La recherche d'une unité entre les contrats privés et les publics revient à vouloir démontrer l'existence d'un socle, d'un droit commun aux contrats privés et aux contrats publics au stade de leur formation. Cependant, si l'unité des éléments essentiels du contrat peut se révéler imparfaite entre le droit privé et le public, deux notions peuvent apporter une cohérence au phénomène juridique d'unité des contrats : la notion générale de contrat en sa qualité de principe fondateur du phénomène d'unité permet la recherche d'une définition unitaire du contrat dont l'expression est la notion de consentement ; alors que les notions d'objet et de cause se révèlent être des instruments d'identification principal et accessoire du phénomène d'unité des contrats. Ainsi, s'il existe une multitude de contrats, il n'existe qu'une notion de contrat. S'il existe une infinité d'objet, de cause et de moyen de consentir, il n'existe qu'une notion d'objet, de cause et de consentement. L'unité des contrats privés et des contrats publics est cela : la réduction d'une pluralité de notions à une notion-cadre fondamentale, la notion de contrat. / Seeking unity between private and public contracts is ultimately intended to demonstrate the existence of a base, a law common to private and public contracts, at the stage of their conclusion. However, if the unity, in terms of private and public law, of the basic elements of the contract may prove to be imperfect, two concepts may bring cohesiveness to the legal phenomenon of the unity of contracts: the general concept of contract in its role as a founding principle of the phenomenon of unity enables a uniform definition for the contract to be sought, the expression of which is the concept of consent whereas the notions of object and cause reveal themselves to be main instruments of identification, ancillary to the phenomenon of the unity of contracts. Thus, if multiple contracts exist, there only exists one concept of the contract. If there are an infinite number of objects, causes and means of consent, there is only one concept of object, cause and consent. The unity of private contracts and public contracts is this: the reduction of a multiplicity of notions into one basic framework, the concept of the contract.

It is generally accepted that the award of contract damages in English law is governed by the expectation principle. This principle provides that following an actual or anticipated breach of contract the innocent party is entitled to be put into the position that he or she would have occupied had the contract been performed. There is significant ambiguity over what ‘position’ means in this context. The conventional understanding of the expectation principle is that it stipulates the appropriate measure of loss for an award of compensation. This thesis challenges this understanding and proposes a new performance-oriented account of awards given in accordance with the expectation principle. The thesis is in two parts. Part I outlines and challenges the orthodox understanding of awards given in accordance with the expectation principle. Chapter One outlines the orthodox account, and explains the traditional interpretation of loss in this context. Chapter Two mounts a doctrinal challenge to the orthodox account, demonstrating the existence of many awards for breach of contract that do not reflect the actual loss suffered by the innocent party. Chapter Three highlights the conceptual difficulty of the orthodox account and outlines the problems with conventional terminology, proposing stable definitions for important legal concepts. Part II advances an alternative account of contract damages that draws a distinction between two different kinds of money awards. The first is an award substituting for performance. The second is an award compensating for loss. Chapter Four outlines the account’s foundations by defending the existence of the right to performance and the existence of the proposed distinction. Chapter Five explains the quantification and restriction of money awards substituting for performance. Chapter Six explains the nature of money awards compensating for loss. Finally, Chapter Seven defends English law’s preference for awarding monetary substitutes for performance rather than ordering specific performance.

L’étude de l'avant-contrat en droit des contrats d'auteur est celle de la période précédant le contrat d'auteur, période de l'avant-contrat et des avant-contrats pouvant jalonner celle-ci. Cette étude s'intéresse à l'articulation, dans la période précédant la conclusion du contrat, entre les règles du droit commun et les règles du droit des contrats d'auteur auxquelles sera soumis le contrat préparé. Il apparait que la période de l'avant-contrat est, au delà de l'influence indirecte qu'exerce le droit d'auteur sur la justification d'un renforcement de certains devoirs, entièrement soumise au droit commun. L'avant-contrat précédant le contrat d'auteur est ainsi régulé par le droit commun. Le droit spécial des contrats d'auteur n'est cependant pas absent de la période de l'avant-contrat. Il intervient dans cette période en encadrant les avant-contrats pouvant être conclus par l'auteur, délimitant un cadre à l'intérieur duquel pourront s'épanouir ces contrats préparatoires. Les avant-contrats apparaissent alors comme le vecteur de l'infiltration des règles du droit des contrats d'auteur dans la période de l'avant-contrat. / The study on the pre-contract in author’s contract law is about the period before the author’s contract itself; the pre-contracts can punctuated that period. This study is about the junction, during the pre-contract period, between the system of common law and the author’s contract law rules under which the contract will be written. It appears that the pre-contract period is completely subjected to the common law rules even though the author’s contract law has an indirect influence on the pre-contract, especially concerning the importance of certain duties. Thus, the pre-contract, which appears before the author’s contract, is subjected to the common law. However, the period of the pre-contract does not ignore the author’s contract law. It gives a legal framework to pre-contracts which can be concluded by the author. Pre-contracts allow contracts’ law rules to infiltrate the pre-contract period.

This thesis deals with legal relations existing between real estate agencies and its clients. Main objective of thesis lies on analyzing of possible legal risks based on using agent services of real estate agencies. Such risks are not only described but thesis tries to find out its sources and practical impacts. Author works with large amount of particular examples of agreement which are actually used in practise.

A regulamentação das hipóteses de erro no Direito Obrigacional foi objeto de profunda alteração em razão da nova redação atribuída à matéria pelo novo Código Civil e em razão do novo cenário desenhado pelo princípio da manutenção do contrato. A presente dissertação trata das diferenças entre a regulamentação do erro em face do Código anterior (1916 – “CC/16”, artigos 86 a 113) e do novo Código (2002 – “CC/02”, artigos 138 a 166). Além disso, a dissertação trata sobre as conseqüências advindas do desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro, inclusive sobre eventual indenização. As questões propostas e que subjazem esta dissertação são: em quais situações a parte pode requerer o desfazimento por erro? A existência de erro, somente, é suficiente para que se declare inválido o contrato? E quais são as conseqüências da invalidação do negócio jurídico? Há algum dever indenizatório? As respostas a essas questões serão umas, se analisadas a partir das regras do Código Civil de 1916, e outras, se respondidas com base nas regras do Código Civil de 2002. A dissertação analisa o fato de, em regra, a doutrina apontar como modificação do novo Código Civil a introdução do princípio da proteção da confiança daquele que não agiu em erro. Na verdade, no entanto, essa proteção já era implementada na vigência do Código Civil anterior (CC/16), por meio do dever de indenizar. Portanto, a proteção da outra parte não é novidade introduzida pelo novo Código Civil (CC/02). A tese exposta nesta dissertação aponta para o fato de que, além da proteção da outra parte, a lei protege o contrato em si, como uma forma de proteger o comércio, ou seja, todos os demais contratos que dependem dele, direta ou indiretamente. E essa proteção é colocada em prática ao se dificultar o desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro. Nesse sentido, o novo Código Civil inovou ao acrescentar um outro requisito para o desfazimento do negócio por erro: a sua recognoscibilidade. / The regulation of the hypotheses of mistake in Contract Law has suffered deep modifications due to the new wording of the new Civil Code and the new scenario drafted by the principle of maintenance of the contract. The presented thesis covers the differences between the old regulation supported by the old Civil Code (1916 – “CC/16”, articles 86 to 113) and the new one (2002 – “CC/02”, articles 138 to 166). Besides that, it deals with the consequences of the extinguishment of the contract due to mistake, including the possibility of indemnification of the other party. The questions posed, which are beneath this thesis, are: in which situations a party may avoid a contract for mistake? The existence of the mistake, solely, is enough to make the contract unenforceable? And what are the consequences? Is there any duty of indemnification? The answers will be different according to the rules of the Civil Code of 1916 and the 2002 one. In general, writers have pointed out as the modification introduced by the new Civil Code the protection of the other party that has not acted in mistake. Actually, this protection has been in evidence since the old Civil Code (CC/16), what was put into practice throughout the duty of indemnification. Thus, the protection of the other party is not the change introduced by the new Civil Code (CC/02). The point is that the new law, besides protecting the other party, protects also the contract itself, as a means of protection of the market, or, in other words, all other contractual relations that depend on it, direct or indirectly. And this protection is put into practice by making more difficult to terminate the contract for mistake. In this sense, the new Civil Code added one more requisite: the recognosibility of the mistake.

A regulamentação das hipóteses de erro no Direito Obrigacional foi objeto de profunda alteração em razão da nova redação atribuída à matéria pelo novo Código Civil e em razão do novo cenário desenhado pelo princípio da manutenção do contrato. A presente dissertação trata das diferenças entre a regulamentação do erro em face do Código anterior (1916 – “CC/16”, artigos 86 a 113) e do novo Código (2002 – “CC/02”, artigos 138 a 166). Além disso, a dissertação trata sobre as conseqüências advindas do desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro, inclusive sobre eventual indenização. As questões propostas e que subjazem esta dissertação são: em quais situações a parte pode requerer o desfazimento por erro? A existência de erro, somente, é suficiente para que se declare inválido o contrato? E quais são as conseqüências da invalidação do negócio jurídico? Há algum dever indenizatório? As respostas a essas questões serão umas, se analisadas a partir das regras do Código Civil de 1916, e outras, se respondidas com base nas regras do Código Civil de 2002. A dissertação analisa o fato de, em regra, a doutrina apontar como modificação do novo Código Civil a introdução do princípio da proteção da confiança daquele que não agiu em erro. Na verdade, no entanto, essa proteção já era implementada na vigência do Código Civil anterior (CC/16), por meio do dever de indenizar. Portanto, a proteção da outra parte não é novidade introduzida pelo novo Código Civil (CC/02). A tese exposta nesta dissertação aponta para o fato de que, além da proteção da outra parte, a lei protege o contrato em si, como uma forma de proteger o comércio, ou seja, todos os demais contratos que dependem dele, direta ou indiretamente. E essa proteção é colocada em prática ao se dificultar o desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro. Nesse sentido, o novo Código Civil inovou ao acrescentar um outro requisito para o desfazimento do negócio por erro: a sua recognoscibilidade. / The regulation of the hypotheses of mistake in Contract Law has suffered deep modifications due to the new wording of the new Civil Code and the new scenario drafted by the principle of maintenance of the contract. The presented thesis covers the differences between the old regulation supported by the old Civil Code (1916 – “CC/16”, articles 86 to 113) and the new one (2002 – “CC/02”, articles 138 to 166). Besides that, it deals with the consequences of the extinguishment of the contract due to mistake, including the possibility of indemnification of the other party. The questions posed, which are beneath this thesis, are: in which situations a party may avoid a contract for mistake? The existence of the mistake, solely, is enough to make the contract unenforceable? And what are the consequences? Is there any duty of indemnification? The answers will be different according to the rules of the Civil Code of 1916 and the 2002 one. In general, writers have pointed out as the modification introduced by the new Civil Code the protection of the other party that has not acted in mistake. Actually, this protection has been in evidence since the old Civil Code (CC/16), what was put into practice throughout the duty of indemnification. Thus, the protection of the other party is not the change introduced by the new Civil Code (CC/02). The point is that the new law, besides protecting the other party, protects also the contract itself, as a means of protection of the market, or, in other words, all other contractual relations that depend on it, direct or indirectly. And this protection is put into practice by making more difficult to terminate the contract for mistake. In this sense, the new Civil Code added one more requisite: the recognosibility of the mistake.

A regulamentação das hipóteses de erro no Direito Obrigacional foi objeto de profunda alteração em razão da nova redação atribuída à matéria pelo novo Código Civil e em razão do novo cenário desenhado pelo princípio da manutenção do contrato. A presente dissertação trata das diferenças entre a regulamentação do erro em face do Código anterior (1916 – “CC/16”, artigos 86 a 113) e do novo Código (2002 – “CC/02”, artigos 138 a 166). Além disso, a dissertação trata sobre as conseqüências advindas do desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro, inclusive sobre eventual indenização. As questões propostas e que subjazem esta dissertação são: em quais situações a parte pode requerer o desfazimento por erro? A existência de erro, somente, é suficiente para que se declare inválido o contrato? E quais são as conseqüências da invalidação do negócio jurídico? Há algum dever indenizatório? As respostas a essas questões serão umas, se analisadas a partir das regras do Código Civil de 1916, e outras, se respondidas com base nas regras do Código Civil de 2002. A dissertação analisa o fato de, em regra, a doutrina apontar como modificação do novo Código Civil a introdução do princípio da proteção da confiança daquele que não agiu em erro. Na verdade, no entanto, essa proteção já era implementada na vigência do Código Civil anterior (CC/16), por meio do dever de indenizar. Portanto, a proteção da outra parte não é novidade introduzida pelo novo Código Civil (CC/02). A tese exposta nesta dissertação aponta para o fato de que, além da proteção da outra parte, a lei protege o contrato em si, como uma forma de proteger o comércio, ou seja, todos os demais contratos que dependem dele, direta ou indiretamente. E essa proteção é colocada em prática ao se dificultar o desfazimento do negócio jurídico por erro. Nesse sentido, o novo Código Civil inovou ao acrescentar um outro requisito para o desfazimento do negócio por erro: a sua recognoscibilidade. / The regulation of the hypotheses of mistake in Contract Law has suffered deep modifications due to the new wording of the new Civil Code and the new scenario drafted by the principle of maintenance of the contract. The presented thesis covers the differences between the old regulation supported by the old Civil Code (1916 – “CC/16”, articles 86 to 113) and the new one (2002 – “CC/02”, articles 138 to 166). Besides that, it deals with the consequences of the extinguishment of the contract due to mistake, including the possibility of indemnification of the other party. The questions posed, which are beneath this thesis, are: in which situations a party may avoid a contract for mistake? The existence of the mistake, solely, is enough to make the contract unenforceable? And what are the consequences? Is there any duty of indemnification? The answers will be different according to the rules of the Civil Code of 1916 and the 2002 one. In general, writers have pointed out as the modification introduced by the new Civil Code the protection of the other party that has not acted in mistake. Actually, this protection has been in evidence since the old Civil Code (CC/16), what was put into practice throughout the duty of indemnification. Thus, the protection of the other party is not the change introduced by the new Civil Code (CC/02). The point is that the new law, besides protecting the other party, protects also the contract itself, as a means of protection of the market, or, in other words, all other contractual relations that depend on it, direct or indirectly. And this protection is put into practice by making more difficult to terminate the contract for mistake. In this sense, the new Civil Code added one more requisite: the recognosibility of the mistake.

The interest towards managing structural change successfully through downsizing activities has increased as a result of globalization and the recent economic, technological and demographic changes occurring across Europe. As a result of downsizing activities companies often break a Psychological Contract that an employee has established with the organization when starting the employment contract. This results in employees experiencing negative feelings, lack of motivation, inability to re-motivate oneself after the downsizings and uncertainty about one’s future within the organization. If an employee is unable to rebuild the psychological contract, one might decide to resign from the organization as a consequence. Since employees are companies most valuable asset for companies and the key asset to remain competitive, companies should focus on preventing the violation of the psychological contract. The purpose of this study is to understand why some downsizing survivors decide to voluntarily resign during the post-downsizing era. A collective case study was conducted in a form of interviews from two cases. The results from the primary and secondary data illustrated that employees who are unable to rebuild the psychological contract are more likely to voluntarily resign.

published_or_final_version / abstract / Psychology / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation examines how the structures of compensation for executives and directors are affected by the possibility that managers can influence the risk of a firm's cash flows. In chapter 1, I consider a moral hazard model which shows that a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity in managerial compensation may deteriorate shareholder value when shareholders cannot monitor managerial risk-seeking activities. Intuitively, while high-powered managerial compensation provides the manager with incentives to increase the firm's value by exerting effort, it also creates managerial incentive to engage in (unproductive) risk-seeking activities. To test this prediction, I consider a regulatory change that makes it more difficult for managers to conceal information about the (speculative) use of derivative instruments. Specifically, I examine how the structures of compensation for executives and managers are affected by the adoption of a new accounting standard, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FAS 133) which mandates the fair value accounting for derivative holdings. Consistent with the model prediction, I find that relative to other firms, derivative users (firms that traded derivatives before adopting FAS 133) increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO/CFO compensation. In Chapter 2, I extend the model by incorporating the realistic features that shareholders delegate to the (self-interested) board the tasks of monitoring managers and of setting their compensation contracts. My analysis shows that while high-powered board compensation induces the board to monitor the firm and to properly design managerial compensation, it also provides the board with incentives to misreport managerial risk-seeking activities and to engage in collusive behavior with the manager at the expense of shareholders. From these trade-offs, I develop a number of testable hypotheses and take them to the data. Consistent with the model predictions, I find that firms in which (i) managerial risk-seeking activities are more likely to occur (e.g., high R&D firms or banks) and (ii) board monitoring costs are likely to be lower (e.g., firms that have non-officer blockholders on the board) show weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity of board compensation and stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. / text