<p>Direct taxation is an area which has not been harmonized entirely within the European Community. Nevertheless, the ECJ has in its case law stated that even though direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they may not exercise that competence by breaching EC law. At the same time the EC Treaty provides certain exceptions in the form of justifications for national measures resulting in such breach of EC Law. The justification grounds provided by the EC Treaty are, however, limited and general and not suitable for justifying tax measures. That is why the rule of reason has played such an important role within the area of direct taxation. The rule of reason made it possible to in-voke justification grounds that were not expressly mentioned in the EC Treaty. Since the list of justifying grounds, not provided by the EC Treaty, is open-ended, Member States have been invoking several different justifying grounds which were suitable for tax measures. One of those justification grounds which has been used the most is the preservation of the cohesion of the national tax system.</p><p>The first time the cohesion of a national tax system was brought forward as a justifying reason for a restrictive measure was in the Bachmann case. There the ECJ held that the Belgian legislation could be justified on the ground of the cohesion of the national tax system. However, the ECJ has been applying the cohesion justification very restrictively and never accepted it as a valid justification ground after the Bachmann case. What the ECJ has done in subsequent cases is to develop the meaning of the principle and adding new criteria which must be fulfilled in order for the cohesion justification to be successfully invoked. However, during this course the ECJ has been very unclear and inconsistent, harming legal certainty, which taxpayers are supposed to expect. Even in the doctrine, authors have been questioning the validity of the cohesion justification due to the ECJ’s reluctance to accept it again. In connection with recent case law concerning cross-border dividend taxation, voices have been heard, demanding the ECJ to address the cohesion justification once more in order to set out clear boundaries for its application and to disperse the current legal uncer-tainty regarding the matter. As a consequence the aim of this paper is to analyze the appli-cation of the cohesion justification to cross-border dividend situations from a legal certainty perspective. As becomes clear from analyzing recent cross-border dividend cases, the ECJ seems to have departed from earlier established criteria and a new line of thought seems to direct the development towards the introduction and application of new criteria.</p><p>Conclusively, we have found that the application of the cohesion justification by the ECJ has been very inconsistent and that this inconsistency has led to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty, making it difficult to predict the outcomes of future cases. Therefore, we conclude that the ECJ should take the opportunity, which has presented itself in recent cases concerning cross-border dividend taxation, to clarify the cohesion justification and set out clear definitions for how to apply it.</p>

<p>According to the arm’s length principle, transactions between associated multinational en-terprises (MNE) shall be based on the same conditions as transactions between unrelated parties. This means that intra-group prices on cross-boarding transactions must be at arm’s length range and consistent with conditions in the open market. The arm’s length principle is expressed in article 9.1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Chapter 14 section 19 of the Swedish Income Tax Act.</p><p>When transfer pricing between associated MNEs is not reflecting the arm’s length princi-ple, states face the possibility of losing tax revenue. The majority of OECD member coun-tries have implemented national documentation requirements and involve enterprises to present documentation on their transfer pricing. This obligation increases the possibilities for Tax Authorities to control whether or not a company follows the arm’s length princi-ple. Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines provides general guidance in this matter. Within the EU the transfer pricing forum JTPF, has developed a standardized model for docu-mentation known as the EUTPD. Application of the EUTPD depends on the MNEs themselves but also on national requests.</p><p>The Swedish legislator intends to implement national documentation requirements through the Government Bill 2005/06:169 “Effektivare Skattekontroll”. The regulation is likely to become effective 1 January 2007. Regardless that the burden of proof still lies on the Tax Authorities, MNEs are obligated to produce documentation that will be used as evidence of their transactions. The bill is drafted as a legislative framework and the implication will be developed through further directions from the Tax Authorities. Court Law will also be significant in how the legislation is applied.</p><p>This thesis concludes that the proposed regulation is unclear and therefore stands to coun-teracts or undermines the purposes behind the legislation. Since transfer pricing is not an exact science it is logical that the regulation be proposed as a framework, which would ren-der the possibilities for extensive interpretations. However, indistinctive rules would not increase neither the awareness nor the predictability concerning transfer pricing and docu-mentation requirements. Considering that the majority of MNEs in Sweden are small and medium sized companies and not always familiar with the arm’s length principle, the legis-lator should have expressed the documentation requirements more precisely. Nonetheless, since the enquiries will most likely increase, enterprises will be forced to allocate resources on their transfer pricing and documentation. This legislation will in turn increase the aware-ness and predictability in the long-term.</p>

<p>It was assumed in the mid 1990s that 60% of all global trade took place within a group of enterprises. With increased globalisation leading to an increase in mergers and acquisitions this figure is most likely higher. Thus intra-company and intra-group transactions form a major part of business. These transactions, due to the association between the enterprises, may not always reflect the conditions that a market with independent actors would dictate. There are various reasons for this, which include not only tax considerations but also difficulties in establishing conditions that reflect those that inde-pendent companies would apply, in other words conditions in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In cases where these conditions are not in accordance with what the state considers as an arm’s length price, the profits of the enterprise located in that state may be adjusted for taxation purposes under transfer pricing provisions.</p><p>The complexity of transfer pricing rules and the various methods for establishing an arm’s length price result in different interpretations and increased uncertainty for multinational enterprises that often face different rules for determining a correct transfer price. Therefore, enterprises may often face transfer pricing adjustments of their profits due to the complexity and differences in transfer pricing legislation. Transfer pricing adjustments potentially lead to unresolved double taxation, in fact business reports have indicated that 42% of the transfer pricing adjustments lead to double taxation. Therefore it is imperative to have legal mechanisms that resolve potential double taxation.</p><p>The Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (Arbitration Convention) was adopted to give the multinational enterprises, facing double taxation due to adjustments of their profits, a remedy that obliged the states to resolve the double taxation. This was the first, and is still the only, EC-wide mechanism that technically guarantees that transfer pricing double taxation is resolved and thus holds a great improvement over other existing mechanisms to resolve double taxation. The Arbitration Convention was originally a proposed EC Directive but was transformed into a intergovernmental convention. This has resulted in that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has no jurisdiction to interpret the Arbitration Convention or its application. Furthermore there is no supranational or international organ that could take action against states that interpret or apply the Conven-tion in an unintended manner. The chosen legal form has also resulted in different interpretations as to what status the Arbitration Convention has compared to bilateral tax conventions, and thus whether it precedes them. This could prove troublesome when future bilateral treaties are concluded or where there already exist tax treaties that have different solutions to transfer pricing related double taxation.</p><p>The risk of the Convention being interpreted differently is greatly increased by the various undefined terms and lack of precise provisions in the Convention. Therefore, the Convention has been subject to an inconsistent application and interpretation from the date it came into effect in 1995. The Convention was only given a five year life span, after which it was destined to be renewed if the contracting states so expressed, involving the same ratification process as at the initial acceptation of the Convention. However, as this was inefficient, a Prolongation Protocol was signed to amend the Convention with an automatic extension of its life. As it took till 2004 for this Protocol to be ratified and finally enter into force on 1 November 2004 it created one of the main interpretation and application differences in the life of the Convention.</p><p>The function of the Convention’s procedures and thus its efficiency in resolving double taxation is impeded by the numerous interpretation differences and lack of precise pro-visions in the Convention. The fact that there is no way to guarantee that the provisions of the Convention are precisely followed, partly since there are uncertainties regarding the precise interpretation but also partly since there is no organ that could enforce a uniform application of the Convention, further impedes the efficiency of the Convention, which is clearly seen in practice.</p><p>Another question of interpretation and application raised is that, although the Convention was originally intended as a means for resolving transfer pricing related double taxation, there have been arguments that the Convention could apply to double taxation due to provisions concerning thin capitalisation as well. These provisions bring about similar conditions as those the Convention requires for its applicability and, although a different area of law, the connections in the conditions are many and undeniable.</p>

<p>The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether legal rights are upheld when wording and applying the postponement of payment of tax regulations of chapter 17 section 2 p. 2-3 of the payment of Tax Act. We also investigate how the wording of the regulations relate to the requirement of legal security.</p><p>It has been questioned if the regulations concerning postponement of payment of tax are compatible with the requirement of legal security. Of course does not a taxpayer want to pay tax that he or she consider incorrect, and that has not been under trial by an impartial authority. If the request for postponement of payment of tax is rejected, the consequences for the taxpayer can lead to huge financial losses. The worse scenario for the taxpayer is if he or she goes bankrupt due to the rejected request.</p><p>The tax assessment regulations forming the basis for the postponement of payment of tax regulations are considered disputable, which has brought the matter to the fore. When ap-plying for reassessment or making an appeal, the question arises whether the tax in process should be submitted before the matter has been settled. The regulations of chapter 23 sec-tion 7 of the payment of Tax Act stipulate that the obligation to submit taxes remains re-gardless of its disputability. The only way the taxpayer can avoid having to submit taxes be-forehand is to apply for postponement of payment of the tax. When the application for postponement of payment of tax has reached the Tax Authority it is treated separately from the underlying tax assessment matter. However, the outcome of the postponement of payment of tax matter depends on the prerequisites on which the tax assessment is based.</p><p>This thesis is based on the regulations of chapter 17 section 2 p. 2-3 of the payment of Tax Act. The section stipulates that postponement of payment of tax may be granted in matters where the outcome of an ongoing tax assessment process may be uncertain, or where it may lead to considerable damage or else appear unreasonable to submit taxes. The founda-tions for judgment are very vaguely worded, which creates room for subjective interpreta-tions, and moreover, it means that judicial authorities must fill up the prerequisites with their judgments. Unclear bases for judgment limit taxpayers’ demands for predictable taxa-tion, and the risk both local tax offices and the Tax Authority and administrative courts make different assessments is great.</p><p>When the Tax Authority and the administrative courts treat claims for postponement of payment of tax, legal rights must always be considered. There are often deficiencies in the handling of the matters, which impair the taxpayers’ legal rights. The matters should be suf-ficiently investigated and the decisions motivated in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, the handling of claims for postponement of payment of tax should be objective, and decisions made with consideration to the consequences of the ruling.</p><p>As things are at present, it takes a considerable amount of time for the courts to investigate the underlying tax assessment, which means the consequences of not being granted a post-ponement of payment of tax are so much the graver. This also means that the taxpayer is forced to live a long time in financial and psychological uncertainty. One suggestion of how to come to terms with this problem is to increase specialization in the administrative courts.</p><p>The lack of clearly worded legal texts, preparatory work and practice leads to predictability being impaired for the individual and create difficulties for the Tax Authority and the ad-ministrative courts. From a legal rights perspective, more generous regulations regarding postponement of payment of tax should be introduced. One suggestion is to turn the main regulation of chapter 23 section 7 of the payment of Tax Act around. Postponement of payment of tax would then be granted unless particular reasons for its denial exist. An al-ternative to this suggestion may be to leave the main regulation in its current wording and have the exception regulations of chapter 17 section 2 of the payment of Tax Act grant postponement of payment of tax, unless particular reasons hindering this exist. In such a case of denying postponement of payment of tax the reasons for denial should be speci-fied.</p> / <p>I uppsatsen undersöks om rättssäkerheten upprätthålls vid tillämpningen av anståndsbe-stämmelserna i 17 kap. 2 § p. 2-3 SBL. Samt hur utformningen av bestämmelserna förhåller sig till kraven på rättssäkerhet.</p><p>Det har ifrågasatts om anståndsbestämmelserna är förenliga med rättssäkerhetens krav. Detta följer av att en skattskyldig naturligtvis inte vill betala skatt som denne anser är felak-tig och som inte ännu har hunnits prövats av en oberoende instans. Avslås en anståndsbe-gäran kan detta få stora ekonomiska konsekvenser för den skattskyldige. I värsta fall riske-rar den skattskyldige att försättas i konkurs.</p><p>Anledningen till att anståndsbestämmelserna uppkommer är att det underliggande taxe-ringsbeslutet som ligger till grund för dessa är tvistigt. Vid en begäran avseende ompröv-ning eller överklagan uppstår frågan huruvida den berörda skatten som är under process skall betalas innan ärendet är avgjort. Enligt huvudregeln i 23 kap. 7 § SBL stadgas det att skyldigheten att erlägga skatt består oavsett om den är tvistig. Den utväg som återstår för den skattskyldige att slippa att betala skatten innan beslutet vunnit laga kraft är att begära anstånd med betalningen av skatten. När begäran om anstånd inkommit till Skatteverket blir detta ett ärende som hanteras separat från den underliggande taxeringsfrågan, dock är utgången av anståndsärendet beroende av de rekvisit som ligger till grund för taxering.</p><p>Uppsatsens inriktning syftar till reglerna i 17 kap. 2 § p. 2-3 SBL. I paragrafen stadgas att anstånd kan ges i fall, där utgången i en pågående skatteprocess är tveksam eller där det kan medföra betydande skadeverkningar eller annars framstå som oskäligt att betala skatten. Dessa bedömningsgrunder är som synes mycket vagt utformade, vilket skapar utrymme för subjektiva tolkningar och dessutom innebär detta att de rättstillämpande instanserna måste fylla ut rekvisiten med sina bedömningar. Oklara grunder för bedömning medför att de skattskyldigas krav på en förutsebar beskattning inskränks, dessutom är risken för olikfor-mig bedömning mellan både lokala Skatteverkskontor samt mellan Skatteverket och för-valtningsdomstolarna stor.</p><p>I behandlingen av anståndsärendet hos Skatteverket och förvaltningsdomstolarna finns det flera rättssäkerhetsaspekter som bör uppfyllas. I flera av dess finns brister i handläggningen som gör att den skattskyldiges rättssäkerhet kan komma att begränsas. Ärendet skall utre-das tillräcklig och när beslut lämnas skall detta motiveras för den skattskyldige på ett till-fredsställande sätt. Dessutom bör hanteringen av anståndsärendet skötas objektivt och hän-syn till konsekvenserna av beslutet bör beaktas.</p><p>I nuläget är handläggningstiderna för att få den underliggande taxeringsfrågan utredd av domstolarna mycket lång, vilket innebär att konsekvenserna av att inte få anstånd med be-talning av skatten blir ännu större. Det innebär att den skattskyldige under lång tid tvingas leva i både ekonomisk och psykologisk ovisshet. Ett förslag för att komma till rätta med problemet är att en ökad specialisering inom förvaltningsdomstolarna sker.</p><p>Bristen på klar lagtext, förarbeten och praxis leder till att förutsebarheten inskränks för den enskilde samt svårigheter för Skatteverket och domstolarna vid lagtillämpning. Ur rättssä-kerhetssynpunkt bör generösare bestämmelser angående anstånd med betalning av skatt in-föras. Ett förslag är att vända på huvudregeln i 23 kap. 7 § SBL. Anstånd skulle då som hu-vudregel medges. Om det däremot föreligger särskilda skäl skall den skattskyldige nekas an-stånd. Ett alternativ till detta förslag skulle vara att huvudregeln står kvar i nuvarande ut-formning, men att undantagsreglerna i 17 kap. 2 § SBL regelmässigt medger anstånd om inte särskilda skäl talar emot detta. I ett sådant anståndsavslag skall skälen som ligger till grund för beslutet preciseras.</p>

<p>Abstract</p><p>The freedom of establishment in Articles 43 and 48 EC is a fundamental freedom within the EU meaning that companies are free to set up secondary establishments in any other Member State. The freedom of establishment is an important means to achieve the com-pletion of the internal market and therefore it is important that this freedom is protected. Member States are obliged to legislate in accordance with the objectives of the fundamental freedoms, still Member States are restricting Articles 43 and 48 EC by applying discrimina-tory national legislation regarding direct taxation. In the Cadbury Schweppes judgment from September 2006 the ECJ found the British CFC legislation to be contrary to Community law. The purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent tax avoidance by conferring additional tax upon companies having subsidiaries in low tax states. According to the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, if the CFC rules are too general in its application they are violating the freedom of establishment. Hence, the CFC legislation must be aimed specifically at “wholly artificial arrangements” aimed at circumventing national tax normally payable. Therefore it is of importance, in the context of applying CFC rules, to clarify the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment. It is also important to note that the CFC rules ap-ply even when a subsidiary is established outside the EU.</p><p>The concept of abuse of Community law has been developed through case law and prohib-its companies to improperly use the provisions of Community law in order to circumvent national legislation. Even if an establishment in another State is made to avoid tax in the State of origin, it is not necessarily abuse of the freedom of establishment since companies are allowed to choose to establish subsidiaries in the Member States with least restrictive rules. The ECJ stated that establishing subsidiaries with the sole purpose to benefit from the lower tax regime do not constitute an abuse of the freedom of establishment as long as the subsidiaries pursue genuine economic activity. The criteria for what is regarded as eco-nomic activity has been discussed in both value added tax and direct tax cases. The re-quirements so far is that the subsidiary established has to be physically present in the host State on a durable basis and have staff and equipment to a certain degree. The ECJ has as-sessed the criteria similarly in value added tax and direct tax cases and stated that the activ-ity has to be considered per se and without regard to its purpose or result. The activity also has to be based on objective factors and be ascertainable by third parties.</p><p>The Cadbury Schweppes case is the first case in the area of CFC legislation and the Court has provided little guidance regarding what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement”. As a consequence of this judgement some Member States have already changed their CFC legis-lation to comply with Community law. Nevertheless, there are cases pending before the ECJ that are further questioning the application of CFC rules and how to define a “wholly artificial arrangement”. The judgement of these cases may result in more changes in the na-tional legislation of the Member States. The future development of the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment is important for the protection of the principle of legal certainty. A clarification of what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement” will improve the foreseeability for companies and their cross-border transactions will be more efficient.</p> / <p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Etableringsfriheten i artiklarna 43 och 48 EG är en av de grundläggande friheterna inom EU som innebär att företag är fria att etablera dotterbolag i andra medlemsländer. Etable-ringsfriheten är ett viktigt medel för att uppnå målen med den gemensamma marknaden och därför är det viktigt att denna frihet respekteras. Medlemsländerna är skyldiga att lag-stifta i ljuset av de grundläggande friheterna, trots det finns diskriminerande skattelagstift-ning som strider mot artiklarna 43 och 48 EG. I Cadbury Schweppes domen från september 2006 fann EG-domstolen att de brittiska CFC reglerna strider mot gemenskapsrätten. Syf-tet med CFC regler är att förhindra skatteundandragande genom att löpande beskatta in-komster från dotterbolag etablerade i lågbeskattade länder. CFC regler som tillämpas gene-rellt är enligt Cadbury Schweppes domen i strid med etableringsfriheten. Därmed måste CFC reglerna tillämpas specifikt på ”konstlade upplägg” som har som enda syfte att undvika na-tionell skatt. Det är därför viktigt att klargöra skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av eta-bleringsfriheten. I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att poängtera att CFC reglerna är till-lämpliga även på dotterbolag som är etablerade i ett icke-medlemsland.</p><p>Konceptet om missbrukande av EG-rätten har utvecklats i praxis och förbjuder företag att missbruka bestämmelserna i gemenskapsrätten för att kringgå nationell lagstiftning. Även om ett dotterbolag har etablerats i ett medlemsland enbart för att utnyttja den låga skatteni-vån är det nödvändigtvis inte missbruk av etableringsfriheten eftersom företag har rätt att etablera dotterbolag i det land som är mest fördelaktigt ur skattehänseende. EG-domstolen har fastställt att etablering av dotterbolag enbart för att utnyttja en mer fördelaktig skattere-gim inte utgör missbruk av etableringsfriheten om dotterbolaget bedriver verklig ekono-misk verksamhet. Kriterierna för vad som anses utgöra verklig ekonomisk verksamhet har diskuterats i såväl mervärdesskatterättsliga som företagsskatterättsliga mål. Hittills uppställ-da krav är att det etablerade dotterbolaget måste vara varaktigt fysiskt närvarande i värdsta-ten samt till en viss grad ha personal och utrustning så att tredje part kan förvissa sig om dess ekonomiska verksamhet. Utvärderingen av den ekonomiska verksamheten måste ske självständigt utan hänsyn till dess syfte och resultat.</p><p>Cadbury Schweppes är det första målet angående CFC lagstiftning och EG-domstolen har endast tillhandahållit begränsad vägledning om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg”. Som en konsekvens av denna dom har några medlemsländer redan ändrat sin CFC lagstiftning så att den överensstämmer med EG-rätten. Icke desto mindre finns det en del oavgjorda mål som ytterligare ifrågasätter CFC reglernas tillämpning och definitionen av ”konstlade upplägg”. Avgöranden i dessa mål skulle kunna resultera i att medlemsländerna måste göra ytterligare ändringar i sin lagstiftning. Den framtida utvecklingen av vad som är skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av etableringsfriheten är viktig för rättssäkerheten. Ett klargö-rande om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg” kommer att öka förutsebarheten för före-tag vilket leder till en effektivisering av deras gränsöverskridande transaktioner.</p>

<p>The Savings Directive will enter in to force 1st of July 2005, after years of discussions about it. The Directive has caused some controversy and several proposals have been rejected.</p><p>The Savings Directive means that an individual who recieves savings income in the form of interest payment from another Member State will be taxed in his or hers State of residence. This will be achieved by an automatic exchange of information be-tween the Member States, concerning interest payments on savings. Some countries have opted out of the information exchange and will instead levy a withholding tax during a transitional period.</p><p>The free movement of capital became fully liberalized when articles 1 and 4 in Directive 88/361/EEC was given direct effect. Later the main provisions from that Directive were implemented in the EC Treaty. All restrictions on the free movement of capital are prohibited, according to article 56 EC. Exceptions to this free movement can be found in article 58 EC. One example of a possible justification is the right for Member States to apply tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested.</p><p>Certain fundamental principles have to be complied with, foremost the Principle of Proportionality and the Principle of Legal Certainty, to be able to justify a restriction on the free movement of capital.</p><p>If the Savings Directive is in breach of the free movement of capital according to article 56-60 EC, is analysed in this thesis. It is discussed whether the Directive constitutes a restriction and in that case which possible justifications there are.</p><p>Our conclusion is that the Savings Directive constitutes a restriction, in so far that it will likely dissuade residents from placing their capital in another Member State, because they will be taxed in their State of residence anyhow. However, this restriction is possible to justify according to article 58 (1) (b) EC. Therefore, the Savings Directive is not in breach of the free movement of capital.</p> / <p>Sparandedirektivet träder i kraft 1 juli 2005, efter många års diskussioner kring det och efter att flera förslag har röstats ner.</p><p>Sparandedirektivet innebär att en individ från en Medlemsstat som mottager ränteinkomst härrörande från sparande i ett annat Medlems land blir beskattad i Medlemsstaten där han eller hon bor. Detta skall ske genom automatiskt utbyte av information rörande ränteinkomster på besparingar mellan Medlemsstaterna. Några länder har fått dispans från informations utbytet under en viss tid och kommer då istället att påföra en källskatt.</p><p>Den fria rörligheten av kapital blev liberaliserad fullt ut i och med att artiklarna 1 och 4 i Direktiv 88/361/EEC gavs direkt effekt. Huvudbestämmelserna från det direktivet blev senare implementerade i EG fördraget. Enligt artikel 56 EG är alla restriktioner på fri rörlighet av kapital förbjudna. I artikel 58 EG hittas dock undantag till denna fria rörlighet. Ett exempel på en möjlig rättfärdigande grund för en restriktion är möjligheten för Medlemsstater att behandla individer skattemässigt olika beroende på var de är bosatta och beroende på var kapitalet är placerat.</p><p>För att kunna rättfärdiga en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital måste också vissa grundläggande principer följas, framförallt proportionalitetsprincipen och principen om rättssäkerhet.</p><p>Denna uppsats utreder om Sparandedirektivet bryter mot den fria rörligheten av kapital uppställd i artiklarna 56-60 EG, genom att analysera om Direktivet utgör en restriktion och i så fall vilka rättfärdigandegrunder som är möjliga att använda.</p><p>Slutsatsen, baserat på vår utredning, blir att Sparandedirektivet utgör en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital, eftersom det troligtvis kommer att avskräcka personer från att placera besparingar utomlands, då de kommer att bli beskattade i den stat de bor i alla fall. Restriktionen är dock möjlig att rättfärdiga genom 58 (1) (b) EG. Därför bryter Sparandedirektivet inte mot fri rörlighet av kapital.</p>

No description available.

On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.

The provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to capital cost allowances have had and are having a profound impact on the operations of the individual corporation and the national economy as a whole. [...]

No description available.