No description available.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo provar que há mais espaço para elaboração de regras morais no utilitarismo de Mill quando comparado ao utilitarismo de Bentham. Para que esta tese seja provada é necessário comprovar que a concepção de natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill é mais complexa do que a concepção de natureza humana de Bentham, pois é a ciência da natureza humana que constitui o fundamento das prescrições da moralidade. Esta tese provará que a natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Bentham resume-se a uma natureza humana dotada, principalmente, de uma razão capaz de formular cálculos complexos entre prazer e dor (que inclui a intensidade, proximidade, longinquidade, etc) para decidir sobre a melhor ação (aquela que aponta para o prazer, no cômputo geral do balanço). Em outras palavras, um apelo ao primeiro princípio, ao princípio de utilidade é efetuado a cada ação, questionando as regras do costume e reduzindo o espaço da moral a apenas ao princípio de utilidade. Para Mill, ao contrário, a natureza humana é mais complexa. Ela é composta, de leis da mente ou leis psicológicas, da tese hedonista (que significa que os indivíduos buscam prazer e evitam a dor, assim como para Bentham) e subteses da tese hedonista, como o fato de que os indivíduos, por natureza, agem por hábito, possuem faculdades elevadas das quais derivam prazeres de qualidade superior e possuem a capacidade de se transformar ao longo do tempo. Essas características da natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill permitem converter um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que prescreve que é correto buscar o prazer e fugir da dor como característica central, mas que ressalta que mais elementos precisam ser aventados para que se compreenda a busca do prazer ou a busca da felicidade. É precisamente quando a formulação do princípio de utilidade de Mill abre espaço para que mais elementos precisem ser expostos para que se entenda a busca do prazer ou a maximização da felicidade, que surge a possibilidade de elaboração de regras morais, preceitos ou princípios secundários que permitem que o agente guie-se no mundo prático. Em outras palavras, a natureza mais complexa do indivíduo teórico de Mill admite a elaboração de um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que dá margem à elaboração de uma moralidade também mais complexa, com mais regras morais (ainda que inicialmente embasadas em um cálculo de prazer) relativamente à moral de Bentham. / This work aims to prove that there is more place for the elaboration of moral rules in Mills utilitarianism when compared to Benthams utilitarianism. To prove this thesis it is necessary that Mills conception of human nature be more complex than Benthams conception of human nature, given the fact that it is science of human nature which holds the foundation of morality. This thesis will prove that human nature of Benthams individuals is resumed to a human nature which main feature is an instrumental reason, able to formulate complex calculations between pleasure and pain (which includes intensity, proximity, duration, etc of the pleasures and pains) to decide about the best action (the one which decides for pleasure, once made the balance). In other words, an appeal to the first principle, to the principle of utility is done in each action, questioning customary rules and reducing morality to the principle of utility. For Mill, on the contrary, human nature is more complex. It consists of laws of mind or psychological laws, of hedonistic thesis (which means that individuals look for pleasure and avoid pain in the same sense as Benthams individuals) and sub-thesis of hedonistic thesis, such as the fact that individuals act by habit, they have elevated faculties which derive pleasures of higher qualities and they hold the capacity of transforming themselves through time. Those human nature features of Mills individuals permits to formulate a more complex principle of utility which determines that it is right to look for pleasure and right to avoid pain as the main feature, but many more elements need to be sustained in order to achieve a better understanding of happiness. It is precisely when the formulation of Mills principle of utility opens room for more elements to explain the search of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or the maximization of happiness, that the possibility of formulation of moral rules becomes plausible. Secondary principles are necessary in Mills system to be formulated, so the agent can guide himself in the practical world without an appeal to the first principle in each action. In other words, Mills more complex individuals nature permits the elaboration of a more complex principle of utility which opens place for the elaboration of a more complex morality with more moral rules (even if, initially, those moral rules are grounded on a calculation between pleasure and pain) when compared to Benthams morality.

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Zugl.: Giessen, Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit.

The present investigations study the John Stuart Mill thinking and his position towards paternalism justification, taking into account the harm principle elaborated in his book “On Liberty”. Two are the objectives of this paper. In first place, the anti - paternalist tesis sustained by this autor will be analyzed to identify deficiencies and limitations. In second place, it is sought to determine to what extent they actually opposed such interventions, to verify the accuracy of that somewhat extended belief that sees Mill a strong opponent of paternalism. It is concluded that the defects of Mill’s theses are explained in good account due to an excess of optimism in the capacities of human beings for self-regulation, a strong skepticism about the capacity of the State to achieve effective paternalistic measures, granting From an excessively strong and unrealistic weight to individual autonomy, among other erroneous considerations. It is also concluded that it is not correct to say that John Stuart Mill has maintained an extremely broad or almost absolute antipaternalistic thesis. Although his famous principle of harm makes it impossible to validate many measures of this nature, a more detailed review of his entire work shows that Mill admitted the validity of many interventions in adults. / La presente investigación estudia el pensamiento de John Stuart Mill y su posición alrededor de la justificación del paternalismo, tomando en consideración el principio de daño elaborado en su obra “Sobre la libertad”. Dos son los objetivos de este trabajo. En primer lugar, se analizarán las tesis anti-paternalistas sostenidas por este autor para identificar sus deficiencias y limitaciones. En segundo lugar, se busca determinar hasta qué punto dichas tesis realmente se opusieron a dichas intervenciones, para verificar la exactitud de aquella creencia algo extendida que considera a Mill como un fuerte opositor del paternalismo. Se concluye que los defectos de las tesis de Mill se explican en buena cuenta debido a un exceso de optimismo en las capacidades de los seres humanos para la auto-regulación, un fuerte escepticismo sobre la capacidad del Estado para lograr medidas paternalistas efectivas, el otorgamiento de un peso excesivamente fuerte e irrealista a la autonomía individual, entre otras consideraciones erróneas. Asimismo se concluye que no es correcto afirmar que John Stuart Mill haya sostenido una tesis anti-paternalista sumamente amplia o casi absoluta. Si bien su famoso principio de daño permite excluir de validez a muchas medidas de dicha naturaleza, una revisión más detallada de toda su obra permite mostrar que Mill admitió la validez de muchas intervenciones en adultos.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo provar que há mais espaço para elaboração de regras morais no utilitarismo de Mill quando comparado ao utilitarismo de Bentham. Para que esta tese seja provada é necessário comprovar que a concepção de natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill é mais complexa do que a concepção de natureza humana de Bentham, pois é a ciência da natureza humana que constitui o fundamento das prescrições da moralidade. Esta tese provará que a natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Bentham resume-se a uma natureza humana dotada, principalmente, de uma razão capaz de formular cálculos complexos entre prazer e dor (que inclui a intensidade, proximidade, longinquidade, etc) para decidir sobre a melhor ação (aquela que aponta para o prazer, no cômputo geral do balanço). Em outras palavras, um apelo ao primeiro princípio, ao princípio de utilidade é efetuado a cada ação, questionando as regras do costume e reduzindo o espaço da moral a apenas ao princípio de utilidade. Para Mill, ao contrário, a natureza humana é mais complexa. Ela é composta, de leis da mente ou leis psicológicas, da tese hedonista (que significa que os indivíduos buscam prazer e evitam a dor, assim como para Bentham) e subteses da tese hedonista, como o fato de que os indivíduos, por natureza, agem por hábito, possuem faculdades elevadas das quais derivam prazeres de qualidade superior e possuem a capacidade de se transformar ao longo do tempo. Essas características da natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill permitem converter um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que prescreve que é correto buscar o prazer e fugir da dor como característica central, mas que ressalta que mais elementos precisam ser aventados para que se compreenda a busca do prazer ou a busca da felicidade. É precisamente quando a formulação do princípio de utilidade de Mill abre espaço para que mais elementos precisem ser expostos para que se entenda a busca do prazer ou a maximização da felicidade, que surge a possibilidade de elaboração de regras morais, preceitos ou princípios secundários que permitem que o agente guie-se no mundo prático. Em outras palavras, a natureza mais complexa do indivíduo teórico de Mill admite a elaboração de um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que dá margem à elaboração de uma moralidade também mais complexa, com mais regras morais (ainda que inicialmente embasadas em um cálculo de prazer) relativamente à moral de Bentham. / This work aims to prove that there is more place for the elaboration of moral rules in Mills utilitarianism when compared to Benthams utilitarianism. To prove this thesis it is necessary that Mills conception of human nature be more complex than Benthams conception of human nature, given the fact that it is science of human nature which holds the foundation of morality. This thesis will prove that human nature of Benthams individuals is resumed to a human nature which main feature is an instrumental reason, able to formulate complex calculations between pleasure and pain (which includes intensity, proximity, duration, etc of the pleasures and pains) to decide about the best action (the one which decides for pleasure, once made the balance). In other words, an appeal to the first principle, to the principle of utility is done in each action, questioning customary rules and reducing morality to the principle of utility. For Mill, on the contrary, human nature is more complex. It consists of laws of mind or psychological laws, of hedonistic thesis (which means that individuals look for pleasure and avoid pain in the same sense as Benthams individuals) and sub-thesis of hedonistic thesis, such as the fact that individuals act by habit, they have elevated faculties which derive pleasures of higher qualities and they hold the capacity of transforming themselves through time. Those human nature features of Mills individuals permits to formulate a more complex principle of utility which determines that it is right to look for pleasure and right to avoid pain as the main feature, but many more elements need to be sustained in order to achieve a better understanding of happiness. It is precisely when the formulation of Mills principle of utility opens room for more elements to explain the search of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or the maximization of happiness, that the possibility of formulation of moral rules becomes plausible. Secondary principles are necessary in Mills system to be formulated, so the agent can guide himself in the practical world without an appeal to the first principle in each action. In other words, Mills more complex individuals nature permits the elaboration of a more complex principle of utility which opens place for the elaboration of a more complex morality with more moral rules (even if, initially, those moral rules are grounded on a calculation between pleasure and pain) when compared to Benthams morality.

No description available.

When thinking about Stuart Hall’s theoretical legacy, ‘power’ is probably not the first term that comes to mind. Concepts like representation, racism, ethnicity, encoding/decoding, articulation, conjunctural analysis etc. more readily suggest themselves and structure our reception of his work. Yet nonetheless, when taking a closer look, his entire oeuvre may be said to be permeated, on different levels, by themes that touch upon the issue of power, not least in connection with the concepts listed above. The latent omnipresence of power in Hall’s thinking is perhaps most readily detectable on the meta-level on which he situates and positions himself as a cultural-studies scholar, and it is this level that hence will be addressed first. In the second section, Hall’s view of power on the economic, social and state levels will be considered, particularly by pointing out his indebtedness to Antonio Gramsci’s conception of hegemonic power. In an attempt to let Hall speak for himself as much as possible, the section will provide quite a few quotes, many of which will be taken from the collaboratively written Policing the Crisis, in order to shed some light on his – and his co-authors’ – ideas about power. The third section attempts a systematisation of the issues raised, particularly by integrating a Foucauldian perspective on power, which was nearly as important for Hall as the Gramscian. The last section will conclude by returning to the beginning, reconsidering Hall’s self-positioning within the power/knowledge nexus that structures the discourse of cultural studies.

In the past decades, political theory and philosophy have seen the canonization of a new conceptual difference, whose roots have been traced back to a number of thinkers, but whose main theoretical elaboration can be said to have begun with the Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique founded by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in 1980 and closed in 1984: the difference between la politique and le politique, or between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. As Chantal Mouffe (2005a: 8f), borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, has pointed out, the two terms operate on different levels: whereas ‘politics’ refers to the ‘ontic’ level and designates the empirical ‘facts’ of political organization – practices, institutions, discourses, etc. – ‘the political’ implies a philosophical inquiry at the ‘ontological’ level, asking, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1981: 12) put it, about the ‘essence of the political’. While, in theorists as diverse as Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek, Claude Lefort, Roberto Esposito, Ernesto Laclau, and many others – most of them located on the political left – this inquiry has yielded very different results, they all agree on the basic necessity to make this distinction between conventional politics, on the one hand, and a more profound dimension concerning the institution of the social itself, on the other. Similarly, virtually all the thinkers mentioned are in agreement as to the state of the political in the contemporary world: they all see it as in danger of being ignored, repressed or neutralized in the context of what they criticize as increasingly ‘post-political’ and ‘post-democratic’ social arrangements. This critique of today’s post-politics is a powerful and important one. In the following, I want to argue that the work of Stuart Hall to some extent shares in – in fact, anticipates, since most of the relevant theories were developed after 1989 – this critical discourse. More specifically, I will 1) bring out and discuss Hall’s critique of post-politics; 2) elaborate upon his own understanding of the political, which is implicit in this critique and elsewhere in his writings – I will argue that Hall’s thought can be considered as belonging to what the sociologist Oliver Marchart (2010) has termed ‘the moment of the political’, insofar as it is a product of and response to our ‘post-foundational condition’, emphasizing as it does conflictuality, contingency and the groundlessness of society; 3) and finally, building on this, I will briefly talk about the conclusions concerning (ontic) politics that the post-foundationalism Hall shares with most of the other theorists I have mentioned leads him to, which are very different from those arrived at by philosophers such as Badiou, Rancière or Žižek and closer – partly via the shared engagement with Gramsci – to those of Mouffe and Laclau or Lefort.

No description available.