This thesis provides the theoretical groundwork for a 'virtue ethical' account of international political conduct. The project begins by investigating the distinct patterns of normative theorising within international scholarship, noting not only that moral philosophical foundations are unpronounced and interchangeable, but that even in this diminished capacity the influence of virtue ethical thought is limited and fragmentary relative to its competitors. Redressing this underrepresentation is thus dually motivated: developing a fresh perspective on important global issues, whilst also subjecting the theory to an atypical angle of scrutiny. Adapting virtue ethics to the international realm requires, most essentially, that we settle the level at which its concepts should be applied. Can the theory’s central focus on character be reconciled with the collective nature of global political interaction? Can we accurately ascribe virtues and vices to governments and states? These questions of group agency form the heart of thesis investigation. Beginning from abstract foundations, the possible justification for such ascriptions is sought in competing theories of joint action and attitude. The 'individualist' accounts of Searle and Bratman are ultimately rejected in favour of Gilbert's non-reductive 'plural subject' theory, and - presenting group-level accounts of intention, motivation, practical wisdom, emotion and disposition around her concept of 'joint commitment' - a general model of collective character is constructed. Allied to additional requirements of moral responsibility, this framework is then used to assess the virtue-capability of actual political bodies, considering the decision-making hierarchy of the United Kingdom as a case study for the modern state. Tracing the route of policy authorisation across cabinet, government and parliament, a sophisticated yet ultimately impermanent picture of group-virtue-ethical agency is established, in tension with the notion of enduring state liability. By shifting focus to the national level, it is argued that this fluctuating footprint of agency can nevertheless be unified, modifying Gilbert’s notion of a 'population joint commitment' to tie institutional virtue and vice to a persisting state identity. This provides a template for international character evaluation.

Ancrée dans une double posture interprétativiste et positiviste et une fondation théorique triple d’éthique de la vertu, d’apprentissage social et de leadership authentique, cette thèse exploratoire mobilise les champs de la philosophie et des sciences sociales afin de conceptualiser les dimensions de l’Exemplarité Managériale Perçue (EMP) : 1) des comportements d’éthique personnelle, de management éthique d’équipe et de considération d’autrui, 2) un processus de perception de l’exemplarité managériale et 3) l’impact de cette perception sur les individus. Une étude exploratoire est suivie de deux études quantitative et qualitative sur un échantillon de 1172 professionnels dans 28 pays. Nous identifions des processus mimétiques qui facilitent la socialisation et l’adoption de normes et la transmission de connaissances et de compétences, ainsi que des sources d’inspiration vertueuse qui encouragent l’individu à devenir un meilleur être humain, collaborateur et manager. Les résultats présentent un modèle relationnel issu d’analyses factorielles exploratoires et de modélisation par équations structurelles qui souligne la nature exemplaire de comportements éthiques et de l’alignement et identification du manager à l’organisation ainsi que des contrastes entre différentes cultures. Le développement en cours d’un instrument de mesure ouvre des voies de recherche futures dans la méthodologie d’exploration à grande échelle et la recherche d’antécédents de managers perçus comme exemplaires. Cette recherche trouve des applications managériales en alignement organisationnel, conduite du changement et en développement du management et du leadership / Anchored in both an interpretivist and positivist epistemological posture and a triple theoreti-cal foundation of virtue ethics, social learning and authentic leadership, this transdisciplinary exploratory doctoral thesis mobilizes philosophy and social sciences fields to conceptualize the dimensions of Perceived Managerial Exemplarity (PME): 1) behaviors manifesting personal ethics, team management ethics and consideration of others, 2) a perception process of managerial exemplarity and 3) the impact of that perception has on individuals. An explorato-ry study is followed by two quantitative and qualitative studies on a sample of 1,172 professionals in 28 countries. We identify on one hand mimetic processes that facilitate so-cialization and the adoption of common standards and norms and the transmission of knowledge and skills, and on the other sources of virtuous inspiration that encourage the indi-vidual to become a better human being, associate and manager. The results show a relational model originating from exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modeling that high-lights the exemplary nature of ethical behavior and alignment/identification of the manager with the organization, as well as contrasts between different cultures. The ongoing develop-ment of a measurement instrument opens future avenues of research in large-scale exploration methodology and research of common antecedents of perceived exemplary managers. This re-search finds diverse managerial applications in organizational alignment, change management and management development and leadership

L’éducation est une relation humaine vivante et nécessaire. Tissée de valeurs et tendue vers des finalités, elle comporte une dimension intrinsèquement éthique. Elle implique d’emblée le respect de tous les êtres humains ; chacun d’entre eux, sans exception, est toujours une Personne qui doit être respectée de façon inconditionnelle et universelle dans sa dignité, dans les principes de non-nuisance et de non-violence. De plus, si l’on considère qu’éduquer consiste à agir en relation en vue de faciliter l’émergence relationnelle de chacun des sujets éduqués comme personne dans ses dimensions plurielles (par exemple morale, sociale, cognitive, citoyenne, artistique, physique), ainsi qu’à mettre en place les conditions lui permettant de cheminer vers davantage de liberté intérieure et vers un mieux-être, alors nous pouvons entrevoir que l’éducation et l’altruisme semblent intimement liés. Pourtant, la notion d’altruisme n’a pas encore été interrogée de manière explicite et spécifique en sciences et philosophie de l’éducation. Ce travail entend réparer cet oubli et consiste ainsi à construire puis à explorer une problématique de recherche portant sur l’altruisme en éducation. Cette interrogation apparaît d’autant plus légitime que l’époque actuelle, qualifiée parfois d’hypermoderne, est une période charnière caractérisée par des mutations plurielles, des promesses comme des difficultés, qui sont autant de défis à relever. Dans ce contexte, et en vue d’échapper au double piège du nihilisme et du dogmatisme, il apparaît fondamental de s’interroger sur des repères universalisables, à la fois théoriques et praxéologiques, non exhaustifs, et à réinterroger sans cesse, à propos de ce que semblent être les principales conditions, valeurs et finalités d’une relation véritablement éducative. À travers une démarche philosophique au sein des sciences de l’éducation, le parcours réflexif et spéculatif proposé mobilise les domaines de l’éthique, de l’épistémologie, de l’ontologie, de la philosophie du langage et de l’anthropologie philosophique, tout en s’articulant avec les études scientifiques ; l’investigation porte sur les liens entre l’éthique de l’éducateur et l’émergence relationnelle du sujet éduqué comme personne. L’altruisme est inconditionnel, universel et désintéressé. Il s’agit d’une vertu éthique relationnelle avec laquelle il est possible de se familiariser et de progresser durablement. C’est une intention dynamique – qui va colorer les actes de l’agent moral dans la relation avec, par et pour autrui – que l’autrui universel puisse accéder de façon durable à davantage de liberté intérieure et de bonheur. L’altruisme favorise l’instauration d’une juste et bonne distance dans la relation éducative, qui permet d’éviter les pièges de la fusion relationnelle, de la manipulation, du dressage, comme de la totale permissivité, de l’indifférence, du laxisme et de la complaisance. La démonstration logique et analytique fait apparaître progressivement que l’altruisme est au cœur des conditions de l’Éducation, ce qui pourrait participer à l’ouverture d’un nouveau regard, voire à la constitution d’un nouveau paradigme. Se dessinent alors, de manière réflexive et non moraliste, les contours possibles (philosophiques, empiriques, pédagogiques et institutionnels) d’une éthique éducative de l’altruisme qui pourrait faire l’objet d’une démarche de sensibilisation auprès des professionnels des métiers de l’éducation, mais qui ne saurait être imposée. Prenant la forme d’une invitation à philosopher soi-même, elle s’appuie sur le discernement, l’expérience et la réflexion personnelle de l’éducateur en tant qu’agent moral. Cette éthique éducative, laïque, prend forme à travers une praxis relationnelle, étroitement liée à l’avènement du dialogue dans l’intégration interlocutive et éthique du tiers personnel, d’une autorité éducative émancipatrice, ou encore du postulat d’éducabilité. / Education is a living and necessary human relationship. Interwoven with values and aiming at finalities, it entails an intrinsically ethical dimension. It implies from the outset respect for all human beings; each of them, without exception, is always a Person who must be respected unconditionally and universally in his dignity, in a harmless and non-violent way. Moreover, if we consider that educating means acting in a relationship in order to facilitate the relational emergence of each educated subject to become gradually emancipated as person through the development of his manifold dimensions (as a moral, social or cognitive subject, as a citizen, etc.), and if it means setting up the conditions allowing himself to progress towards more inner freedom and better well-being, then we can suggest that education and altruism are intimately connected. Even so, this dimension has not yet been questioned explicitly in the context of sciences and philosophy of education. This thesis intends to fill this gap and will thus consist in building and then exploring altruism in education as its research question. Such a question appears all the more legitimate since the present time, sometimes described as hypermodern, is a pivotal phase characterised by multifaceted changes, promises as well as difficulties, which are actually just as many challenges to face. In such a context, and with a view to avoiding the double pitfall of nihilism and dogmatism, it seems essential to look for both theoretical and pragmatic reference points that may be universalised (while being non-exhaustive), and which may be open to continuous questioning in relation to what appear to be the main conditions, values and goals of a truly educational relationship seem to be. Through a philosophical approach within the domain of science of education, the reflexive and speculative research path proposed here draws upon the fields of ethics, epistemology, ontology, philosophy of language and philosophical anthropology, while interacting with scientific studies; our investigation focusses on the links between the educator’s ethics and the relational development of the educated subject as a person. Altruism is unconditional, universal and disinterested. It is a relational ethical virtue with which it is possible to familiarize oneself and to achieve constant progress. It is a dynamic intention that the « autrui universel » can have lasting access to greater inner freedom and happiness: this intention will colour the acts of the moral agent in the relationship with, by and for others. Altruism allows to establish a just and adequate distance in an educational relationship, thus avoiding the pitfalls of a fusional relationship, of manipulation, or of mere training, but also the pitfalls of complete permissiveness, indifference and complaisance. Our logical and analytical demonstration reveals progressively that altruism is at the heart of the conditions of Education – a discovery that could contribute to the opening of a new perspective on education, or even to the formation of a new paradigm. In this way, we can see the reflexive and non-moralistic delineation of a possible framework (with philosophical, empirical, pedagogical and institutional dimensions) for educational ethics inspired by virtuism and directed towards altruism; professionals working in education could be made aware of this ethical approach which, however, should not be imposed on them. Indeed, this ethical framework takes the shape of an invitation to individual philosophising, and relies on the discernment, experience and personal reflexion of each educator in his quality as a moral agent. Respecting the principle of secularism, such an altruistic stance takes shape through a relational praxis and is linked to the advent of dialogue in the interlocutory and ethical integration of the personal third person, to an emancipatory educational authority, and to the postulate that it is possible to educate.

<p>I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt.</p><p>Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte.</p> / <p>In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right.</p><p>The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.</p>

I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt. Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte. / In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right. The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.

This work deals with the comparison of Plato and Aristotle's conception of virtue ethics. The first part describes Plato's view of this area of philosophy. Plato puts his ethics based on the analogy between the municipality and the soul. Plato also operates with good ideas. In the second part, Aristotle view. First, I discuss the objectives of its philosophy, which is good, and then bliss. Then there is the division of the moral virtues and intellectual. Then describe each of Aristotle's virtues. The third main section consists of two subsections, the first of which generally compare both concepts when I find the first differences in the overall approach of both authors. In the second subsection I compare other points of doctrine, especially community, friendship and goodness.

Ce travail de recherche vise à questionner le concept d’éthique militaire. Le travail s’appuie sur une grille analytique combinant trois théories venant de trois disciplines différentes : l’éthique du care, développée en philosophie morale, la théorie des parties prenantes, en éthique des affaires, les approches néo-institutionnelles, en sciences de gestion. Cette grille est ensuite appliquée à deux terrains différents : le premier terrain concerne l’étude de batailles aux enjeux moraux particulièrement exacerbés : la bataille d’Alger, la guerre en Irak, la bataille de Srebrenica. Le deuxième terrain consiste en des entretiens qualitatifs auprès d’officiers revenant du champs de bataille : 10 officiers américains ayant vécu le conflit irakien et 7 officiers français revenant d’Afghanistan. Ces deux terrains sont complétés par une analyse des programmes de formation initiale proposés aux Etats-Unis et en France pour les officiers. Les résultats de recherche montrent que les personnels militaires mettent au centre de leur action une sollicitude envers leur camarade de régiment. C’est une véritable éthique du care, bien plus que des vertus ou les respect de grands principes de droit, qui conduit l’action des soldats et officiers, sans pour autant que ce souci d’autrui s’applique à l’ensemble des parties prenantes au conflit. Les enseignements de ce travail peuvent permettre de futures recherches dans la formation des soldats et officiers, ainsi que dans les travaux sur les valeurs, l’éthique ou les cultures organisationnelles. L’originalité de la thèse tient également à l’application de l’éthique du care et de la théorie des parties prenantes aux organisations militaires. / This research questions the idea of military ethics. Our work uses an analytical framework combining three different disciplines: Ethics of care, developed in moral philosophy, Stakeholder theory, from business ethics, New institutionalism theory, from management science. This framework is then applied on two different research fields: the first one deals with the study of battles where ethical stakes were particularly high: the battle of Alger, the Iraqi war, the Srebrenica battle.The second one is qualitative interviews with officers coming back from the battlefield: 10 US officers from the Iraqi conflict and 7 French militaries from Afghanistan. These two research fields are completed by an analysis of initial trainings made in France and in the US for officers. Research results shows military men act upon a feeling of care, particularly strong towards their regimental comrade. This is a true ethics of care, more than virtues or an attachment to great principles that drives soldiers and officers’ action, even if this care to the other needs does not apply to all stakeholders, only to people from the same unit. Lessons of this work can lead to future researches not only for soldiers and officers trainings, but also in values, ethics and corporate culture.The research originality is also in the implementation of ethics of care and stakeholder theory upon military organisations.

Norm criticism is a well-spoken topic in the Swedish after-school center, never has the gender and race aspect been so debated as now. In this candidate thesis, norm criticism in the Swedish after-school center, is brought to the surface and put into the perspective of intersectionality through two cases. Their cultural background and normative values will also play a role. Our two cases connected through years of working in the after-school center, will be debated through different contemporary articles, literature and a observation as well to bring focus on norm critical pedagogy. We will work around the questions; how do we use norm critical pedagogy, if we don’t know whose norms to emanate from, and how important are norms really in our daily work as teachers? Do all students get the same treatment, or is there a difference between students with a minority background, and is there a difference between how teachers view, categories and judge them according to their own evaluation and norms? / Normkritik är ett ämne som är omtalat i svenska fritidshem, aldrig har genus och rasaspekter varit så omdebatterat som nu. I detta kandidatarbete kommer normkritik i det svenska fritidshemmet att lyftas fram intersektionellt genom två berättelser, kulturella och normativa värden kommer även att spela en roll. Genom två beskrivna händelser, kopplat till år av arbete i fritidshemmet kommer vi att reflektera med hjälp av samtida artiklar, litteratur och en observation samt fokusera på normkritisk pedagogik. Vi kommer att utgå från frågeställningar som; hur använder vi oss av normkritisk pedagogik om vi inte vet vems normer vi utgår ifrån, och hur stor roll spelar egentligen normer i vårt dagliga arbete som lärare i fritidshem? Får alla elever samma bemötande i skolan, eller finns det en skillnad mellan elever från minoritetskulturer och är det skillnad på hur lärare bedömer och kategoriserar dem kopplat till deras egna värderingar och normer? / <p>Bedömningsgrad: VG</p>

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