, they indifferently refer to the capacity of shareholder or to the capacity of owner of shares – as both are supposed to coincide. And this can be explained by the idea that shareholders are meant to bear the corporate hazard. However, this hazard can only be inferred from an ownership corresponding to the absolutist conception of the Civil Code’s authors. Yet, the development of temporary ownerships or ownerships for others has lead to assign voting rights to shareholders who do not bear this hazard, and has undermined the corporate construction. In addition to this, practices allowing a non-shareholder to vote, without assurance that the vote will be cast on behalf of a shareholder, have a similar effect. The pursuit of a coherent and complete solution prompts to redefine the notion of shareholder, basing it on the concept of corporate hazard. Voting rights would thus only benefit to persons who bear such a hazard. This solution can easily be implemented by slightly adapting the current methods for recognizing shareholder’s capacity and corporate rights. Nevertheless, a specific legal framework for devices allowing non-shareholder to vote remains necessary.