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1	Regressing forward: army adaptability and animal power during World War II Martin, Jason C. January 1900 (has links) Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark Parillo / America forged a successful way of war that relied on adaptation, and this trait was not simply an adjunct to industrial might as a reason why the Allies won World War II. An American penchant for organization and corporate management allowed for mass production of war material, which clearly contributed to Axis defeat. However, to claim that the Axis Powers were merely overwhelmed by an avalanche of weapons and supply is reductionist. This dissertation contends that adaptability was as much an American way of war as mass production and overwhelming firepower. The particular nature of American adaptability and its contribution to Allied victory are exhibited in the Army’s use of animal power during a conflict synonymous with mechanized warfare and advanced technology. The application of pre-modern technology in a modern, machine-driven war was not archaic. On the contrary, the nature of American adaptability allowed the Army to move forward by retreating down a culturally constructed hierarchy of modernity and employing the traditional mode of animal transportation. The Army’s technological regression from motors to mules in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India during World War II is the focus of this work. Americans possessed material abundance in campaigns across Western Europe and the Central Pacific in 1944 and 1945, as German and Japanese prisoners attested. Mountains of artillery shells, fuel, and food, however, did not exist in the backwater “sideshows.” American military success on the periphery was not due to material abundance, nor to a greater sense of determination. America won the backwater campaigns because the nature of American adaptability was cultivated over the centuries and converted from a way of life to an American way of war. Adaptability World War II Mules Army Animal power American way of war History (0578)
2	As forças de operações especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão: um novo modo de guerra americano? Jorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo [UNESP] January 2009 (has links) (PDF) Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5) / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions. Imperialismo Estados Unidos - Política e governo Special Operations Forces American Way of War Afghan Model Military Transformation George W. Bush Donald Rumsfeld United States of America
3	As forças de operações especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão : um novo modo de guerra americano? / Jorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo. January 2009 (has links) Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira / Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions. / Mestre Imperialismo. Estados Unidos - Política e governo. Special Operations Forces. eng American Way of War. eng Afghan Model. eng Military Transformation. eng George W. Bush. eng Donald Rumsfeld. eng United States of America. eng
4	As Forças de Operações Especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão: um novo modo de guerra americano? / United States Special Operations Forces and the intervention in Afghanistan: a new American way of war? Jorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo 23 March 2009 (has links) Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bernardo Wahl Goncalves de Araujo Jorge.pdf: 1473998 bytes, checksum: 8cefb96903764170d80df6eb0969cfa8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the military transformation that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a new american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of global war on terror , went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da transformação militar que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um novo modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de guerra ao terror , as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas Forças de Operações Especiais Modo de guerra americano Modelo afegão Transformação militar Bush, George W -- 1946- Rumsfeld, Donald -- 1932- Afeganistao, Guerra do, 2001 Guerra contra o terrorismo, 2001 Estados Unidos -- Relacoes exteriores Special Operations Forces American way of war Afghan model Military transformation United States of America
5	The Limits of Fire Support: American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam War Hawkins, John Michael 16 December 2013 (has links) Excessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time. It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War. 11th marines 12th marines abrams air force allied american way of war ammunition army artillery attrition arvn australian b-52 birtle budget cap cea classical clausewitz clifford coled-v collins communist congress constraints conventional counter-battery counterinsurgency dollar expenditures filipino finances fire support firepower five-by-five free world military fwmaf h&i haines harold harrassment hunt hybrid interdiction johnson kalergis komer korean krepinevich laird leonard taylor lewy lyndon macv marines mcnamara mekong nagl new zealand nixon nva observed operations philippine preemptive preparatory resor restraint riverine rok savings sensors sorley south vietnamese strategy summers tactics thai third country trinity unconventional unobserved usarv van fleet viet cong vietnam westmoreland wheeler wise men

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