Thirteen qualitative interviews have been conducted with key individuals who have profound knowledge and experience in the subject of crisis communication. The thesis used a theory testing approach and highlights the main issues regarding the influence of intercultural competence in crisis information, and to what extent social media channels are used for crisis communication. Also, it covers how the leadership during crises affects the communication from the perspectives of the key individuals. In this empirical investigation, the analytical method of thematization has been used in order to select essential themes throughout the qualitative interviews. These themes have been compared to the relevant theories within the subject - crisis communication, intercultural competence, and social media in crisis situations. The emerging conclusions from this study were the importance of pre-existing relations between organizations and authorities in crisis situations, and the amplifications of crisis communication through crisis networks operating between organizations. Another conclusion was that proactive crisis communication plans need to be of a consise and general design to be practical in crisis situations. Furthermore, one conclusion was that most organizations according to the interviewees were aware of the absence of intercultural competence, but due to lack of resources this was not prioritized. The last conclusion was that social media channels have a high interest level during crisis situations, but was seldom used to a large extent during crises

This thesis presents a reassessment of historical change in Nigeria and its relationship with economic performance. Situated within the context of recent debates on the country's agricultural 'crisis', it finds the contributions structured within the political economy tradition to be analytically deficient and factually inaccurate. Using Marx's method of historical analysis, a more coherent and e£fective study of social change is presented which refutes the stagnationist slant evident in Radical Political Economy perspectives. Transformations in the structure of property relations and the level of productive forces are highlighted in various contexts, as well as the contradictions they embody. A case study, based on extensive fieldwork is used to assess the implications of the depicted changes for rural reproduction. A process of social differentiation is revealed which confers cumulative advantages to a segment of the peasantry. The sources of this differentiation and the relationship it expresses and generates, linked to wider histc>rical processes, together portendithe emergence of capitali~m. The dynamic consequences of capitalist transformation in Nigerian agriculture- the potential provided for accumulation and productivity increases, are however found to be retarded by powerful forces exogenous to the agrarian structure. An assessment of the macroeconomic contours of capitalist development in Nigerian agriculture identifies the constraining features to agricultural growth to consist mainly of internal factors aqd policies, rather than structural constraints deriving from international trade relations. A brief examination of contemporary debates on economic policy reforms is found to provide an insufficient basis for unguarded optimism regarding the potential for long-term agricultural growth.

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This study describes a conceptual framework that portrays information system project failures as organizational crises. The main assumption of this study is that such failures will invariably happen and thus there is a need to make them less costly and more beneficial to organizations. To identify the behaviors and factors that influence an organization's ability to effectively manage a project failure, this dissertation reviews the crisis management literature. Based on this review, a three-stage model is formulated. To understand the mechanisms underlying this model, a number of hypotheses (which are informed by a number of related organizational behavior areas) are generated. These hypotheses focus on three key crisis management factors: the organization's ability to promptly detect an impeding failure, its capacity to manage the failure's impacts, and its propensity to learn from it. To empirically assess the validity of the conceptual model, three case studies of Canadian public organizations were conducted. The empirical findings provide strong support to the model's conjectures and indicate that project failures generate several crisis-related behaviors and responses. More specifically, the findings suggest that an organization's proactive preparation for a failure can have a significant moderating effect on its impact. However, the findings clearly show that an organization's ability to promptly detect (and prepare for) a failure is impeded by behaviors that are motivated by escalation of commitment. Such behaviors lead to a prolonged pre-crisis denial period and have a suppressing effect on whistle-blowing, which is pursued as a denial-curtailing strategy by non-management participants. The empirical findings describe both operational and legitimacy tactics used by organizations to cope with the aftermath of a project failure and indicate that credibility restoration is a significant concern during large crises. Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that organizational learning and adaptation are more likely to follow major project failures than less significant ones. This contradicts threat-rigidity arguments and provides support to the failure-induced learning theory.

My dissertation investigates the behavior of consumers and banks in the presence of government as the credit insurer of last resort. Consumers have an option to file for bankruptcy under law when there are unexpected adverse shocks, while banks, especially large banks, are supported by the government during financial crisis because of systemic risk. I explore the heterogeneous behavior among consumers and banks with adverse shocks. In the first chapter of my dissertation, my inquiry focuses on the heterogeneous behavior of households in filing for bankruptcy. In the literature, there are two theories in explaining personal bankruptcy: adverse event theory and strategic timing theory. Fay, Hurst and White(FHW) 2002(AER) include both financial benefit and adverse event variables in explaining the bankruptcy decision, and they find only financial benefit from filing is significant in explaining whether to file or not. Our argument is that adverse events may not work directly on bankruptcy decisions, however, they operate by running a higher amount of debt. Thus FHW's setting may not be appropriate. Instead, adverse event consumers' debt occurs after adverse events, while strategic timing consumers' debt decision and bankruptcy decision are jointly determined, which means their debt or financial benefit is endogenous; thus we propose that the endogeneity test of financial benefit is a way to distinguish the two types of consumers. Assuming only one type exists in the sample, we find support for adverse event theory. Extending the analysis to allow for both adverse events and strategic timing consumers shows existence of both types of filers, and strategic timing filers are more sensitive to financial benefit. Additionally, lower access to debt markets and lower income significantly increase the chance of strategic behavior. The second part of my dissertation is to study the effectiveness of the Troubled Asset Relief Program(TARP) on banks' loan to asset ratio. One of the fundamental objectives of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is to stimulate bank loan growth. I use panel data to study the dynamic effect of TARP investments on banks' loan to asset ratio (LTA). I find that TARP stimulate recipients' LTA growth as a whole, and the effect is significant only for medium banks(asset between 1 billion and 10 billion), with an annual decrease of 14 percentage points in LTA with the LTA in treatment quarter as benchmark. In terms of a dollar amount, 7.71 dollar more loans are generated for every TARP dollar invested in medium banks, compared with the average level of the quarters before TARP. There is no significant effect on small banks or big banks. Using graphs and different regression models, I argue that the dynamic setting, rather than the cross-sectional comparison, is more appropriate.

The global dimension of Mexico's 1994 financial crisis brought a renewed interest in the institutional framework of international finance. The failure of Mexico's financial reform raises important questions. At the level of policy-making, the prescriptions based on the premise of less state intervention and a major role for the market have to be taken more cautiously. At the level of analysis, the role of institutions has to be emphasised more in the explanations of the effects of policy decisions upon economic behaviour. The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it tries to explain President Salinas's success in implementing a far-reaching programme of economic liberalisation, despite the fact that pro-market policies are not particularly popular in Mexico. Second, it tries to explain the apparent failure of the financial reform, despite the fact that it conformed to the dominant orthodoxy and was implemented by a technically proficient technocracy. The favoured approach in this thesis says that Mexico's financial reform was the result of political entrepreneurship. The charismatic leadership of President Salinas aligned a powerful coalition of support for economic reform. Salinas used extensively the organisational and institutional infrastructure of the quasi-authoritarian Mexican state to overcome the 'legitimacy deficit' of his government. Regarding Mexico's 1994 financial crisis, the evidence points to the combination of three sets of interrelated factors. First, the financial reform stifled domestic savings and re-directed most of the capital inflows towards portfolio investment. Second, the end- of-sexenio political cycle that produced a great deal of political turmoil and economic uncertainty. Third, the policy mistakes that exacerbated the size and depth of the crisis. The thesis is organised into three parts. The first part-chapters one to four-develops the framework, both theoretical and historical. The analysis addresses four main themes: state autonomy, external dependency of domestic states on international capital, political change under President Carlos Salinas and financial policy. The second part presents the analysis of three cases of institutional change in the financial system-development banking reform, commercial banking privatisation and autonomy of the central bank. Each case study shows how the reforms conformed to the ideas of the dominant consensus on economic policy and how they delivered an inefficient incentive structure. The third part-chapter eight-brings together all the elements presented throughout the thesis to establish the relationship between the financial reform under President Salinas and the 1994 financial crisis.

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La presente investigación, tiene por objeto analizar la influencia de la ética y las fallas de administración en el origen y desarrollo de la crisis económica-financiera mundial que se inició en 2008 en Estados Unidos y que fue denominada como “Sub Prime”, misma que tuvo una serie de efectos y consecuencias hasta el año 2012. Este estudio se desarrolló en base a tres dimensiones: los antecedentes y desarrollo de la crisis económica-financiera mundial, la ética en las decisiones y, las estrategias de administración relacionadas a este tema. Con lo anterior se logró identificar y analizar las medidas tomadas por el gobierno de Estados Unidos y las empresas de ese país, determinando las distorsiones en los aspectos éticos y administrativos que finalmente derivaron en una crisis de dimensión mundial. Del mismo modo, se hizo lo propio con las decisiones de los gobiernos europeos, encontrándose que se incurrió en las mismas distorsiones éticas y administrativas, sumándose a esto la crisis de Grecia que lo agravó y prolongó. Terminado el análisis y apoyándose en el programa informático, Atlas.ti, que contribuyó a organizar esta investigación, se concluyó que la conducta poco ética en la toma de decisiones económico financieras, aportó al origen y desarrollo de esta crisis de magnitud mundial.

The aim of this thesis was to examine the cognitive processes through which experienced Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) make decisions during emergencies, and to determine whether they use a naturalistic or normative decision making strategy. That is, do they recognise the emergency as familiar and base decisions on condition-action rules serially generated (naturalistic), or do they need to concurrently compare and contrast options before selecting the best possible (normative). Emphasis was on the individual OIM's understanding of an emergency and the meaning he attached to the information or events taking place. The method employed to achieve this objective, was a Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) based on triangulation principles, i.e. using multiple methods to examine the same research question and so enhance reliability and validity. The main findings of this thesis were: • Decision making in Safety Case (1992) identified offshore installation emergencies is primarily based on condition-action rules, or rule-based according to Rasmussen's (1983) model, not Standard Operating Procedures. • Decisions are serially generated. There is no evidence of option comparison. • The environment severely limits the number of options available to the OIM. • Decisions are predominantly made when one element of the present status of the incident changes. • Tactical decisions account for approximately 54% and operational decisions for 46% of the decisions made. • Nearly 50% of the decisions taken are instigated by other team members. • The majority of the time (86.8%) is spent on situation assessment. • The OIMs' situation awareness is limited to a maximum of eight interdependent problem categories. • Situation awareness comprises approximately four categories at any one point. • Risk and time pressure are the two major factors contributing to incident assessment. • There are individual differences in decision making style and situation awareness.

No description available.