This dissertation aspires to revive the dystopian liberalism which identifies the avoidance of the worst as the fundamental aim of politics. The theory I present consists of three elements overall: The first element is what I call the Priority Claim, stating that the most important aim of social institutions should, morally speaking, be to avoid cruelty qua worst evil (Part I). The second element is the identification of the informal structure, the set of social norms within a population, as an important site to realize this ideal (Part II). The third element is the application of the principle that cruelty be avoided to the in-formal structure (Part III). This leads to an account of desirable social norms and in turn to a concrete answer to the question how individuals can in their everyday lives do their part to create a world that is overall less cruel and more humane.

Le libéralisme politique se présente comme un système cosmopolite et universalisable. Pourtant, au cours des dernières décennies, il a souvent été accusé d’imposer arbitrairement une conception morale particulière. Comment expliquer cette apparente contradiction ? Ce travail vise à déterminer si le caractère « libéral » est nécessaire, même s’il n’est pas suffisant, pour qu’une société soit juste ; ou s’il s’agit d’un attribut contingent. Il se demande donc s’il est possible d’universaliser les principes du libéralisme politique. La thèse défendue est que seule une justification via negationis de la liberté peut être universalisable. Pour démontrer cela, nous mettrons en lumière qu’il existe une distinction qualitative entre les justifications négatives, qui font appel à la valeur politique de la liberté en tant qu’instrument de limitation du pouvoir ; et les justifications positives qui font appel à sa valeur morale, en tant que bien humain. De même, nous défendrons deux arguments : a) un principe d’asymétrie du bien et du mal, selon lequel l’évitement du mal détient une priorité épistémique et morale sur la production du bien ; et b) l’idée que le summum malum peut avoir un statut absolu et universel. Comme le soutient Judith Shklar, ce souverain mal est la cruauté. Contrairement au summum bonum, le summum malum est indépendant des éthiques particulières. Le libéralisme doit alors prouver que sa configuration politique permet d’éviter ou de réduire le mal politique pour pouvoir donner un statut normatif et universalisable aux libertés individuelles. C’est la structure argumentative du libéralisme négatif. / Political liberalism aspires to be a cosmopolitan and universal system. Yet, in the last decades, it has often been accused of arbitrarily imposing a particular conception of the good. How can we to explain this apparent contradiction? This study aims to determine if the liberal character is necessary to have a just society, even if it is not sufficient, or if it is a contingent feature. It tries to see if it is possible to universalize the principles of political liberalism. Our thesis is that only a justification of liberty via negationis can be universalized. In order to demonstrate this idea, we will highlight the qualitative distinction between the negative justifications that defend the political value of liberty as a tool to restrain power; and the positive justifications that defend its moral value, as a human good. Furthermore, we will defend two arguments: a) a principle of asymmetry of good and evil, which states that avoiding evil has an epistemic and moral priority over promoting good; and b) the idea that the summum malum can be absolute and universal. As defended by Judith Shklar, cruelty is that sovereign evil. Unlike the summum bonum, summum malum is independent from particular moralities. In order to give a normative and universal status to individual liberties, liberalism shall then prove that its political configuration allows to avoid or reduce political evil. That is the argumentative structure of negative liberalism.

What I dub the “worst-result” principle is a criterion that identifies civil war and tyranny as the worst evils that could befall a state, and prescribes their prevention. In this thesis, I attempt to define the worst-result principle’s concrete prescriptions and institutional arrangements to meet these. To do so, I explore different understandings of the worst-result principle, that each contributes to the general argument. Montesquieu’s crucial insight concerns the separation of powers to prevent the state from collapsing into despotism. Judith Shklar shows that ‘damage control’ needs to be constantly performed so as to minimize chances of governmental brutality. Roberto Unger points at the importance of encouraging citizens’ involvement in the political process to safeguard freedom. I finally argue, in the light of historical evidence, that it would be unreasonable to think that the task of preventing tyranny can be effectively performed in the absence of courts entrusted with checking powers.

Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, while characterized by deep skepticism and dissatisfaction with utilitarian theories on liberalism, is also filled with hope and a tireless dedication to the victims of our political worlds. This thesis in international political theory explores Judith Shklar’s underappreciated international political thought. The thesis argues that while her liberalism of fear can be considered a coherent alternative to rivaling theories in international political theory, as it explores questions on ethics beyond the horizons of single political communities, it also presupposes strict limitations regarding the purpose of international political theory. Consequently, the liberalism of fear can be thought of as an international political theory that functions as a sense-making tool rather than being action-guiding. Hence, the aim of this thesis is twofold: It aims to contribute to the secondary literature on Shklar’s political thought in the context of international relations, but it also aims to contribute to the broader discussion on the study of ethics in international relations, especially concerning realist political theory, and in such ways, it illuminates some fundamental complexities in real-world politics.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)