In the past decade, there has been a significant decrease in US corporate tax revenues. Multinational companies have been employing several different techniques of tax avoidance to get around paying corporate taxes. Tax avoidance is used by any large multinational corporation for a variety of reasons. The US has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world and is seeing many companies relocate their operations abroad to lower their tax expenses. The different methods of tax avoidance are discussed in this thesis, as well as the different reasons behind their use. To understand how companies implement tax avoidance techniques, it is necessary to understand US corporate taxes. I have researched the few key items of US corporate taxes, which are vital to understanding the implementation of tax avoidance techniques. Through different examples you will see how tax avoidance occurs and how it benefits multinational companies.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lourivaldo Lopes da Silva.pdf: 712388 bytes, checksum: 743b45995489685642aa60a21e26255a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-17 / Until the end of 1.996, the Brazilian legislation did not regulate the transactions of importation and exportation related to companies from overseas. However, with the law number 9.430/96, January 1st, 1.997, the legislation for tax return regulated for the first time the issue about the cost for international transferring of goods, services, rights and interests. It was a big step to minimize the over costs on the importations and the under costs on the exportations. Several countries have been controlling all transferring of goods, services, rights and interests related to people from overseas for decades. In the United States of America they have adopted this process over 40 yeas ago. Several alterations have happened recently in the Brazilian Taxation scenario, especially with respect to cost transferring. This work is about the methodologies imposed by the Brazilian Legislation, for importation and exportation issues and to know if the current rules go against the Accounting Fundamental Principles and supplies recommendations to account the excess of costs from importing of goods, services and interests with companies from overseas / Até o final de 1.996 a legislação brasileira não regulamentava as transações relacionadas com importação e exportação, com pessoas vinculadas no exterior. Com a lei 9.430/96, a partir de 1º. de janeiro de 1.997, a legislação do imposto de renda regulou pela primeira vez a questão dos preços de transferência internacionais de bens, serviços, direitos e juros. Foi um grande passo no sentido de minimizar o superfaturamento nas importações e o subfaturamento nas exportações. Diversos países há muito já controlam os preços de transferência de seus bens, serviços, direitos e juros nas operações com pessoas vinculadas no exterior. Para se ter uma idéia, o controle nos Estados Unidos já ultrapassa os trinta anos. Tendo em vista as diversas alterações ocorridas no cenário tributário brasileiro, mormente no que diz respeito ao preço de transferência, este trabalho se propõe a estudar as metodologias impostas pela legislação brasileira tanto na importação como exportação, observar se as regras impostas contrariam os Princípios Fundamentais de Contabilidade e fornecer sugestões de contabilização para o excesso de custos oriundos da importação de mercadorias, serviços e juros com pessoas vinculadas no exterior

This master’s thesis discusses and analyzes difficulties in transfer pricing methods’ applicability to intangibles. With basis from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the U.S. regulations, this thesis investigates applicable methods in legislation, theory, recommendations, case law and how they are applied in practice. The OECD Guidelines do not provide an exact solution to the valuation of a transfer of intangibles between controlled parties. It refers to the arm’s length principle to determine whether the price set for a transfer between controlled parties is the same, as unrelated parties would have paid, under the same circumstances. The best method rule used in the U.S. has no preferred order of application although it provides specific methods to be applied to intangibles. In the U.S., as in most countries (and recommended by the OECD), the Comparable Uncontrolled Price/Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction methods are considered most reliable if comparables can be identified. The profit split method is recommended if there are no comparable transactions available and is applicable to non-routine intangibles. Other methods that require comparables are however used in the application of the profit split method to set an arm’s length price on routine functions. This method will probably become more popular in the future since it is not as dependent on comparables as most other transfer pricing methods. There are several other methods and approaches to the arm’s length principle, which shows the complexity of intangibles and the ambition to find some form of standard. This master’s thesis has identified the problems with most of the methods applied to intangibles relying on comparables to some extent. The comparability factors concerning intangibles are a problem, as they are difficult to apply strictly and a frequent problem is the limited access to information. A majority of available agreements published in databases are strongly focused on U.S. based enterprises transactions and rarely disclose all the required details. As a result, the comparables used become less reliable since the geographical area, size of the enterprise and functions compared seldom are comparable with the tested party or transaction. In some industry sectors, it is almost impossible to find independent comparables, especially for non-routine intangibles. The discrepancy between theory and practice is shown through the usage and acceptance by tax authorities and courts, of comparables without sufficient comparability. This simplified and practical approach to transfer pricing derives from the limited availability of information and the need to avoid unreasonable requirements on the MNEs to produce transfer pricing benchmarking in particular and documentation in general. / Denna magisteruppsats diskuterar och analyserar svårigheterna med internprissättningsmetoders tillämplighet på immateriella tillgångar. Med utgångspunkt från OECD:s riktlinjer och de amerikanska reglerna, undersöker denna uppsats lagstiftningen, teorin, rekommendationer och rättsfall rörande tillämpliga metoder och hur de tillämpas i praktiken. OECD:s rekommendationer ger ingen direkt lösning på värderingen av transaktionen av immateriella tillgångar mellan parter i intressegemenskap. Den hänvisar till armlängdsprincipen för att avgöra huruvida priset på en transaktion mellan kontrollerade parter är samma som okontrollerade parter skulle ha betalat under samma omständigheter. Best method rule som används i USA ger inget krav på i vilken ordning metoderna ska användas även om den omfattar särskilda metoder som skall tillämpas på immateriella tillgångar. I USA, liksom i de flesta länder (och rekommenderat av OECD), anses Comparable Uncontrolled Price/Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction metoderna vara de mest tillförlitliga om jämförbara transaktioner kan identifieras. Profit split metoden rekommenderas om det inte finns några jämförbara transaktioner tillgängliga och kan användas på icke rutinmässiga immateriella tillgångar. Andra metoder som kräver jämförbara transaktioner används dock vid tillämpningen av profit split metoden för att bestämma ett armslängdsmässigt pris på rutinmässiga funktioner. Denna metod kommer troligen att bli mer populärt i framtiden eftersom den inte är lika beroende av jämförbara transaktioner som de flesta andra internprissättningsmetoder. Det finns flera andra metoder och strategier för att bestämma ett armlängsmässigt pris vilket visar immateriella tillgångars komplexitet och ambitionen att hitta någon form av standard. Denna magisteruppsats har påvisat problematiken med att de flesta metoder som tillämpas på immateriella tillgångar använder i viss utsträckning jämförbara transaktioner. Kompabilitetskraven på de jämförbara immateriella tillgångarna utgör ett problem eftersom de är svåra att tillämpa strikt och ett återkommande problem är den begränsade tillgången till information. En majoritet av de tillgängliga avtalen publiceras i databaser som är starkt fokuserad på amerikanska företags transaktioner och sällan ges alla nödvändiga uppgifter. Detta resulterar i sämre tillförlitlighet på de jämförbara transaktionerna, eftersom det geografiska området, storleken på företagen och dess funktioner sällan är jämförbara med de testade parterna eller transaktionerna. I vissa branscher är det näst intill omöjligt att hitta oberoende jämförbara transaktioner, särskilt för icke-rutinmässiga immateriella tillgångar. Skillnaden mellan teori och praktik visas genom användandet, skattemyndigheters och domstolars accepterande, av transaktioner utan tillräcklig jämförbarhet. Detta förenklade och praktiska tillvägagångssätt beror på den begränsade tillgången på information och behovet av att undvika orimliga krav på multinationella företag att producera jämförbarhetsanalyser och dokumentation till internprissättningen

<p> </p><p>This master’s thesis discusses and analyzes difficulties in transfer pricing methods’ applicability to intangibles. With basis from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the U.S. regulations, this thesis investigates applicable methods in legislation, theory, recommendations, case law and how they are applied in practice.</p><p>The OECD Guidelines do not provide an exact solution to the valuation of a transfer of intangibles between controlled parties. It refers to the arm’s length principle to determine whether the price set for a transfer between controlled parties is the same, as unrelated parties would have paid, under the same circumstances.</p><p>The best method rule used in the U.S. has no preferred order of application although it provides specific methods to be applied to intangibles. In the U.S., as in most countries (and recommended by the OECD), the Comparable Uncontrolled Price/Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction methods are considered most reliable if comparables can be identified.</p><p>The profit split method is recommended if there are no comparable transactions available and is applicable to non-routine intangibles. Other methods that require comparables are however used in the application of the profit split method to set an arm’s length price on routine functions. This method will probably become more popular in the future since it is not as dependent on comparables as most other transfer pricing methods.</p><p>There are several other methods and approaches to the arm’s length principle, which shows the complexity of intangibles and the ambition to find some form of standard.</p><p>This master’s thesis has identified the problems with most of the methods applied to intangibles relying on comparables to some extent. The comparability factors concerning intangibles are a problem, as they are difficult to apply strictly and a frequent problem is the limited access to information. A majority of available agreements published in databases are strongly focused on U.S. based enterprises transactions and rarely disclose all the required details. As a result, the comparables used become less reliable since the geographical area, size of the enterprise and functions compared seldom are comparable with the tested party or transaction. In some industry sectors, it is almost impossible to find independent comparables, especially for non-routine intangibles.</p><p>The discrepancy between theory and practice is shown through the usage and acceptance by tax authorities and courts, of comparables without sufficient comparability. This simplified and practical approach to transfer pricing derives from the limited availability of information and the need to avoid unreasonable requirements on the MNEs to produce transfer pricing benchmarking in particular and documentation in general.</p><p> </p> / <p> </p><p>Denna magisteruppsats diskuterar och analyserar svårigheterna med internprissättningsmetoders tillämplighet på immateriella tillgångar. Med utgångspunkt från OECD:s riktlinjer och de amerikanska reglerna, undersöker denna uppsats lagstiftningen, teorin, rekommendationer och rättsfall rörande tillämpliga metoder och hur de tillämpas i praktiken.</p><p>OECD:s rekommendationer ger ingen direkt lösning på värderingen av transaktionen av immateriella tillgångar mellan parter i intressegemenskap. Den hänvisar till armlängdsprincipen för att avgöra huruvida priset på en transaktion mellan kontrollerade parter är samma som okontrollerade parter skulle ha betalat under samma omständigheter.</p><p>Best method rule som används i USA ger inget krav på i vilken ordning metoderna ska användas även om den omfattar särskilda metoder som skall tillämpas på immateriella tillgångar. I USA, liksom i de flesta länder (och rekommenderat av OECD), anses Comparable Uncontrolled Price/Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction metoderna vara de mest tillförlitliga om jämförbara transaktioner kan identifieras.</p><p>Profit split metoden rekommenderas om det inte finns några jämförbara transaktioner tillgängliga och kan användas på icke rutinmässiga immateriella tillgångar. Andra metoder som kräver jämförbara transaktioner används dock vid tillämpningen av profit split metoden för att bestämma ett armslängdsmässigt pris på rutinmässiga funktioner. Denna metod kommer troligen att bli mer populärt i framtiden eftersom den inte är lika beroende av jämförbara transaktioner som de flesta andra internprissättningsmetoder.</p><p>Det finns flera andra metoder och strategier för att bestämma ett armlängsmässigt pris vilket visar immateriella tillgångars komplexitet och ambitionen att hitta någon form av standard.</p><p>Denna magisteruppsats har påvisat problematiken med att de flesta metoder som tillämpas på immateriella tillgångar använder i viss utsträckning jämförbara transaktioner. Kompabilitetskraven på de jämförbara immateriella tillgångarna utgör ett problem eftersom de är svåra att tillämpa strikt och ett återkommande problem är den begränsade tillgången till information. En majoritet av de tillgängliga avtalen publiceras i databaser som är starkt fokuserad på amerikanska företags transaktioner och sällan ges alla nödvändiga uppgifter. Detta resulterar i sämre tillförlitlighet på de jämförbara transaktionerna, eftersom det geografiska området, storleken på företagen och dess funktioner sällan är jämförbara med de testade parterna eller transaktionerna. I vissa branscher är det näst intill omöjligt att hitta oberoende jämförbara transaktioner, särskilt för icke-rutinmässiga immateriella tillgångar.</p><p>Skillnaden mellan teori och praktik visas genom användandet, skattemyndigheters och domstolars accepterande, av transaktioner utan tillräcklig jämförbarhet. Detta förenklade och praktiska tillvägagångssätt beror på den begränsade tillgången på information och behovet av att undvika orimliga krav på multinationella företag att producera jämförbarhetsanalyser och dokumentation till internprissättningen</p><p> </p>

In 2017 an amended version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines was published which included new provisions to prevent BEPS through the shifting of risks. Through the amendment of the Guidelines, it was clarified that for an entity in an MNE to contractually assume a risk, for transfer pricing purposes, it needs to control the risk and have the financial capacity to assume it. Since the proposal of an updated framework regarding risk it has been discussed whether the framework on risk was the right way to go to come to terms with the problem with the shifting of risks and whether the concept of control over risk is in line with the arm’s length principle which constitutes the foundation for the Guidelines. The objectives of the thesis include providing an overview of the OECD framework related to risk, analysing, and evaluating the definition of control over risk, and assessing its application and interpretation in Swedish courts. On the basis of this the objectives are to examine the consequences of the concept and its application in relation to the arm’s length principle and Swedish law and with this discussing the future of the Guidelines in Swedish law. To assess whether an entity in a MNE has control over risk multiple sub-concepts needs to be assessed out of which few have a clear meaning. Of main importance when assessing the concept is to determine the performance of decision-making functions. The interpretation of control over risk has in some cases, in Swedish courts, led to results which are not in line with the principle of legality and the principle of the actual substance of the transaction. Similarly, to the Guidelines, the Swedish courts put emphasis on the performance of decision-making functions in order to have control over risk. Parts of the control over risk concept can be seen as not being in line with the arm’s length principle by imposing higher control and financial capacity requirements on entities in MNEs than what independent enterprises actually have. Because of the inherent problems in defining control over risk, the effects of the interpretation of the concept in Swedish courts, and the non-arm’s length character of the risk assessment it can be questioned which role the Guidelines should have in Swedish law.

Den fortsatt snabba tillväxten av internationell handel och den ökade globaliseringen harresulterat i en ökning av användandet av internprissättning inom koncerner. Detta har i sin turuppmärksammat multinationella företag, som till följd av detta hamnat i mitten av en storm avstridigheter. I takt med att transaktioner ökat, har det uppstått problem med internprissättning.Internprissättningen används som ett viktigt verktyg av globala företag för att uppnå optimalavinster, där det kan uppstå manipulation av internpriser. Internprissättning förklaras därförofta som fenomenet att vinstmaximera genom att utnyttja andra länders skattesystem ochkringgå statliga regleringar. Mobiliseringen av internprissättning i syfte av skatteflykt är nästintill osynligt för allmänheten och ytterst svårt för tillsynsmyndigheter att upptäcka. För attkomma till underfund med detta problem och samtidigt hjälpa skattemyndigheter ochmultinationella företag har organisationen Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) tagit fram ett antal riktlinjer.Syftet med vår studie är att genomföra en komparativ undersökning för att pröva om det finnsen skillnad mellan tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjer, mellan länder med anglosaxiskrespektive kontinental redovisningstradition. Därför sker den komparativa studien mellan detkontinentala Tyskland och det anglosaxiska Storbritannien. För att undersöka potentiellaskillnader används kapitel I, II och IV i OECD:s riktlinjer för internprissättning (OECDTransfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010).Dessa kapitel innehåller armlängdsprincipen, internprissättningsmetoder och dokumentation.För att kunna bedöma om det finns några skillnader i tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjermellan Tyskland och Storbritannien har vi kvalitativt granskat lagtexter och riktlinjer frånländernas skattemyndigheter. Vidare har vi använt oss av kvalificerad juridisk och ekonomisklitteratur.Vi har kommit fram till att det finns en skillnad mellan tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjermellan Storbritannien och Tyskland. Trots likheter som identifierats finns även storaskillnader mellan de två länderna. Dessa olikheter har varit av sådan omfattning att slutsatsenom att det råder skillnader i tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjer mellan ett anglosaxiskt ochkontinentalt land, kunnat dras. Studien bidrar till ökad kunskap om hur skattelagstiftningen ärutformad i Storbritannien och Tyskland. Den bidrar även med kunskap om hur OECD:sriktlinjer är utformade och hur dess utformning påverkar andra länders internprissättning. Vårstudie bidrar vidare med litteratur om Tysklands och Storbritanniens implementering avOECD:s riktlinjer samt OECD:s påverkan på utformning av länders skatteregler inominternprissättning. / The continued rapid growth of international trade and the increased globalization has resultedin an increase of use of transfer pricing within corporate groups. This has, further attractedattention to multinational companies that, as a consequence, have ended in the midst of astorm of debates. As transactions increased the problem of transfer pricing arose. Transferpricing is used as an important tool of global companies to achieve optimal profits, whereinternal prices may be manipulated. Transfer pricing is therefore often explained as thephenomenon of maximizing profit by utilizing other countries' tax systems and bypassinggovernment regulations. The mobilization of internal pricing for tax evasion is almostinvisible to the public and extremely difficult for regulatory authorities to detect. In order toaddress this problem while helping tax authorities and multinational companies, theOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed a numberof guidelines.The purpose of our study is to carry out a comparative study to determine if there is adifference between the application of the OECD guidelines, between countries with Anglo-Saxon and Continental Accounting tradition. Hence, the comparative study takes placebetween the Anglo-Saxon United Kingdom and the Continental Germany. To investigatepotential differences, chapters I, II and IV are used in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration 2010. These chapters include the arm'slength principle, transfer pricing methods and documentation. In order to assess whether thereis any difference in the application of the OECD guidelines between United Kingdom andGermany, we have qualitatively reviewed legal texts and guidelines from the tax authorities ofthe countries. Furthermore, we have used qualified legal and economic literature.We have found that there is a difference between the application of the OECD guidelinesbetween United Kingdom and Germany. Despite similarities identified, there are also majordifferences between the two countries. These differences have been of such, that theconclusion that there are differences in the application of the OECD guidelines between anAnglo-Saxon and Continental country, could be drawn. The study contributes with increasedknowledge of how tax law is designed in the United Kingdom and Germany. It alsocontributes with knowledge of how the OECD guidelines are designed and how its designaffects other countries' transfer pricing. Our study further contributes literature on UnitedKingdom’s and Germany's implementation of the OECD Guidelines, as well as the OECD'simpact on the design of countries' tax rules in transfer pricing.This paper is hereinafter written in Swedish.

On 8 June 2012, National Treasury amended Regulation 10(1) (c) of the Exchange Control Regulations to specifically include intellectual property. In so doing, all companies wishing to dispace intellectual property to an offshore destination had to obtain prior approval from National Treasury. However, National Treasury is reticent to grant permission to reassign these assets, as revenue from intellectual property is perceived to contribute vastly to the South African tax revenue. This amendment came into being shortly after the dismissal in the Oilwell case. This case, in essence, held that intellectual property is not capital for the purposes intended by National Treasury, and therefore no prior approval to assign it offshore is required from National Treasury. This dismissal led to a large outflow of intellectual property to tax favourable foreign locations. At the same time, it exposed transfer pricing risks that had previously gone unnoticed. Although these risks have once again been mitigated by the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c), it does not mean that it is now a thing of the past, best left forgotten. The South African government intends to relax or abolish all exchange control regulations in the future. At present the exact date when this is to take place is not known. Once the exchange control regulations are abolished, the transfer pricing risks associated with intellectual property will once again come to the forefront and will lead to significant loss to South African tax revenue. The three main risks that became apparent during the period before the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c) are the following: * Transfer pricing risk consisting of mainly: - A lack of a comparables database to enable tax administrators to determine an appropriate arm’s length price for intellectual property. - A lack of the relevant skills, experience and knowledge required to accurately assess transfer prices of intellectual property. * Challenges in obtaining relevant, comprehensive and timely information to accurately determine arm’s length prices for intellectual property transactions. * A lack of understanding the principle of economic substance and legislation in South Africa to define economic substance parameters. * In this mini-dissertation, these weaknesses are discussed in more detail to highlight to SARS the trials it faces when the exchange controls regulations are expelled. Various ways in which these flaws can be challenged head-on are also presented. / MCom (South African and International Tax), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

On 8 June 2012, National Treasury amended Regulation 10(1) (c) of the Exchange Control Regulations to specifically include intellectual property. In so doing, all companies wishing to dispace intellectual property to an offshore destination had to obtain prior approval from National Treasury. However, National Treasury is reticent to grant permission to reassign these assets, as revenue from intellectual property is perceived to contribute vastly to the South African tax revenue. This amendment came into being shortly after the dismissal in the Oilwell case. This case, in essence, held that intellectual property is not capital for the purposes intended by National Treasury, and therefore no prior approval to assign it offshore is required from National Treasury. This dismissal led to a large outflow of intellectual property to tax favourable foreign locations. At the same time, it exposed transfer pricing risks that had previously gone unnoticed. Although these risks have once again been mitigated by the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c), it does not mean that it is now a thing of the past, best left forgotten. The South African government intends to relax or abolish all exchange control regulations in the future. At present the exact date when this is to take place is not known. Once the exchange control regulations are abolished, the transfer pricing risks associated with intellectual property will once again come to the forefront and will lead to significant loss to South African tax revenue. The three main risks that became apparent during the period before the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c) are the following: * Transfer pricing risk consisting of mainly: - A lack of a comparables database to enable tax administrators to determine an appropriate arm’s length price for intellectual property. - A lack of the relevant skills, experience and knowledge required to accurately assess transfer prices of intellectual property. * Challenges in obtaining relevant, comprehensive and timely information to accurately determine arm’s length prices for intellectual property transactions. * A lack of understanding the principle of economic substance and legislation in South Africa to define economic substance parameters. * In this mini-dissertation, these weaknesses are discussed in more detail to highlight to SARS the trials it faces when the exchange controls regulations are expelled. Various ways in which these flaws can be challenged head-on are also presented. / MCom (South African and International Tax), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

M. Tech. (Cost and Management Accounting), Vaal University of Technology / This study was undertaken to assess the extent to which transfer pricing was effectively used by multinational manufacturing companies operating in the Southern Gauteng region of South Africa. The target participants of the study traded their products across international borders and as such made use of transfer pricing in one way or the other to achieve strategic objectives. Scant research has been undertaken to analyse the degree to which transfer pricing can be used to effectively influence managerial performance. On the other hand there is a wealth of knowledge on the relationship between transfer pricing and taxation. In-depth review of literature showed that even though multinationals formulated their transfer pricing policies to target financial and managerial objectives, self-interest and outside influences tended to hinder the equitable realization of both types of objectives. The study therefore set out to establish whether this is true of Multinational corporations (MNCs) in Southern Gauteng and in the process answer questions about the procedure for formulating transfer pricing policies by these MNCs, the relationship, if any, between transfer pricing and profitability and the use of transfer pricing for performance enhancement and assessment. The study made use of a mixed methods research methodology to collect and analyze data from 45 MNCs operating in the target geographical area. Of the 45 companies, 15 cooperated fully with the study. Data was collected via the use of questionnaires and follow-up face-to-face and/or telephonic interviews. Collected data was analysed using statistical methods including the Chi Square Test, standard deviation, frequency tables and the Kruskal-Wallis H test. The results from the questionnaire and interviews show that there is no universally appropriate Transfer Pricing Policies(TPP) which applies equally to all organizations in all circumstances. Firms are affected by different environmental factors while striving for tax-compliance and value creation. The fear of falling on the wrong side of tax laws is a major driving force behind transfer pricing policies of MNCs. As such other objectives that are managerial in nature become secondary and tend to be neglected if/when they conflict with the primary objective.

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in Engineering by advanced course work and research, March 2017 / It is estimated that US$50 Billion is attributed to illicit financial outflows from Africa each year. This has created an environment in which African tax administrations have placed political pressure on industry and in particular the mining sector, to account for this erosion of tax bases across the African continent. Transfer pricing abuse by multinational enterprises in the mining industry has been attributed to a large portion of these illicit outflows. This report sets the objective of understanding African transfer pricing challenges, both general and mining specific, as well as initiatives addressing these challenges so as to identify the subsequent synergies and gaps that exist between the two. The following general challenges related to transfer pricing on the African continent were identified namely; effective policy and legislation addressing transfer pricing, sufficient skills and capacity in tax administrations, effective document requirements pertaining to transfer pricing transactions, access to comparable data databases and exchange of information between tax administrations. In addition to these general challenges, two mining specific challenges were identified namely; the complex nature of vertically/laterally integrated mining value chains and inadequate understanding by tax authorities of mining related transactions along the value chain in terms of function, asset and risk of each transaction. Of the six initiatives identified in the literature, the World Bank Group and Centre for Exploration Targeting sourcebook on transfer pricing in African Mining as well as the African Tax Administration Forum tax programs were selected through an Analytical Hierarchy Process as being the best aligned to deal with the challenges mentioned. Synergies between these two initiatives were identified in the areas of transfer pricing policy and legislation alignment as well as transfer pricing skills and capacity building. Gaps were identified under the practical ability to implement the outcomes from the World Bank Group sourcebook which requires a centralised body and multinational transfer pricing model positioned and able to carry out the transfer pricing recommendations from the sourcebook such as effective audits and skills and capacity building programs. The report concludes with a basic framework of how such a Multi-National Transfer Pricing Unit under ATAF might function, as a possible solution to addressing this gap. / CK2018