Thesis (M.Phil.)--Murdoch University, 2008. / Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Education. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-123).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz. / Xerox copy of typescript. Bibliography: leaves 196-200.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The purpose of this thesis is to discover the meaning of, and relationship among, what Kierkegaard refers to in his writings as the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious spheres of existence. The sources consulted cover the majority of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings. In the first chapter it is shown that Kierkegaard developed the concept of spheres of existence in an effort to show that philosophical categories must be derived from the structure of existence rather than the structure of thought. Contrary to Hegel, Kierkegaard maintains that in existence thought and being can never be identified, but are dialectically related in the sense of being in dialogue with each other. It is the principle of mediation to which Kierkegaard most objects. The consequence of the identification of thought and being is to put them into an immediate relationship to each other and thereby remove from thought its traditional philosophical function of elucidating and directing being. Kierkegaard uses the word existence to refer to the giveness of being, the facticity of the individual. It is in recognizing that the Hegelian attitude toward the dialectical character of existence represents a possible mode of consciousness and that his own attitude represents an opposing mode that Kierkegaard distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical spheres of existence. The third sphere of existence, the religious, arises from the possibility that consciousness may relate itself to that which underlies existence, i.e. God. The identification of the spheres of existence with the self-conscious development of human subjectivity is further supported by Kierkegaard's discussion of the self in Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard maintains that if one is to secure a position in the flux that is existence, consciousness must cease to be passive and establish itself through resolution. Hence a sphere of existence is defined not only by its moce of consciousness but by its telos. In the second chapter it is shown that the aesthetic consciousness is an immediate, non-reflexive consciousness which has its telos in the external world. It reveals itself as an essentially unstable and unfree consciousness in that it is vulnerable to events over which it has no control. This vulnerability is the sign of despair, which is the occasion for consciousness to heal itself in self-choosing or abdicate its task to exercise itself as free spirit in the dialogue of thought and being. In the phenomenon of irony Kierkegaard finds an illustration of what he calls "boundary zones" to the spheres of existence, by which he means the consciousness of the ideal and all it involves without the choice of it. In the "boundary zone" there is no telos in the proper sense as consciousness entertains the telos of both spheres it bounds. In the third chapter ethical consciousness is seen to be a reflexive, self-choosing consciousness. The self that is chosen is personal existence, which reveals itself as given, in virtue of which one has a history and because of which one must repent. The ethical telos is the eternal validity of the self, which reveals itself as the universal human. Kierkegaard characterizes the ethical choice as absolute, and thus, even though the choice is of subjectivity, the qualification of absolute rules out the possibility of capricious and anarchic subjectivity. such an absolute choice, Kierkegaard believes, must give continuity to the self and must recognize its relation or dependence on something other than itself as it immediately is. With the subjectivity of choice arises the danger of temptation in the form of the possibility of a teleological suspension of the ethical. With this possibility arises the awareness that the self did not create itself but was created by Another, to Whom consciousness may establish a relationship. At this point consciousness may again enter a "boundary zone" of existence as the humorous consciousness, prior to the decision to relate itself to God. In the fourth chapter it is seen that consciousness, in its awareness of itself as dependent is also aware of itself as separated from that on which it defends, and hence that it can assume two attitudes toward this separation, that of resignation and that of faith. When the religious consciousness is characterized by resignation, Kierkegaard calls it religiousness A. When it is characterized by faith, he calls it religiousness B. In religiousness A the dialectical character of existence becomes fully explicit and consciousness becomes a sufferin; consciousness because the continuity it desires cannot be achieved in existence. Hence, in religiousness A consciousness resigns itself to a life of strife. In religiousness A consciousness has arrived as close to the truth as it is able through its own effort. Religiousness B is possible only if the condition for truth is given by God. The condition is faith, not as an exercise of thought, but as a mode of being. The temporality and finitude that characterized personal existence and separate it from its eternal happiness are made compatible with the religious telos in the person of Christ. That is, Christ is the only true mediction. However, Kierkegaard emphasizes that belief in this mediation is possible only at the offense of thought. In the last chapter it is asserted that the significance of Kierkegaard's conception of spheres of existence is that existence is not absurd, and that while man is not self-creating, he is self-choosing. / 2031-01-01

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Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação do Departamento de Filosofia, 2013. / Submitted by Alaíde Gonçalves dos Santos (alaide@unb.br) on 2013-08-15T10:48:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-08-15T10:57:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-15T10:57:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Desde a antiguidade clássica que Eros ou o amor tem sido objeto de investigação filosófica. Notadamente, foi com Platão que o amor ganhou contornos filosóficos e assim ele pode construir de forma paradigmática uma erótica que teve ressonâncias na história da filosofia. O começo deste trabalho faz um retorno à filosofia ‘erótica’ de Platão, com vista a demonstrar como Kierkegaard opera uma continuação, ainda que crítica, da erótica socrático-platônica. Atualiza o tema do amor e investiga como ele aparece na modernidade através do movimento romântico conduzindo-o a uma transfiguração. Na conclusão da erótica kierkegaardiana, impetrada em As Obras do Amor, o Eros não será mais uma idealização ou objeto de predileção, mas uma prática do indivíduo cristão. Kierkegaard se valerá do mandamento bíblico “tu deves amar ao próximo como a ti mesmo” para ensejar uma interpretação polissêmica e cheia de polêmica. O amor ao próximo será a nova face de Eros estabelecida por Kierkegaard. A alteridade e a igualdade são requeridas para se relacionar com o próximo, este que equivale a todos os homens indistintamente. O Eros é transfigurado e assim passa a ser uma prática obrigatória do verdadeiro cristão. O amor passa a ser um dever. _______________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / Since the Classical Antiquity that Eros or the Love has been subject of philosophic investigation. Notably, was Plato that gave to the love philosophical contours and, by this way, he could build, in a paradigmatic form, erotic issues that have resonances in the History of Philosophy. The beginning of this work makes a return to the Plato’s erotic philosophy, in order to demonstrate how Kierkegaard operates one continuation – albeit critical – of the Socratic-Platonic’s erotic. It updates the theme about the love and investigates how it appears in the Modernity through the Romantic Movement, conducting itself to a transfiguration. In the conclusion of the kierkegaardian’s erotic, perpetrated in ‘The Works of Love’, Eros won’t no more be an idealization or an object of predilection but a practice of the Christian individual. Kierkegaard uses the biblical commandment “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” to try a polysemic interpretation full of controversy. The love to the neighbor will be the new face of the Eros, as established by Kierkegaard. The alterity and the equality are required to relate with other persons, which is equivalent to all men, indistinctly. The Eros is transfigured and, by this way, becomes a mandatory practice of the true Christian. Love becomes a duty.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / The intention of this thesis is to dwell on three small, specific texts in the work Either/Or from Danish Soren Aybe Kierkegaard (1813-1855). The first two texts are The erotic immediate states and Seducer's Diary, and are among the texts of the first part of the aforementioned book. The third text entitled The balance between the esthetical and the ethical in shaping the personality and belongs to the second part of the same book. The basis of a detailed explanation of the contents of these texts intends to consider the issue of Kierkegaardian stages (aesthetic, ethical and religious) and how they relate to the existence and consciousness. Within the concrete existence, the question of consciousness appears to the Danish philosopher from the explanation of these three existential dimensions, which are constituted in line with affective provisions and also with material modes of living and acting closely described by the daily existence of character. Bereft, initially, of any determination, the conscience will be materializing itself stemming from its sensitive existence, which keeps different moments and possibilities of its own. The basic thesis being discussed in this context is that these existential moments cannot be considered an evolutionary process, but must be taken as possibilities or ways of life, with its positivity and its risks. This study aims to show how the current readings of Kierkegaard's philosophy tend to value the ethical and moral development of stadiums and ignore the dimension of being more original, the immediate dimension which, when neglected, creates a gap between man and himself. / Essa dissertação pretende deter-se sobre três pequenos e específicos textos constantes da obra Ou... Ou, do dinamarquês Sören Aybe Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Os dois primeiros textos são Os estados eróticos imediatos e Diário do Sedutor, e estão entre os textos da primeira parte do livro supracitado; o terceiro texto intitula-se O equilíbrio entre o estético e o ético na formação da personalidade e pertence à segunda parte do mesmo livro. Partindo de uma explicitação detalhada do conteúdo destes textos pretende-se pensar a questão dos estádios kierkegaardianos (estético, ético e religioso) e a forma como estes se relacionam com a existência e a consciência. No âmbito da existência concreta, a questão da consciência aparece para o filósofo dinamarquês a partir da explanação destas três dimensões existenciais, as quais se constituem em sintonia com disposições afetivas e também com modos materiais de viver e agir, detidamente descritos pela existência cotidiana de personagens. Desprovida, inicialmente, de qualquer determinação, a consciência vai se concretizando a partir de sua existência sensível, que guarda constantemente diferentes momentos ou possibilidades próprias. A tese fundamental a ser discutida, neste contexto, é a de que esses momentos existenciais não podem ser considerados de forma evolutiva, mas precisam ser tomados como possibilidades ou formas de vida, com sua positividade e seus riscos. O trabalho pretende mostrar de que forma as leituras correntes da filosofia de Kierkegaard tendem a enaltecer o aspecto ético e moral dos estádios, acabando por ignorar a dimensão mais originária do ser, qual seja, a dimensão da disposição imediata que, ao ser desprezada, abre um flanco entre o homem e ele mesmo.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / The intention of this thesis is to dwell on three small, specific texts in the work Either/Or from Danish Soren Aybe Kierkegaard (1813-1855). The first two texts are The erotic immediate states and Seducer's Diary, and are among the texts of the first part of the aforementioned book. The third text entitled The balance between the esthetical and the ethical in shaping the personality and belongs to the second part of the same book. The basis of a detailed explanation of the contents of these texts intends to consider the issue of Kierkegaardian stages (aesthetic, ethical and religious) and how they relate to the existence and consciousness. Within the concrete existence, the question of consciousness appears to the Danish philosopher from the explanation of these three existential dimensions, which are constituted in line with affective provisions and also with material modes of living and acting closely described by the daily existence of character. Bereft, initially, of any determination, the conscience will be materializing itself stemming from its sensitive existence, which keeps different moments and possibilities of its own. The basic thesis being discussed in this context is that these existential moments cannot be considered an evolutionary process, but must be taken as possibilities or ways of life, with its positivity and its risks. This study aims to show how the current readings of Kierkegaard's philosophy tend to value the ethical and moral development of stadiums and ignore the dimension of being more original, the immediate dimension which, when neglected, creates a gap between man and himself. / Essa dissertação pretende deter-se sobre três pequenos e específicos textos constantes da obra Ou... Ou, do dinamarquês Sören Aybe Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Os dois primeiros textos são Os estados eróticos imediatos e Diário do Sedutor, e estão entre os textos da primeira parte do livro supracitado; o terceiro texto intitula-se O equilíbrio entre o estético e o ético na formação da personalidade e pertence à segunda parte do mesmo livro. Partindo de uma explicitação detalhada do conteúdo destes textos pretende-se pensar a questão dos estádios kierkegaardianos (estético, ético e religioso) e a forma como estes se relacionam com a existência e a consciência. No âmbito da existência concreta, a questão da consciência aparece para o filósofo dinamarquês a partir da explanação destas três dimensões existenciais, as quais se constituem em sintonia com disposições afetivas e também com modos materiais de viver e agir, detidamente descritos pela existência cotidiana de personagens. Desprovida, inicialmente, de qualquer determinação, a consciência vai se concretizando a partir de sua existência sensível, que guarda constantemente diferentes momentos ou possibilidades próprias. A tese fundamental a ser discutida, neste contexto, é a de que esses momentos existenciais não podem ser considerados de forma evolutiva, mas precisam ser tomados como possibilidades ou formas de vida, com sua positividade e seus riscos. O trabalho pretende mostrar de que forma as leituras correntes da filosofia de Kierkegaard tendem a enaltecer o aspecto ético e moral dos estádios, acabando por ignorar a dimensão mais originária do ser, qual seja, a dimensão da disposição imediata que, ao ser desprezada, abre um flanco entre o homem e ele mesmo.

Ce mémoire se propose d'étudier la conception de la liberté chez Soren Kierkegaard. On y voit sa conception du paradoxe, de la qualité et du saut qualitatif, lesquels constituent la dialectique de la liberté correspondant à son concept d'existence. L'existence est une première base de la liberté. L'autre base est l'intériorité. En l'homme, le christianisme voit un combat intérieur pour devenir meilleur. Notre nature doit faire l'objet d'une perpétuelle réaffirmation, laquelle comporte effort et souffrance. Nous manifestons notre liberté à partir de cette intériorité en devenir et dans une angoisse. L'angoisse est l'état, concrètement envisagé, de l'homme libre devant prendre une décision. L'angoisse vient de tous ces possibles entre lesquels il faudra choisir. Nous examinons également quel est le statut de cet idéal auquel le chrétien doit se rapporter. Nous développons la notion du péché, et nous faisons ressortir quelles sont les caractéristiques du premier choix libre chrétien, c'est-à-dire la chute. Il ressort de notre analyse que la liberté se rapporte à l'autorité par son intériorité. L'autorité a pour elle l'être de l'idéal. De même, toute autorité se doit, de près ou de loin, de correspondre à l'idéal de l'assujetti, sinon il y a contrainte, donc autoritarisme. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Kierkegaard, Existence, Péché, Liberté, Autorité, Théologie, Philosophie, Angoisse, Intériorité, Dieu, Péché originel, Transcendance, Paradoxe, Individu, Désespoir.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-10-21T18:46:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar a relação entre Platonismo e Cristianismo em Migalhas Filosóficas de Kierkegaard, mostrando que a diferença entre os modelos do Platonismo e do Cristianismo, apontadas pelo autor, na relação Mestre e Discípulona mesma obra, assinada por seu pseudônimo Johannes Climacus, não implica que tais modelos sejam essencial e mutuamente excludentes, mas que são passíveis de uma reconciliação. Para tanto, a partir do Platonismo e suas teorias interdependentes de Reminiscência e Metempsicose, será sustentado que a diferença supramencionada é, em certa medida, artificialmente criada ou exageradamente radicalizada pelo autor, e setentará evidenciar eventuais incompatibilidades do Cristianismo assim ‘inventado’ por Climacus com o Cristianismo primitivo (sugerindo pesquisa em Orígenes) e tradicional,bem como alguns dos mais relevantes pontos em comum deste último com o Platonismo, particularmente o Princípio da Imanência. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This work has the object to investigate the relation between Platonism and Christianityin Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, showing that the difference between thePlatonist and the Christian Models, pointed by the author, in the master and disciplerelationship in the same work, signed by the pseudonymous of Johannes Climacus, notimply that such models were essentially and mutually exclusives, but that they couldhave a possible reconciliation. To do such, from the Platonism and its interdependenttheories of Recollection and Metempsychosis, it will be sustained that the differencementioned above is, in certain measure, artificially created or too much radicalized bythe author, and it will be tried to show evidence of eventual incompatibilities betweenthe Christianity so ‘invented’ by Climacus and the Early (suggesting research in Origen)and Traditional Christianity, as well as some of the most relevant common pointsbetween the latter and Platonism, particularly the Principle of Immanence.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2013. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2013-09-02T13:53:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-09-02T14:02:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-02T14:02:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Esta dissertação trata do problema da repetição em Kierkegaard do ponto de vista daquilo que ele concebe como sendo o estético. Tanto as articulações do significado deste conceito dentro da obra A Repetição, quanto o significado do estético nesta e em outras obras, serão trabalhados no sentido de aproximar aquilo que, no texto, aparece associado de maneira apenas indireta. A tarefa, portanto, exige uma exposição detalhada da ideia de repetição em toda a sua abrangência tal como Kierkegaard apresentou, bem como o significado do estético e como a repetição abre seus limites para o religioso enquanto uma postura existencial que a ultrapassa. A colisão entre o estético e o religioso, a partir da qual o poético aparece como uma forma de realização da repetição, consiste, portanto, na ideia central deste trabalho e no tema chave, em que seus elementos deverão ser desenvolvidos tanto em seus aspectos divergentes quanto convergentes. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation intents to see the problem of repetition in Kierkegaard from that point of view which he conceives to be aesthetical. Both the meaning of this concept inside the book Repetition, as well as the meaning of the aesthetic on this matter in this text and in other writings, will be developed in order to bring together what appears linked in the text only in an indirect manner. The task altogether requires a detailed exposition of the idea of repetition in all its complexity as was shown by Kierkegaard, as well as the meaning of the aesthetical and the limits opened by repetition towards the religious as an existential posture that surpasses it. The collision between the aesthetical end the religious, from which the poetical appears as a way of realizing repetition, consists, for that matter, in the main idea of this work and its key-theme, in which its elements shall be developed in both its divergents and convergent aspects.