This study explores different perceptions of security and investigates if recognition of climate change as a security issue has implications for countries’ armed forces. I use a securitization framework to understand how discursive positions are created, and by making the framework more dynamic I investigate how similar security matters are represented in different ways. I argue that securitization of climate change in national contexts changes the armed forces’ strategies to bring about security and that their activities are affected by the underlying logics of the discursive arguments. To investigate the proposed relation, I conduct a comparative case study of Norway and Sweden, and find that different ideas about the security dimension of climate change have different implications for the armed forces’ practices and organization.

A tese analisa o pensamento dos militares sobre a Amazônia brasileira e a escolha das estratégias das Forças Armadas para defender a região, dando uma especial atenção às modalidades de sua presença na área. A pesquisa mostra que a identificação da Amazônia como prioridade estratégica das Forças Armadas não se deve apenas a uma reconfiguração dos interesses estatais em matéria de segurança e defesa. A importância atribuída à região amazônica pelos militares resulta de uma intrincada relação entre interesses e elementos simbólicos. O primeiro capítulo apresenta o debate acadêmico entre neorealistas, organizativistas e construtivistas sobre o que determina a adoção de uma doutrina militar por um Estado. O segundo capítulo analisa o discurso dos militares sobre a região amazônica e as transformações deste discurso ao longo das duas últimas décadas, dando especial atenção ao discurso do Exército. O terceiro capítulo examina a presença do Exército na Amazônia e as estratégias militares elaboradas para defendê-la. O quarto capítulo trata das percepções da Força Aérea e da Marinha sobre os problemas de Defesa Nacional na Amazônia. E o quinto capítulo aborda a percepção dos formuladores de política civis sobre a problemática amazônica e as medidas adotadas para incrementar a defesa militar da região. A principal fonte de pesquisa desta tese é a bibliografia militar, composta por discursos, entrevistas, documentos doutrinários, revistas, livros de memórias, e monografias de final de curso das Escolas de Comando e Estado- Maior das Forças Armadas. Para a elaboração desta pesquisa também foi consultada uma bibliografia acadêmica que trata das relações entre os civis e os militares no Brasil, de sociologia militar, e de relações internacionais. Ademais, foram consultados documentos parlamentares, como os anais da Câmara de Deputados e do Senado Federal, assim como os arquivos eletrônicos disponíveis na internet referentes aos partidos políticos brasileiros, aos Ministérios das Relações Exteriores, e da Defesa. / This thesis analyzes the Brazilian Armed Forces strategic thought about the Amazon and the military presence in the region. It shows that the identification of the Amazon as a strategic priority to Brazilian military is not due only to a reconfiguration of state security and defense interests. The importance given to the region by the military service derives from a framework of interests and symbolical elements. The first chapter presents the academic debate among neorealism, organization theory and constructivism about the origins of military doctrine. The second chapter analyzes the military discourse about the Amazon and its changes over the last two decades, giving special attention to the Army. The third chapter focuses the Army presence in the Amazon and the military strategies to its defense. The fourth chapter deals with the Navy and the Air Force perceptions on the Amazon security problems. The fifth chapter presents the civilian perceptions on the Amazon problem and the policies adopted in order to increase the military defense of the region. The main source of this research is the Armed Forces bibliography, which is composed by speeches, interviews, doctrinaire documents, military magazines, memory books and Military Academies degree monographies. An academic bibliography dealing with civil-military relations in Brazil, military sociology and international relations was also adopted. Besides, the thesis dealt with parliamentary documents (as the Proceeding of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Federal Senate), as well as internet electronic archives referring to political parties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense.

Este trabalho teve por objetivo geral realizar uma análise de como contabilizar obrigações, com benefícios previdenciários de risco, em regimes de repartição simples, que não preveem formação de reserva ou métodos pré-definidos para isso. Para a consecução de tal objetivo, escolheu-se o benefício de pensão por morte (pensão militar) das Forças Armadascomo objeto de estudo. Nesse sentido, o uso de uma base de dados real contendo as informações individualizadas, pode ser apontado com um dos diferenciais desta pesquisa.Considerando-se o grau de confiabilidade dessa base de dados, além do ineditismo do seu uso em pesquisas acadêmicas, foi possível inferir que os resultados obtidos contribuíram para ratificar diversos conceitos expostos na plataforma teórica. A trajetória metodológica desta pesquisa foi desenvolvida com base no emprego de métodos de custeio atuarial a fim de realizar a projeção de receitas e despesas do sistema de pensões militares. Tais métodos, além da repartição simples, estão alinhados com as abordagens Accumulated Benefit Obligation(ABO) e Projected Benefit Obligation(PBO). Dessa forma, por meio da comparação entre os resultados oriundos das mencionadas abordagens, buscou-se identificar os possíveis impactos nas contas da União, enquanto ente empregador. O confronto de resultados foi realizado com base em uma análise comparativa cujo método principal para o cálculo atuarial foi o fluxo projetado, bem como o fundo financeiro decorrente desse fluxo. Com base nos valores obtidos, diante das diferenças conceituais das abordagens estudadas, entendeu-se que uma forma adequada para permitir a comparação dos resultados seria o cálculo do fundo financeiro futuro a cada período de tempo (t). A análise dos resultados indicou a ocorrência de diferenças representativas entre as abordagens. Na verdade, constatou-se que por não considerar o aumento salarial, o modelo ABO previu menores valores de obrigações com os benefícios futuros, portanto, os valores presentes do fundo financeiro foram maiores do que os modelos que consideraram aumento salarial.Nessa perspectiva, sob o enfoque do ente empregador, os resultados pareceram mais otimistas.Por fim, a abordagem PBO apresentou resultados que pareceram mais aderentes `a realidade do sistema, aproximando-se relativamente do resultado da repartição, no cenário com taxa de juros de 3% (menor taxa utilizada nas projeções). Considerando-se o tempo total das projeções, foi possível observar que, para os modelos de repartição e PBO, existiu um passivo a ser registrado nas contas da União. No entanto, o modelo ABO indicou o contrário, sugerindo que há uma ativo a ser contabilizado no Balanço Geral da União. Tal situação indicou que há diferenças concretas nos resultados, que podem levar os usuários da informação contábil a tomar decisões equivocadas em decorrência dessa distorção de valores. Ficou evidenciado que quanto maior for o horizonte de tempo projetado, maiores serão as diferenças. Ou seja, no menor horizonte adotado (25 anos) constatou-se as menores diferenças. Nesse horizonte, todos os modelos apresentaram valores de que sugerem a existência de um ativo a ser contabilizado. À luz de tal constatação parece razoável sugerir como adequada a revisão do tempo de projeção hoje empregado no âmbito da União (75 anos) na tentativa de reduzir a parcela de incerteza embutida nesse horizonte de longo prazo. / The main objective of this study was to analyze how to account for obligations with risk pension benefits in simple distribution systems that do not provide for reserve formation or predefined methods for this. In order to achieve this objective, the death benefit (military pension) benefit of the Armed Forces was chosen as the object of study. In this sense, the use of a real database containing the individualized information can be pointed out with one of the differentials of this research. Considering the degree of reliability of this database, in addition to the novelty of its use in academic research, it was possible to infer that the results obtained contributed to ratify several concepts exposed in the theoretical platform. The methodological trajectory of this research was developed based on the use of actuarial costing methods in order to realize the projection of revenues and expenses of the military pension system. Such methods, in addition to simple partitioning, are in line with the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) and Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) approaches. Thus, through a comparison of the results from the mentioned approaches, it was sought to identify the possible impacts on the Union accounts, as an employer. The comparison of results was performed based on a comparative analysis whose main method for the actuarial calculation was the projected flow, as well as the financial fund resulting from this flow. Based on the values obtained, in view of the conceptual differences of the approaches studied, it was understood that an adequate way to allow the comparison of the results would be the calculation of the future financial fund at each time period (t). The analysis of the results indicated the occurrence of representative differences between the approaches. In fact, it was found that the ABO model predicted lower bond values with future benefits, therefore, the present values of the financial fund were higher than the models that considered a salary increase. From this perspective, under the focus of the employer, the results seemed more optimistic. Finally, the PBO approach presented results that seemed to be more consistent with the reality of the system, relatively close to the result of the distribution, in the scenario with an interest rate of 3 % (lower rate used in the projections). Considering the total projection time, it was possible to observe that, for the allocation models and PBOs, there was a liability to be recorded in the Union accounts. However, the ABO model indicated the opposite, suggesting that there is an asset to be recorded in the Federal Government Balance Sheet. This situation indicated that there are concrete differences in results, which may lead the users of the accounting information to make mistaken decisions as a result of this distortion of values. It has been shown that the larger the projected time horizon, the greater the differences. That is, in the lowest adopted horizon (25 years) the smallest differences were observed. Within this horizon, all models presented values that suggest the existence of an asset to be accounted for. In light of this, it seems reasonable to suggest as appropriate the review of the projection time currently used in the Union (75 years) in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty embedded in this long-term horizon.

Between the 1950s and late 1990s the Swedish armed forces prepared for an invasion from the Soviet Union. However, after the cold war, the conditions changed, and the perceived threat slowly faded away. In lack of threats against the Swedish sovereignty, Swedish armed forces changed strategy. It led to extensive cuts in the Swedish army’s capability to defend the Swedish territory. The more extensive changes began in the late 1900s and in 2015, the Swedish government declared a military re-armament. This study is a comparative study of the justifications from the Swedish government for the changes in military capability. The propositions behind the defense acts of 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2015 represents the analysis material of this study. This study shows that the development of the security policy constituted the main justification for the disarming, as well as the military re-armament. The Swedish government has adapted its military capabilities according to how Russia has been acting militarily. The adaption has been made with respect to Russia’s current military capability. Thus, future changes in the Russian military strategy has been miscalculated. In addition to how Russia has been acting, disarmament has also been affected by other factors such as economy, culture and technology. The re-armament has also been affected by the defense’s low operational ability and increased need for cooperation capacity.

For a long time the military arena has been a context that is male-dominated and which even has been described as the arena that produces ideal forms of masculinity. This study examines the conditions for the women who choose to join the male-dominated military arena. The purpose of the study was to provide knowledge about womens experiences from basic military education in Sweden through a gender perspective. And more specifically, give insight into how women who completed education relate to expectations associated with being women and expectations associated with the role of the soldier. Central questions were created and these concerned how women perceived the role of the soldier, the extent to which they perceived gender segregation practices and the strategies used by women to deal with the male-dominated education and its possible gender segregation processes. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with five women who had complete basic military education in Sweden. A theoretical framework was created that contained theories about gender, gender power systems, women's strategies in male dominated professions, gender segregation processes, gender regimes and hegemonic masculinity. Previous research on women's conditions and experiences in the military indicates that women face opposition and exclusion, while women's presence at the same time has challenged discourses about femininity and the normative soldier. The results from the studie pointed out that the women perceived the military arena as a place where they were given the opportunity to do gender in new ways, while highlighting different problem areas during the education. These included that women were not expected to perform in the same degree as men and that the commanders had little understanding of specific female needs or questions.

The aim of the diploma thesis is to evaluate how the members of the Czech Armed Forces perceive military chaplains and especially their right to being armed. The theoretical part summarizes the legal aspect of religious services in the Czech Armed Forces as well as the history of significant representatives of the militaryreligious services. It also looksat the specifics of ministration as relevant to application within the army services. The subsequent part of the thesis summarizes the results of empirical research based on questionnaire analysis revealing the approach of military chaplains to their gun possession. The gathered data has been categorized and statistically evaluated. The data indicate the approach of the members ofthe Czech Armed Forces towards the religious services in the army and emphasize their importance especiallyduring deployment.

武舉常科創自武曌（則天），長安二年（702）始設。歷後各朝，除元代不開武科，宋、金、明三代偶有停罷，武科相沿一千二百年，幾與文科相埒。職是之故，近世中國之造士與選士，於文科、儒學、儒經、文廟一系之外，另有武科、武學、武經、武廟一系。兩系雖各有輕重，然並駕駢行千餘載，交互制衡，以保政治之平穩暢達。 / 入關伊始，清廷即詔令因襲前明舊制，開設文武科考。自順治二年（1645）開科鄉試，至光緒二十七年（1901）正式廢除，清代武科持續運作二百五十餘年，幾與王朝相伴始終。清代武科之主要層級同於文科，皆始於童試，繼而鄉試、會試，終於殿試。各級武考中式者，亦相應得授武生員、武舉人、武進士出身。武科各級考試，均分別外場、內場進行，以外場試武藝，內場試文藝。錄取權衡時外場重於內場，外場技藝之中，馬、步箭及開弓又重於舞刀、掇石。 / 清代武科之制度設計及考試內容，延續中國歷代選士「文武合一」之一貫理想，然現實中卻文武殊途。清代武科之設計與運作，既體現旗民之別，八旗內部又有滿蒙與漢軍之別、京旗與駐防之別。武科之正面影響遠不及文科，然文武科考皆為常規掄才途徑，兩者所揭櫫清代政局大勢與掄才需求之變化，實際異曲同工。通過文武兩途考選，清代科考人才之宏觀佈局，呈現南方文風熾盛、北方技勇突出之特徵。武進士之初始授職，以皇宮侍衛及地方營、衛守備為主，然武科選途清初即病壅滯，實授遷轉甚難。 / 清廷之復武科，宣稱旨在遴選「干城之才」，以為「腹心之寄」。然武科內場考試，自乾隆朝廢止《四書》，嘉慶朝盡廢論、策之試，改為默寫《武經》，日漸形同虛設。武科士子之文化素養，亦日益下降。武科外場所試技藝，係屬展示表演，而非對抗實戰。而且，自乾隆間改試鳥槍之議被禁，外場各項冷兵器技藝考核陳陳相因，與實際戰局日漸疏離。職是之故，清代中期以降，武科越益頹化為授予功名之儀式與恩榮，而非掄才要徑、晉身要途。武進士初始授職之品級，雖遠較文進士為高，然武科出身之仕途前景與政治影響遠不及文科。更有甚者，武科內、外場不僅弊情嚴重，不少武科士子更危害一方，成為地方社會亂源，大悖設科初衷。 / 清代武科出身雖有功勳卓著、官居高位者，然究屬鳳毛麟角，且集中於清代初中期。整體而論，這套幾乎橫貫全國、縱跨全清之掄才制度，得材甚少。其對帝國整體軍事力量，亦鮮少實質促進。然武科之存續，仍有平衡文武、調劑滿漢之功用，清廷既可藉此驅策雙方、維持動態均勢，又可以之宣示恩典威權、籠絡地方。因此，清代武科雖然實效不彰，卻又相沿不輟。必至清末內憂外患之鉅變衝擊，始與文科相繼停廢。復因武科之影響遠不及文科，故廢除武科所致近代中國社會之震盪，亦不可與停廢文科同日而語。 / Established by Empress Wu in 702, the imperial military examination system lasted, albeit having been suspended in the entire Yuan dynasty and in part of the Song, Jin and Ming dynasties occasionally, for 1200 years, which was nearly as long as the period of existence of the imperial civil examination system. In effect, the military examination system, associated with military schools, military classics and military temples, functioned as a mechanism parallel to the civil examination and its related institutions (i.e., Confucian schools, Confucian classics and Confucian temples) for cultivating and recruiting talents in late imperial China. Although the two systems exerted influence in different degrees on the Chinese empire, they co-existed and managed to keep a balance between them for more than a millennium so as to contribute to the stable and smooth governance of traditional China. / The Manchu court, immediately after entering Beijing, decreed to resume the civil and military examinations by adopting the former Ming institutions. Since its restoration in 1645, the military examination system ran consecutively for more than 250 years until it was eventually abolished in 1901. The vertical levels of the military examination, which were the same as those for its civil counterpart, included Tongshi (examination for junior students), Xiangshi (provincial examination), Huishi (metropolitan examination), and Dianshi (palace examination). Candidates who passed examinations at different levels were conferred the corresponding status of Wushengyuan (military government students), Wujuren (military provincial graduates) and Wujinshi (military metropolitan graduates). At each level, the military examination consisted of the outer session for tests of martial arts and physical strengths and the inner session on military classics and literary abilities. As for selection criteria, the outer session often carried greater weight. Among the examination items for the outer session, mounted archery, standing archery and bow-drawing were more important than long-handled sword-brandishing and stone-lifting. / To integrate literary and martial competence, the long-standing ideal of talent-recruitment in traditional China, was also materialized in the Qing military examination. In reality, however, the civil and military tracks diverged remarkably from each other. The design and implementation of the military examination system evinced a clear distinction between banner people and commoners. Even within the Eight Banners, there were different arrangements for Manchus, Mongols and Han military bannermen, and for capital banners and provincial garrison banners as well. In terms of positive influence, the military examination system could not compare with the civil one. However, the vicissitudes of both the civil and military examination systems, as components of the mechanism for the recruitment of talents, reflected almost similarly the changes in political development and the correspondent needs for helps from social elites in Qing times. Under these two systems, the macro-spatial distribution of talented candidates in the Qing demonstrated that those from the south were versed in literary skills, whilst those from the north were excellent in martial arts. The initial position for a newly admitted military Jinshi was usually the imperial guard or mid-ranking officer in the local Green Standard Army. But the career prospects of the military degree holders started to dim as early as the beginning of the dynasty. The situation became increasingly difficult afterwards when promising appointments with promotion prospects were hard to come by. / The Qing court constantly claimed that the restoration of military examination aimed at nurturing able military talents to serve as reliable defenders of the empire. Yet after Emperor Qianlong cancelled the test on The Four Books and Emperor Jiaqing further replaced discourse essay composition with short paragraph writing of the military classics from memory, the inner session of the examination was gradually turned into something in name only. The result was an increasing decline of the overall literary level of the candidates. More problematically, the test of martial skills in the outer session of the examination was more on individual demonstrative performance than actual confrontational combat. And since Emperor Qianlong had banned the inclusion of musket as an item of examination in the outer session, the use of traditional cold weapons and relevant skills were tested repeatedly without substantial reform, making the examination further and further irrelevant to actual warfare. Thus after the mid-Qing era, the military examination degenerated gradually into something ceremonial and honour-endowing, rather than a key mechanism of talent recruitment. Despite the superior rankings of initial appointments, the subsequent career prospects and political influences of the military Jinshi were far less favorable than those of their literary peers. What further worsened the situation was the phenomenon that, apart from severe malpractice and corruption in the examination, many military degree holders even committed infamous deeds and thus became the source of unrests in local society, starkly betraying the original intention of the institution of imperial examination. / Cases of military degree holders who performed meritoriously in military and political realms did exist. They were nevertheless rare and mainly appeared during the first half of the dynasty. A holistic evaluation of the military examination system, which was operated spatially all over the empire and temporally nearly throughout the entire dynasty, nurtured few serviceable military talents. It could therefore hardly make significant contribution to the empire’s overall military strengths. Paradoxically, the military examination system did continue to function as an institution to balance the civil and military sectors, and Manchus and the Han, in terms of interest and power. In adopting it, the Manchu court could manipulate both sides and keep a dynamic balance between them, meanwhile bestowing favours on, declaring authority over, and winning the support of society. Therefore, the military examination system remained in operation although it did not work effectively as a due talent-recruiting institution. It was officially abrogated, shortly before the abolition of its civil counterpart, in the very late period of the Qing under the impact of a series of social upheavals and tremendous political changes, amid external military threats. As the influence of the military examination system could nowhere match that of the civil examination system, the abolition of the latter seemed to have brought a much bigger shock to Chinese society in transition to the modern era. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 李林. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 345-360). / Abstracts also in English. / Li Lin.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-10T13:57:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Tifaldi.pdf: 864654 bytes, checksum: 1dbc883557bd48ed70003affc0e32f90 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-10T13:57:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Tifaldi.pdf: 864654 bytes, checksum: 1dbc883557bd48ed70003affc0e32f90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Fundação São Paulo - FUNDASP / The general objective of this dissertation is the residual dictatorship. Highlight so that you can understand what's left of the civil-military dictatorship, from 1964 to 1985, in the contemporary democratic and, above all, why no progress, or rather, why won't you move, keeping the transition between authoritarianism and democracy, from 1986 to 1988. It is considered to be dictatorial residue which makes the current democratic regime, formally established in 1988, stay stagnant, or rest in a kind of intermediate regime, safety, fostered by the diffuse feelings of fear and insecurity, which recriaria a society eager for militarism. To highlight the residual dictatorship, will be addressed in this essay aspects such How to: maintain repressive apparatus of the civil-military regime of 1964 in democratic rule after 1988, in particular the auxiliary armed forces and army reserve; resistance on if reestruturto them in the context of the current democratic regime; the absence of content or subjects of Military Law in legal education; and, as the proposed ' constitutional ' military intervention, the latest public demonstrations , ria can be interpreted in the context of the dictatorship. Aspects that will be discussed from a theoretical explanatory basis, adding to the primary production data methodology to illustrate the argument / O objetivo geral desta dissertação de mestrado é evidenciar a ditadura residual. Evidenciar para que se possa compreender o que resta da ditadura civil-militar, de 1964 a 1985, no regime democrático contemporâneo e, principalmente, por que não se avança, ou melhor, por que não se quer avançar, mantendo-se incompleta a transição entre autoritarismo e democracia, de 1986 a 1988. Considera-se ser esse resíduo ditatorial o que faz com que o regime democrático atual, formalmente instaurado em 1988, mantenha-se estagnado, ou repouse numa espécie de regime intermediário, difuso de segurança, fomentado pelos sentimentos de medo e de insegurança, o que recriaria uma sociedade ávida pelo militarismo. Para se evidenciar a ditadura residual, serão abordados nesta dissertação aspectos tais como: a manutenção de aparatos repressivos do regime civil-militar de 1964 em regime democrático do pós-1988, em especial as forças armadas auxiliares e reserva do Exército; a resistência em se reestruturá-las no contexto do atual regime democrático; a ausência de conteúdos ou de disciplinas de Direito Militar no ensino jurídico; e, de como a proposta de intervenção militar “constitucional”, das mais recentes manifestações públicas, poderia ser interpretada no contexto da ditadura residual. Aspectos que serão abordados a partir de base explicativa teórica, acrescentando-se à metodologia produção primária de dados para se ilustrar a argumentação

The changing security environment in Asia has led to a renewed interest in the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but with limited understanding of the people within; who they are, what they do, and how they think. This dissertation opens up the black box and brings the SDF officers into the analysis of civil-military relations in post-war Japan. I present a theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory, in which I hypothesize that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and preference divergence between the civilians and the military produces four different outcomes in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly excessive). I examine how civil-military relations in Japan evolved over time and across three realms of defense policy making, budget, personnel, and use of force; utilizing the findings from an opinion survey conducted among SDF officers and civilian elite addressing the "civil-military gap," oral history records of former SDF leaders and civilian defense officials, and interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. My research shows that civil-military relations in Japan was generally calm, not because the ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but because the policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support of the alliance relationship with the United States. Such preference convergence made it possible for the politicians to continue "auto-pilot control" of the SDF, which was convenient for politicians who preferred to avoid dealing with military matters in face of the anti-militaristic public. However, this led to two paradoxical outcomes: (1) the SDF came to enjoy their relative autonomy within the ex-ante constraints, and (2) the ex-ante constraints turned out to be self-binding for politicians, possibly hampering their ability to control the SDF ex-post. Institutional changes through the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s along with the perceived changes in the security environment surrounding Japan enhanced both the incentive and capacity of politicians to release the ex-ante constraints and to control the SDF in their own hands. Re-interpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self defense is a step in the same direction. Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post control may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where their preferences diverge.

For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the study of these wars has been largely ignored. Existing scholarship on wartime alliances focuses almost exclusively on the causes of alignment or the onset of conflict ignoring the conduct and consequences of these arrangements. Wartime partnerships exhibit enormous variation in their structure, however. What accounts for the varied multinational security arrangements states adopt in wartime? I argue that the choices states make in constructing these wartime partnerships have important consequences for both the conduct and outcome of conflicts. Following the institutional design literature, I argue that these differences are purposeful and originate from the rational calculations and strategic interactions among the actors creating them. I focus on one design feature of multinational military structures in particular, that of command and control (C2). The enormous variation visible in multinational command and control structures in wartime begs two questions: First, why do states adopt different command and control structures? Second, what drives actors to abandon one structure in favor of another? To answer these questions, I develop a theory of failure-driven change. Because conventional wisdom suggests that greater cooperation is beneficial, yielding gains for all, the puzzle naturally arises as to why all wartime partnerships don’t start out in the tightest configuration possible, that of unified command. After all, the benefits of greater wartime integration are seemingly vast; from the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs to the conferral of legitimacy, tightly integrated arrangements confer distinct advantages. Despite the many benefits wartime integration confers, however, I argue states are reluctant to adopt unified command for fear of having to surrender operational control over their military forces. Yet even a cursory examination of wartime multinational partnerships reveals that states do sometimes enter into more integrated command relationships, leading to the (second) question of what motivates them to do so. Here, I argue that one factor in particular, that of battlefield performance, leads states to abandon their intrinsic reluctance toward unity of command. Specifically, I argue that when faced with military defeat on the battlefield, states often respond by experimenting with new command and control arrangements. The learning process is often tentative and slow yet over time leads to greater integration. Additionally, I argue that greater integration in multinational command and control structures is correlated with improved military performance. In short, failure leads to adaptation which then leads to success. To test my theory of institutional learning, I employ comparative historical analysis, specifically process tracing and the congruence method. The universe of cases consisted of all multinational wars since 1816, some 38 conflicts. However, because a number of these cases featured multinational parties on both sides, this yielded a total of 43 cases. Three cases were chosen on the basis of representativeness and variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest. The cases examined were the Entente and Central Powers in World War I and the UN coalition in the Korean War. Overall, the cases provide strong support for my theory of wartime learning. The findings suggest that failure is a key determinant of wartime integration.