Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die politieke oorgangsperiode en die aanloop tot die vestiging van ‘n veelparty demokrasie, het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid wesenlike veranderinge ondergaan. As opkomende regerende party het die African National Congress (ANC), die Military Research Group (MRG) gestig om díe party se standpunte rondom verdedigingsbeleid te formuleer. Sedertdien het die MRG, Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid grootliks omskrywe. Die MRG het ANC leiers aan die term non-offensive defence (NOD), wat ‘n Europese idee uit die Koue Oorlog-era is, bekendgestel. NOD is daarop gemik om die veiligheidsdilemma, wapenwedlope en toevallige oorlog te verhoed. Die ANC het NOD ondersteun en bevorder. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking sedert 1994 te beskryf aan die hand van NOD se prominensie. Non-offensive defence idees het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid beduidend beïnvloed en verskyn in alle wetgewing en beleid wat verband hou met verdediging. NOD het die ANC se plaaslike beleidsdoelwitte binne die nuwe veiligheidsparadigma ondersteun. Soos NOD, is díe paradigma ‘n produk van die Peace Research denkskool. As ‘n defensiewe idee het NOD, Suid-Afrika se oogmerk om betrekkinge met state in Suider-Afrika te verbeter, benadruk. NOD het verder ook SA se strategiese defensiewe postuur en gepaardgaande militêre doktrine bepaal en beklemtoon. Die ANC het NOD gebruik om die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) te transformeer en magsprojeksievermoëns af te skaal. Twee argumente word in hierdie studie benut om die aard van verdedigingsbeleidmaking in Suid-Afrika te beskryf, met die inagneming van die belangrikheid van NOD. Eerstens, dat beleidmakers ontvanklik is vir idees en modelle van nywerheidslande, ten spyte van die beperkte toepaslikheid en tekortkomings van sulke modelle. Tweedens, dat modelle deur verskeie belangegroepe gebruik kan word om beleid te beïnvloed. Die MRG en die SANW het NOD as ‘n teoretiese instrument benut om verdedigingsbeleid tot die bevordering van eie belange te beïnvloed. Verskeie eienskappe van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking is geïdentifiseer in die studie. Eerstens, dat die Grondwet nie die staat of die individu se veiligheid bo die ander stel nie. Dit veroorsaak botsende wêreldbeskouings van realisme en idealisme oor verdediging. Beleid behels dus dikwels kompromieë tussen die twee uitgangspunte. Tweedens, alhoewel die Grondwet voorsiening maak vir openbare deelname in beleidmaking, is daar nie gelyke ‘n verspreiding van mag tussen belangegroepe om beleid te beïnvloed nie. In die opsig is die wetgewende gesag en parlementêre komitees aansienlik swakker as die uitvoerende gesag.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing en magsaanwending. Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig. Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het. Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite aangeraak nie. Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer. Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf. ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die lig laat sien het. Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing. Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is. Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf. Ter opsomming dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word. Die tesis maak dus die gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is. Ten slotte is die weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat.

Thesis (MMil (Computer Information Systems))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Since the 1940s, the evaluation of information systems has been the topic of many authors’ research. When taking into account the amount of resources invested in an organisation’s information systems, especially in the present fiscal conditions, then the evaluation of an information system’s success is imperative. Traditionally, monetarybased evaluation measures were used to evaluate the success of an information system, however, these types of measures were found to be inadequate in their attempt to measure the complexity of information systems successfully. Surrogate measures, such as the user’s satisfaction with the information system, were developed to replace monetary-based evaluation measures. These forms of measures are often perceptual by nature and usually encompass the different stakeholders involved in the information system.

Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies. Military History)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Henry Timson Lukin was born and educated in Britain. After completion of his schooling at the Merchant Taylor’s School in 1875 he had hoped to enter the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, but failed the entry examinations. However, seizing the moment of a war in South Africa, he left in 1879 for Natal, where he worked first as a road foreman, but soon, with the help of a cousin, Lieutenant Jack Spurgin, he was commissioned into the 77th Regiment and under the command of Major H.M. Bengough and saw service during the Anglo-Zulu War. Having distinguished himself in the field in Zululand, Lukin was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Cape Mounted Riflemen (CMR) and served with this outfit in the Basuto War (1881), the Langeberg campaign (1896-97) and the South African War (1899-1902). During the South African War he received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for the defence of Jammersbergdrift and played an important role in capturing key rebel commando leaders, including Commandant Johannes Lötter and Commandant Gideon Scheepers. After the war he received the Commander of the Order of St Michael & St George (CMG) and was appointed as the Commandant General of the Cape Colonial Forces. He played an important role in establishing the structures of the Union Defence Forces (UDF) and was appointed as Inspector General of the Permanent Force in 1912. He influenced the debate on colonial warfare with the writing of the maxim handbook and a training pamphlet, Savage Warfare: Hints on Tactics to be adopted and Precautions to be taken and during the First World War distinguished himself as commander of a force of the South African troops in German South-West Africa (1914-1915) and as commander of the South African Brigade in Egypt (1916) and in France (1916-17). He was promoted to Major General when he assumed the command the 9th Scottish Division in December 1916. In 1917 one of the highest honours was bestowed upon him when he was knighted. The illness of his wife, Annie Marie (Lily) necessitated a transfer to Britain, where he commanded the 64th Division until the end of the war. He retired from the military shortly after the Armistice and returned with his wife to South Africa, where he remained active in a variety of ex-servicemen’s organisations, including that of 1 South African Infantry Brigade. He was also a guest speaker at various functions, including the unveiling of monuments and memorials, and served on the Defence Commission of Enquiry (1924). Major General Sir Henry Timson Lukin died after a full, varied and distinguished military career in December 1925. Lukin and the Brigade had an enormous impact on the creation of a new South African identity during the First World War and period immediately after and played an important role in the formation of a new South African military organisation and culture.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / Nuclear ssion is commonly known as a process where a heavy nucleus such as Uranium or Thorium decays into two fragments of roughly equal mass. On occasion however, instead of decay into two parts a process known as binary ssion, the nucleus can decay into three fragments. In this decay channel known as ternary ssion, the nucleus splits into three fragments with the third particle being too light compared to the main ssion fragments. There are also instances where heavy nuclei split into three fragments of comparable masses, the so called \true ternary ssion" as was predicted by the theoretical calculations of Strutinsky [Str63]. While theoretical predictions hold promises for this decay mode, experimental attempts had little success in proving the existence of true ternary ssion in low energy ssion. The challenges and di culties faced by experimentalist in con rming the existence of true ternary ssion also proved that this ssion mode is a very rare phenomenon. This thesis is devoted to the investigation of ternary ssion know as collinear cluster tripartition (CCT) in spontaneous ssion of 252Cf, and the design and development of two time-of- ight spectrometers aimed at identifying all collinear multi-body decay partners directly. Prior to this study the only technique that was used at identifying decay partners in CCT was the \missing mass" approach. In this approach only two partners are identi ed directly with the third partner being identi ed by subtracting the two observed partners from the initial mass of the nucleus. The experimental results from the two spectrometer setups showed that it was possible to identify all three partners of the CCT channel. The results also con rmed the existence of the so called \Sn lost" CCT mode which was already observed in earlier experiments. / National Research Foundation (NRF) / Joint Institute of Nuclear Science (JINR) / Financial support from Dr D V Kamanim / Dept of Science and Technology (DST)

Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and 10 explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The study is intended as a descriptive analysis of conflict and peace in a case study of Burundi. Since independence in 1962, intermittent conflict has characterised the state of Burundi. There are various accounts of the conflict, of which a popular, but superficial, relates an 'ethnic' conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Equally disparate, is the prescription of solutions, the most dominant of which is power sharing based on ethnic quotas. The conflict is played out in the context of a failing state with sharp structural weaknesses. In addition, Burundi is mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the communicable effects thereof. The study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict mark different phases in the life cycle of a single conflict. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. These two tendencies in analysis generate serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. The contention brought forward by this study is that exclusion would appear to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. In this regard, one particular contentious issue has remained constant throughout all the incidences of conflict involving different groups. The central issue has been about the political economy of Burundi that has systematically denied social mobility for the 'other'. The Burundian state is a repository of political, economic and social security where the 'other', defined in ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, regional, elitist (and historically dynastic) terms, is excluded and subordinated. Exclusion (and the consequent inequalities and injustices) is a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. The resultant conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state. Inter alia, the conflict has been pemicious, genocidal, protracted and intractable. The notion of institutionalised power sharing, based on ethnic quotas, has been put forward by the actors in the peace process as the fundamental principle guiding the search for a solution to the conflict in Burundi. The study concludes that power sharing may be necessary, as a confidence building measure, however, power Sharing in itself is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peace, and may well in fulure prove to be Ihe weakest link in the peace process. Inter alia, the conditions in Burundi are not amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such, e.g. the presence of an overwhelming majority, and deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic lines. Further, the current power sharing structure in Burundi tilts the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security, awards the Tutsi with a de facto veto power, fixes the ethnic balance of power, and thus perpetuates conflict generating Tutsi domination of the political economy of Burundi. This study proposes the reconstruction of the state (state building) as a necessary precondition for peace. II is concluded that political representation, economic opportunity and social mobility, must transcend social categories in Burundi. The continuing instabilities in the Great Lakes region are also a point of concem. Thus, peace in Burundi is also contingent upon greater efforts to curb the communicable conflicts in this region.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Na Suid-Afrika se toetrede tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op 6 September 1939, het die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) verander vanaf ‘n verouderde vredestydse weermag na ‘n moderne mag met offensiewe projeksievermoëns. Gedurende die tussenoorlogperiode het ‘n gevoel van swaarmoedigheid in terme van militêre inovasie in die UVM geheers. Die resultaat hiervan was verwarde denke ten opsigte van pantseroorlogvoering en meganisasie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeplanners het nie die offensiewe potensiaal van pantsermagte verstaan nie. Die gevolg was dat die UVM in September 1939 slegs oor ‘n simboliese pantsermag beskik het. Die Suid-Afrikaanse toetrede tot die oorlog het die stukrag vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n lewensvatbare pantsermag binne die UVM verleen. Gevolglik is die Suid-Afrikaanse Tenkkorps (SATK) in Mei 1940 gestig. Veranderinge in beide die aard en organisatoriese struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsinstellings het gevolg. Die Italiaanse teenwoordigheid in Abessinië en Italiaans-Somaliland is as ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die aangrensende Britse Oos-Afrika gebiede gesien. In Junie 1940, kort na die Italiaanse oorlogsverklaring, is Suid-Afrikaanse magte na Kenia ontplooi. Die UVM ontplooiing na Oos-Afrika was die eerste in ‘n gereelde oorlogsituasie sedert die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Ten spyte van die doktrine wat die Suid-Afrikaanse ontplooiing van pantsermagte na Oos-Afrika ondersteun het, het die SATK-eenhede gou geleer dat die aanvaarde doktrine, ontleen aan die Britse Ministerie van Oorlog gedurende die tussenoorlogsjare, slegs ‘n gids was tot offensiewe aanwending. Die storie van die Suid- Afrikaanse ontplooiing in Oos-Afrika gedurende die oorlog, word as ‘n lens gebruik waardeur die rol en aanwending van beide die UVM se pantserkarre en ligte tenks ondersoek word. Die geallieerde offensiewe deur Italiaans-Somaliland en suidelike Abessiniȅ gedurende 1940 – 1941 illustreer duidelik dat die taktiese en operasionele aanwending van die Suid- Afrkaanse pantsermagte gedurende hierdie tydperk van groot belang was vir die suksesse en mislukkings van die veldtog. Die aard van die opponerende magte in Oos-Afrika, die voortdurend veranderende topografie en klimaat van die operasionele teater, asook die aard van die Suid-Afrikaanse offensiewe operasies gedurende die veldtog, het gekombineer om die unieke manier waarop die pantserkarre en tenks van die UVM van 1940 tot 1941 aangewend is, te vorm. Die operasionele ervarings wat die UVM opgedoen het gedurende die Oos-Afrika Veldtog, het die verdere ontplooiings van Suid-Afrikaanse pantser na Noord- Afrika, Madagaskar en Italiȅ gedurende die res van die oorlog gevorm.

Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT APPLICABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY CAMOUFLAGE CLOTHING COMMODITY There are many reasons for the popularity of the supply chain or the supply chain management concept. Through globalisation, entities are forced to look for more effective ways to coordinate the flow of goods and material between facilities, into and out of the business. Customers are consistently demanding products that are delivered faster, exactly on time, and with no damage. Supply chain management is the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular entity and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purpose of improving the long-term performance of the individual entities and the supply chain as a whole. One key objective of supply chain management is to lower the costs required to provide the necessary level of customer service, in order to gain a competitive advantage within a market segment. To be fully effective in today’s competitive environment, entities must expand their integrated behaviour to incorporate customers and suppliers. Low cost and differentiated service help build a competitive advantage for the supply chain. When entities take up a supply chain management philosophy, they must determine and establish management practices that permit them to operate and behave consistent with this philosophy. Performance measurement provides the necessary assistance for performance improvement in pursuit of supply chain excellence. The efficient and effective management of this supply chain with performance measurement and internal controls establishes a solid base for competitive advantage. The SA Army camouflage clothing logistics reveals elements of improvement, as compared to supply chain management principles. Camouflage clothing forms an important element of the total supplies of a soldier in sustaining military and warfare capabilities. Camouflage clothing logistics in the SA Army is a complex mix of physical entities, processes and rules that is governed by mostly conceptual concepts and principles. The SA Army lacks an integrated supply chain philosophy and clear supply chain management principles. Supply chain management can enhance camouflage clothing logistics in the SA Army, if the principles are properly applied. The SA Army is a military institution with peacekeeping operations as their core function. The manufacturing and distribution of clothing is not a core function of the SA Army and can therefore be outsourced to address most of the concerns raised under the present system. Although it would be difficult and cumbersome to implement an integrated supply chain, with supply chain management philosophy and practices, the principle will enhance efficiency and effectiveness in today’s economic environment. The level of outsourcing and the effectiveness of control will determine the degree of success the SA Army will achieve. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: AANVOERKETTINGBESTUUR VAN TOEPASSING OP DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE LEëR KAMOEFLEERDRAG KOMMODITEIT Daar is verskeie redes vir die populariteit van die aanvoerketting of die aanvoerkettingbestuurskonsep. Globalisasie het entiteite gedwing om ondersoek in te stel na meer effektiewe maniere om die vloei van goedere en materiaal, tussen fasilitieite, asook in en uit die entiteit te koördineer. Kliënte eis gereeld produkte wat vinniger, presies op tyd en met geen skade afgelewer word. Aanvoerkettingbestuur is die sistemiese, strategiese koordinasie van al die tradisionele besigheidsfunksies, asook taktieke oor hierdie besigheidsfunksies, binne ‘n entiteit en oor besighede binne die aanvoerketting, met die doel om die langtermyn prestasie van die individuele entiteite en die aanvoerketting as geheel te verbeter. Een sleuteldoel van aanvoerkettingbestuur is om kostes te verminder. Hierdie kostes word geassosieer met ‘n sekere vlak van kliëntediens, wat voorsien moet word om ‘n kompeterende voordeel in die marksegment te verkry. Om in vandag se kompeterende omgewing ten volle effektief te wees moet entiteite hul geïntegreerde gedrag uitbrei om kliënte en verskaffers in te sluit. Lae koste en gedifferensieërde diens help om kompeterende voordeel binne die aanvoerketting te bou. Sodra entitieite ‘n aanvoerkettingfilosofie aanneem, moet hulle bestuurspraktyke bepaal en vastel hoe om in lyn met dié filosofie op te tree en te funksioneer. Prestasiemeting voorsien die nodige riglyn vir prestasieverbetering in die strewe na aanvoerketting uitnemendheid. Kamoefleerdrag vorm ‘n belangrike element in die uitrusting van die soldaat wanneer militêre- en oorlogsvermoë hanteer moet word. Kamoefleerdraglogistiek in die SA Leër is ‘n komplekse mengsel van fisiese entiteite, prosesse and reëls wat meestal deur konseptuele beginsels geregeer word. Die SA Leër kamoefleerdrag logistiek reflekteer elemente van verbetering, wanneer vergelyk word met aanvoerkettingbestuursbeginsels. Die SA Leër kort ‘n geïntegreerde aanvoerkettingfilosofie, asook duidelike aanvoerkettingbestuursbeginsels. Aanvoerkettingbestuur kan die kamoefleerdrag logistiek in die SA Leër verbeter, as die beginsels reg toegepas word. Die SA Leër is ‘n militêre instelling met vredesoperasies as primêre funksie. Die vervaardiging en verspreiding van klerasie is nie die SA Lëer se primêre funksie nie en kan daarom geprivatiseer word. Dit sal primêr die probleme wat onder die huidige stelsel voorkom, aanspreek. Al word dit voorsien dat dit moeilik en omslagtig sal wees om ‘n geïntegreerde aanvoerkettingfilosofie en -beginsel in die SA Leër te implimenteer, dit die doeltreffendheid en doelmatigheid van die huidige stelsel in vandag se ekonomie sal verbeter.

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.

Bibliography / Thesis (MPhil (Military Science. Security Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary. Its roles and responsibilities through the years have depended on both the requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time. Possible future roles in peace support would therefore depend on political requirements as well as the capabilities and composition of the SAN. To date, the SAN has only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika, and assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi. The seemingly minor nature of this contribution is disconcerting, because the contributions of the SANDF in present (ongoing) peace support are very highly rated by the South African Government. To enhance its visibility, the SAN should preferably play a more visible role in peace support in Africa, and generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the African coastline. The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should therefore not only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to land forces carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the support the SAN can give to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and other African, maritime zones. Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in particular therefore need to be interrogated more comprehensively to foster a deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the peace support environment, and that of Africa in particular. To determine the possible contributions and roles of the SAN, the traditional roles and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace support operations) were investigated. It was found that the roles emanating from the traditional roles for navies were assimilated into navies. doctrines, roles and tasks. Possible roles and missions for the SAN are reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine. Regional expectations have added more roles and missions like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information, the requirement of maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea. The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) seem to be adequate to carry out possible peace support activities. However, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by the scope of future budgets and the shortages of skills, equipment and capacity. The foreseen budgets available will not allow participation in activities beyond those being undertaken at present. Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities in Africa will probably not extend beyond some lake patrols and VIP protection. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Suid Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) het na die Eerste Wêreld Oorlog tot stand gekom omrede so 'n inheemse vloot as broodnodig vir Suid Afrika beskou was. Die SAV se rol en verantwoordelikhede was deur die geskiedenis gerig deur die behoeftes van die regering van die dag en van die politieke oorwegings van die oomblik. Toekomstige verantwoordelikhede vir vredesteun sal insgelyks afhang van politieke oorwegings, sowel as die aard van, en bates beskikbaar vir, die SAV. Tot dusver was die SAV bydrae aan vredesteun beperk tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika meer in Burundi, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader met BBP werk in Burundi. Hierdie geringe bydraes is onstellend omrede vredesteun pogings belangrik geag word deur die Suid Afrikaanse regering. Die SAV sal dus 'n groter rol in vredesteun in Afrika moet speel, en veral in die instandhouding van goeie orde op see, ten einde beter sigbaarheid te bewerkstellig. Die potensiële SAV bydraes aan vredesteun aktiwiteite moet dus nie slegs gesien word in die direkte SAV steun aan landmagte betrokke by vredesteun in een of ander land nie, maar ook in die bydrae tot die instandhouding van goeie orde in die ooreenkomstige maritieme omgewings in Afrika. Potensiële SAV bydraes moet daarom in diepte ontleed word ten einde 'n beter insig te vekry in die maritieme streke (veral in Afrika) waar tot dusver maar min navorsing gedoen is. Om hierdie potensiële bydraes te bepaal, is die tradisionele rol en doktrines van vlote (veral die wat betrokke is by vredesteun) ondersoek. Daar is bevind dat die huidige doktrines, rol en take van vlote voortgevloei het uit die tradisionele rol van vlote. Moontlike rolle en bydraes van die SAV is reeds beskikbaar in die SAV Maritieme Doktrine (2006). Verdere moontlike bydraes spruit voort uit die verwagtinge van die verskillende streke in Afrika soos die deelname in Suid Afrikaanse opleiding, kundigheid en informasie, en die behoefte aan instandhouding van maritieme veiligheid en goeie orde op see. Die huidige en toekomstige bates van die SAV (insluitende skepe, eenhede en personeel) blyk voldoende te wees om by te dra tot moontlike vredesteun aktiwitiete. Die moontlike bydraes sal egter beperk word deur ontoereikende toekomstige begrotings en tekortkominge met betrekking tot kundigheid, toerusting en kapasiteit. Trouens, die huidige en toekomstige begrotings is ontoereikend vir verdere vredesteun bydraes buiten dit wat tot dusver gelewer word. Sonder 'n toename in die begroting sal die vredesteun pogings van die SAV beperk bly tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika Meer, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader in BBP werk.