My goal in this thesis is to propose a new theory of truth in fiction. In Chapter One, I will examine David Lewis, Gregory Currie and Alex Byrne’s theories of truth in fiction. By the end of Chapter Two, I will discuss six conditions a theory of truth in fiction must meet (for example, the theory must account for stories in which there is no intelligent life to tell the tale, and also for truths in authorless fictions.) In Chapter Three, I will explain Kendall Walton’s distinction between the “work world” and the “game world” — the fictional world of the story versus the fictional world of the game of make-believe that the reader plays with the story. Finally, I will introduce a new “fictional author,” located in a game world, in order to propose a new theory that satisfies the conditions. / October 2016

In a confessional, first person narrative, the concept of truth and how it is constructed and perceived is important. Truth in fiction can be created and interpreted in a number of different ways, and when the narrative that portrays it in addition is unreliable and ambiguous, discerning truth becomes a decidedly complex process. This essay interprets the confessional testimony of the narrator in John Banville’s The Book of Evidence, in order to examine the function of these narrative devices and how they affect the understanding of what is true in Banville’s unreliably narrated novel. It does so by following literary theories regarding unreliable narration by Tamar Yacobi and others, as well as theories of truth in fiction as first presented by David Lewis and expanded upon by Ben Levinstein and others. The different types of ambiguity suggested by William Empson are also considered. The novel’s narrative is analyzed specifically in relation to the understanding of how the protagonist eludes to his feelings of guilt and shame. These emotions are chosen for their prevalence in conventional confessions. The essay claims that the narcissistic narrator harbors neither of these feelings pertaining to the crime he has committed, but rather that he admits to being guilty and is ashamed of being caught, and that this is portrayed through the structure of the narrative rather than its content.

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Les fictions posent problème en philosophie, que l'on soit porté sur les considérations ontologiques, épistémologiques, logiques ou esthétiques. Dans un livre important nommé Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), Kendall Walton proposa une théorie de la représentation qui révolutionna notre compréhension des fictions. En résumé, elle met en avant la notion de fictionalité, ou vérité dans la fiction, qu'elle définit en termes de prescription imaginative. La présente étude porte sur la philosophie de Walton, sur la théorie de Mimesis, sur les critiques qu'elles ont reçues. La première partie est une présentation de la méthodologie philosophique de Walton et d'un de ses articles les plus influents, "Categories of Art" (1970). La seconde partie est un commentaire détaillé de Mimesis, construit sur une opposition entre la théorie de la représentation de Nelson Goodman (1968) et celle de notre philosophe. La troisième partie concerne les critiques reçues par la théorie. Une partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui admettent les principes fondamentaux de sa théorie : ce sont les critiques intentionnalistes de Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque et Stein Olsen (1994), ou encore Jerrold Levinson (1993). Je défends que ces critiques sont inopérantes. Une autre partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui cherchent à miner ces principes fondamentaux : ce sont les critiques de Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), voire de Walton (2015) lui-même. Je défends que, bien comprises, ces critiques ne sont pas décisives, mais qu'elles sont importantes. Elles devraient nous orienter vers une meilleure compréhension des aspects sémiotiques de la fictionalité. / The ordinary concept of fiction raises ontological, epistemological, logical and aesthetical questions. Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) introduced a groundbreaking theory on fiction and representation. According to his main claim, the practice of appreciating representational works of art shares significant similarities with the practice of playing games of make-believe. According to Walton, both activities rely on the concept of fictionality, the fact of being true in the fiction, which is understood in terms of prescriptions to imagine. My dissertation consists of an introduction to Walton's philosophy, a commentary of Mimesis' theory of make-believe and a defense against their critics. The first part provides a presentation of Walton's philosophical methodology and discusses one of his most famous articles, "Categories of Art" (1970). The second part provides a detailled commentary of Mimesis, based on a confrontation between Nelson Goodman's theory of representation and Walton's one. The third part is dedicated to analyse the criticisms that are encountered by the theory. A first set of criticisms comes from philosophers admitting the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), or Jerrold Levinson (1993). I argue that those objections are groundless. Another set of criticisms comes from philosophers attempting to undermine the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), or even Walton himself (2015). According to me, those objections are on the right tracks if correctly understood, but fall short from being decisive. Nevertheless, I argue they should lead us to develop a research on the semiotic aspects of fictionality.

This thesis is about expanded narrative, a new field of experimental narrative practices that are not represented by single subjects or by categories such as ‘interactive’. It is defined by works that present a challenge to the form, fiction or nonfiction, in terms of the content, structure, style of writing or audience engagement. Extending the cognitive term ‘perceptual multistability’, that refers to switching between interpretations experienced when we look at an ambiguous figures, such as, the Necker cube, this thesis develops the position that expanded narrative practices and specifically locative narrative, a genera of expanded narrative, hold the potential to prompt the experiential effects of multi-stability. The metaphor of multi-stability introduced here stands in for three aspects of experience: language, perception and belief. While ambiguity and misperceptions have been recognised in the literature of experiential narrative practices, further exposition is required. The thesis asks what are the conditions in which the qualities of the metaphor of multi-stability may be prompted and what framework usefully articulates the parameters of experience? Drawing upon the writings of the philosopher William James, subsequent pragmatists, cognitive neuroscience and narratology, it explores how a radical empiricist perspective can form the basis of a non-foundational experiential framework that questions the status of knowledge and the problems of translation between experience and narrative interpretation. It suggests that the subjective classification of imagined and perceptual objects can be affected by the relations between the narrative form, the environment and the participant’s beliefs. The major contributions of the thesis are (1) the development of the Jamesian experiential framework that sets up cross-disciplinary parameters for the thematics of experience to engage with the ontological and epistemological challenges of evaluating and designing for multistability presents; (2) a relational approach to interpretation and coding participants’ feedback of locative narratives; (3) that is employed in the development of a collection of speculative strategies for evoking the effect of the metaphor of multi-stability, based on the development of four published locative narrative apps and ten prototypes. While highly contingent, participant introspective accounts of experience are central here to the methodology, the process of serial hypothesis forming and the iterative development of prototypes and locative narrative case studies. This research does not attempt to draw causal connections from science to that of narrative experience or vice versa. The thesis first considers the field of expanded narrative and the semantic and pragmatic framings of the term narrative and narratological framings of language as multi-stable. It goes on to examine the antecedent and coexistent practices of locative narrative. The epistemological implications for misperception, the function of representation and intentionality in perception are examined in relation to the environmentally situated perceptual, interpretative, aesthetic and emotional dimensions of experience. This research contributes to research in narrative and creative practices. It extends the form of locative narrative with the concept of multi-stability that has a wider application with the field of expanded narrative, creative practice and narratology.