Smaller states face conventional force strength asymmetry against larger states like Russia and, it is in their interest to find ways to mount an effective and multifaceted resistance. Being able to sustain operations on occupied territory against an occupying force could be one of these ways. These operations can be categorized as part of a state’s special operations capacity and furthermore sub-categorized as unconventional warfare. Military logistical theories are based primarily on logistical supply chains where the force largely has its own geographical control or dominance. However special operations in occupied or enemy controlled territory faces the challenge that the geographical area is controlled or dominated by the enemy, effectively blocking sustainment, the question then becomes: How can sustainment for a military force, operating in enemy controlled territory, be achieved? The aim of this study is therefore to make a contribution to theoretical military logistic literature by conducting a theory developing study. This by deductively developing a tentative theoretical framework from existing theories of conventional military logistics combined with special operations theory. The framework is then tested in a qualitative multiple historical case study by using the cases as a testing ground for the theory. The study concludes that the logistical options (methods) needed to sustain the unconventional force are determined by taking into account operational environmental factors such as geography, climate and enemy actions in order to achieve physical access and concealment for supplies. Together access, concealment and planned combat events influence the choice of logistical option or combination of options and as result a build-up time of supply levels is needed before sufficient sustainment is reached. Furthermore, this build-up time is always present no matter if the unconventional operation is planned or not. But, an advantage in force availability and execution exists when planning and preparing campaigns.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Since World War II, the Philippines has confronted threats from communist insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and a few other agitators. Recently, however, a new threat has emerged-- this time coming from a terrorist organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Although the ASG is a relatively small group, it has wrought great injury to the Philippine image as of late. Common among the groups presenting a threat to internal security are that their strategies and tactics tend to be unconventional and asymmetric. This thesis seeks to determine how special operations can improve the AFP's capability to address internal security threats. The study begins by examining the security environments in which the AFP currently operates, and then proceeds to study emerging security environments in which it will likely operate. The current special operations capability of the AFP is explored and assessed, while inquiring whether it needs enhancing. Case studies of past AFP special operations against groups which posed major internal threats are analyzed to determine whether or not the doctrine and strategy of the AFP was correct, especially regarding its use of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Furthermore, this study considers the United States (U.S.) model for special operations, namely the U.S. Special Operations Forces, in proposing a special operations strategy for the AFP that is feasible, suitable, and sustainable. It is suggested that such an examination will produce a strategy that is relevant, adaptable, and responsive to dealing with the internal security environments likely to be encountered by the Philippine government. / Major, Philippine Army

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / SOF members must be fully capable (fluent and adept) at operating in, through and upon networks to maximize the leverage of information technologies. Military information operators must possess the components of network capital (access to technology, computer literacy, and social networking ability), a strong tendency to engage in trusting behavior, high cognitive ability and a formal education. Virtual communities offer a mosaic of social behaviors and practices that provide models for virtual organization(s) within the military. Computermediated communications technologies (CMCTs) provide an inherently neutral but polymorphic forum for human social interaction (cyberspace). Specific emergent social topology (real or virtual) depends on the local social needs of individuals and/or bounded groups (communities). Because differences in topology are emergent, topological models have little predictive value. Virtual communities are better understood and predicted through analysis of their metadata. Virtual communities can be characterized as open or clandestine, according to their purpose, accessibility, level of trust, and primary mode of connectedness (bonding or bridging ties). Both open and clandestine communities offer methods of ensuring high levels of efficiency, trust, and security within military computer-mediated communications networks, as well as providing models of organizational flexibility that can be adapted to SOF missions and roles. / Captain, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis defines the strategic utility of Special Operation Forces (SOF), identifies why SOF only provide limited strategic utility, and presents an operational concept for the reorganization, alignment, and employment of SOF to overcome these shortf alls. The thesis is presented in a deductive manner that argues that SOF were designed for strategic purposes, and leads the reader to conclude that reformation must occur for SOF to provide strategic utility and meet their intent. SOF would be in an optimal position to meet their organizational intent by becoming a fifth armed service within the Department of Defense (DoD). Through the creation of mission-based units and a holistic employment strategy, SOF would become a strategic instrument capability of assisting national decision -makers in blending the elements of national power. Finally, the thesis concludes with additional required areas for research to make this concept become a reality, but that are beyond the scope of this study. / Major, United States Army

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kalev I. Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-96). Also available online.

The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise -- UW is the military’s doctrinal term for support to resistance activities and movements. This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic option for the nation. Through a qualitative methods case study analysis utilizing macro- and micro-level process-tracing with a conceptual framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory, the author shows that viable and acceptable resistance elements existed in Syria in March 2011 to June 2014 and that the conventional US military failed to recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and craft a strategic UW option for the national security decision-makers to consider. This finding is significant in that it exposes a deficiency in the US military’s culture, structure and process that results in an incomplete and insufficient menu of military options for the president. If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this strategic error in the future. The author identifies specific recommendations for national security practitioners; however, the overarching theme is the need to change the institutional culture and the old structures of the conventional military to be able to provide the president a more complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of options to consider when assessing and responding to violent political crises short of conventional war.

Submitted by ALBERTO PINHEIRO NETO (apinheironeto@hotmail.com) on 2014-01-28T22:26:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação PINHEIRO NETO.pdf: 978939 bytes, checksum: d00adb91c3b41d1aa15b345104aa4a04 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2014-02-03T12:43:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação PINHEIRO NETO.pdf: 978939 bytes, checksum: d00adb91c3b41d1aa15b345104aa4a04 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-02-11T12:07:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação PINHEIRO NETO.pdf: 978939 bytes, checksum: d00adb91c3b41d1aa15b345104aa4a04 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-02-11T12:08:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação PINHEIRO NETO.pdf: 978939 bytes, checksum: d00adb91c3b41d1aa15b345104aa4a04 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-17 / Este trabalho de pesquisa tem como objetivo identificar os fatores críticos determinantes para a construção da competência essencial do BOPE, o Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais da Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, uma equipe de alto desempenho com forte autonomia atuando em cenários de alta incerteza. Apresentamos os resultados de um estudo realizado nesta unidade. Conduzimos a pesquisa utilizando métodos qualitativos, com historiografia oral, através de entrevistas em profundidade. Nossos resultados apontam para fatores como liderança, seleção, treinamento, confiança mútua e baixo distanciamento de poder, como críticos e explicativos na construção da competência essencial do BOPE. / This research aims to identify the critical factors determining the construction of the core competence of the BOPE, the Special Police Operations Battalion of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro, a team of high performance and strong autonomy and acting in complex scenarios unpredictable. We present the results of a study conducted in BOPE. Conduct research using qualitative methods, with oral history through interviews. Our findings point to factors such as leadership, selection, training, mutual trust and low power distance, as critics and explaining the construction of the core competence of the BOPE.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5) / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.

Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira / Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions. / Mestre

Durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la Grande-Bretagne tente de diviser les forces allemandes et de nuire à leur effort de guerre en envoyant des agents dans les pays conquis en Europe et en Asie. Ces agents sont chargés de rapatrier les soldats alliés, de saboter les lignes de communication ennemies ou encore de coordonner la Résistance. Parmi tous les agents parachutés se trouvent une quarantaine de Canadiens recrutés pour leur connaissance du français et envoyés infiltrer la France. L’étude suivante fait état de leur parcours dans les forces spéciales britanniques, de l’importance que prend le caractère francophone des agents, mais surtout de la collaboration entre Londres et Ottawa entourant leur prêt. Comment le Canada soutient-il la Grande-Bretagne dans ses opérations derrière les lignes ennemies? Quel rôle les agents canadiens y occupent-ils? Comment sont-ils perçus par les Britanniques? Grâce aux archives militaires canadiennes et britanniques, particulièrement les correspondances entre les deux pays au sujet des agents et les dossiers militaires des agents, nous explorons la participation canadienne aux forces spéciales britanniques, plus précisément dans le Special Operations Executive et le MI 9. Notre étude s’étend de la création de ces organisations à leur dissolution, de leurs opérations en France à celles en Asie, du recrutement des Canadiens jusqu’à leur retour à la vie civile. Ce mémoire montre que l’expérience et les capacités des agents canadiens acquis en France les rend intéressants auprès des opérations spéciales britanniques au-delà des capacités linguistiques ayant initialement mené à leur recrutement. / During World War II, Britain attempted to divide German forces and undermine the Nazi war effort by sending agents behind enemy lines in the conquered countries of Europe and Asia. These agents were tasked with repatriating allied soldiers, sabotaging enemy communication lines, and coordinating the resistance movements. Among the agents were around thirty Canadians recruited for their knowledge of French. The following study outlines their journey in the British special forces, highlighting the need of French-speaking agents and how London organize its use of soldiers from its former colony. How does Ottawa support Britain in its operations behind enemy lines? What role do Canadian agents play? How are they perceived by the British? Through Canadian and British military archives, notably the correspondence between the two countries regarding Canadian agents and the soldier’s military records, we explore Canadian participation in British special forces, specifically in the Special Operations Executive and MI9. This study explores the creation of those organizations to their dissolution, their operations in France to those in Asia, the Canadian agents’ recruitment and their return to civilian life. This paper shows that the experience and capabilities the Canadian agents acquired in France made them interesting to the British special operations beyond the linguistic skills that initially led to their recruitment.