Gli studi sulla politica monetaria e fiscale suggeriscono che l'economia sommersa o informale è un potente cuscinetto in grado di assorbire i canali di trasmissione delle politiche macroeconomiche. In questo lavoro, sviluppiamo un modello DSGE con economia sommersa al fine di analizzarne l’impatto sui canali di trasmissione delle politiche monetarie e fiscali nei paesi emergenti e in via di sviluppo. La tesi è organizzata in tre capitoli. Il primo capitolo cerca di esaminare gli effetti di trasmissione e l'efficacia della politica monetaria e di altri shock strutturali attraverso l’interazione con l’economia sommersa. Il nostro modello determina se la presenza di un'economia sommersa influisce sulle risposte dell'economia ufficiale e chiarisce anche i cambiamenti nel meccanismo di trasmissione all'interno di entrambi i settori. Il secondo capitolo descrive un nuovo modello DSGE keynesiano con economia sommersa e analizza il ruolo delle politiche fiscali sul ciclo economico aggregato. In questo capitolo, abbiamo cercato di chiarire se la presenza di un'economia sommersa riduca o incrementi l'effetto delle trasmissioni di politica fiscale. Abbiamo anche cercato di capire se le politiche fiscali possono essere utilizzate per stabilizzare l'economia in risposta agli shock. Nel terzo capitolo, studiamo l'interazione tra i consumatori e la presenza di un'economia sommersa focalizzandoci sugli shock della politica fiscale. L‘obiettivo è sapere se l'introduzione di un'economia sommersa indebolisca l'effetto amplificativo dei consumatori sul moltiplicatore fiscale. / Theoretical literature on monetary and fiscal policy have suggested that shadow economy or the informal sector is a powerful buffer which absorbs large proportions of the transmission channels of macroeconomic policies. We develop a theoretical DSGE model with shadow economy and investigate their impact on the transmissions of monetary and fiscal policies in developing and emerging countries. The thesis is organised in three chapters as follows. Chapter one seeks to examine the transmission effects and efficacy of monetary policy and other structural shocks with the interaction of shadow economy. Our model determines whether the presence of shadow economy affects the responses of the official economy and also clarifies the changes in the transmission mechanism within both sectors. The second chapter describes a new Keynesian DSGE model with shadow economy and investigate the role of fiscal policies over the aggregate business cycle. In this chapter, we sought to elucidate whether the presence of shadow economy dampens or amplifies the effect of fiscal policy transmissions. We further tried to understand whether fiscal policies can be used to stabilise the economy in response to shocks. In chapter three, we study the interplay of rule-of-thumb consumers and the presence of shadow economy focusing on fiscal policy disturbances. Our basic motivation is to know whether the incorporation of shadow economy weakens the amplifying effect of rule-of-thumb consumers on fiscal multipliers.

This paper analyses the relationship between corruption and shadow economy. Synthesis of existing theoretical models and the empirical findings in this paper show that different types of corrupt behavior interact with shadow economy differently. Therefore, the relationship between contexts differs. Overall, it seems that the mechanisms leading to the complementary relationship are more prevalent. The results also imply that the quality of public goods available in the official economy influences where the different types of corrupt behavior manifest. When the quality of the public goods is high, corruption and shadow economy appear to be substitutes and when the quality is low, they are complements. However, the relationship is not robust and depends upon the measures used to assess the public goods quality. Furthermore, corruption and shadow economy seem to be complements in decentralized countries and countries with high taxes.

The Diploma Thesis deals with estimation of tax evation of value-added tax in the Czech Republic during 2006-2010. For the estimate we have used the concept of tax gap (in the case of VAT we speak about VAT gap), which is based on comparison of theoretical tax liability of the economy with the actual tax receipts. An international comparison of the Czech Republic VAT gap with available data of other countries has been made as well. The Thesis includes further description of tax evation types specific for VAT and other approaches to measurement of tax evation. Role of the shadow economy measurement used for tax evation estimates is accounted for.

yes / Various research has concluded that economic life did not die out during the conflict in Sierra Leone, but took on different forms. Different stakeholders at all levels were engaged in economic activities during the war. The specific roles of women in the shadow economy are under-researched with the result that most analysis and policy-options are inadequate. While some of Sierra Leone¿s Market Women strategically participated in war economies to `do well out of war¿, most did so out of the need to survive. With the end of the war, market women have been able to make a successful transformation to peace economies through micro-credit assistance.

本文旨在探討俄羅斯影子經濟現象，而在影子經濟包羅萬象的形式中，又以當前俄羅斯最重要議題之一的貪污為主要分析主題。本文內容主要可以分為三部分：第一部分，首先釐清影子經濟與貪污概念，並闡述影子經濟於蘇聯末期發展情況以了解其背景。第二部分，探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯向市場經濟轉型時期影子經濟的轉變，以及貪污的主要模式。第三部分，剖析普欽任總統時期俄羅斯影子經濟的發展，自不同面向檢視貪污情形，並闡釋影子經濟與貪污的關係。 本文將影子經濟內涵界定為家戶經濟，非正式經濟活動，與犯罪經濟活動。其中，貪污屬犯罪經濟活動範疇，且又以政府部門的貪污影響最劇。俄羅斯影子經濟自蘇聯末期開始快速發展，向市場經濟轉型時期，由於各類必要制度的缺乏，改革措施導致影子經濟規模擴展，許多影子關係亦於此時期制度化。二十一世紀初期，俄羅斯影子經濟受葉爾欽時期遺續影響，規模仍大。然而，普欽第一任總統任期中，影子經濟與貪污情況皆有所改善。但於第二任期間因政府治理品質惡化，行政體系問題，以及整體民主自由度的下降，導致貪污再次成長。最後本文指出，貪污不僅為影子經濟中主要制度之一，且為促使非法影子經濟發展的主要根源。因此，本文認為，欲抑制削減非法影子經濟應得從打擊貪污著手，並嘗試提出降低貪污規模的辦法。 / The main purpose of this article is to explore the phenomena of shadow economy in Russia. And in the multiform shadow economy, the most topical issue in Russia today – corruption has been chosen as the core of our analysis. Contents of this article can be divided into three parts: first of all, the concepts of the shadow economy and corruption are defined. Meanwhile, the development of the shadow economy in the late Soviet era is introduced as background knowledge. In the second part, the evolution of the shadow economy during Russia’s transition to market economy, as well as specific models of corruption are expounded. The third part presents an analysis of the development of the shadow economy in Putin’s period, examines corruption from different dimensions, and interprets the relations between shadow economy and corruption. In this article the shadow economy includes following three kinds of activities: household economic activities, unofficial economic activities, and illegal economic activities. As one kind of illegal economic activities, corruption of government officials has the most serious impact. The shadow economy in Russia spread quickly in the last years of Soviet Union. Afterward throughout the economic transition, owing to lack of essential institutions, market reforms stimulated expansion of the scale of the shadow economy. Diverse shadow relations and behaviors were also institutionalized in that period. While at the beginning of Putin’s regime, because of the legacy of his predecessor, the scale of the shadow economy remained high, in Putin’s first term the situations of the shadow economy and corruption indeed had been improved. Nevertheless, due to deterioration of the quality of governance, problems in the administrative system, and a decline in the level of democratic freedom, corruption again wildly grew in his second term. Corruption is seen in this article as a primary institution of the shadow economy and the root of illegal shadow economy. Thus it is considered in this article that restraining illegal shadow economy must start from combating corruption, and few possible methods of reducing corruption are purposed.

Ekonominio nuosmukio sąlygomis, fiskalinės politikos sprendimai ypač svarbūs, nes vienokie ar kitokie žingsniai gali sutrumpinti arba pailginti ir pagilinti ūkio nuosmukį. Tokiu metu ekonomikos dalyviai labai jautriai reaguoja į fiskalinės politikos klaidas. Taigi svarbu tinkamai įvertinti kiekvieno sprendimo pasekmes. Dabartinės sąlygos neleidžia didinti valstybės išlaidų bei biudžeto deficito ir taip skatinti ekonominį atsigavimą. Tenka mažinti išlaidas ir stengtis didinti pajamas labai tam nepalankiu metu. Siekiant padidinti mokestines pajamas didinant mokestinę naštą, įvertinti tik aritmetinį to rezultatą nepakanka. Teorija ir empiriniai Lietuvos ir kitų šalių biudžeto surinkimo duomenys rodo, kad didesni mokesčiai ne visada lemia didesnes mokestines pajamas dėl dviejų priežasčių: dėl sumažėjusio ekonominio aktyvumo ir dėl šešėlinės ekonomikos dalies didėjimo. Viena iš pagrindinių šešėlinės ekonomikos plėtros priežasčių, kaip parodė daugelis tyrimų visame pasaulyje, yra mokestinė našta ir valstybės reguliavimas. Apibendrinus visas sąlygas Lietuvoje - ekonomikos smukimą, neigiamus ekonomikos dalyvių lūkesčius ir kita - paaiškėja, kad susidaro gana palanki aplinka šešėlinės ekonomikos plėtrai. Atsižvelgiant į biudžeto surinkimo duomenis ir atliktus tyrimus, galima daryti prielaidą, kad šešėlinės ekonomikos plėtra Lietuvoje galėjo lemti didesnį nei prognozuota ekonomikos smukimą. Turint omenyje mažesnį nei planuota biudžeto surinkimą ir padidinus mokesčius, galima... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / During the economic slowdown, fiscal policy decisions are very important because they can shorten or lengthen and deepen economic downturn. At these times economic actors are very sensitive to fiscal policy mistakes. So it is important to evaluate the consequences of every single decision. Today’s situation does not allow stimulation of economy by increasing government expenditure and budget deficit. One must reduce expenditure and increase revenue in such unfavourable time. While trying to increase tax revenue by increasing tax burden, it is not sufficient to evaluate only arithmetical effect. Theory and empirical Lithuanian and other countries budget collection show that higher taxes do not always bring higher tax revenue because of two reasons: lower economic activity and increase in shadow economy. According to numerous surveys, the main reason of shadow economy is tax burden and state regulation. By summing up all the conditions – economic slowdown, negative expectation of economic actors and other – it is quite clear that the conditions for shadow economy are quite favourable. Considering budget collection and surveys, increase in shadow economy could have encouraged higher than forecasted economic slowdown. Lower than planned budget collection even with higher taxes allow to forecast that further increase in tax burden would only decrease tax revenue. Furthermore, collection of separate taxes shows that the collection of those taxes which were increased, differed from... [to full text]

This paper will discuss the obstacles governments of developing countries face in regulating related party transactions in this rapidly globalizing world. The first section of this paper will focus on foreign direct investment, its benefits, and the tax incentives instituted by developing countries to attract the capital of multinational corporations. Next, this paper will examine the major obstacles to growth a developing country must combat: shadow economies and corruption. These two enemies of growth hurt a developing country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment, to develop its rule of law and tax administration, and to efficiently allocate its resources with the goal of developing a stable economy. Finally, I will explain the difficulties developing countries must overcome to regulate firm transfer pricing under the current global standard.

This thesis examines how drug policy and enforcement affect drug manufacturers. The approach taken is a comparative institutional analysis of cannabis and methamphetamine production. I focus on the effects of prohibition, privacy, and clandestine markets on producer behavior for these two drugs and the unintended consequences that result. I demonstrate that cannabis and methamphetamine producers both face substantial transaction costs and that producers alter their behavior to manage these transaction costs. I conclude that cannabis producers can adopt indoor, small-scale operations to hide their activity, which are capable of yielding continuous, high-potency crops. Methamphetamine producers also adopt small-scale, decentralized strategies, but commodity control increases their exposure and leads to greater overall transaction costs during the manufacturing process.

In this paper, we argue that shadow activities and different levels of marketization of household production systematically distort international comparisons of aggregate gross household saving rates (HSRs): Higher shares of hidden income increase observed HSRs. Panel data for 18 (24) OECD-countries covering a period of a decade show that gross HSRs are positively related to the degree of corruption(used as a proxy for the propensity to shift economic activities into the shadow) and to the share of income from property and self employment. At the same time, gross HSRs are negatively related to the female employment rate, the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes, and to the tax wedge. One plausible story behind these phenomena might be that unobserved consumption and wages in the shadow labor market induce an upward bias in observed HSRs and profit shares, while the price level effects of a higher share of indirect taxes and a 'welfare state' effect lower observed HSRs. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Why do some people in Halifax, Nova Scotia work collecting recyclables rather than in other—more formal—means of employment? Some scholars argue that informal economic activity is the product of a shift towards flexible work regimes and reductions to the social welfare system (the informalization thesis) and/or that increasingly marginalized people are forced into informal economic activities by economic necessity (the marginalization thesis). Drawing on a close analysis of provincial and municipal recycling policies and ethnographic fieldwork with informal recyclers, I argue that the informalization and marginalization theses are based on overly deterministic models of informal employment. Demand for informal recycling in Halifax is supported by a complex raft of environmental legislation designed to increase the rate of recycling. People willingly choose informal recycling as an alternative to formal employment for various reasons, but above all because it offers a tax-free, honest living, autonomy and a decent income.