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This thesis examines how ethics and various conceptualizations of the divine are explored and expressed in contemporary fiction, and in this particular case, in Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000. It is meant to highlight the philosophical underpinnings within these works, and to discuss how readers and consumers of such fiction and media may be affected in their views regarding religiosity and ethics. This exploration is mainly done through the lens of virtue ethics, specifically Aristotelian and Nietzschean schools of thought, with the primary focus being on the heroes and villains of the respective works. This essay argues that in the case of both Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000, the Aristotelian tendency appears to be more clearly present in both works, while a Nietzschean perspective appears to be driving the villains of Star Wars and to some degree those of Warhammer 40,000 as well. How these ethical frameworks are linked to the transcendent reality described in both works is also discussed, with concepts such as Classical Theism being weighed against that of Pantheism. While fiction such as Star Wars has been the subject of research before, it has not been examined as closely through the lens of ethics. Warhammer 40,000 has only received limited attention, and this essay argues that the similarities between Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000 can most likely be established between other works of fiction as well, opening up for further exploration.

Most philosophical work on ethical questions concerning disability and impairment, human vulnerability and the cycles of life is found within feminist care ethics and the philosophy of disability. When it comes to eudaimonist virtue ethics, a discussion of such truths about our human condition usually falls within an account of external goods. Alasdair Macintyre's work is the most notable exception. In his book, Dependent Rational Animals, Macintyre argues that the cultivation of the virtues of acknowledged dependence is necessary for living a eudaimon life. Rather than focus, as Macintyre and some care ethicists do, on our often contingent dependence, I argue that it is a right orientation toward our interdependence which allows us to live with the vulnerabilities inherent in the human condition and live well. To that end, I put forward a hitherto unspecified virtue which I call Proper Interconnection and argue for its necessary role in sustaining human flourishing in an interdependent world. I establish that Proper Interconnection is a legitimate virtue in its own right by demonstrating that it meets the conditions which Rosalind Hursthouse in "Environmental Virtue Ethics," and Macintyre in After Virtue specify must be met in order for a trait to qualify as a virtue. In accordance with Hursthouse's conditions, I show that Proper Interconnection is a deep-seated disposition of character comprised of four cognitive and emotional components: recognition, compassion, acceptance and shared responsibility. Proper Interconnection is integral to the acquisition of practical wisdom, can be inculcated in children and plausibly fits within an account of human nature. Turning to Macintyre's conditions, I provide several examples from anthropology which I argue suggest that Proper Interconnection is both central to and helps sustain particular practices and traditions—such as the practice of hospitality and traditions of kinship. Macintyre argues that, just as the virtues help sustain practices and traditions, they also enable us to flourish by sustaining the integrity of our character and, by extension, our life narratives. We are both the authors of our lives and inextricably interconnected with those whose life narratives intertwine with our own. As our individual flourishing cannot exist apart from the flourishing of the whole, we cannot live an integrated life narrative by engaging in just any form of interconnection. We need to cultivate the virtue of Proper Interconnection, as we search and strive for both our own good and the good of humankind.

When a business organization designs an ethics program, should it adopt a situationist conception of moral psychology or a virtue approach to character building? In this dissertation I argue that the answer is, both. The complement model is a recommendation for business ethics programs that blends the best aspects of these two theories in social psychology and philosophy. I start by giving a critique of the experimental literature surrounding situationism and argue that older adults have different prosocial competencies than the younger college-age subjects used in the situationist experiments. I give an explanation of virtue development, which concludes with the claim that older adults are an overlooked resource to be used in formal ethics mentoring programs. I also present the findings from a study I conducted with business ethics professionals, which provided information that I used to formulate the recommendations for the complement model.

This thesis presents an environmental ethic based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Chapter One uses Heidegger's conception of 'dwelling' as the basis for a satisfying account of the 'otherness' or alterity of nature. Chapter Two draws upon Heidegger's writings on 'the dif-ference', Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy and the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead to develop a 'dialectical' conception of holism which can accommodate both the account of alterity presented in Chapter One and an account of the intrinsic value of individual beings. Chapter Three frames this conception of environmental holism in terms of ethics. It is argued that Heidegger's ideal of 'releasement' can be thought of as an essential 'function' of humans, the exercise of which promotes human flourishing. Extending this Aristotelian line of reasoning, it is shown how one can draw upon Heidegger's philosophy to articulate a form of environmental virtue ethic. Chapter Four investigates the charge that Heidegger's later thought is quietistic, a general allegation which is analysed into four interrelated specific charges: 1) the accusation that Heidegger is advocating a passive withdrawal from the world; 2) Adorno's charge in Negative Dialectics that Heidegger's philosophy is inimical to critical thought; 3) the objection that Heidegger is unable to deal adequately with either interhuman relations or the relations between humans and nonhuman animals; and 4) the charge that Heidegger's later writings cannot be brought to bear upon practical environmental issues. In answer to this last objection, case studies are presented of two environmental issues: 1) the environmental impact of tourism; and 2) the practice of environmental restoration.

When it comes to potential children, is to love them to leave them be (nonexistent)? I examine the possibility of virtuous reproduction, as well as some more basic theoretical issues surrounding the nature of moral goodness and obligation generally. Currently, there is a large body of literature in the field of reproductive ethics on questions of what considerations and practices ought to guide reproductive decision-making. The appropriate use of testing technologies to inform such decision-making, for instance, has been widely debated. Much smaller and less visible is the debate surrounding the prior question of whether reproduction itself is morally appropriate or desirable. I am particularly interested in how consequentialist strategies for including considerations of beneficence in reproductive decision-making have shaped moral approaches to reproduction. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), which mandates potential reproducers to select the best possible child, highlights the problematic nature of these strategies. The limited conceptual resources and problematic normative foundations of such strategies have stymied the development of a robust discussion on the ethics of reproduction itself. Other types of ethical approaches, loosely defined as deontological, offer superior accounts of what is at issue in reproduction, but also draw on some flawed background assumptions regarding, for instance, the nature of the moral agent and the scope of the moral sphere. The question of the morality of reproduction itself thus leads to an examination of far more basic issues in ethical theory: namely, the significance of meta-ethical commitments, and the desirability of a normative framework that offers a rich and agent-focused account of moral goodness and badness. I argue that a virtue-centred ethics, grounded in neo-Aristotelian naturalism, accomplishes just that. And it is well-equipped to provide a meaningful and helpful analysis of the morality of reproduction, both holistically, in terms of the potential virtuousness of reproduction generally, and in terms of how the virtues of courage and benevolence may be expressed in reproduction. I conclude that a virtue-centred assessment of reproduction offers a sound and practical form of evaluation and that a virtuous character may indeed be expressed through reproduction. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-17 10:44:50.827

This research strives to illuminate the concept of "Christian values" and it points out the possible connection between this term and the ethics of values. At the beginning is introduced a reflection on the "Christian values" from both philosophical and theological point of view, then we try to find a connection between the Christian values and the ethics of values. The paper is methodologically structured in several subsequent steps. The first one is the reflection on the concept of "value" in the philosophy of values (20th century). the emphasis is put on the connection between the term "value" and the term "good", because we work on the assumption that there is some non-specific relationship between the good and the values. The following step is a theological elaborate of the term "value" that proceeds from a biblical examination, during which we concentrate non only on the term itself but also on the question if the value-focused thinking in the Scripture has a specific implicit form. Thereafter we examine the term of "value" from the systematic-theology point of view. At first we try to look into the values as an expression of the Divine perfection, then we move on to the moral-theological view, where we present the Christian interpretation of values. With this theological examination we lay the foundations for the determination of "Christian values". In the final part of the paper we present the connection between values and the ethics of values. We examine in detail the definition of the ethics of values itself, consequently we talk about the role of values in the ethics of values as well as the theological development of this doctrine. We can conclude that a satisfactory and widely accepted definition of values does not exist, which is why we also examined the term of "good" in order to find the differences between the two terms. We came to the conclusion that the difference is not convincingly explained by the ethics of values. In the theological reflection of the term "value" we tried to find a biblical foundation for values. The language analysis of the biblical texts showed that the term of values is not very frequent in the Bible and less it is in the contemporary understanding of the texts. However, deeper examination of individual texts of the New Testament showed that value-oriented statements can be found relatively often in the Bible. These statements concern the highest value, as well as the hierarchy of natural and supernatural values, etc. The next step of the theological reflection showed, that in the christian understanding, God is the source of all good/values. He is the originator and the aim of all that is and al that comes from him is good. The ethics of virtues is interesting because it differs from another normative ethics by its theological thinking. It focuses on human action from the point of view of the ultimate goal of human life. It is also associated with natural law. Indeed, each of the cardinal virtues is based on some of the basic benefits of human nature. Cultivating the virtues in life leads one to the goal of life, whether it is a naturally successful life or, in the Christian concept, eternal life, that is, communion with God. In the final step, let's take a look at the very notion of "Christian values." First of all, an inclusive concept is possible, which is based on the fact that God is the originator of all that is good, and therefore all goodness can be understood as good Christian. But then there is no difference between good and Christian good. Perhaps only in the perspective of the person who evaluates this good. Secondly, the concept of exclusive is also possible, with Christian values being what is specifically Christian, that is, what has its foundation in Revelation. In other words, it is the good / value that we would not know if it were not for Christianity.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / This dissertation argues that both wealth and poverty function as moral luck to impede the pursuit of virtue and that economic inequality worsens the problem. I begin with a chapter describing the state of economic inequality today, asking whether economic inequality is a problem distinct from poverty. I conclude that it is, for three reasons: inequality causes many social ills traditionally associated with poverty; it self-perpetuates; and—the argument I advance throughout the dissertation—inequality functions as moral luck to harm virtue. In the next chapter, I argue for a Christian virtue account of moral luck. Moral luck is a term used by feminist philosophers to describe the impact of life circumstances on persons’ ability to pursue virtue. I examine Scripture, Aquinas, and the work of womanist theologians to propose a Christian virtue account of moral luck that acknowledges both the pervasiveness of sin and Christian hope for God’s promised redemption. In the third chapter, I draw on Aquinas and contemporary virtue theorists to provide rich descriptions of the eight virtues I will consider throughout the dissertation. I describe a new virtue taxonomy: cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, and humility; “daughter” virtues of solidarity, fidelity and self-care; and helper virtues of temperance and fortitude. To understand how inequality functions as moral luck, we must first understand how wealth and poverty affect our pursuit of virtue. I continue with a chapter describing the impact of wealth, which I define as “having more than we need,” on the virtues in my taxonomy. Blending resources from psychology, sociology and theology, I conclude that wealth impacts the pursuit of virtue in two major ways: by endowing the wealthy person with hyperagency, or greater power, freedom and choice than that enjoyed by others; and by becoming an end in itself. This does not mean that wealth has a unilaterally negative impact on the pursuit of virtue; for example, I argue that wealth can help in pursuing the virtue of self-care. In the next chapter, I assess how poverty, which I define as being unable to meet one’s needs or meeting them only through constant and precarious struggle, functions as moral luck. Consulting social science, memoirists and journalists who write about poverty, and liberation theologians, I show that key issues in poverty’s impact on virtue include scarcity, which impacts cognitive processing and can limit access to certain virtuous practices, and diminished self-regard. This does not mean that poverty has a unilaterally negative impact on the pursuit of virtue; for example, a variety of evidence suggests that poverty encourages the virtue of solidarity. My final chapter shows how inequality exacerbates the impact of wealth and poverty on virtue in terms of hyperagency, wealth as an end in itself, scarcity and self-regard. I offer suggestions for future Christian ethical work on moral luck and responses to the impact of economic inequality on virtue. These include practical economic solutions to reduce inequality and theological solutions including encounter, conversion, satisfaction with contentment, and dependence on God. I suggest that the Christian community can respond to the impact of economic inequality on virtue through political action; a renewed approach to tithing and aid; and creating sites for encounter between the rich and the poor. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The United States penal system, fragmented by contradictory impulses toward retribution and incapacitation, is in need of coherent objectives for its prisons and jails. This dissertation draws upon the resources of virtue ethics to suggest a new model of justice, one which claims that a Christian theological framework can offer insight for public correctional institutions. In developing a model of justice as virtue, I incorporate rehabilitative goals and contributions from restorative justice. Advancing beyond these foundations, I draw upon two key sources. First, from a study of virtue and justice in the work of Thomas Aquinas, I argue that the virtue of legal justice - an orientation toward the common good - is the fundamental lens for understanding punishment. The prison can only cultivate justice to the extent that it empowers moral agency and (re-)orients offenders toward right relationship with the community. Second, an inclusive, restorative account of biblical justice - developed particularly from Isaiah, the Psalms, and the New Testament - establishes justice as a saving intervention. Thus, punishment can be a legitimate means but is not constitutive of justice itself. Despite its necessary limitations, the prison must empower the moral agency of inmates through just action, reformulate the role and practices of correctional staff, and facilitate just relationships between offenders and their communities and families. Furthermore, prisons themselves can be understood as moral agents that bear responsibility for cultivating justice in society. For the United States prison, a model of justice as virtue mandates unremitting efforts to transform offenders and the larger community into just moral agents. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The dissertation will contribute not only to an appreciation and critical evaluation of fortitude in the Philippine context, but has a wider significance for the practice of virtue ethics. The thesis is that (a) virtue must be analyzed contextually, in specific social contexts, as well as (b) in dependence upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the virtues, that (c) social virtue as well as individual virtue exists, and that (d) this social, contextual, Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to virtue provides a basis for a social-ethical critical evaluation and prescription for particular societies. If virtue ethics is to generate sound social normative claims, its argument needs to be based not merely upon the classical tradition, but also on a socially, historically and culturally aware analysis of the way virtues are fleshed out in context. This dissertation will argue that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition still has much to teach us about courage or fortitude, and in dialogue with contemporary social science still provides legitimate moral insights into fortitude today. Second, it will argue that virtue takes on a particular color or texture in specific social contexts, and will argue this in relation to the Filipino context: Philippine fortitude is Thomistic, with unique attributes of resilience and joy. Third, it will argue that it is necessary to engage in a social-ethical critique of social virtue, arguing that there are deficiencies in Philippine fortitude in that it lacks a crucial link with justice. This critical evaluation will lead to the elaboration of an ethical and social imperative for the Filipino people to develop good anger to fuel a less passive, more assertive fortitude that is ordered to justice. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.