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In this thesis I investigate the political significance of the aesthetic domain. I hope to show that it is not despite but because of its autonomy that the aesthetic realm is to be credited with political importance. I argue that the aesthetic sphere - both in the kind of judgment characteristic thereof and in the the experience of autonomous art - has a distinctive capacity to influence forms of of judgment and action characteristic of politics.

No description available.

This doctoral thesis is an examination of the possibility of ascribing objectivity to aesthetic judgements. The aesthetic is viewed in terms of its being a certain kind of relation between the mind and the world; a clear understanding of aesthetic judgements will therefore be capable of telling us something important about both subjects and objects, and the ties between them. In view of this, one of the over-riding aims of this thesis is the promotion of an ‘aesthetic psychology’, a philosophical approach, that is to say, which emphasises the importance of the psychological processes involved in the making of aesthetic judgements. One of the aims of this thesis is to develop a revisionary account of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the domain of value. This revision will undertake to dismantle some of the assumptions implicit in a metaphysical framework which traditionally ascribes objectivity only to judgements about facts, and not to judgements about values and other concerns such as norms and emotions. Further, the thesis examines the intricate ways in which aesthetic properties, the focus of aesthetic judgements, depend on the (emotional and other) responses of the subjects of experience. The particular role played by first-hand experience in the making of aesthetic judgements is among the things critically investigated in the interests of reaching a clearer understanding of the manner in which aesthetic judgements may be objective in the sense of being justifiable. Eventually, a defence is outlined of the view that aesthetic judgements can be supported by good reasons, but not in the same way as ordinary cognitive judgements. Finally, I outline the main tenets of a proposed ‘reasonable objectivism’ for aesthetic judgements, an objectivism grounded on justifying reasons.

What does it mean to have aesthetic experience? Is it something we are all capable of? Or is our capacity for aesthetic pleasure something we develop, like a skill? What do we mean when we declare something ‘beautiful’, or when we dismiss a performance because it is ‘not to our taste’? Is taste something we possess, concerned with our own personal likes and dislikes? Or is taste part of aesthetic experience, something that happens? Indeed, what is aesthetic experience? And what is the place, in theatre and performance, for the aesthetic qua aesthetic? In this thesis I explore and develop the Kantian notion of aesthetic experience by taking three terms central to the Critique of Judgment – taste, beauty, sublime – and considering their value in the experience and analysis of contemporary performance. In exploring these ideas, the thesis centres on a range of works from the early avant-garde, including extended analyses of Alfred Jarry’s Ubu Roi (1896) and Edward Gordon Craig’s Dido and Æneas. The contemporary works central to the thesis are Proto-type Theater’s Virtuoso (working title) (2009), 3rd Person (redux)(2010) and Whisper (2008). The study also looks at contemporary work from Reckless Sleepers, Station House Opera, and Societas Raffaello Sanzio. The primary theoretical framework is drawn from the field of philosophical aesthetics, and, specifically, the works of Immanuel Kant. In the post-Kantian era, the works of Arthur Schopenhauer, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wendy Steiner, Jean-Luc Marion, Arnold Berleant, and Christian H. Wenzel provide a connection to the world of post-Enlightenment aesthetics and interconnect Kantian philosophy with developments in performance and aesthetics. In aiming to uncover the value of the aesthetic as such, the thesis looks to reflect on taste, beauty, and the sublime in a way that offers a fresh and vital perspective on the experience of performance.

La pensée de Bergson situe l'esthétique à l'intérieur d'une philosophie de la nature, dont le principe métaphysique est loin d'être soumis au déterminisme, et encore plus loin de retomber dans le hasard, car elle se réfère à l'irréversibilité du temps. Au lieu d'être une discipline intellectuelle qui cherche la nature de la beauté, il s'agit d'une performance vitale, du processus virtuel de différenciation vers la position actuelle de nouveautés radicales, qui peuvent aboutir ou non à une activité artistique. Par conséquent, l'art n'est pas un ensemble d'attributs donnés ou la pratique de certaines compétences spécifiques. Il est, en effet, un mode d'action qui entremêle les régimes du virtuel et de l'actuel, sans jamais permettre que l'existence conquise recouvre complètement la consistance. Il se réalise exactement dans une telle ouverture métaphysique. Si la poussée de la vie est ce qui fait communiquer l'esprit et la matière, en insérant de la liberté dans la nécessité, il s'ensuit que l'activité artistique est l'une des voies où l'élan s'écoule, aux côtés des êtres vivants et de l'expression mystique. Pour que l'individuation d'une œuvre soit viable, il faut certains degrés de liberté et niveaux de conscience qui ne peuvent s'expliquer ni par l'espèce, ni par l'individu, car la durée prend d'autres tonalités vitales. Touché par une émotion créatrice, l'artiste va effectivement du Tout ouvert à la position de nouveaux mondes. Ainsi, le véhicule d'action se confond avec l'action elle-même, le créateur avec la créature, de sorte que le corps artistique instauré devient pur débordement de vitalité, excès joyeux à partir duquel le temps prend conscience de lui-même. / Bergson's aesthetics lies within a philosophy of nature, whose metaphysical principle is far from any determinism or chance as it refers to the irreversibility of time. Instead of an intellectual discipline that seeks the nature of beauty, it is rather defined by a vital conduct, a process of virtual differentiation towards the position of radical novelties, which may or may not culminate in artistic activity. Therefore, art is not a set of actual attributes or the practice of specific skills; it is on the other hand, a mode of action that interweaves the regimes of the virtual and the actual, never allowing its existence to overlap its consistency. Its realization indeed relies in its own opening. If the impulse of life is what makes spirit and matter communicate, by inserting liberty into necessity, it follows that artistic activity is one of the ways in which the élan flows, alongside living beings and mystical expression. The individuation of a piece of art involves certain degrees of freedom and levels of consciousness that cannot be explained neither by the species nor by the individual, since the duration assumes other tones of vitality. Touched by a creative emotion, one goes from the perspective of the open Whole to the placement of new worlds. The vehicle of action then merges with the action itself, creature with creator, so that the artistic body is pure overflowing vitality, a triumph which makes time regain consciousness of itself. / O pensamento de Bergson situa a estética no seio de uma filosofia da natureza, cujo princípio metafísico está longe de qualquer determinismo e do arbítrio do acaso, remetendo-se à irreversibilidade do tempo. Ao invés de disciplina intelectual que busca a natureza da beleza, trata-se, antes, de conduta vital, processo de diferenciação virtual rumo à posição de novidades radicais, podendo ou não desembocar na atividade artística. A arte não é, portanto, um conjunto de atributos atualmente dados ou a prática de habilidades específicas e, sim, um modo de ação que entrelaça os regimes do virtual e do atual sem permitir que a existência se sobreponha à consistência, realizando-se, inclusive, na sua própria abertura. Se o impulso da vida é o que comunica espírito e matéria, inserindo liberdade na necessidade, segue-se que a atividade artística é uma das vias em que desemboca o elã, ao lado dos seres vivos e da expressão mística. A individuação de uma obra implica certos graus de liberdade e níveis de consciência que não se explicam nem pela espécie, nem pelo indivíduo, já que sua contração intuitiva submete a duração do artista a tonalidades não psicológicas e a-subjetivas. Tocado por uma emoção criadora, vai-se realmente do Todo Aberto à colocação de novos mundos. O veículo de ação confunde-se com a própria ação, criatura com criador, de modo que o corpo artístico instaurado é puro transbordamento de vitalidade, consciência de si do tempo.

Les fictions posent problème en philosophie, que l'on soit porté sur les considérations ontologiques, épistémologiques, logiques ou esthétiques. Dans un livre important nommé Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), Kendall Walton proposa une théorie de la représentation qui révolutionna notre compréhension des fictions. En résumé, elle met en avant la notion de fictionalité, ou vérité dans la fiction, qu'elle définit en termes de prescription imaginative. La présente étude porte sur la philosophie de Walton, sur la théorie de Mimesis, sur les critiques qu'elles ont reçues. La première partie est une présentation de la méthodologie philosophique de Walton et d'un de ses articles les plus influents, "Categories of Art" (1970). La seconde partie est un commentaire détaillé de Mimesis, construit sur une opposition entre la théorie de la représentation de Nelson Goodman (1968) et celle de notre philosophe. La troisième partie concerne les critiques reçues par la théorie. Une partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui admettent les principes fondamentaux de sa théorie : ce sont les critiques intentionnalistes de Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque et Stein Olsen (1994), ou encore Jerrold Levinson (1993). Je défends que ces critiques sont inopérantes. Une autre partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui cherchent à miner ces principes fondamentaux : ce sont les critiques de Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), voire de Walton (2015) lui-même. Je défends que, bien comprises, ces critiques ne sont pas décisives, mais qu'elles sont importantes. Elles devraient nous orienter vers une meilleure compréhension des aspects sémiotiques de la fictionalité. / The ordinary concept of fiction raises ontological, epistemological, logical and aesthetical questions. Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) introduced a groundbreaking theory on fiction and representation. According to his main claim, the practice of appreciating representational works of art shares significant similarities with the practice of playing games of make-believe. According to Walton, both activities rely on the concept of fictionality, the fact of being true in the fiction, which is understood in terms of prescriptions to imagine. My dissertation consists of an introduction to Walton's philosophy, a commentary of Mimesis' theory of make-believe and a defense against their critics. The first part provides a presentation of Walton's philosophical methodology and discusses one of his most famous articles, "Categories of Art" (1970). The second part provides a detailled commentary of Mimesis, based on a confrontation between Nelson Goodman's theory of representation and Walton's one. The third part is dedicated to analyse the criticisms that are encountered by the theory. A first set of criticisms comes from philosophers admitting the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), or Jerrold Levinson (1993). I argue that those objections are groundless. Another set of criticisms comes from philosophers attempting to undermine the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), or even Walton himself (2015). According to me, those objections are on the right tracks if correctly understood, but fall short from being decisive. Nevertheless, I argue they should lead us to develop a research on the semiotic aspects of fictionality.

Cette thèse souhaite rendre intelligibles les expériences esthétiques puissantes qu'on nomme duende dans le flamenco. D'une part, le topos veut que le duende, parce qu'irrationnel et idiosyncrasique, constituerait une réalité indicible transcrite par un terme intraduisible. D'autre part, le flamenco est un genre artistique hybride dont il est difficile de cerner les limites : il s'alimente aussi bien au chant qu'à la musique instrumentale et à la danse, mêle les cultures populaire et savante et fait intervenir la spontanéité au sein d'un système de communication pourtant très codifié. Il pose donc des questions esthétiques singulières portant tout à la fois sur sa nature en tant qu'art, sur ses enjeux identitaires, mais aussi sur ses représentations, lesquelles, par un phénomène de contamination réciproque, semblent tout autant s'alimenter aux pratiques que les influencer en retour. Nombre de mythes et de clichés informent le flamenco depuis ses débuts, qu'ils émanent de la pensée commune, de l'activité artistique ou de la flamencologie. L'image d'un art démesuré, dont l'authenticité serait liée au débridement des instincts, gage d'une hypothétique « pureté », a largement fait fortune. Or, cette image apparaît par excellence dans les usages liés au duende. Tout se passe donc comme si, à étudier le duende, on était inévitablement renvoyé au flamenco, et réciproquement, alors même qu'ils constituent l'un pour l'autre des impensés. Comment, dès lors, approcher le flamenco par l'intermédiaire d'un phénomène apparemment insaisissable, et comment, en retour, approcher le duende par l'intermédiaire d'un art aux contours indistincts ? On formule ici l'hypothèse qu'à la condition d'adopter une conception souple de la définition, le duende devient définissable, et que, de surcroît, il nous livre le concept unificateur de certains des enjeux majeurs du flamenco. / This dissertation aims to make intelligible the powerful aesthetic experience called duende in flamenco. On the one hand, its irrational and idiosyncratic nature is viewed as an inexpressible reality designated by a term beyond translation. On the other hand, flamenco is a hybrid genre of art with ill-defined boundaries. It thrives on singing, instrumental music and dance, mixing popular and scholarly cultures spontaneously within a highly codified framework of communication. This triggers questions on the nature of flamenco as an art form, such as how it defines a cultural identity as well as the relations between representation, norms and practices that mutually influence each other. Since the beginning, flamenco has suffered from numerous myths and stereotypes originating from collective common thought, artistic practice or flamencology. The representation of an intense, instinctive and wild art defined by its excessiveness has long been stamped in the common knowledge as a proof of “purity”. This short-sighted and simplistic perception has thus imposed serious limitations on a rational analysis of the duende. It appears that the study of duende leads to flamenco and vice versa even if both are, so far, rather poorly defined concepts. How, then, to approach the study of flamenco through a seemingly elusive phenomenon, and how, in return, to approach the duende through art with indistinct contours? The necessary working hypothesis is then to use a flexible definition of the concept of duende, which allows for the possibility of a unifying concept for some of the majors' stakes of the flamenco.

Cette thèse porte sur l'esthétique au sein de la phénoménologie, et plus particulièrement sur le problème de l'unité de l'esthétique, sur la question de la continuité entre sensibilité et art telle qu'elle est posée dans les philosophies d'Erwin Straus, de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et d'Henri Maldiney. Nous montrons d'abord comment la phénoménologie, en devenant phénoménologie de l'art, reprend et accomplit la philosophie de l'art traditionnelle, retrouvant par-là même ses difficultés et impasses : la subordination de l'art à la philosophie, le primat théorique de l’œuvre d'art sur l'artiste, l'assimilation de l'artiste au génie, la promotion de la peinture et de la littérature et l'exclusion de la danse, l'identification du spectateur à un incréateur. Nous mettons ensuite en évidence le fait que la phénoménologie est irréductible à une philosophie de l'art, qu'elle est aussi une esthétique capable de dépasser les problèmes de la phénoménologie de l'art autant que de l'esthétique classique, intellectualiste et empiriste. Seulement l'esthétique phénoménologique rejoue plutôt qu'elle ne déjoue ces problèmes : l'art et l'artiste demeurent mystérieux, l'esthétique phénoménologique est encore une religion de l'art. C'est pourquoi, enfin, une nouvelle esthétique s'impose – une esthétique cosmologique –, nourrie de la double déconstruction de la phénoménologie de l'art et de l'esthétiquephénoménologique, et dirigée vers l'impératif d'éconduire le mysticisme résurgent des doctrines sur l'art. En somme, ce travail vise à rendre compte philosophiquement, sans mythologie interposée, du phénomène artistique. / This doctoral dissertation focuses on aesthetics within the phenomenological movement, especially on the problem of the unity of aesthetics, on the question of continuity between sensibility and art as it is formulated in the philosophies of Erwin Straus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Henri Maldiney. We start by showing how phenomenology, by becoming a phenomenology of art”, recovers and completes the traditional philosophy of art, thereby rediscovering its impasses and difficulties: the subordination of art to philosophy, the theoretical priority of the work of art over the artist, the assimilation of the artist to a genius, the promotion of painting and literature and theexclusion of dance, the identification of the spectator with an uncreator. We then highlight the fact that phenomenology is irreducible to a philosophy of art, that it is also an aesthetics able to surpass the problems of the phenomenology of art as much as those of classical – intellectualist and empiricist – aesthetics. Nevertheless, “phenomenological aesthetics” updates these problems: art and artist remainmysterious, phenomenological aesthetics is still a religion of art. For this reason, finally, a new aesthetics is necessary – a “cosmological aesthetics” –, nourished by the double deconstruction of the phenomenology of art and phenomenological aesthetics, and directed towards the imperative to erase the resurgent mysticism of doctrines on art. In short, our study intends to explain – philosophically, without mythology – the artistic phenomenon.