It is my overall aim in this work to defend the view that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief or empirically adequate belief, and thus is not the primary epistemic good. I engage predominately with Jonathan Kvanvig‟s work for an assessment of the value of knowledge. In turn, I assess the arguments for the value of knowledge for their ability to support the view that knowledge is uniquely valuable. First I will consider an argument which relies on a purported connection between knowledge and proper action. It will then be suggested that arguments tying knowledge to our proper action are not adequate to justify this standard view of the value of knowledge. Furthermore, I will assess an argument that appeals to the value of truth to explain the superior value of knowledge. From this it will be concluded that truth is also less valuable than typically thought, consequently resulting in an overvaluation of knowledge. Lastly, I will investigate the possibility that knowledge has its value because of its stability and resistance to irrationality. Again, I will argue that this is insufficient justification of the standard view about the value of knowledge by offering counterexamples to both the stability of knowledge and knowledge‟s resistance to irrationality. After this I will discuss the implications of my analysis on the value of knowledge.

In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to knowledge justified?’. I argue that Plato’s psychological doctrine of knowledge marks the starting point of a philosophical inquiry motivated by the possibility to discover foundations of knowledge through investigating the nature of mind. At the core of this inquiry lies the hypothesis that if the psychological mechanisms that govern the capacity for knowledge acquisition is fully understood, then answers will follow about why judgements are true or false. The prospective result of the inquiry is a theory of universal epistemic justification which demarcates epistemically warranted beliefs from unwarranted beliefs. I suggest that there is a historically persistent case of cognitive dissonance within the epistemological enterprise — a tension between two of its central theses — which is caused by the persistence of the of the hitherto unsuccessful but ongoing quest for universal epistemic justification, and its inciting promises. The contradicting theses are those of certain justification (that one is justified in believing that p only if p is entailed by evidence) and proportional justification (that one is proportionally justified in believing that p to the extent that evidence makes p credible). I discuss the consequences of giving up one of the respective theses. I conclude that the thesis of certain justification cannot be given up unless an adequate theory of proportional justification is proposed, and that the legacy of searching for universal epistemic justification will continue unless epistemologists are able to construct one.

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Το ζήτημα της γνώσης φαίνεται να απασχολεί τον Πλάτωνα από τους πρώιμους διαλόγους. Στα περισσότερα έργα της πρώιμης συγγραφικής του περιόδου θέτει στους συνομιλητές του ερωτήματα που αφορούν στην εύρεση της ουσίας εννοιών όπως είναι η αρετή και η δικαιοσύνη. Αυτά τα ερωτήματα παίρνουν συνήθως τη μορφή «τι είναι το χ;» ή «τι είναι χ;». Μπορεί στα πρώτα έργα του Πλάτωνα να προκύπτουν ζητήματα μεθόδου ως προς την απόκτηση της γνώσης της ουσίας των πραγμάτων αλλά δεν προτείνεται μια θεωρία της γνώσης ούτε φαίνεται να απασχολεί τον Πλάτωνα το πώς η γνώση γενικά αποκτάται. Ακόμα, ούτε ενδείξεις για το πως συνδέεται με άλλες λειτουργίες όπως είναι η αίσθηση, η σκέψη και η γνώμη έχουμε. Από τον Μένωνα και έπειτα, όμως, ο Πλάτων καταπιάνεται και με ερωτήματα σχετικά με την ίδια τη γνώση. Η εξέλιξη της σκέψης του προφανώς δημιουργεί την ανάγκη να απαντήσει στο πώς είναι δυνατόν να έχουμε γενικώς γνώση και πώς η γνώση συνδέεται με την αληθή γνώμη (ορθή δόξα). Αυτές οι ερωτήσεις επιδέχονται συστηματικής εξέτασης, στην οποία θα προβούμε όσο γίνεται περισσότερο στο παρόν κείμενο εστιάζοντας σε τρεις διαλόγους που προέρχονται από τις τρεις συγγραφικές περιόδους της πλατωνικής συγγραφής αντίστοιχα. Αυτοί είναι: ο Μένων που συγκαταλέγεται στα έργα της πρώιμης συγγραφικής περιόδου , η Πολιτεία που είναι ένα από τα έργα της μέσης περιόδου και ο Θεαίτητος που θεωρείται έργο της ύστερης συγγραφικής περιόδου του Πλάτωνα. Πρόθεση μας εδώ είναι να αναπτύξουμε όσο το δυνατόν πιο επαρκώς και ολοκληρωμένα τα επιχειρήματα του Πλάτωνα όσον αφορά στη γνώση και στην διάκριση της από την δόξα, που γίνεται σε αυτούς τους διαλόγους, να δούμε σταδιακά την εξέλιξη της σκέψης του όσον αφορά σε αυτά τα ζητήματα και να εξετάσουμε το κατά πόσο ο Πλάτων καταφέρνει να δώσει έναν ορισμό για τη γνώση. / Knowledge is considered by Plato as an important issue and preoccupies him from the very beggining of his philosophical career. In the earlier works however he does not refer to it directly but he is occupied with matters of method and knowledge of the essence of things, such as justice and beauty. The matter of knowledge is becoming more crucial from the Meno and afterwards where Plato grapples with questions considering the essence of knowledge as such. In this paper we are trying to follow Plato's thought from Meno to Theautetus regarding knowledge, focusing in the distinction between knowledge and belief.

This paper is written in special acknowledgement and recognition of oppressed minority groups including, but not limited to, those of Black, Indigenous, and Asian persons. All lives do not matter until Black, Red, and Yellow lives matter. / Obama once spoke of his desire to see empathetic individuals appointed to the position of Supreme Court Justice of the United States. His desire was met by many with resistance as people voiced concerns regarding the unreliability of beliefs founded on empathy and possible negative consequences that may come about. Concerns regarding unreliability are the product of our inability to access the ‘privileged information’ or the actual thoughts and perspectives of those we intend to empathize with. Attempts to form empathic beliefs, in the absence of this information, could lead to various harms to the very groups we intend to empathize with. Stereotyping, bias, and claims of sincerely ‘knowing’ the unique circumstances of those very different from ourselves can all lead to the justification of actions with harmful consequences. In my thesis I wish to address these concerns by acknowledging that most practical sources of knowledge (those we make use of and depend on regularly), such as those predicated on notions of cause and effect, have similar risks associated with them. Theories such as gravity and evolution remain theories and yet via the establishment of best practices and diligent communities, we are able to minimize the dissemination of false knowledge claims and their respective harms. In my paper I acknowledge this and explain how empathy can be dealt with in a similar fashion, while also reducing potential harms to others and allowing us to take advantage of the many benefits empathic knowledge has to offer. In the same way that we still continue to make use of our understanding of gravity to improve our lives and society by building aircrafts, we can make use of empathy to improve the ability of individual social and moral agents, as well as society as a whole. Under this pragmatic approach even the legal system can reap the benefits of empathic knowledge claims, so long as we, moving forward, work to collectively discern how to best ensure the validity of empathic knowledge claims. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / Obama once spoke of his desire to see empathetic individuals appointed to the position of Supreme Court Justices of the United States. His desire was met by many with resistance as people voiced concerns regarding the unreliability of beliefs founded on empathy and possible negative consequences that may come about. In my thesis I wish to address these concerns by acknowledging that most useful sources of knowledge have similar risks associated with them, and yet via the establishment of best practices and diligent communities we are able to minimize the dissemination of false knowledge claims and their respective harms. In my paper I acknowledge this and explain how empathy can be dealt with in a similar fashion, while also reducing potential harms to others and allowing us to take advantage of the many benefits empathic knowledge has to offer.