Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Le droit impose à l’immeuble une fonction de protection de la nature. Cette fonction se décline d’abord par l’accumulation des contraintes de protection sur l’immeuble lui-même, ou sur les activités qui peuvent y être exercées. Mais elle s’affirme pleinement avec l’essor de la notion de patrimoine commun. Car en imposant à l’immeuble de protéger les éléments du patrimoine commun naturel, le droit révèle sa part collective. Il comporte ainsi un domaine commun et un domaine individuel. Le premier, conservé par la communauté, a pour objet d’assurer la conservation de l’immeuble dans un état suffisant pour qu’il assure sa fonction de protection de la nature. Le second symbolise la part de l’immeuble dont l’usage est laissé au propriétaire, à charge pour lui de ne pas altérer le domaine commun.Affirmée par le droit, la fonction n’a de valeur que si elle est préservée. A l’étude, sa préservation présente un double effet. Il sera atténué lorsqu’il permet des exceptions à l’impératif de protection de la nature. Il sera intégral s’il ne s’en accommode pas. L’effet atténué est matérialisé par le régime de la compensation écologique. Outre qu’il n’est pas certain qu’une nature reconstituée est l’équivalent d’une nature originelle, le régime soulève des écueils temporels, que le statut juridique de l’immeuble de l’immeuble permet de lever. Si le dommage est accidentel, l’effet de la préservation de la fonction sera alors intégral. Sans conciliation possible, le droit sanctionne toute dégradation du domaine commun. / The law imposes a duty of nature protection on real estate property.The rise of the common heritage principle has bought this duty to the forefront; this has translated into an accumulation of protection constraints on the real estate (property) itself, but also on the activities which may be exercised within it.By imposing an obligation to protect the natural common heritage, the law demonstrates the common dimension of real estate property. Therefore it includes a common domain and a private domain.The first aims to maintain the real estate property in good and sufficient repair so that it can fulfill its nature protection duty.The second symbolizes the part of the real estate property whose use is left up to the owner, in which case it is up to him not to alter the common domain.However this duty is of no value if it isn’t guaranteed/protected. This thesis shows that this preservation has two different effects. The effect is attenuated when it allows exceptions to the nature protection imperative and it is full when it does not.The attenuated effect is materialized by the environmental compensation system. Apart from the fact that it is never certain that a restored environment is the equivalent of the original one, the system also raises issues concerning the length of the effect; issues that the legal status of real estate property help to clear. If the damage is accidental, then the effect of the duty of preservation will be full. Any degradation of the common domain will be sanctioned by law, without any possible conciliation.

Text in Afrikaans / Theft in South African law is one of the most well-known common law crimes. It is also one of the crimes in respect of which opinions vary considerably. Furtum possessionis is one of the manifestations of the crime of theft at common law. The general requirements of furtum possessionis were already established in Roman law. Emphasis was not placed on the taker of the thing but on the particular position of the person who was deprived of the property. This approach was also followed in Roman-Dutch law. Fur tum possessionis in South African law can be defined as follows: It is the unlawful and intentional appropriation by the owner or someone else of a movable corporeal thing in commercio, in circumstances in which the possessor of the thing has a valid right of retention of the thing, with the intention of depriving the possessor permanently of control of the thing. Theft in the form of furtum possessionis differs in an important respect from theft in the form of the removal of a thing. In the case of removal the complainant can also be a person acting as a holder, that is someone exercising control of the thing on behalf of the owner. In the case of furtum possessionis the complainant is the person with the right of retention and from whose possession the thing is taken away. The accused either possesses the thing as an owner or as a holder before possession of the thing was transferred to the complainant. Mere possession is not enough. The possession of the complainant has to be accompanied by a right to retention. Furthermore the possession of the thing has to be lawful / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

Text in Afrikaans / Theft in South African law is one of the most well-known common law crimes. It is also one of the crimes in respect of which opinions vary considerably. Furtum possessionis is one of the manifestations of the crime of theft at common law. The general requirements of furtum possessionis were already established in Roman law. Emphasis was not placed on the taker of the thing but on the particular position of the person who was deprived of the property. This approach was also followed in Roman-Dutch law. Fur tum possessionis in South African law can be defined as follows: It is the unlawful and intentional appropriation by the owner or someone else of a movable corporeal thing in commercio, in circumstances in which the possessor of the thing has a valid right of retention of the thing, with the intention of depriving the possessor permanently of control of the thing. Theft in the form of furtum possessionis differs in an important respect from theft in the form of the removal of a thing. In the case of removal the complainant can also be a person acting as a holder, that is someone exercising control of the thing on behalf of the owner. In the case of furtum possessionis the complainant is the person with the right of retention and from whose possession the thing is taken away. The accused either possesses the thing as an owner or as a holder before possession of the thing was transferred to the complainant. Mere possession is not enough. The possession of the complainant has to be accompanied by a right to retention. Furthermore the possession of the thing has to be lawful / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)