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Showing 1 to 10 of 10 (0.032 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"horsepower""
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En tung börda på amfibieskyttesoldatens axlar? : Eller har rörligheten varit prioriterad… / A heavy burden on the marine infantry soldiers shoulders? : Or has mobility been in priority...Nilsson, Richard January 2010 (has links)
<p>Bakgrunden till studien är att vikten på den enskilda soldaten ökar allt mer vilket reducerar rörligheten. Om soldaten bär för tungt ökar risken för att verkan inte kan avges på rätt plats i rätt tid på grund av minskad rörlighet. Terrängen som amfibiesoldaten verkar i medför att stor del av striden sker till fots vilket torde betyda att rörligheten borde vara prioriterat för soldaten. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om rörlighet har varit prioriterat, för en amfibieskyttesoldat när den bedriver strid till fots, gentemot vikten på och plutonens anpassning av verkans- och skyddsutrustning. Metoden som använts är en jämförelse mellan amfibieskyttesoldatens olika utrustningsalternativ med de vikter som fastställts i författarens analysverktyg som utgår från de amerikanska doktrinerna. Även amfibieskytteplutonens anpassning av verkans- och skyddsutrustning ingår i analysverktyget. De tekniker som använts är litteratursökning, deltagande observation från verksamhetsförlagdutbildning på AmfStriS och intervju med en grundutbildad amfibieskyttegruppchef. Slutsatsen från studien är att rörlighet inte har varit prioriterat kopplat till vikten och plutonensarbete med att anpassa verkans- och skyddsutrustning. Det är framförallt skyddsnivån och ammunitionsmängd som påverkar slutsatsen. Det skulle vara svårt för plutonchefen att förklara en soldats skada eller dödsfall med att rörlighet prioriterats framför verkan och skydd. Alltså tränar soldaten som den skall strida, med andra ord skyddsnivå HÖG och all ammunition med.</p> / <p>The background to this study is that the weight of an infantry soldier is increasing, which reduces the mobility. If the soldier is carrying too much equipment there’s a substantial risk that efficient fire can’t be delivered in the right place at the right time. The marine infantry soldier operates in an environment where most of the combat is by foot. This would mean that mobility must be in priority. The aim of this paper is to examine if the mobility has been in priority, for a marine infantry soldier, in comparison with the weight of the equipment and the marine platoons work to adapt the firepower and protection equipment. The method used is a comparison between the different options of equipment for the marine infantry soldier with the weights that the author confirm in his analysis tool which are based on FM 7-8 andFM 7-10. The marine infantry platoons adaption of equipment to improve mobility is also included in the analysis tool. The techniques to collect information are literature review, participant observation and an interview with a basic trained marine infantry squad leader. The conclusion from this study is that mobility hasn’t been in priority coupled to the weight of the equipment and the platoon’s adaptation of equipment to improve mobility. It’s the level of protection and the amount of ammunition that particular affect the answer to the conclusion. There would be difficulties for a platoon commander to explain a soldier’s injury or death with the explanation that mobility was in priority in comparison with protection and firepower. The marine infantry soldiersare training as they fight, which means that they bring all ammunition and choose a HIGH level inprotection.</p>
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En tung börda på amfibieskyttesoldatens axlar? : Eller har rörligheten varit prioriterad… / A heavy burden on the marine infantry soldiers shoulders? : Or has mobility been in priority...Nilsson, Richard January 2010 (has links)
Bakgrunden till studien är att vikten på den enskilda soldaten ökar allt mer vilket reducerar rörligheten. Om soldaten bär för tungt ökar risken för att verkan inte kan avges på rätt plats i rätt tid på grund av minskad rörlighet. Terrängen som amfibiesoldaten verkar i medför att stor del av striden sker till fots vilket torde betyda att rörligheten borde vara prioriterat för soldaten. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om rörlighet har varit prioriterat, för en amfibieskyttesoldat när den bedriver strid till fots, gentemot vikten på och plutonens anpassning av verkans- och skyddsutrustning. Metoden som använts är en jämförelse mellan amfibieskyttesoldatens olika utrustningsalternativ med de vikter som fastställts i författarens analysverktyg som utgår från de amerikanska doktrinerna. Även amfibieskytteplutonens anpassning av verkans- och skyddsutrustning ingår i analysverktyget. De tekniker som använts är litteratursökning, deltagande observation från verksamhetsförlagdutbildning på AmfStriS och intervju med en grundutbildad amfibieskyttegruppchef. Slutsatsen från studien är att rörlighet inte har varit prioriterat kopplat till vikten och plutonensarbete med att anpassa verkans- och skyddsutrustning. Det är framförallt skyddsnivån och ammunitionsmängd som påverkar slutsatsen. Det skulle vara svårt för plutonchefen att förklara en soldats skada eller dödsfall med att rörlighet prioriterats framför verkan och skydd. Alltså tränar soldaten som den skall strida, med andra ord skyddsnivå HÖG och all ammunition med. / The background to this study is that the weight of an infantry soldier is increasing, which reduces the mobility. If the soldier is carrying too much equipment there’s a substantial risk that efficient fire can’t be delivered in the right place at the right time. The marine infantry soldier operates in an environment where most of the combat is by foot. This would mean that mobility must be in priority. The aim of this paper is to examine if the mobility has been in priority, for a marine infantry soldier, in comparison with the weight of the equipment and the marine platoons work to adapt the firepower and protection equipment. The method used is a comparison between the different options of equipment for the marine infantry soldier with the weights that the author confirm in his analysis tool which are based on FM 7-8 andFM 7-10. The marine infantry platoons adaption of equipment to improve mobility is also included in the analysis tool. The techniques to collect information are literature review, participant observation and an interview with a basic trained marine infantry squad leader. The conclusion from this study is that mobility hasn’t been in priority coupled to the weight of the equipment and the platoon’s adaptation of equipment to improve mobility. It’s the level of protection and the amount of ammunition that particular affect the answer to the conclusion. There would be difficulties for a platoon commander to explain a soldier’s injury or death with the explanation that mobility was in priority in comparison with protection and firepower. The marine infantry soldiersare training as they fight, which means that they bring all ammunition and choose a HIGH level inprotection.
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Teknologi & Numerär : Frågan om vem som vinner / Technology vs. Preponderance : The Question of How to be VictoriousHansson, Johan January 2010 (has links)
<p>The reason for this study is to settle the balance between technology and preponderance in war. Each theory claims its own superiority to be decisive when it comes to achieving military victories, but this study will show what actually happens when the two theories are analyzed together in the same conflict. To prove the conclusions, a case-study on Operation Gazelle is used. The study will describe the theories, what a military victory is and which party in the conflict came out victorious after this specific operation. Both sides’ forces will be shown and compared. The most significant technological systems will be analysed and compared. When this is done, the victory and the theories’ importance can be explained. Operation Gazelle was an act performed by Israel in October 1973 during the conflict with Egypt. It was an attempt to cross the Suez Canal and in that way gain an improved political status during the peace negotiations that were to come. The main question that will be answered is:- Which of the two theories, numerical preponderance and technology, is decisive when it comes to achieving military goals? To answer this question three other questions are answered:- What were the numerical conditions during Operation Gazelle?- What were the technological conditions between the parties?- Which party was victorious?</p>
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Cost and Capability Evaluation of the Marine Corps Combined Arms Regiment (CAR)Gentry, Robin G. 12 1900 (has links)
Upon consultation with NPS faculty, the School has determined that this thesis may be released to the public, its distribution is unlimited effective August 25, 2011. / One result of the break-up of the Soviet Union is that the DOD has been forced to reevaluate the roles of each of the Armed Services based on the declining resource pool. From the Marine Corps' evaluation of itself came the Combined Arms Regiment (CAR) concept. The objective of this study was to develop an estimate of the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of the two possible vehicles used with the CAR and the CAR's components. Standard cost factors are used to cost out the various organizations involved. Two supporting analyses done in this study are: an evaluation of the Marine Corps' role in national security and how the CAR could be used to support that security role, and a comparison of the vehicle option operating characteristics which was done to enrich the dimensions under which the CAR could be evaluated. The results of the study are a tool which can help Marine Corps planners make more informed decisions in regards to the CAR concept. The final conclusion, based on the assumption that any CAR would act as a follow-on element of the MAGTF, was that although the CAR(LAV) was a workable option, the CAR using upgraded AAVs was the better, more cost effective option.
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Helikopters överlevnad mot en kvalificerad motståndareArrenäs, Rickard January 2018 (has links)
Syftet med studien har varit att ur ett militärtekniskt överlevnadsperspektiv ta fram underlag över vilken verkansförmåga helikopter 16 behöver under ett transportuppdrag, i en nationell insats där hotet utgörs av mekaniserat infanteri. Studien har genomförts som en kvalitativ studie med ett visst kvantitativt inslag och baseras på data och fakta hämtad ur öppen litteratur samt genom intervjuer av uppdragsspecialister med erfarenhet och kunskap inom dörrskytte. Till hjälp har metodverktyget A´WOT-analys använts, vilken är en hybrid till SWOT-analysen. Syftet med A´WOT-analysen är att skilja ut de faktorer som behövs för verkan från helikopter 16 mot en definierad motståndare. Det samlade resultatet och sammanfattningen av studien är att helikopter 16 verkansförmåga behöver en omfattande uppgradering, om uppdrag som egen taktisk enhet skall kunna genomföras i en hotmiljö som utgörs av en kvalificerad motståndare. / The purpose of the study has been to investigate, from a military technical survival perspective, the effectiveness of helicopter 16 during a transport mission, in a national effort where the threat consists of a qualified opponent. The study has been conducted as a qualitative study with a certain quantitative element and based on data and facts obtained from open literature as well as interviews by mission specialists with experience and knowledge from door gunnery. As a help, the method tool A'WOT analysis have been used, which is a hybrid to the SWOT analysis. The purpose of the A'WOT analysis is to distinguish important factors for the effect from helicopter 16 against a defined opponent. The overall result and summary of the study is that helicopter 16 action ability needs a proper upgrade if assignments as a tactical unit can be carried out in a hot environment dictated by a qualified opponent.
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Teknologi & Numerär : Frågan om vem som vinner / Technology vs. Preponderance : The Question of How to be VictoriousHansson, Johan January 2010 (has links)
The reason for this study is to settle the balance between technology and preponderance in war. Each theory claims its own superiority to be decisive when it comes to achieving military victories, but this study will show what actually happens when the two theories are analyzed together in the same conflict. To prove the conclusions, a case-study on Operation Gazelle is used. The study will describe the theories, what a military victory is and which party in the conflict came out victorious after this specific operation. Both sides’ forces will be shown and compared. The most significant technological systems will be analysed and compared. When this is done, the victory and the theories’ importance can be explained. Operation Gazelle was an act performed by Israel in October 1973 during the conflict with Egypt. It was an attempt to cross the Suez Canal and in that way gain an improved political status during the peace negotiations that were to come. The main question that will be answered is:- Which of the two theories, numerical preponderance and technology, is decisive when it comes to achieving military goals? To answer this question three other questions are answered:- What were the numerical conditions during Operation Gazelle?- What were the technological conditions between the parties?- Which party was victorious?
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An Army without doctrine the evolution of US Army tactics in the absence of doctrine, 1779 to 1847 /Harvey, Conrad E. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M. of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / "A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and Science, Military History." Title from cover page of PDF file (viewed: May 29, 2008).
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The disparity surrounding the integration of Joint Fires an argument for a Joint Fires Observer (Airborne) (JFO(A)) /Phillippi, David M. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.
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The Limits of Fire Support: American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam WarHawkins, John Michael 16 December 2013 (has links)
Excessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time.
It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War.
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Low Intensity Conflict: Contemporary Approaches and Strategic ThinkingSearle, Deane January 2007 (has links)
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC.
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