The Popular Front Policy of the Communist International contributed to the unity of the Popular Front coalitions in France and Spain that won the elections in 1936. It also led to progress for the Communist Party. This never happened in Sweden, but there was some anti-fascist unity within the working class movement. Communist and Social Democrats worked together within the Jansson-Mineur-Committee (1935–1938), an organisation working for the release of two Swedish seamen imprisoned in Nazi Germany. This study examines the Popular Front Policy of the Communist Party of Sweden within the Committee. In relation to previous research, this study’s main contribution is a detailed analysis of the Popular Front Policy on a practical organisational level. The Communists had decisive influence on the Committee, which achieved considerable anti-fascist unity. But unlike in France or Spain, this anti-fascist unity did not lead to broader unity and to progress for the Communist Party, because the dominant Social Democratic Party blocked the Communists efforts. Also, the anti-fascism in France and Spain was different from the Swedish anti-fascism which was mainly directed against foreign fascism. These factors constrained the possibilities of transferring the anti-fascist unity into a general unity within the working class movement.

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and analyze how the Soviet Union attempted to win the sympathies of the Swedish population during the period 1945-1958 through the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Sweden-Soviet Union Societies. The dissertation includes the central Soviet decision-making apparatus’ general formulation of strategy and what means were to be used to win the sympathies of populations in other countries. Concerning VOKS’s work targeting Sweden, this dissertation examines the general strategies and means used in practice. This dissertation links these activities with realism which serves as an analytical framework. Realism focuses states seeking their security in the international system. Security is considered achievable through strategies for using different means of force, in this case, diplomacy and its sub-instruments in the form of soft power and public diplomacy. Immediately after World War II, VOKS was seen by the Soviets as a tool for countering American and British propaganda. VOKS’s reorganization in the early 1950s led to more country-specific activities. Increasingly in the 1950s VOKS sought out partners from outside organizations associated with national communist parties. This strategy aimed to optimally convey the message and to popularize the Soviet Union. This also led to a decline in VOKS’s importance. VOKS during the period 1945-1958 can be viewed as a collaborative project between the state and the party.  The Soviet Union, through VOKS, used the Sweden-USSR Society to popularize the country among the Swedish public. VOKS took increasingly greater control over the societies’ activities, which were reviewed and approved by the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm and VOKS in Moscow. To develop these societies, VOKS increased its efforts to influence the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP) to take part in the societies’ activities. At the suggestion of VOKS in Moscow, the local Sweden-USSR societies formed a national organization in the autumn of 1950 called the Sweden-Soviet Union Federation. After 1953, VOKS’s interest intensified in implementing and developing cultural collaborations with other actors in addition to the societies. Near the end of VOKS’s existence, representatives from the Soviet Embassy and VOKS tried to establish an intergovernmental cultural agreement with Sweden. However, no such agreement was ever signed. The Soviet Union continued to channel most of its public diplomacy toward Sweden through the societies.

This essay examines two communist parties in Sweden; The Communist Party (Kommunistiska partiet [KP]) and Sweden's Communist party (Sveriges kommunistiska parti [SKP]). Furthermore, this essay is a comparative study where the two parties' political agendas are compared. The method with which the study was conducted is a quantitative content analysis, where the frequencies of usage pertaining to certain words and expressions have been measured. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx has also been compared to these two parties' political agendas concerning words and expressions. This was done in order to determine which of the examined parties stands closer to the aforementioned original document from an ideological perspective. The result reveals which differences that were detected.

År 1935 invaderar Italien under ledning av Benito Mussolini Etiopien, på den tiden kallat Abessinien. Kriget föregicks av en lång tids mobilisering och debatt, både i omvärlden och i Sverige. Den här uppsatsen handlar om hur tidningarna Ny Dag och Folkets Dagblad påverkades av Sovjetunionens politik gentemot Abessinienkrisen 1935 i deras egna ställningstaganden i Abessinienkrisen, samt hur det påverkade deras syn på antikrigsdemonstrationer i Sverige. Ny Dag var partitidning för Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti och Folkets Dagblad för Socialistiska Partiet. Källmaterialet i denna uppsats består av bevarade upplagor ifrån Ny Dag och Folkets Dagblad som finns i Kungliga bibliotekets mediearkiv. Undersökningen är uppdelad i två tidsperioder, mellan januari-juli 1935 samt juli-oktober 1935. Detta för att Kominterns kongress äger rum i augusti 1935 samt att kriget bryter ut i oktober. Även om båda tidningarna var motståndare till Italiens invasion av Abessinien visar resultatet av denna undersökning på att det rådde stora motsättningar mellan tidningarna om hur antikrigsarbetet skulle föras, samt att tidningarnas relationer till Sovjetunionen i hög grad präglade tidningarnas ställningstaganden. Detta var extra tydligt efter Kominterns 7:e kongress i augusti 1935, då tidningarna upptog en bitter och intensiv rivalitet gentemot varandra kring Abessinienfrågan. Medan Ny Dag i stort sett var helt eniga med Kominterns riktlinjer gällande Abessinienkrisen och på vilket sätt antikrigsarbetet skulle föras, ställde sig Folkets Dagblad skarpt kritiskt till Komintern och Ny Dag i dessa frågor. Ämnen som tidningarna kom att vara oense om var Sovjetunionens roll i Abessinienkrisen, Nationernas Förbunds roll samt Sveriges roll och hur antikrigsrörelsen i Sverige skulle mobiliseras.

This dissertation concerns Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (SKP) [the Swedish Communist Party] – in 1967 renamed Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna (VPK) [the Left Party – the Communists] and in 1990 renamed Vänsterpartiet (V) [the Left Party] – and the Party's process of coming to terms with history and its communist legacy. The aim of the study is to describe and analyse the SKP/VPK/V's process of coming to terms with history for the period 1956-2006, and to set out and problematise the driving forces and constraining mechanisms of this process. The theoretical framework of the study consists of Gunnar Sjöblom’s theory about party strategies of political parties in multi-party systems and Michael Freeden’s conceptual approach to ideology analysis.      During the period of study the SKP/VPK/V has, like no other political party in Sweden, been ascribed historical guilt regarding its own party history but also regarding the effects of world communism. The Party has thus found itself in a situation where it has had history as an adversary. The process of coming to terms with history has mainly revolved around three issues: independence (1956-1977), international ties (1977-1989) and a broadening beyond the communist tradition (1986-2006). The internal debate within the Party has linked these issues to calls for change aimed at ridding the party of what is considered undesirable elements of the Communist legacy. By analysing the arguments pursued in favour of these calls, it is possible to pick out a number of the driving forces behind the Party's process of coming to terms with history, namely an ambition to obtain vote maximisation, programme realisation and maximisation of parliamentary influence. The urge to distance the Party from certain aspects of its communist past has thus been related to fundamental goals that political parties in multi-party systems seek to obtain.      The results of the dissertation show that it is possible to pick out five main constraining mechanisms in the Party's process of coming to terms with history. 1) The safeguarding of Party cohesion. 2) The safeguarding of the distinctive character of the Party.  3) The need to resist external pressure. 4) The desire to avoid unfair apportioning of blame. 5) The safeguarding of the right to define the substance of one's own ideology. The existence of these constraining mechanisms help to explain why the process of coming to terms with history lingered on for several decades, and also why it seems to have been a process of such complexity for the Swedish Communist and Post-Communist Party.