Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Borer, Douglas A. Second Reader: Rothstein, Hy S. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, International Security and Assistance Force, U.S. Special Operations Forces. Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-116). Also available in print.

Special operations as a military mean have become more important in today’s conflicts. During the last decade, the importance of reliable intelligence has increased. A principle task for special opera-tion forces is Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, but there is not much open research regarding these kinds of Special Reconnaissance operations and related guiding principles and theories are missing. A theory would be valuable to improve the institution of special operation forces by creating the ability to explain what institutional features help or hinder the uses of special operations.Admiral McRaven’s principles and approach is widely accepted as a theory, but was done with McRaven’s own definition of special operation described as Direct Action. The Swedish Military Op-erational Doctrine, regarding special operations, has a foundation drawn from McRaven’s theory.To reach a better understanding and widen the knowledge for the Swedish Armed Forces there is a need for further explanations on what is unique to the special operation forces and special opera-tions. Deficiencies in knowledge and understanding can lead to the wrong use of these forces, when complex intelligence collection mission is to be conducted.The purpose of this case study is to compare McRaven’s principles regarding special operations and their application in conducting a Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance mission. As a result this paper shows that there are emerging guiding Special Reconnaissance principles of importance to be found. McRaven’s principles can be used to some extent, but should be done with caution, since they are not optimized for Special Reconnaissance missions.

Den tredje och fjärde oktober 1993 sköt somaliska rebeller ner två amerikanska Black Hawk-helikoptrar i Mogadishu, Somalia. Dels på grund av ett bristande doktrinärt agerande resulterade det i en 14 timmar lång strid om att överhuvudtaget överleva och många skadades eller omkom. Inte långt därefter lämnade FN och USA Somalia och insatsen sågs som ett militärt misslyckande. Insatsen i Somalia har påverkat amerikanarnas syn på utrikespolitik och den visar tydliga exempel på den komplexitet som counterinsurgency-operationer för med sig. Uppsatsen är en teoriprövande fallstudie där David Kilcullens teorier om upprorsbekämpning prövas på Specialförbandsstyrkan Task Force Rangers insats i Mogadishu, Somalia. Uppsatsen syftar inte till att pröva huruvida Kilcullens teorier fungerar eller ej, utan till att pröva hur och i vilken utsträckning Task Force Rangers medel och metoder överensstämmer med vad Kilcullen förespråkar. Resultatet av denna studie visar att förekomsten av Kilcullens teorier i vissa fall överensstämmer men överlag är väldigt få. Bland annat på grund av komplexiteten i det somaliska samhället och dess kultur. Vidare visar arbetet att den största bidragande faktorn till utfallet av insatsen beror på det bristfälliga underrättelsearbetet som gjordes av Task Force Ranger under den berörda tidsperioden.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2008. / Title from PDF title page; viewed on Nov. 5, 2008. "4 April 2008." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88).

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-107)

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-95). Also available via the Internet.

The use of special operations to achieve political and strategical aims have risen in modern warfare. There is a lack of studies about special operations in general and especially studies about protection against these operations. Therefore, the aim of this essay is to explain how a defensive actor can achieve success against an offensive special operation. Through analyzing William McRaven´s theoretical framework about relative superiority, how an offensive special operation can achieve success, with the reversed ambition three hypotheses are formed. Namely that the probability of the success of a defensive actor depends on a) concealed actions or unsystematic changes in the defense b) a relative to the special operation matutinal indication of the enemy by the defensive actor c) the defensive actor manages to contain or delay the enemy in battle. This study substantiates these hypotheses through the study of two cases of special operations, the raid on Makin Island 1942 and Operation Prelim 1982. The two latter hypotheses were strengthened in the study; however, the result depends on the delamination and definitions of vital concepts of the study. In combination, the hypotheses are an embryo of academical understanding of protection against a special operation and should be considered an inspiration for additional and more extensive studies on the phenomenon.

No description available.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The need for a well thought out, planned, and rehearsed command and control organization to conduct special operations in the US Northern Command Area of Responsibility is vital to success in defending the Homeland. Currently, USNORTHCOM does not have an apportioned or assigned command and control structure for the conduct of special operations. This thesis analyzes three courses of action to fulfill this requirement: use the current USNORTHCOM battle staff command structure including the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North; rely on the newly formed US Special Operations Command's Joint Task Force Structures; and establish a Theater Special Operations Command North assigned to USNORTHCOM. Through the conduct of analysis and research this thesis recommends that The Joint Staff direct the reorganization required to establish a Theater Special Operations Command North to exercise command and control of special operations forces conducting operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. / Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Trying to adapt to the post-9/11 challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, the Romanian Ministry of National Defense continues its efforts to modernize and professionalize the country's armed forces in accordance with NATO standards. Part of this process is the development of a Special Forces (SF) capability that is to accomplish initial operational readiness by FY 2005. With appropriate organizational arrangements and focused combat training, the Romanian SF will increase their performance during future deployments in joint and combined settings. This project analyzes Romania's strategic documents, identifies the missions that can be conducted by the country's General-Purpose Forces or other security services, and finally proposes five appropriate tasks for the SF: Combating Terrorism, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Security Detail for Romanian officials in crisis zones. In exploring what are the most effective structural arrangements for the Romanian Special Forces, this thesis uses a design program the recommendations of which lead to the proposal of a new organizational structure. Thus, it is determined that Romania's Special Forces elements should develop into a flexible, highly-mobile and joint organization displaying a flat hierarchy and centralized command and control. / Lieutenant, Romanian Army