Thesis--University of Oregon. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--University of Oregon. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the first question. Meta-epistemological scepticism is the thesis that a satisfying philosophical explanation of how our knowledge of the world is possible is itself not possible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the second question. In this thesis, I explore the prospects of meta-epistemological scepticism. In particular, I structure the thesis around two master arguments from Stroud (1984, 2000, 2004, and 2009) for meta-epistemological scepticism. The first argument is what I call “Stroud’s puzzle”, and the second argument is “Stroud’s dilemma” (cf. Cassam 2009). I argue that Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. However, I also argue that Stroud’s dilemma withstands serious objections (e.g., from Sosa 1994, Williams 1996, and Cassam 2009). In short, while Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism, Stroud’s dilemma does seem to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. This thesis therefore represents a partial defence of meta-epistemological scepticism. Meta-epistemological scepticism is therefore a live option in epistemology. In Chapter 1, I explain what meta-epistemological is, present Stroud’s puzzle and Stroud’s dilemma for meta-epistemological scepticism, and argue that meta-epistemological sceptics are not committed to first-order scepticism. In Chapter 2, I examine what I call the “anti-revisionist” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 3, I examine the “conditional scepticism” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 4, I look at Williams’s (1996) master argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and argue that it fails. In Chapter 5, I look at externalist responses to Stroud’s dilemma, and in particular, Sosa (1994). I argue that Sosa’s objection fails, and therefore Stroud’s dilemma survives serious externalist objections. In Chapter 6, I explain Cassam’s (2009) argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and I argue that it fails. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarising the main results.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-129).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-129).

The phenomenon of phantom limb pain has been well documented for centuries, but little clinical work has been done to alleviate it. Physician and neuroscientist Vilayanur S. Ramachandran began researching this condition nearly two decades ago, and has discovered a promising alternative treatment: mirror-box therapy. This therapy is not yet widely accepted by the scientific and medical communities because there is insufficient data explaining how and why it works. This study analyzes Ramachandran's rhetoric promoting the therapy. Scott Stroud's melioristic method is applied to Ramachandran's scientific and popular publications. The purpose is to determine whether or not his rhetoric is melioristic in that it promotes positive, and thus, pragmatic changes. This thesis indicates the important insights pragmatism can yield when utilized in acts of rhetorical criticism. / Graduation date: 2012

Thesis (MScFor (Forest and Wood Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / The aim of this study was to develop a set of models that will allow the determination of volume for Tectona grandis trees and stands grown in plantation form in Tanzania. As a secondary objective, models describing tree and dominant stand height were developed. Total volume and volume ratio models were fitted that respectively predict total tree volume and merchantable volume. In order to allow the calculation of volume for different product classes and dimensions, taper models were fitted. All the data were collected by non-destructive sampling methods using a Barr and Stroud optical dendrometer. This proved to be an accurate and inexpensive method of collecting data for developing volume and taper models. Sampling stratification was based on age and site quality and as wide a range as possible was covered to ensure adequate representation of all growing sites and ages present in Tanzanian teak plantations. A total of 2617 individual observations were made from 222 trees at three teak plantations. Several models were selected from the literature to describe teak volume and shape. Results indicated that the Schumacher and Hall (1933) volume equation best describes total volume over and underbark to a fixed upper limit of 7.5 cm. Merchantable volume to upper stem diameter and height limits were best described by respectively the Burkhart (1977) volume ratio model and the Cao and Burkhart (1980) modification thereof. Many of the fitted taper models were unable to adequately describe stem shape over the whole stem, mainly due to the large range in tree sizes and ages used in model fitting. The variable form taper model by Perez, Burkhart and Stiff (1990) provided the best results according to various criteria and is recommended for predicting teak underbark diameters to various heights and, if only a single model is required, the merchantable volume. Top height growth of teak stands was adequately described by the generalized Schumacher (1939) model with the value of the exponent k estimated from the sample data. From this a series of anamorphic site index curves were developed. Suitable height-dbh curves were obtained by a simple linear model and predictions improved by including stand age and site index as predictor variables.

Notre étude s'attache à reconnaitre en Thompson Clarke, le précurseur d'un contextualisme épistémique puissant qui rend compte de l'applicabilité conceptuelle et ce que prétendent signifier les philosophes. En effet, Clarke examine les définitions épistémologiques traditionnelles à propos de la nature des concepts, du philosopher, de l'ordinarité et du scepticisme. En étudiant la nature de l'épistémologie traditionnelle, il ambitionne de substituer à la méthode austinienne, sa propre méthode d'examen des présupposés concernant la nature de l'expérience et du langage. Il défend ainsi une philosophie de la connaissance programmatique qui nous interroge sur ce que nous faisons avec nos concepts en matière de connaissance. Elle peut être réalisée à partir de l'examen du legs du scepticisme, à savoir : un nouvel éclairage apporté à la nature et aux procédures du scénario sceptique montre manifestement que la prétendue objectivité attribuée à l'ordinarité n'est que superficielle ou relative. L'idée clarkienne de relative non-objectivité n'est en aucune mesure identifiable ou réductible à un relativisme ou à un subjectivisme épistémique. Selon Clarke, il n'existe pas de traits internes à l'expérience. Il suggère simplement que l'existence des objets nous est confirmée à partir de traits caractéristiques que nous discernons, reconnaissons et identifions comme tels. Ces traits qui caractérisent les objets nous permettent d'établir l'applicabilité des concepts. Or, l'ordinarité n'a pas proprement de traits qui la restreindraient à être de telle ou telle manière, comme le prétendent les philosophes et les sceptiques. Cette prétention relève d'un rêve d'une complétude intégrale de la concevabilité de la structure de l'ordinarité partagé implicitement par les épistémologues et leurs détracteurs, les sceptiques. Le rêve et la veille ne sont pas deux expériences au sein d'un genre qu'il suffirait d'identifier. Tout comme le rêve n'a pas de traits caractéristiques qui viendraient déterminer son application ou sa non-application, l'ordinarité n'a pas de traits en propre qui nous permettent fondamentalement de déterminer et de fixer, ni une limite à celle-ci, ni une frontière absolue entre le philosophique et le non philosophique. Pour ces raisons, selon Clarke, nous ne savons pas foncièrement, ni ce qu'est un concept, ni pourquoi les concepts et leurs applications, comme ceux de Plain et de Philosophical, sont susceptibles d'être sensible au contexte. / Our study focuses on the recognition that Thompson Clarke was the precursor of a powerful epistemic contextualism which gives an account of conceptual applicability and what philosophers claim to mean. Clarke examines the traditional epistemological definitions pertaining to the nature of concepts, of philosophizing, of ordinarity and of skepticism. By studying the nature of traditional epistemology, his ambition is to substitute his own method for examining presuppositions with regard to the nature of experience and of language for that of Austin. He thus defends a philosophy of programmed understanding which makes us look at what we do with our concepts regarding understanding. It can be achieved by an examination of the legacy of skepticism, i.e. a new light thrown on the nature and the procedures of the skeptic’s scenario manifestly show that the so-called objectivity attributed to ordinarity is only superficial or relative. The Clarkian idea of relative non-objectivity is in no way identifiable with, or merely reduced to, epistemic relativism or to epistemic subjectivism. According to Clarke, experience has no internal features. He simply suggests that the existence of objects is confirmed by characteristic features that we discern, recognize and identify as such. These features which characterize objects enable us to establish the applicability of the concepts. However, ordinarity does not strictly have features which would restrict it from being thus or thus as philosophers and skeptics claim. This claim belongs to a dream of a completedness of the conceivability of the structure of ordinarity shared implicitly by the epistemologists and their detractors, the skeptics. The states of dreaming and waking are not two experiences of a type which it suffices to identify. Just as the dream does not have characteristic features which will determine its application or its non-application, ordinarity does not have features of its own which fundamentally enable us to determine and to fix either a limit to it, or an absolute boundary between the philosophical and the non philosophical. For these reasons, according to Clarke, we don’t really know what a concept is, nor why concepts and their applications, such as those of the Plain and of the Philosophical, are likely to be context-sensitive.