The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

1 Aim of this Thesis. The aim of this thesis is to critically examine the understanding of the relationship between fundamental option and virtue ethics in the work of Karl Rahner. This is done in the light of: both the classical heritage of virtue ethics and its contemporary recovery in post modernity: both the pre-history of the fundamental option and the contemporary issues of post modernity surrounding it. The work of Karl Rahner has been chosen as the subject of this thesis because, first, as the pre-eminent post-conciliar Catholic theologian, he developed the leading theory of fundamental option based on fundamental freedom, and second, as a self confessed Thomist, he also included virtue theory within his theology. These two traditions in moral theology, of virtue theory and fundamental option theory, have not only developed in relative mutual isolation (the former largely confined to the English speaking world, the latter a product of continental moral theology) but they have also been seen in some quarters as irreconcilable. This thesis uses the example of Karl Rahner to provide a bridgehead between these two distanced ethical theories. The example of the reconciliation of these two traditions in the work of Karl Rahner will be pursued in the setting of postmodernity. This provides the opportunity to assess the continuing significance of the theology of Karl Rahner. 2 The Scope of the Thesis. The thesis begins by stating the problem under examination, that is, that there has been no sustained analysis of the link between virtue ethics and fundamental option in the work of Karl Rahner (or any other contemporary moral theologian). The setting for this thesis topic is briefly considered. First, the setting of postmodernity is examined and then second, the profound impact of the Second Vatican Council on contemporary moral theology is examined, in particular with regard to the development of the perspective of moral agency. In order to establish the link between virtue ethics and fundamental option, an understanding of these two approaches per se is developed, beginning with the precursors of fundamental option (in particular, the approach of Aquinas) and then the recovery of virtue and its classical antecedents, (in particular, Aristotle and Aquinas). Both these concerns have been influenced by the shift in moral theory from moral act to moral agency, with a concern for the moral dimension of the psychology and communitarian perspective of the human person. Attention is also given to the role of passions and the hexis/habitus controversy in virtue theory insofar as they impinge on the understanding of freedom in fundamental option. This general setting of the history of Christian ethics is then given a narrower focus with the work of Karl Rahner. Various aspects of his thought are examined, in particular his intellectual heritage, his transcendental anthropology, and his perspectives on moral theology. The focus is narrowed further to particular components of his theology, viz. his understanding of fundamental option, fundamental freedom, Ignatian mysticism, supernatural existential, virtue ethics, theology of grace and metaphysics of knowledge. The Rahnerian understanding of virtue ethics and fundamental option is considered further with regard to the issues raised in the contemporary debate on these subjects. His metaphysics of knowledge is also considered in relation to the contemporary concern of virtue epistemology and the rediscovery of metaphysics. The link between fundamental option and virtue ethics in the work of Karl Rahner is examined with reference to antecedents in Aquinas et alii and contemporary minimalist approaches. 3 Conclusions. Despite the fact that there is no systematic treatment of either fundamental option or virtue ethics in the Foundations of Christian Faith (Rahner's most systematic work) and further, that Rahner seemed unaware of the recovery of virtue ethics, it has been possible to establish in Rahner's work a link between fundamental option and virtue. The link is explicitly embedded in an an obscure way in diverse works but it is more importantly and implicitly preeminently dependent on the theological virtues. For example, faith is the exercise of a fundamental option for or against God, not a process of categorical choice or habit, but a state of fundamental freedom. What stands behind the exercise of faith, and the other theological virtues of hope and love are all the components of his transcendental anthropology, viz. fundamental freedom, supernatural existential, grace and metaphysic of knowledge. They all have as their terminus the virtue of faith, that is belief with absolute assent. Rahner also gives centrality to the virtues of hope and love. The three theological virtues are the three basic perfections of Christian existence which abide and last. They are interrelated, distinguishable yet possess a unity and condition one another. The theological virtues vis-a-vis the fundamental option are pre-eminent, have unity in diversity and are linked intimately with both the supernatural existential and fundamental option in grace and freedom. They are at the centre of Rahner's anthropology even if they are heavily camouflaged. They reflect Rahner's Thomist heritage, they lend themselves, via Rahner's metaphysic of knowledge, to a virtue epistemology, to a recovery of metaphysics and they contribute to a contemporary philosophical psychology in the setting of postmodernity and engagement with the leading concerns of postmodernism.

abstract: Principle-based ethical frameworks, which commonly make use of codes of ethics, have come to be the popular approach in guiding ethical behavior within scientific research. In this thesis project, I investigate the benefits and shortcomings of this approach, ultimately to argue that codes of ethics are valuable as an exercise in developing a reconciled value profile for a given research community, and also function well as an internal and external proclamation of values and norms. However, this approach results in technical adherence, at best, and given the extent to which scientific research now irreversibly shapes our experience as human beings, I argue for the importance of cultivating ethical virtues in scientific research. In the interest of doing so I explore concepts from Aristotelian virtue ethics, to consider how to ameliorate the shortcomings of principle-based approaches. This project was inspired by a call to research and develop an ethical framework upon which to found a cooperative research network that would be aimed at combating the spread of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in resource-restricted countries, specifically throughout Latin America. The desire to found this network on an ethics-based framework is to move beyond technical compliance and cultivate a research community committed to integrity, therefore establishing and maintaining trust and communication that will allow for unprecedented productive collaboration and meaningful outcomes. I demonstrate in this thesis that this requires more than a code of ethics, and use this initiative as a case study to exhibit the merit of integrating concepts from virtue ethics. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Biology 2017

With the permission of Swedish Allemansrätten, the Right of Public Access, allows people to interact with the natural environment... . Environmental ethics, discuss about the relationship between man and nature, and is hence clearly connected to the questions of wildlife tourism. Great part of the previous literature has focused on the environmental ethics in tourism from the perspective of utilitarianism or deontology, with special concern in animal rights, animal ethics and animal welfare. However, questions like ‘what kind of people will do good to the environment?’, ‘What are the characteristics of these people?’ are among those that still need to be discussed in the field of wildlife tourism research. According to the theory of environmental virtue ethics, man's attitude towards nature originates from the internal quality and character of human beings. Whether it is the western scholars Thomas Hill and Geoffrey Frasz, or the ancient Chinese School of Confucianism and Taoism, they all put forward their own opinions on the characters required by the virtue ethics of the environment. In this thesis, documentary writing and network media records of wildlife tourists in Sweden are used as empirical materials to demonstrate the behavioral and psychological manifestations of the three characters of environmental virtues ethics. These three characters reflect the harmonious interaction between man and nature, and contribute in the theoretical discussions of of ethics in Tourism Studies.

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the possibilities of applying virtue ethics in the HR-profession by presenting the foundation for virtue ethics and addressing how it could be transformed into virtue ethical principles for HR-practitioners in Swedish work-life. I address the questions how virtue ethics could support HR-practitioners in doing ”the right thing” and how a HR-practitioner should be. I argue that the fit between virtue ethics and the HR-profession rests on principles of moral consciousness and intellectual reflection and on the principles of practice and developing excellence. I also argue that moral institutionalization through measures of professional ethical codification could form an important practical feature. Mediated by the concept of phronesis, I define four core virtues for HR-practitioners: trustworthiness, cooperation, justice and integrity. I conclude that virtue ethics could be pivotal in promoting positive culture, forming the basis of increased trust, confidence and security within organizations.

The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

The focus of environmental philosophy has thus far heavily depended on the extension of rights to nonhuman nature. Due to inherent difficulties with this approach to environmental problems, I propose a shift from the contemporary language of rights and duties to the concept of character development. I claim that a theory of environmental virtue ethics can circumvent many of the difficulties arising from the language of rights, duties, and moral claims by emphasizing the cultivation of certain dispositions in the individual moral agent. In this thesis, I examine the advantages of virtue ethics over deontological and utilitarian theories to show the potential of developing an ecological virtue ethic. I provide a preliminary list of ecological virtues by drawing on Aristotle's account of traditional virtues as well as on contemporary formulations of environmental virtues. Then, I propose that certain types of rules (rules of thumb) are valuable for the cultivation of environmental virtues, since they affect the way the moral agent perceives a particular situation. Lastly, I offer preliminary formulations of these rules of thumb.

The majority of academic study on the epistle to the Colossians focuses primarily on issues related to Christology, the identification of the heresy that threatened the church, or the ongoing debate surrounding authorship of the epistle. Current research leaves several lacunae in the broader understanding of the writer’s intent with the Colossian epistle. There is very little attention given to the existence of a process by which the Colossian believers can mature in Christ and face any theologically aberrant teachings with a growing faith and solid doctrine. There is also a gap in the research within the field of Christian spirituality regarding the application of specific principles of spirituality to sacred canonical texts and early Christian writings. This thesis seeks to fill these research gaps through the use of socio-rhetorical strategies and principles of Christian spirituality. The primary text for this research is the pericope of Colossians 3.1-17. The research on the epistle examines the pericope for an embedded process of character transformation by which the Colossian believers grow towards Christlikeness. As the Colossians grow in maturity, their lived experience of God changes. There are spiritualities embedded within the text that begin to impact the growth of the believers through the embodiment of the text. The identification of these spiritualities as well as the process of character transformation allows for the filling of research gaps and a richer understanding of the epistle writer’s intent. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Phil. (Theology)

L’éthique néo-aristotélicienne développée à la suite du programme proposé par G.E.M. Anscombe en 1958 exclut-elle la notion de moralité ? Anscombe contestait la pertinence de la notion de « devoir moral ». Cela implique-t-il que l’on doive, pour la suivre, renoncer à toute distinction entre le « moral » et le « non moral » ? La défense d’un absolutisme moral motivait les analyses d’Anscombe concernant « l’intention ». Les critiques du légalisme, du conséquentialisme ou du subjectivisme qui sont menées dans le sillage de « La philosophie morale moderne » par les principaux représentants de l’éthique néo-aristotélicienne – Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse ou Martha C. Nussbaum – répondent au même type de préoccupation. Les néo-aristotéliciens cherchent à opposer aux conceptions modernes de la rationalité morale l’idée d’une rationalité pratique homogène. Mais c’est pour montrer qu’elle est intrinsèquement liée à la vertu. Dans le même esprit, ils opposent à l’anti-naturalisme de la morale britannique du XXème siècle un naturalisme non réductionniste. Sous ces différents aspects, leur réflexion bénéficie des liens qu’elle renoue avec l’inspiration originelle de la méthode de la « psychologie » anscombienne. C’est ce qui permet à certains d’entre eux de poser les jalons d’une éthique fondée sur les notions de vertu et de bonheur, que celle-ci revendique ou non son appartenance à « l’éthique de la vertu ». A travers sa définition de « l’action humaine », cette éthique qui possède certains traits caractéristiques de l’éthique des Anciens, implique bien néanmoins une définition exigeante et originale de la moralité. / Does neo-Aristotelian ethics, which was developed according to the programme by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, exclude the notion of morality? Anscombe challenged the relevance of the concept of ‘moral duty’. Does this imply that, to follow her programme, one must give up any distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’? The defence of moral absolutism motivated Anscombe's ‘intention’ analyses. Critics of legalism, consequentialism or the subjectivism that was conducted in the wake of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ by the main representatives of neo-Aristotelian ethics—Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse and Martha C. Nussbaum—have responded to the same type of concern. The neo-Aristotelians, despite their disagreement on many points, seek to set the idea of a homogeneous practical rationality against modern conceptions of moral rationality; however, it is to show that rationality is intrinsically linked to virtue. In the same spirit, they set a non-reductionist naturalism against the anti-naturalist British ethics of the 20th century. Under these different aspects, their reflection benefits from a return to the original inspiration of Anscombe’s ‘psychology’ method. This return is also what allows some of them to lay the foundations for an ethical theory based on notions of virtue and happiness regardless of whether it claims to belong to ‘virtue ethics’ or not. Through its definition of ‘human action’, this ethical theory—which proposes to reconnect with certain characteristics of ancient ethics—implies, however, a demanding and original definition of morality.

Almost since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden has been criticised for doing too little to stop the spread of the virus. No lockdowns have been implemented and schools have stayed open throughout the pandemic. In his book Pandemic Ethics, Ben Bramble argues that lockdowns are necessary and that Swedes may become ”somewhat colder” and ”less able to flourish” as a result of Sweden’s pandemic response. In this essay I discuss whether or not the Swedish people are being failed as moral agents by Swedish authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. I analyse two senses in which the people could be morally wronged: (1) by having too much moral responsibility placed upon them, and (2) by becoming less virtuous or less able to flourish as a result of actions and words of the authorities. In answering (1), I argue that an individual moral agent has little or no moral responsibility from a utilitarian point of view. From a virtue ethics point of view, the cause behind the action is more important than its consequences, so being handed the responsibility for stopping the spread of coronavirus would not be significantly different from other instances where citizens are free to act in a way that may lead to them causing harm to others. By analysing examples of how citizens can exercise their moral virtues in states with differing responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, I show that citizens becoming more or less virtuous does not follow from the pandemic response of the country they live in, thereby refuting (2). I then briefly discuss two ways in which I believe authorities could fail its citizens as moral agents.