In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defends the mathematically deterministic world of physics by arguing that its essential features arise necessarily from innate forms of intuition and rules of understanding through combinatory acts of imagination. Knowing is active: it constructs the unity of nature by combining appearances in certain mandatory ways. What is mandated is that sensible awareness provide objects that conform to the structure of ostensive judgment: “This (S) is P.” Sensibility alone provides no such objects, so the imagination compensates by combining passing point-data into “pure” referents for the subject-position, predicate-position, and copula. The result is a cognitive encounter with a generic physical object whose characteristics—magnitude, substance, property, quality, and causality—are abstracted as the Kantian categories. Each characteristic is a product of “sensible synthesis” that has been “determined” by a “function of unity” in judgment. Understanding the possibility of such determination by judgment is the chief difficulty for any rehabilitative reconstruction of Kant’s theory. I will show that Kant conceives of figurative synthesis as an act of line-drawing, and of the functions of unity as rules for attending to this act. The subject-position refers to substance, identified as the objective time-continuum; the predicate-position, to quality, identified as the continuum of property values (constituting the second-order type named by the predicate concept). The upshot is that both positions refer to continuous magnitudes, related so that one (time-value) is the condition of the other (property-value). Kant’s theory of physically constructive grammar is thus equivalent to the analytic-geometric formalism at work in the practice of mathematical physics, which schematizes time and state as lines related by an algebraic formula. Kant theorizes the subject–predicate relation in ostensive judgment as an algebraic time–state function. When aimed towards sensibility, “S is P” functions as the algebraic relation “t → ƒ(t).” / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2008. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on June 9, 2009) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

A presente pesquisa pretende analisar o período do pensamento filosófico de B. Russell e L. Wittgenstein entre os anos de 1905 e 1914 descrevendo o desenvolvimento da filosofia do atomismo lógico presente no Tractatus logico-philosophicus de Wittgenstein. Para tanto, será observada a crítica deste à teoria do juízo desenvolvida por Russell, a qual seria fundamento para a teoria do conhecimento que o último elaborava. Reconhecemos, com base nas críticas, que Russell sofria uma forte influência do empirismo de sua época, o que tornou sua epistemologia frágil. Essa fragilidade é evidenciada por Wittgenstein, que, ao criticar alguns pontos fundamentais da teoria do juízo, fez com que Russell assumisse essa característica de suas teses e inevitavelmente parasse a produção de seu segundo projeto filosófico depois de Principia mathematica, intitulado atualmente Theory of knowledge e geralmente conhecido como \"o manuscrito de 1913\". Wittgenstein, por outro lado, produz nesse mesmo período sua primeira e única obra publicada em vida, o Tractatus logico-philosophicus, em que inaugura e propõe um novo entendimento da lógica da linguagem por meio de uma radicalização da teoria russelliana das descrições. Essa radicalização é feita mediante a postulação de nomes logicamente simples que designam objetos simples. Essa postulação é justificada pela teoria da figuração elaborada no Tractatus, a qual sustenta o elo necessário entre lógica e mundo e contribui para que o sentido de todo e qualquer pensamento seja mostrado sem a exigência de explicações atreladas ao empirismo. / This research aims to analyze the period of philosophical thought of B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein between the years of 1905 and 1914 describing the development of the philosophy of logical atomism present in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus of Wittgenstein. For this aim, will be observed the criticism of Wittgenstein to the theory of judgment developed by Russell and which would be grounds for the theory of knowledge that Russell was elaborating. We recognize, from the criticism, that Russell had a strong influence of the empiricism of his day, which made his epistemology fragile. This weakness is evidenced by Wittgenstein that, by criticizing some key points of the theory of judgment, made Russell take the fragility of his own arguments and inevitably stopped with the production of his second philosophical project after Principia mathematica, as currently entitled Theory of knowledge and usually known as \"the 1913 manuscript.\" Wittgenstein, on the other hand, produces in the same period his first and only book published in life, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, which opens and proposes a new understanding of the logic of language through a radicalization of Russell\'s theory of descriptions. This radicalization is done through the postulation of logically simple names that designate simple objects. The postulation is justified by the picture theory drafted in the Tractatus, which maintains the necessary link between logic and world and contributes that the sense of any thought be shown without the requirement of explanations linked to empiricism.

L'objectif de ce travail est de se réapproprier la contribution de Heinrich Rickert au programme critique de fondation de l'ontologie. Il est apparu que cette contribution résidait dans l'analyse des structures formelles du jugement et, plus exactement, dans l'analyse du jugement existentiel. À la suite de Rickert, il a fallu déployer cette analyse sur deux versants: le versant noétique ou la théorie des actes judicatifs (Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 1892-1928) et le versant noématique ou la théorie des propositions - ou "teneurs" - judicatives (Die Logik des Prädikats und das Problem der Ontologie, 1930). J'ai montré que cette double analyse permet non seulement de dégager deux concepts formels de l'être (l'être comme "Jaform" et comme "Urprädikat"), mais aussi de jeter les bases d'une théorie des catégories embrassant à la fois les étants sensibles et les étants non sensibles.

A presente pesquisa pretende analisar o período do pensamento filosófico de B. Russell e L. Wittgenstein entre os anos de 1905 e 1914 descrevendo o desenvolvimento da filosofia do atomismo lógico presente no Tractatus logico-philosophicus de Wittgenstein. Para tanto, será observada a crítica deste à teoria do juízo desenvolvida por Russell, a qual seria fundamento para a teoria do conhecimento que o último elaborava. Reconhecemos, com base nas críticas, que Russell sofria uma forte influência do empirismo de sua época, o que tornou sua epistemologia frágil. Essa fragilidade é evidenciada por Wittgenstein, que, ao criticar alguns pontos fundamentais da teoria do juízo, fez com que Russell assumisse essa característica de suas teses e inevitavelmente parasse a produção de seu segundo projeto filosófico depois de Principia mathematica, intitulado atualmente Theory of knowledge e geralmente conhecido como \"o manuscrito de 1913\". Wittgenstein, por outro lado, produz nesse mesmo período sua primeira e única obra publicada em vida, o Tractatus logico-philosophicus, em que inaugura e propõe um novo entendimento da lógica da linguagem por meio de uma radicalização da teoria russelliana das descrições. Essa radicalização é feita mediante a postulação de nomes logicamente simples que designam objetos simples. Essa postulação é justificada pela teoria da figuração elaborada no Tractatus, a qual sustenta o elo necessário entre lógica e mundo e contribui para que o sentido de todo e qualquer pensamento seja mostrado sem a exigência de explicações atreladas ao empirismo. / This research aims to analyze the period of philosophical thought of B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein between the years of 1905 and 1914 describing the development of the philosophy of logical atomism present in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus of Wittgenstein. For this aim, will be observed the criticism of Wittgenstein to the theory of judgment developed by Russell and which would be grounds for the theory of knowledge that Russell was elaborating. We recognize, from the criticism, that Russell had a strong influence of the empiricism of his day, which made his epistemology fragile. This weakness is evidenced by Wittgenstein that, by criticizing some key points of the theory of judgment, made Russell take the fragility of his own arguments and inevitably stopped with the production of his second philosophical project after Principia mathematica, as currently entitled Theory of knowledge and usually known as \"the 1913 manuscript.\" Wittgenstein, on the other hand, produces in the same period his first and only book published in life, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, which opens and proposes a new understanding of the logic of language through a radicalization of Russell\'s theory of descriptions. This radicalization is done through the postulation of logically simple names that designate simple objects. The postulation is justified by the picture theory drafted in the Tractatus, which maintains the necessary link between logic and world and contributes that the sense of any thought be shown without the requirement of explanations linked to empiricism.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose de Resende Junior.pdf: 982772 bytes, checksum: d71902e7206bd6e277284eaced8335b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This is a historiographical work that aims to reconstruct the debates and influences between the so-called Baden's neo-kantianism and the husserlian phenomenology. More precisely, it attempts to trace the impact of some theses of Husserl's Logical Investigations in the philosophy of values of Rickert and Lask. The first part shows how phenomenology influences the development and maturation of Rickert's philosophy of values in relation to the Windelband's original project. The second part shows how Lask appropriates phenomenology and completely transform the philosophy of values, opening new avenues for philosophical research in the twentieth century, such those followed by Heidegger. In general terms, it attempts to show that the background of these discussions between phenomenology and philosophy of values turn around the problem of sense (and/or meaning), not only with regard to knowledge and science, but also all other dimensions of human experience, like ethics, aesthetics, law and religion / Trata-se o presente de um trabalho historiográfico que procura reconstruir as discussões e influências entre o chamado neokantismo de Baden e a fenomenologia husserliana. Mais propriamente, procura-se remontar o impacto de algumas teses das Investigações Lógicas de Husserl na filosofia dos valores de Rickert e Lask. Na primeira parte, mostra-se como a fenomenologia influencia a elaboração e o amadurecimento da filosofia dos valores de Rickert em relação ao projeto original de Windelband. Na segunda parte, mostra-se como Lask se apropria da fenomenologia transformando completamente a filosofia dos valores e abrindo novos caminhos para a pesquisa filosófica no século XX, tal como aqueles trilhados por Heidegger. Em termos gerais, procura-se mostrar que o pano de fundo dessas discussões entre fenomenologia e filosofia dos valores gira em torno do problema do sentido (e/ou significação), não só no que diz respeito ao conhecimento e às ciências, mas a todas as dimensões da experiência humana, como a ética, a estética, o direito e a religião