“Uma Teoria da Justiça" de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / “A Theory of Justice" of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals’ conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar argumentos a favor de uma concepção igualitária de liberalismo político. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se uma classificação dos diferentes tipos de liberalismos políticos contemporâneos: (i) liberalismo do medo, (ii) liberalismo antifundacionista, (iii) liberalismo ético e (iv) liberalismo igualitário. A partir dos princípios de tolerância desenvolvidos em cada um deles, procura-se defender um ideal de razão pública como o melhor critério de justificação para regular o uso da coerção política entre cidadãos livres e iguais. / The work has two main goals. It attempts to provide arguments for the egalitarian branch of political liberalism. At first place, it is presented four types of possible political liberalisms: (i) the liberalism of fear, (ii) antifoundationalist liberalism, (iii) ethical liberalism and (iv) egalitarian liberalism. Departing from reasons for toleration offered by each of them, it argues that an ideal of public reason is the best way to conceive the use of political coercion on free and equal citizens.

“Uma Teoria da Justiça” de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / “A Theory of Justice” of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals’ conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

Chaque année, des centaines de milliers de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier ne peuvent être éloignés de l'Union européenne (UE). L'inéloignabilité de certains étrangers n'est pas toujours transitoire, et nombreuses sont les personnes qui y demeurent pendant des années. Et pourtant, l'inéloignabilité de longue durée ne mène pas forcément à la régularisation du séjour. Je suis intéressé par la manière dont l'UE gère l'inéloignabilité, ainsi que par les raisons pour lesquelles autant de personnes inéloignables se retrouvent dans des limbes juridiques d'exclusion du séjour régulier. Dans une première partie, je conceptualise la nature et les conséquences des divers statuts d'étrangers inéloignables, tels que réglementés par le droit de l'UE. Je propose ainsi une typologie des limbes juridiques entre le séjour irrégulier et régulier. Il existe des limbes de tolérance, d'un côté, et des limbes de séjour régulier non-Reconnu, de l'autre. Je me consacre principalement aux limbes de tolérance. Dans une deuxième partie, j'examine la manière dont l'UE a gouverné ces limbes juridiques, notamment son impact sur le lien dans ses États membres entre divers types d'obstacles à l'éloignement, d'un côté, et les statuts de tolérance, de l'autre. Dans une troisième partie, j'analyse les fonctions attribuées aux limbes de tolérance par des acteurs institutionnels de l’UE. Je soutiens que les statuts de tolérance peuvent se voir attribuer des fonctions de rétribution, de dissuasion, d'éloignabilité, de spectacle étatique, de sélection, et de réduction des dépenses publiques. / Hundreds of thousands of illegally staying third country nationals (TCN) cannot be removed from EU Member States despite the issue of return measures against them. Illegally staying TCNs may not be removable as a result of legal, policy, or practical obstacles to removal. Non-Removability is not always temporary and can in many cases last a very long time. And yet protracted non-Removability does not necessarily lead to regularisation of status. I am interested in how the EU has managed non-Removability and why so many non-Removable persons have been left in a limbo of exclusion from legal residence. In Part I, I provide a conceptual framework for understanding the nature and consequences of a variety of positions that non-Removable TCNs may find themselves in. I do so by providing a typology of what I call limbo spaces between illegal and legal stay. There are limbo spaces of toleration, on the one hand, and limbo spaces of unrecognised legal residence, on the other. I mainly focus on toleration. In Part II, I examine how the EU has governed limbo spaces of toleration, namely its important impact on the nexus in Member States between various forms of non-Removability, on the one hand, and limbo spaces of toleration, on the other. In Part III, I analyse the functions of limbo spaces of toleration. I argue that toleration positions can be viewed as sanctions of membership exclusion, and may be perceived by certain EU institutional actors as performing a range of functions akin to administrative detention and imprisonment: retribution, deterrence, enhanced removability, the expressive power of the State, and selection/rehabilitation.

<p>The Norwegian Rom community (Gypsies) leads a life outside large society. Most of the members are illiterate and poor and they are dependent on social security. Moreover, the Rom children are not going to school because education is not a part of the Rom culture. This situation raises various ethical dilemmas regarding cultural rights and obligations. In this thesis the author asks which of the conflicting rights should weigh most: The parent’s right to bring up their children in accordance with their own culture and beliefs, or the child’s right to education? The author’s argument is structured around two main problem areas. First, what is it with education that is good for all people? The short answer to this question is that education is important for functioning in society. Knowledge provides for a wider range of opportunities, and how to use this knowledge is up to each person. The other problem area is the limits of cultural toleration in liberal societies. Here, the author argues that although the right to culture is important, liberalism cannot accommodate illiberal practices. Childrearing that restricts the child’s access to the world outside its original community is one example of intolerable practices. In order to get the Rom children in to school, dialogue is the preferable way to go. However, if the establishment of dialogue is impossible because of fundamentalist or non-dialogical attitudes, an alternative argument is provided: Discursive paternalism is a compulsion to argue on contested norms. This compulsion reconciles individual freedom (autonomy) and paternalism, and can therefore be justified by liberals. Main references are Will Kymlicka, Martha Nussbaum, Chandran Kukathas, Adeno Addis and May Thorseth.</p>

This study sought to understand how post-secondary students experience and process issues of diversity, to discover what those views of diversity are, and how those views might change. The two issues that participants felt most strongly about were homosexuality and scholarships for students of color. Their views on homosexuality ranged from admitted homophobia, to ambivalence, to tolerance, to full acceptance. Religion seemed to play a part among those who were ambivalent, but not for those who were homophobic. Views were not static, but shifted depending on the circumstances. A participant who might object to a homosexual serving in the military might have no problem having a homosexual as a neighbor. Regarding scholarships for students of color, some of the 27 White students agreed that this was fair, while others seemed to resent the idea and questioned its need. Two of the four multi-racial students were somewhat sympathetic to the latter view. A high degree of acceptance on one diversity issue did not necessarily mean high acceptance on other issues. A participant who advocated for gays to have equal admittance and acceptance in the military was against scholarships for students of color. Participants' views were most influenced by their personal experiences. Interventions such as coursework, workshop, panel presentation, and social contact seemed to have a less influence than personal experiences. Those pivotal moments, as discussed by Young Y. Kim, seemed to have caused stress, adaptation, and growth, which resulted in a greater awareness of an issue, of themselves, and of others. The rejection of experiences and interventions might be explained by encapsulation, as proposed by C. Gilbert Wrenn. Encapsulated individuals seem to choose to reject information or experiences that might challenge their views. The implication for educators is to provide more opportunities for students to have personal experiences involving diversity that might lead to pivotal moments. Thirty-one undergraduates at a small, liberal arts university in the Pacific Northwest were interviewed three times over an average of seven weeks. All had participated in a nationally known diversity workshop and had also participated in regular courses that addressed diversity issues. / Graduation date: 2002

The Norwegian Rom community (Gypsies) leads a life outside large society. Most of the members are illiterate and poor and they are dependent on social security. Moreover, the Rom children are not going to school because education is not a part of the Rom culture. This situation raises various ethical dilemmas regarding cultural rights and obligations. In this thesis the author asks which of the conflicting rights should weigh most: The parent’s right to bring up their children in accordance with their own culture and beliefs, or the child’s right to education? The author’s argument is structured around two main problem areas. First, what is it with education that is good for all people? The short answer to this question is that education is important for functioning in society. Knowledge provides for a wider range of opportunities, and how to use this knowledge is up to each person. The other problem area is the limits of cultural toleration in liberal societies. Here, the author argues that although the right to culture is important, liberalism cannot accommodate illiberal practices. Childrearing that restricts the child’s access to the world outside its original community is one example of intolerable practices. In order to get the Rom children in to school, dialogue is the preferable way to go. However, if the establishment of dialogue is impossible because of fundamentalist or non-dialogical attitudes, an alternative argument is provided: Discursive paternalism is a compulsion to argue on contested norms. This compulsion reconciles individual freedom (autonomy) and paternalism, and can therefore be justified by liberals. Main references are Will Kymlicka, Martha Nussbaum, Chandran Kukathas, Adeno Addis and May Thorseth.

This study investigated low- and high-prejudice whites' personal standards for prejudiced behavior toward African-Americans, gays and lesbians, and Arab-Americans. Using structural equation modeling, the study examined whether feelings of moral obligation, internal motivation to respond without prejudice, and concern with acting prejudiced each mediate the relationship between egalitarianism as defined as equality of opportunity and personal standards. Because the low-prejudice groups uniformly demonstrated non-prejudiced personal standards, the proposed models could not be fit for these groups. Across the high-prejudice groups, however, results indicated that the mediating models demonstrated only fair to poor fit. Moreover, the fit of two alternative models were evaluated; a discussion of theoretical and practical implications and directions for future research are discussed. / Department of Psychological Science

Focusing on a lived and practiced tolerance, this thesis sets out to explore questions concerning education for tolerance, and, specifically, how teachers and educators can prepare students to become tolerating subjects in their everyday encounters with others. Taking its point of departure in real and fictional classroom situations, the overall purpose of the study is to explore the ethical and transformative potential inherent in education for tolerance. The theoretical frame of the study is deconstruction and the philosophical writings of JacquesDerrida. The purpose of the thesis is accomplished in three movements. The first aims to show why teachers and educators need to redirect their attention in the classroom if the ethical and transformative potential that lies in education for tolerance is to be taken seriously. Instead of focusing on the tolerated and “deviating” other, it proposes that the tolerating subject should be the center of attention. The second movement aims to prepare the ground for a deconstructive reading by mapping different contemporary discourses of tolerance. Three distinct but interrelated dilemmas of tolerance are identified: the dilemma of welcoming, the dilemma of drawing boundaries, and the dilemma of bearing or enduring the otherness of the other. The third movement aims to show how a deconstructive reading of the dilemmas of tolerance can help teachers and educators to perceive and relate otherwise to the tolerating subject in education. For this, I turn to Derrida’s deconstructions of three concepts that are vital for our understanding of tolerance: hospitality, justice and mourning. The final section of the thesis discusses some educational implications deriving from the study. It is argued that if we look at the tolerating subject through the experience of its deconstruction, we also come to see education for tolerance otherwise. What this altered perspective can mean for education is articulated within the framework of what is calleda pedagogy of tolerance. / <p>Kommer ev. att publiceras på förlag.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-79).