In this thesis, I study three aspects of sell-side analysts’ stock price forecasts, henceforth target prices: analyst teams’ target price forecast characteristics, analysts’ use of information to revise target prices, and determinants of target price disagreement between analysts.The first essay studies the target price forecast performance of team analysts in the UK and finds that teams issue timelier but not less accurate target prices. Unlike evidence from previous studies, my findings suggest that analyst teamwork may improve forecast timeliness without sacrificing forecast accuracy. However, market reactions to team target price revisions are not significantly different from those to individual analyst target price revisions, suggesting that although target prices issued by analyst teams are timelier and not less accurate than those of individual analysts, investors do not consider analyst team target prices more informative. I conjecture that analysts may work in teams to meet the demand to cover more companies while maintaining the quality of research by individual team members rather than to issue more informative reports.In the second essay, I study how analysts revise their target prices in response to new information implicit in recent market returns, stock excess returns and other analysts’ target price revisions. The results suggest that analysts’ target price revisions are significantly influenced by market returns, stock excess return and other analysts’ target price revisions. I also find that the correlation between target price revisions and stock excess returns is significantly higher when the news implicit in these returns is bad rather than good. I conjecture that analysts discover more bad news from the information in stock excess returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it becomes inevitable, while they disclose good news early. Using a new measure of bad to good news concentration, I show that the asymmetric responsiveness of target price revisions to positive and negative stock excess returns is significant for firms with the highest concentration of bad news but is insignificant for firms with the lowest concentration of bad news. I argue that firms with the highest concentration of bad news are more likely to withhold and accumulate bad news. The findings, therefore, support my hypothesis that analysts discover more bad news than good news from stock returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it is inevitable. The third essay examines the determinants of analyst target price disagreement. I find that while disagreement in short-term earnings and in long-term earnings growth forecasts are significant determinants, recent 12-month idiosyncratic return volatility has the strongest explanatory power for target price disagreement. The findings suggest that target price disagreement is driven not only by analyst disagreement about short-term earnings and long-term earnings growth, but also by differences in analysts’ opinions about the impact of recent firm-specific events on value drivers beyond short-term future earnings and long-term growth, which are eventually reflected in past idiosyncratic return volatility.

Denna studie granskar aktieanalytikers arbetsmetodik, deras påverkan på aktiemarknaden samt deras upplevda yrkesproblematik. För att åskådliggöra detta har vi genomfört tio djupintervjuer med aktörer från dagens finansbransch. Fem analytiker från de större analyshusen samt fem experter från diverse relaterade finansområden har intervjuats. Målsättningen är att granska analytiker utifrån dessa tio respondenters olika perspektiv och därmed tydliggöra analytikers roll i det finansiella maskineriet. Detta uppnås genom att fokusera på tre delområden: Hur analytiker faktiskt praktiserar sitt yrke och vad för vetenskaplig förankring de har (1), vad de har för påverkan på aktiemarknaden (2) samt vilka svårigheter de upplever att yrket möter i dagsläget och en nära framtid (3). Studien påvisar att variablerna bakom aktievärderingarna är viktigare än värderingsverktyget i sig. Analytikers verktyg för analys är därför bristande vilket har sitt ursprung i företagsekonomins ofullständiga finansiella teorier. De aktörerna med störst påverkan på marknaden är de professionella och institutionella placerarna. Det framgår även att analytiker inte har någon större påverkan på marknaden, vilket var studiens utgångpunkt. Småsparare bör vara medvetna om dessa fakta och inte blint följa riktkurser eller rekommendationer. Slutligen kan studien påvisa att analytiker inte befinner sig i en helt oberoende ställning gentemot arbetsgivare, kunder och bolagen de analyserar. Att konstant värna om dessa relationer leder till direkta och indirekta agentkostnader som slutligen drabbar kunderna och analyshuset. / This paper examines analysts' methodology, their impact on the stock market and their perceived professional problems. To illustrate this, we have conducted ten interviews with profiles from today's financial industry. Five analysts from larger investment banks and five experts from various related financial areas were interviewed. The goal is to examine analysts from these ten respondents' perspectives and thereby clarify the analyst’s role in the financial machinery. This is achieved by focusing on three areas: How analysts actually practice their profession and what scientific basis they have (1), what their impact on the stock market is (2) and the difficulties they believe that the profession is facing today and in the near future (3). The paper shows that the variables behind set value of the stock are more important than the tools of how to set the value itself. The analysts’ tools for analyzing are therefore lacking which can be derived from the fact that the financial theories within the community of business administration often are incomplete. The profiles with the greatest impact on the market are the professional and institutional investors. Furthermore, the paper shows that analysts do not have a major influence on the market, which was the study's starting point. Small investors should be aware of these facts and not blindly follow target prices or recommendations. Finally, the study shows how analysts do not have an unbiased relationship towards their employers, clients or the companies they analyze. Constantly trying to preserve these relations leads to direct and indirect agency costs that ultimately affect the clients and investment banks.

Genom att använda ett stort urval av riktkurser utgivna på företag inom OMXS30 under åren 2010–2019, undersöker vi huruvida riktkursförändringar ger upphov till en marknadseffekt eller inte. Med hjälp av en eventstudie visar vi på en signifikant riskjusterad avkastning dagarna omkring förändringen i riktkursen. Genom att dela in riktkursförändringarna i kvintiler, visar studien att graden av riskjusteradavkastning dessutom är hänförbart till dels hur pass stor riktkursförändringen är, dels om den är att beakta som positiv eller negativ. Dessa resultat är särskilt starka när förändringen i riktkursen är ställd mot den tidigare riktkursen av samma analyshus, snarare än när den är ställd mot rådande aktiekurs. Därtill genomförs en regressionsanalys vars resultat stödjer ett positivt samband mellan riktkursförändring och riskjusterad avkastning. Slutligen medför studien ny relevant information om kvartalsrapporters effekt när det kommer till studier om riktkursförändringar. Till skillnad från den tidigare forskningen, eliminerar vi riktkurser som sammanfaller med kvartalsrapporter och visar på skillnader i den riskjusterade avkastningen som följer. / By using a large dataset of target prices issued on companies included in the OMXS30 index during the years 2010-2019, we examine whether target prices cause a short-term market reaction. By doing this, we take an event-study approach and find a significant abnormal return around the days the target price is published. By categorizing the change in target prices into different quintiles, we also show that the size of the abnormal return is due to the change in the target price and whether it’s considered positive or negative. These results are especially salient when the change in target price is based on the earlier target price from the same firm rather than the current stock price. In addition to the event-study a regression analysis is performed, which supports the positive association between the target price change and the abnormal return. This paper also provides useful information about the effects from quarterly reports in prior studies. Unlike previous research, we exclude all target prices that coincide with quarterly reports and find differences in the abnormal return that follows.

Cette thèse de doctorat comporte trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, nous étudions le comportement moutonnier d'investisseurs individuels français. Notre analyse empirique repose sur une base de données de presque 8 millions de transactions réalisées entre 1999 et 2006 par 87 373 investisseurs individuels français. Nous montrons que le comportement moutonnier persiste dans le temps et que la performance passée ainsi que le niveau de sophistication influencent ce comportement. Nous tentons également d'apporter une réponse à une question très peu abordée dans la littérature : adopter un comportement moutonnier est-il profitable pour l'investisseur individuel ? Notre analyse empirique indique que les investisseurs contrariants obtiennent des rendements plus extrêmes (positifs ou négatifs) que les investisseurs moutonniers. Dans le second chapitre, nous montrons que mesurer la précision d'une prévision du prix futur d'une action n'est pas suffisant pour évaluer la qualité de cette prévision car la prévisibilité des prix est susceptible d'évoluer dans le temps et dépend du titre considéré. Nous montrons que la persistance dans les différences individuelles de précision des prévisions d'analystes, mis en avant dans la littérature, ne constitue pas une preuve de différences de compétences entre analystes. Cette persistance est, en réalité, causée par une persistance de la volatilité de la rentabilité des titres. Nous introduisons une mesure de qualité des prévisions qui incorpore à la fois l'erreur de prévision et la prévisibilité du prix. La théorie des options nous fournit les éléments nécessaires à l'estimation de cette prévisibilité. Lorsque celle-ci est prise en compte, il n'y a plus de différences de compétences entre analystes. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous montrons que les analystes expérimentés et inexpérimentés ne couvrent pas le même type d'entreprises. Les analystes expérimentés couvrent des entreprises de type « blue chips » tandis que les analystes inexpérimentés couvrent des entreprises petites, jeunes et en croissance. Ces différences de couvertures impliquent que les analystes inexpérimentés émettent des prévisions de prix sur des entreprises dont les rendements sont plus volatils et donc moins prévisibles. En conséquence, la précision des prévisions n'est pas une bonne mesure pour évaluer si les analystes expérimentés sont meilleurs ou moins compétents que les analystes inexpérimentés. Lorsque ces différences de couvertures sont prises en compte, nous obtenons que les analystes expérimentés émettent néanmoins de meilleures prévisions. Bien que statistiquement significatif, l'impact économique de l'expérience des analystes est faible. / This dissertation is made of three distinct chapters. In the first chapter, we introduce a new measure of herding that allows for tracking dynamics of individual herding. Using a database of nearly 8 million trades executed between 1999 and 2006 by 87,373 individual investors, we show that individual herding is persistent over time and that past performance and the level of sophistication influence this behavior. We are also able to answer a question that was previously unaddressed in the literature: is herding profitable for investors? Our unique dataset reveals that the investors trading against the crowd tend to exhibit more extreme returns and poorer risk-adjusted performance than the herders. In the second chapter, we show that measuring the accuracy of a target price is not sufficient to assess its quality, because the forecast predictability (which depends on the stock return volatility and on the forecast horizon) is likely to vary across stocks and over time. We argue that the evidence of time persistent differences in analysts' target price accuracy, obtained in previous studies, cannot be interpreted as a proof of persistent differential abilities. Our analysis indicates that the persistence in accuracy is driven by persistence in stock return volatility. We introduce a measure of target price quality that considers both the forecast inaccuracy and the forecast predictability. Using elements from option-pricing theory, we provide a simple solution to the issue of estimating target price predictability. Our empirical analysis reveals that, when forecast predictability is taken into account, financial analysts do not exhibit significant persistent differential abilities to forecast future stock prices. In the third chapter, we show that experienced financial analysts tend to cover different firms than inexperienced analysts. Experienced analysts tend to follow blue chips (i.e., large, international, mature firms) while inexperienced analysts focus on small, young, growth-oriented firms. These differences in coverage decisions imply that inexperienced analysts issue target prices on firms for which stock returns are more volatile, and thus less predictable. As a consequence, the accuracy measure of target prices fails to evaluate differences in ability between experienced and inexperienced analysts. When taking into account these differences in coverage decisions, we still find that experienced analysts do a better job at forecasting stock prices. Our results on the influence of analysts' characteristics on target price quality are statistically significant but economically weak.