The White Revolution was a set of six reform measures put to the Iranian people via referendum on 6 Bahman 1341 (26 January 1963), based on a plan for social justice linked with economic development, encased in the concept of a bloodless revolution from the top. This did not happen unexpectedly; it was the culmination of events spanning several years, which accelerated during the John F. Kennedy Presidency. Various plans and reforms paved the way for the White Revolution and certain events as well as political and economic developments encouraged reform. There were similarities between plans and some reforms influenced others, or were shaped to suit different agendas. All played a part in instigating the White Revolution. This included Prime Minister ʻAlī Amīnī’s 15-point plan, the Shah’s Royal Farmān, the Third Development Plan, and the six-points of the White Revolution itself. The question this thesis seeks to answer is to what extent the Kennedy administration was responsible for instigating the White Revolution by influencing the various steps that paved the way for the 6 Bahman referendum?The United States had at its disposal various means by which it might apply pressure and influence development. This included, economic aid, military assistance, numerous advisers, agencies on the ground, plus support for the Shah and other Iranians. Given the Kennedy administration’s association with modernisation and development, the existing historiography has portrayed this period in US-Iranian relations as one of increased pressure on the Shah to reform with the White Revolution being the result of such pressure. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by challenging this portrayal by providing the first detailed, analysis of the period 1961-63, utilising a vast array of newly released documents. This is not the first study to conclude agency on the part of Iran for the White Revolution, but is the first to do so though a detailed, balanced approach, which doesn’t ignore the significance of the US-Iranian relationship. Thus, this thesis is at the forefront of revisionist accounts of US-Iranian relations during the Cold War critiquing the portrayal of the Shah and others as mere tools of the US and reaching the conclusion that contrary to widely held beliefs it was Iranians rather than Americans who instigated the White Revolution by initiating and directing reform.

Many civil wars are illustrative of wider international tensions and connections that transcend state borders. States often intervene to influence the trajectory and outcome of civil conflicts by providing external support to warring parties. This assistance ranges from direct military intervention to the provision of weapons, training, funds, safe havens, intelligence, logistics and other critical resources. This dissertation contains four individual essays that each seeks to advance our knowledge of state support to rebel movements. The first essays (I and II) add to our understanding of how external state support influences conflict dynamics while the latter (III and IV) begin to unpack the political decision-making process behind decisions that alter the original support commitment. Essay I evaluates whether state support to rebels increases the probability of civil war negotiations being initiated. The findings question a widespread belief among policymakers that support can foster negotiations. Essay II explores if external support influences the risk of conflict recurrence. It finds that state support to rebels can increase the risk of conflict recurrence in the short-term while there is no equivalent effect of support provided to governments. Essay III is the first global analysis of support termination and it thereby opens up an entirely new research field. The results suggest that the causes related to the initiation of support and its termination are largely distinct while the transition from the Cold War and the absence of ethnic kinship ties offer some insights into when states are more likely to terminate support. Essay IV unpacks the political decision-making process of the United States’ support to the armed opposition in Nicaragua in the 1980s and in Syria in the 2010s. The results indicate that adverse feedback functions as a trigger for increasing previous commitments as long as policy failure can be attributed to external actors, while reduced support is often a result of attributing failure to the state sponsor’s own actions. Taken together, the essays make significant contributions to advance our understanding of biased third-party interventions, conflict recurrence, civil war negotiations, foreign policy decision-making and state sponsorship of terrorism.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ivy B G Turner.pdf: 404366 bytes, checksum: 8f7580f072c2944058d678625559e197 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-06-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of the present work was to present factors that promote congressional activism in the area of foreign policy. The work involved an analysis of the main subjects related to the participation of the United States Congress in the foreign policy-making process, the intention being to present the latest thinking in this area. As such, the work seeks to contribute to the body of research being developed on the influence of domestic factors in American foreign policy. Although information and studies in Brazil about the United States abound, this is not the case for this specific area of investigation. It should be stressed that the intention of this work was not to explain the performance of the institution through history, but rather to focus on the institutional structure of the process by which US foreign policy is formulated / O objetivo do presente trabalho esteve em tentar desvendar quais fatores promovem ativismo congressual em temas de política externa. Para tanto, realizou-se análise das principais questões relativas à participação do Congresso na formulação da política externa norte-americana. O intento foi apresentar o estado da arte do debate acerca do papel que o Congresso possui neste processo. Ao estudar este tema pretendeu-se contribuir com as pesquisas acerca da influência de fatores domésticos na política externa norte-americana por que, apesar das informações e estudos disponíveis no Brasil acerca dos Estados Unidos serem abundantes, não o são nesta área específica. Ressalta-se que o trabalho não teve intenção de explicar a atuação da instituição ao longo da história, sendo uma análise focada na estrutura institucional do processo

Essay in Political Science, Advanced Course, by Christoffer Hagström “The Bush Administration´s view on international cooperation and international law and political-theoretical traditions influence on the administration´s foreign policy” Supervisor: Jan Olsson The purpose of this paper is to analyze the American foreign policy, particularly with regard to international cooperation and international law. The two following research-questions are used in order to fulfil the purpose: (1) what is the Bush-administrations´s view of of the place for international cooperation and international law in American foreign policy?, and (2) how does the administration´s foreign policy correspond to dominant political-theoretical thought-traditions? The traditions used are: liberalism, realism and neoconservatism. The sources of the study mostly include literature and policy-documents. The author conducts qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the Bush-administration´s policy document National Security Strategy of the United States from March 2006. First the document is summarized based on different criteria followed by categorizations of ideas connected with realism, liberalism and neoconservatism in the document. In the quantative analysis value-words that are appropriate for the various traditions is chosen. The frequency of those words can be seen as indications of the influence of the traditions in the thoughts of the Bush-administration, but is mostly seen as a complement to the qualtative analysis. The main conclusions of the paper are that the Bush-administration most often wish to act according to international law and to cooperate with other actors internationally in the long run, it may even be necessary. In the short run however, it may act outside the parameters of international organizations and international law in order to accomplish foreign policy-goals. Matters related to the security of the American state and people is considered much more important than international cooperation and law. Liberalism seems to be the tradition that has most affected the Bush-administration´s foreign policy. It is followed shortly thereafter by realism and neoconservatism seems to have had the least influence on the the thought-traditions. All of the them has been active in the making of the foreign policy.

This thesis examines the foreign policy of the 44th President of the United States of America, Barack Obama. A significant theme of Barack Obama's candidacy for presidency was "change"; more specifically change in policy from previous administration. Therefore, the thesis looks at the changes brought about by President Obama once he was elected. First, we look at foreign policy of the United States under President George W. Bush, then we look at foreign policy-related assertions of Barack Obama during his candidacy, and lastly we look at the actual policies of the new administration, with particular focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, drones and extrajudicial killing, Guantanamo detention facility and extraordinary rendition, and NSA surveillance.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.