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Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / The United States Army became the dominant U.S. government agency for post-World War II occupation planning. Despite President Roosevelt’s own misgivings, shared by several influential members of his Cabinet, the Army nonetheless prevailed in shaping occupation policy in accordance with its understanding and priorities. The Army’s primacy resulted from its own cultural and organizational imperatives, to include its drive towards professionalization and its acceptance of legalized standards for conflict in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other related factors included the Army’s ability to create coherent internal doctrine, the training and experience of its leaders, the relative weakness of comparative civilian agencies, the real-world experiences of civil affairs in North Africa in 1942-43, and the personality and leadership style of President Roosevelt himself. As a result, the Army created internal training and education, doctrine, and organizations that operated both at the strategic and tactical level to implement military government in accordance with the Army’s institutional understanding. The Army’s planning and implementation of military government in Germany, Austria, and Korea show the effects of the Army’s dominance in planning and implementing the postwar occupations. Furthermore, in these three occupations (unlike Japan’s), of particular concern were how the Americans interacted with their Soviet counterparts in the occupied territories at the beginning of the Cold War. As these three occupations reveal, American military government in those locations, as well as the actions of the occupants themselves, profoundly shaped American interests in those countries and thus profoundly shaped American policy during the early Cold War.

Politics has been an integral part of Korean football since the Japanese colonial era when the game became a vehicle for the Korean independence movement. The split between North and South Korea following the Korean War further accentuated the intrusion of politics into the domain of Korean football. As Koreans residing on either side of the border followed the game with intense interest and often regarded performance in international competition as a signifier of national prestige, the governments of both North and South Korea attached more importance to football than to any other sport and became its foremost patrons. In these circumstances it is not surprising to find that the relative performance of the national teams of North and South Korea mirrored changing economic and political conditions. Thus the rapid rise of North Korean football in the 1960s was a reflection of the state’s systematic and successful postwar reconstruction. Since the 1980s, however, South Korea, with its booming economy, has clearly surpassed its increasingly impoverished northern counterparts in the football field. Undoubtedly, the most two important events pertaining to the development of Korean football were the 1966 and 2002 World Cups. They provided occasions when nationalist sentiment could be expressed through football in both North and South Korea. They also provided opportunities for Korean footballers, through their achievements on the field, to show that the gap between the traditional periphery and core of world football was narrowing. At the same time, participation in competition at this level, whether by teams from North or South Korea, suggested that there was a recognizable and distinctive Korean football style nurtured in training camps where the emphasis was on producing players with sufficient stamina to run at their opponents for ninety minutes. Tireless running football has been the characteristic of successful teams from both North and South Korea. Thus, while recognizing the profound ideological differences that separate North and South Korea, this thesis also emphasizes the football tradition and culture that ethnically homogenous Koreans have in common.

Historians of the early space age have established a norm whereby President Eisenhower's actions are judged solely as a response to the launch of the Sputnik satellite, and are indicative of a passive, negative presidency. His low-key actions are seen merely as a prelude to the US triumph in space in the 1960s. This study presents an alternative view showing that Eisenhower’s space policy was not a reaction to the heavily-propagandised Soviet satellite launches, or even the effect they caused in the US political and military elites, but the continuation of a strategic track. In so doing, it also contributes to the reassessment of the wider Eisenhower presidency. Having assessed the development of three intersecting discourses: Eisenhower as president; the genesis of the US space programme; and developments in Cold War US reconnaissance, this thesis charts Eisenhower’s influence both on the ICBM and reconnaissance programmes and his support for a non-military approach to the International Geophysical Year. These actions provided the basis for his space policy for the remainder of his presidency. The following chapters show that Sputnik had no impact on the policies already in place and highlight Eisenhower’s pragmatic activism in enabling the implementation of these policies by a carefully-chosen group of expert ‘helping hands’. This study delivers a new interpretation of Eisenhower’s actions. It argues that he was operating on a parallel track that started with the Castle H-bomb tests; developed through the CIA's reconnaissance efforts and was distilled in the Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This set a policy for US involvement in outer space that matched Eisenhower’s desire for a balanced budget and fundamental belief in maintaining peace. By challenging the orthodox view, this paper shows that President Eisenhower’s space policy actions were strategic steps that provided a logical next step for both civilian and military space programmes at the completion of the International Geophysical Year.

To explore strategic narratives of the U.S. and Russia is a motivation for this research. The study investigates whether there is a return to the Cold War rhetoric between the West and Russia, or if the discourse has taken a new form. A primary goal is to examine if media originating from the two countries spread propaganda, but mainly to detect what kind of propaganda it is. The research compares types of propaganda techniques that are most commonly applied by RT and CNN, and discusses results in a context of the Cold War propaganda prominent themes. This has been done by comparing how the two media outlets were reporting on a crash of a Malaysian Airlines aircraft in eastern Ukraine on July 17th 2014. A method of a framing analysis has been applied for a material from both channels for a period of four months. The results indicate that a number of propaganda techniques are used by both RT and CNN. Moreover, channels’ discourse is antagonistic, while strategic narratives of the U.S. and Russia nowadays have similarities and differences comparing to the Cold War times. Further research should look at other genres, events and topics reported by the two media.

For most of the second half of the 20th century the world's political map was divided by the Cold War, a name given to the 40-year long standoff between the superpowers - the Unites States and the USSR - and their allies. Due to its geographical location and alliance with the United States, Britain was at the 'frontline' of the Cold War. As a response to increasing tensions, the British Government made arrangements by building hundreds of military sites and structures, which were often dismantled or abandoned as the technology on which they relied became rapidly ineffective. Nowadays, there is a growing (academic) recognition of Cold War sites and their new or contemporary uses, including as heritage attractions within a tourism context. This study has brought forward a constructionist approach as to investigate how heritage works as a cultural and social practice that constructs and regulates a range of values and ideologies about what constitutes Cold War heritage (and) tourism in Britain. It has done this by, firstly, exploring the dominant and professional 'authorised heritage discourse', which aims to construct mutually, agreed and shared concepts about the phenomenon of 'Cold War heritage' within a tourism context. The study identified a network of actors, values, policies and discourses that centred on the concept of 'Cold War heritage' at selected sites through which a 'material reality' of the past is constructed. Although various opposing viewpoints were identified, the actors effectively seem to privilege and naturalise certain narratives of cultural and social meanings and values through tourism of what constitutes Cold War heritage and the ways it should be manifested through material and natural places, sites and objects within society. Differences were particularly noticeable in the values, uses and meanings of Cold iii Cold War heritage (and) tourism War heritage within the contemporary context of heritage management in Britain. For some, the sites were connected with a personal 'past', a place to commemorate, celebrate or learn from the past. For others, the sites were a source of income, a tourism asset, or contrary, a financial burden as the sites were not 'old enough' or 'aesthetically pleasing' to be regarded as a monument to be preserved as heritage. Subsequently, the study also explored the (disempowered) role of visitors to the sites as passive receivers, leaving little room for individual reflections on the wider social and cultural processes of Cold War heritage. Although, most visitors believed that the stewardship and professional view of the Cold War representations at the sites should not directly be contested, this study has illustrated the idea that what makes places valuable and gives them meaning as heritage sites is not solely based on contemporary practices by a dominant heritage discourse. Despite the visitors' support for the sole ownership by site managers, and the selective representations of the Cold War and events, they did question or negotiate the idea of 'heritage' as a physical and sole subject of management practices. Despite having little prior knowledge about the Cold War era or events, by pressing the borders of the authorised parameters of 'Cold War heritage', visitors actively constructed their experiences as being, or becoming, part of their personal and collective moments of 'heritage'. By inscribing (new) memories and meaning into their identity, and therefore also changing the nature of that identity, they reflected upon the past, present and future, (some more critically than others). To conclude, understanding these discursive meanings of Cold War heritage (and) tourism, and the ways in which ideas about Cold War heritage are constructed, negotiated and contested within and between discourses also contributes to understandings about the philosophical, historical, conceptual and political barriers that exist in identifying and engaging with different forms of heritage.

This work set out to determine the cause or causes of the significant growth in the time required to develop and field new technology in major weapon system programs in the U.S. Department of Defense that has occurred over the last sixty years. The effort revolved around the analysis of twenty-one case studies of major technology development and acquisition programs (seven each from the early, late, and post Cold War periods, respectively). Primary causal factors are identified and discussed as well as recommendations to remedy or mitigate them. / text

The United States lost its prime opponent, the Soviet Union, since Post-Cold War. To assure its hegemonic status, Joseph Nye initiated the strategy of soft power to former President Bush and Clinton’s administration, and which had influenced People’s Republic of China (as known as a potential enemy to U.S.) profoundly. Soft power is such a wonderful elementary factor that made a dictatorial state like China a huge change both in its polity and image of the world. Moreover, China had been activated by American strategy of soft power, and eventually developed its own ‘Chinese character’ soft power, which had attracted at least by its peripheral states. Commensurate with its rapid economic and diplomatic development, China used to be considered as “China’s threat”, then due to China’s soft power strategy in terms of “Confucianism” and “Wang Dao”(benign) thought had been well responded by the world. As a dominated state, maybe it is time for the United States to think about trying not to conduct the soft power as a diplomatic tool only, but to seek a new strategy of soft power that combined tolerance and respect toward the others. Anyway, by the engagement of soft power among international relations, and the interdependency of regional economy, the author has an optimistic view for a harmonious world in the future. Key words: Post-Cold War, soft power, China’s threat, Wang Dao, harmonious world. / The United States lost its prime opponent, the Soviet Union, since Post-Cold War. To assure its hegemonic status, Joseph Nye initiated the strategy of soft power to former President Bush and Clinton’s administration, and which had influenced People’s Republic of China (as known as a potential enemy to U.S.) profoundly. Soft power is such a wonderful elementary factor that made a dictatorial state like China a huge change both in its polity and image of the world. Moreover, China had been activated by American strategy of soft power, and eventually developed its own ‘Chinese character’ soft power, which had attracted at least by its peripheral states. Commensurate with its rapid economic and diplomatic development, China used to be considered as “China’s threat”, then due to China’s soft power strategy in terms of “Confucianism” and “Wang Dao”(benign) thought had been well responded by the world. As a dominated state, maybe it is time for the United States to think about trying not to conduct the soft power as a diplomatic tool only, but to seek a new strategy of soft power that combined tolerance and respect toward the others. Anyway, by the engagement of soft power among international relations, and the interdependency of regional economy, the author has an optimistic view for a harmonious world in the future. Key words: Post-Cold War, soft power, China’s threat, Wang Dao, harmonious world.

The United States has maintained a heavy military presence in Afghanistan for a little more than a decade however; the US has been involved in Afghanistan on and off for over three decades. The 2001 ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan became framed around the goal of saving Afghan women. In order to understand how this framing came about and what the impact of this framing was I study US congressional documents, speeches and other public rhetoric by government officials in the 1980s and early 2000s. Analyzing rhetorical language and reoccurring themes helps us understand what major framing devices and narrative techniques were in play during these time periods. Ultimately I conclude that women’s safety was a post-facto justification for intervention; the framing techniques used during the 2001 were utilized in order to create a clear, coherent narrative that selectively ignores the impact of US involvement in Afghanistan during the Cold War.