Inaug.-Diss. -- Göttingen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [vi]-xi).

On 12 June 1986, at a joint sitting of the three houses of Parliament, the State President declared a National State of Emergency. In his speech he said: “. . .the sporadic instances of violence have once again begun to increase and have taken on such proportions that I am of the opinion that the ordinary laws of the land at present on the statute book are inadequate to enable the Government to ensure the security of the public and to maintain public order.” What were the State President’s reasons for declaring the State of Emergency? Was the Government’s action justified? What of the rule of law? Has the National State of Emergency achieved its objectives? When will the National State of Emergency be lifted?

[pt] O estado de sítio constitui uma figura constitucional essencial à compreensão das estruturas políticas democráticas. Se por um lado é mecanismo de proteção da sociedade, alargando os limites da autoridade estatal para rápida ação em situações excepcionais, por outro pode ser instrumento legitimador de arbitrariedades e abusos intervencionistas. As freqüentes decretações de estado de sítio durante a Primeira República brasileira servem como um indicativo das vicissitudes que permeavam os poderes estatais e das tentativas de consolidar o regime republicano federativo no país. A partir da compreensão de que o fenômeno normativo jurídico do estado de sítio pode ser visto como um fenômeno lingüístico, o presente trabalho analisa o instituto constitucional, durante o referido período histórico, com base nas teorias de linguagem de viés culturalista desenvolvidas por Mikhail Bakhtin e Pierre Bourdieu. Para tanto, foram examinados discursos sobre o sítio produzidos nas esferas dos três poderes públicos federais, registrados, principalmente, nos anais da Assembléia Constituinte, do Senado Federal e da Câmara dos Deputados, em mensagens redigidas pelos Presidentes da República e em decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal. O estudo desses materiais, que leva a concluir que as disputas pelos sentidos do estado de sítio foram marcadas por relações lingüísticas de poder simbólico e que o instituto funcionou como meio de configuração das estruturas políticas e jurídicas da Primeira República, está estruturado em três partes: a primeira dedicada aos trabalhos constituintes, a segunda ao processo de concretização dos dispositivos constitucionais e a terceira à reforma da Constituição aprovada em 1926. / [en] Understanding the constitutional precept of the state of siege is essential to understanding the democratic political structures. If, on the one hand, it is a mechanism for the society s protection, thus broadening the limits of the state authority for a quick action in exceptional situations, then on the other hand it can be a legitimizing instrument of arbitrariness and interventionist abuses. The frequent declarations of state of siege during Brazil s First Republic can indicate the vicissitudes that used to permeate the state powers and the attempts to consolidate the federative republican regime in the country. Given that the normative juridical phenomenon of the state of siege can be seen as a linguistic phenomenon, the current work analyses the constitutional institution during the aforementioned period, based on the language theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and Pierre Bourdieu and their culturalist bias. Discourses on the state of siege produced by the three branches of the federal powers - mostly registered in the annals of the Constituent Assembly, the Senate and the House of Deputies, presidential messages and Supreme Court decisions - have been examined. The study of these materials is structured in three parts - the first, dedicated to the making of a new constitution, the second, concerning the solidification process of the constitutional rules and the third, dealing with the 1926 constitutional reform - and leads to the conclusion that the disputes on the meanings of state of siege were characterized by linguistic relations of symbolic power and that this institution worked as a means to configure the political and juridical institutions of the First Republic.

O trabalho ora apresentado versa a respeito do delicado problema dos sistemas de emergência. A tese objetiva demonstrar, num primeiro momento, o quanto a legislação de emergência pátria está defasada e com pouca chance de êxito na hipótese do Brasil ser acometido por uma crise de grandes proporções. E, diante desse cenário, propor um novo sistema constitucional de crise. Inicia-se a tese abordando os precedentes históricos das medidas de emergência, seus tipos e suas classificações. No segundo capítulo, explora-se as medidas de emergência previstas no direito brasileiro. Na terceira parte do trabalho, são analisados os estudos de autores clássicos referentes aos problemas da defesa da ordem constitucional. Analisa-se também o trabalho do Professor de Direito e Ciência Politica na Universidade de Yale Bruce Ackerman. No quarto capítulo são investigados os pontos positivos e negativos dos diferentes instrumentos de exceção existentes, fundados impreterivelmente na concentração de plenos poderes nas mãos do Executivo. No derradeiro capítulo da tese é apresentado um novo modelo de sistema constitucional de crise para o Brasil. Trata-se da instituição de uma espécie de conselho, formado a partir da indicação dos chefes dos três poderes do Estado, que se reuniria nos momentos de tempestades institucionais para decidir, conjuntamente, a respeito das providências de exceção a serem adotadas. A fórmula constitucional proposta se consubstancia num instituto tripartite, ou seja, numa aliança de três pessoas. É uma solução político-institucional inovadora e desenvolvida com vistas a aparar a maior parte das deficiências e inconveniências da vigente técnica de defesa brasileira. Denomina-se triunvirato de emergência. / The work here presented is about the delicate problem of the emergency systems. The thesis aims to demonstrate, at a first, how much the homelands emergency system is outdated and with little chance of success in the case of Brazil being affected by a major crisis. And, with this scenario in mind, propose a new constitutional crisis system. The thesis starts by addressing the historical precedents of the emergency measures, their types and their classifications. The second chapter explores the emergency measures provided for in Brazilian law. In the third part of the work, the studies of classical authors referring to the problems of constitutional order defense are analyzed. It also examines the work of Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University Bruce Ackerman. In the fourth chapter the strengths and weaknesses of the existing different instruments of exception are investigated, founded imperatively in the concentration of full powers in the hands of the Executive. In the final chapter of the thesis a new constitutional crisis system model for Brazil is presented. It is about the institution of a kind of council, formed from the indication of the heads of the three branches of government, which would meet in times of institutional storms to decide, jointly, about the exception steps to be taken. The proposed constitutional formula is embodied in a tripartite institute, meaning an alliance of three people. It is an innovative political-institutional solution and developed in order to trim most of the deficiencies and drawbacks of the current Brazilian defense technique. It is called \"emergency triumvirate\".

O trabalho ora apresentado versa a respeito do delicado problema dos sistemas de emergência. A tese objetiva demonstrar, num primeiro momento, o quanto a legislação de emergência pátria está defasada e com pouca chance de êxito na hipótese do Brasil ser acometido por uma crise de grandes proporções. E, diante desse cenário, propor um novo sistema constitucional de crise. Inicia-se a tese abordando os precedentes históricos das medidas de emergência, seus tipos e suas classificações. No segundo capítulo, explora-se as medidas de emergência previstas no direito brasileiro. Na terceira parte do trabalho, são analisados os estudos de autores clássicos referentes aos problemas da defesa da ordem constitucional. Analisa-se também o trabalho do Professor de Direito e Ciência Politica na Universidade de Yale Bruce Ackerman. No quarto capítulo são investigados os pontos positivos e negativos dos diferentes instrumentos de exceção existentes, fundados impreterivelmente na concentração de plenos poderes nas mãos do Executivo. No derradeiro capítulo da tese é apresentado um novo modelo de sistema constitucional de crise para o Brasil. Trata-se da instituição de uma espécie de conselho, formado a partir da indicação dos chefes dos três poderes do Estado, que se reuniria nos momentos de tempestades institucionais para decidir, conjuntamente, a respeito das providências de exceção a serem adotadas. A fórmula constitucional proposta se consubstancia num instituto tripartite, ou seja, numa aliança de três pessoas. É uma solução político-institucional inovadora e desenvolvida com vistas a aparar a maior parte das deficiências e inconveniências da vigente técnica de defesa brasileira. Denomina-se triunvirato de emergência. / The work here presented is about the delicate problem of the emergency systems. The thesis aims to demonstrate, at a first, how much the homelands emergency system is outdated and with little chance of success in the case of Brazil being affected by a major crisis. And, with this scenario in mind, propose a new constitutional crisis system. The thesis starts by addressing the historical precedents of the emergency measures, their types and their classifications. The second chapter explores the emergency measures provided for in Brazilian law. In the third part of the work, the studies of classical authors referring to the problems of constitutional order defense are analyzed. It also examines the work of Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University Bruce Ackerman. In the fourth chapter the strengths and weaknesses of the existing different instruments of exception are investigated, founded imperatively in the concentration of full powers in the hands of the Executive. In the final chapter of the thesis a new constitutional crisis system model for Brazil is presented. It is about the institution of a kind of council, formed from the indication of the heads of the three branches of government, which would meet in times of institutional storms to decide, jointly, about the exception steps to be taken. The proposed constitutional formula is embodied in a tripartite institute, meaning an alliance of three people. It is an innovative political-institutional solution and developed in order to trim most of the deficiencies and drawbacks of the current Brazilian defense technique. It is called \"emergency triumvirate\".

En France, à la suite de précédentes constitutions, la Constitution de la Ve République consacre l’état de siège (art. 36) ; à l’étranger, de nombreux pays l’ont adopté. Ce constat laisse béant un paradoxe suivant : si la France adopte, la première, une législation d’exception, elle n’offre pas pour autant de réflexion approfondie sur ce qu’est l’état d’exception. L’étude des origines et de l’histoire de l’état de siège met au jour les raisons d’un tel paradoxe.L’état de siège est originellement une disposition technique du droit militaire (loi des 8-10 juillet 1791), qui prévoit que, dans certaines circonstances, l’ordre public et la police passent de l’autorité civile, compétence par principe, à l’autorité militaire. Ainsi, la loi prévoit le renversement du principe selon lequel l’autorité civile prime sur le militaire. Au cours de la Révolution, cette disposition est utilisée afin de réprimer les troubles violents qui se multiplient à l’intérieur du territoire. Durant le XIXe siècle, les régimes successifs y recourent également, jusqu’à ce que la Cour de cassation, en 1832, donne un coup d’arrêt à cette pratique. Le législateur est donc contraint d’adopter un texte – la loi du 9 août 1849 – qui encadre précisément son usage. Cette loi est, véritablement, une législation d’exception, au sens où elle contrevient à un principe consacré par l’ordre constitutionnel, en fonction de circonstances déterminées, pour un temps et un lieu circonscrits. Elle accorde également à l’autorité militaire des pouvoirs étendus qui restreignent les libertés publiques, et consacre la compétence des juridictions militaires pour juger les non-militaires. / In France, following previous Constitutions, the state of siege gained acceptance under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (art. 36); many countries abroad adopted it. This fact leaves a gaping paradox: even if France adopts the first emergency legislation, it does not mean that it provides an in depth reflection on what is the state of emergency. The study of the genesis and history of the state of siege reveals the reasons for such a paradox. Originally, the state of siege was a technical measure of military law (law of July 8-10, 1791), which provided that in certain circumstances, public order and police would transfer from the civil authority, competent on principle, to the military authority. Thus, law foresaw the reversal of the principle according to which the civil authority takes precedence over the military. During the Revolution, this measure was used to suppress the violent unrest that became more frequent inside the territory. Throughout the nineteenth century, successive governments had also recourse to it until the Supreme Court put an end to this practice in 1832. Consequently ,the legislator was forced to pass a bill - the Law of August 9, 1849 - which would frame precisely its use. This law truly is an emergency law, which means that it contravenes a principle enshrined in the constitutional order, depending on specific circumstances, for a circumscribed time and place. It also gives to the military authority enlarged powers which restrict civil liberties, and establishes the jurisdiction of military courts to judge non-military courts.

La loi du 19 juin 1851 qui étatise la police de Lyon marque une rupture majeure dans l’histoire du maintien de l’ordre en France. Depuis la Révolution française, les maires ont en effet été chargés de la police dans toutes les communes françaises, Paris exceptée. À partir de 1851, Lyon fait donc figure d’exception. Parce qu’elle s’est signalée par ses colères récurrentes depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle, qu’elle est considérée comme la capitale du sud-est de la France et que sa population apparaît unanimement comme rétive à toute forme de domination, elle passe pour une cité rebelle. Dans le contexte d’un « Printemps des peuples » marqué par les soulèvements réguliers des partisans de la République démocratique et sociale, en juin 1848 puis en juin 1849, Lyon devient aux yeux des autorités, le quartier général de tous ceux qui veulent renverser l’ordre social en France voire en Europe. Or, durant cette période, la police lyonnaise donne chaque jour les preuves d’une défaillance complète face à la criminalité et à la délinquance, malgré une réorganisation générale tentée à l’automne 1848. En réaction, le pouvoir parisien place progressivement Lyon « hors du droit commun ». La ville et ses faubourgs sont d’abord privés de leurs gardes nationales en juillet 1848, lesquelles ne seront jamais réorganisées, à la différence des autres municipalités, car elles sont perçues, entre Rhône et Saône, comme peu sûres, faibles face à l’émeute et promptes à se retourner contre l’armée et la police. Le 15 juin 1849, une nouvelle insurrection éclate à Lyon. Réprimée par l’armée, elle enclenche la réforme générale de l’organisation administrative et policière de la ville et des faubourgs. Dans l’immédiat, Lyon et les cinq départements de la 6e division militaire sont placés et maintenus en état de siège. Tentée une première fois à l’automne 1849, la réforme aboutit avec la loi du 19 juin 1851. Désormais, Lyon jouit d’une police étatisée, aux mains d’un préfet du Rhône devenu préfet de police, agissant dans une nouvelle entité administrative, l’agglomération lyonnaise, qui regroupe une douzaine de communes et faubourgs. Le décret du 24 mars 1852 fait aboutir cette réforme, en supprimant le maire et en attribuant ses fonctions au préfet, en annexant les communes suburbaines et en divisant la ville en cinq arrondissements. Sur le plan policier, les services sont réorganisés jusqu’en 1854, sur la base des modèles parisien, londonien et genevois. La police d’État lyonnaise traverse le Second Empire et devient le modèle à partir duquel les polices des préfectures de plus de 40 000 habitants sont étatisées en 1855. Cette pérennité de la police d’État ne doit pourtant pas dissimuler une contestation permanente de son existence au cours des années 1860, au Corps législatif puis au Conseil général du Rhône. Les élus républicains demandent en effet la restitution à Lyon d’une municipalité élue, prélude au retour de la ville dans le « droit commun » sur le plan policier. Progressivement, la surveillance politique de l’agglomération s’avère difficile à assurer et les effectifs policiers apparaissent insuffisants. C’est néanmoins la défaite de Sedan qui aura raison de la police d’État. La République proclamée, la municipalité lyonnaise tout juste recomposée reprend immédiatement la direction du maintien de l’ordre le 4 septembre 1870 / The law of 19th June 1851 which establishes state control over the police of Lyon marks a major break in the history of urban policing in France. Since the French Revolution, mayors were in charged of the police in all the French municipalities, Paris excepted. From 1851, Lyon thus became an exception. Because it differenced itself by its recurring revolts since the end of the XVIIIth century, because it is considered as the capital of the southeast-part of France and because its population appeared unanimously as refusing any kind of domination, it was considered as a rebel city. During the "people’s spring" marked by the regular uprisings of the partisans of the democratic and social Republic, in June, 1848 then in June, 1849, Lyon became for the authorities, the headquarters of all those who wanted to turn upside down social order in France and even in Europe. Yet, during this period, the police of Lyon gave daily proofs of a total failure to fight criminality, in spite of a general reorganization tempted in autumn 1848.In reaction, the Parisian power gradually put Lyon "outside the common law". The city and its suburbs were firstly deprived of their national guards in July 1848, unlike the other municipalities, because its guards were perceived, between the Rhône and the Saône, as weak in front of riots and quick to turn around against the army and the police. On June 15th 1849, a new uprising burst in Lyon. Repressed by the army, it engaged the general reform of the administrative and police organization of the city and the suburbs. Lyon and the five departments of the 6th military division had immediately been are placed and maintained under state of siege. Firstly tried in autumn 1849, the reform succeeded with the law of 19th June 1851. From then on, Lyon had a state-controlled police, in the hands of the prefect of the Rhône who became a prefect of police, acting in a new administrative entity, the Lyon agglomeration, which included a dozen municipalities and suburbs. The decree of March 24th, 1852 made this reform succeed, by suppressing the mayor and by attributing its functions to the prefect, by annexing the suburban municipalities and by dividing the city into five districts. On the police plan, services were reorganized until 1854, on the basis of the models of Paris, London and Geneva.The State police of Lyon crossed the Second Empire and became the model from which the polices of the prefectures of more than 40 000 inhabitants passed under state control in 1855. Nevertheless, the State police is contested during the 1860s, in the Legislative Corps and the General Council of the Rhône. The republican asked for the restoration of an elected municipality in Lyon, seen as the first step of the return of the city in the police "common law". Gradually, political surveillance of the urban space became increasingly difficult, and the police staff seemed insufficient. Nevertheless, it was the defeat of Sedan that would mark the end of the State police. Once the Republic had been proclaimed, the municipality of Lyon just recomposed took back immediately the direction of the police on September 4th, 1870.