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The political influence of British Catholics in First World War Britain has been a neglected aspect of British history. This thesis aims to address this deficiency by focusing precisely on the political role played by leading Roman Catholics in Britain during the conflict. This work concentrates on leading Catholic clergy, laymen and the British Catholic press. It demonstrates that the majority of leading Catholics were guided by an excessive nationalism which had two consequences. Firstly, British Catholics supported the war effort and the British government almost unquestionably. Secondly, most leading Catholics failed to give their full support to the Pope and repudiated his efforts to facilitate a negotiated peace. The thesis is based upon research into a wide array of primary material located in archives in the United Kingdom and Ireland. It depends heavily on the private correspondence of the Catholic hierarchy and leading Catholic politicians and publicists. In addition, it includes a survey of the Catholic press of the period, since it manifested the relationship between the leading Catholic clergy and laity, and the rest of British society. / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis examines the principle of national self-determination as it pertained to the Kurdish population of the Middle East after the First World War and the legacy that it has left behind. The end of the War was characterized by a shift from empires to the European state system. This transition necessitated the redrawing of political borders. As victors of the War, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States of America had the power to influence the future of the continent in terms of creating nation-states. While nation-states were created in Europe, a mandate system was implemented in the Middle East. The Great Powers divided the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence. In so doing, the Kurds were left without a state. This research provides a case study for the Kurds at the close of the First World War and examines the obstacles they face today as the struggle for autonomy continues.

Tolkien may not have intentionally created his fictive nations to mirror real nations, but his world certainly bears the scars of his experiences of war. The World Wars heightened his fear of losing everything that he loved about his local culture through literal obliteration or assimilation into another culture in the event of England’s losing. Tolkien saw the nation as a social construct that potentially could minimize losses, if not wholly protect local culture from the forces that threatened to destroy it. Yet he also perceived the nation’s limitations in its ability to protect culture. A nation could grow too large for itself, becoming obsessed with consuming other nations. For Tolkien, national property-amassing leads to a loss of the cultural identity that nationhood aims to preserve. When the forces threatening individual nations become overwhelming, those nations often need to join forces to prevent being taken over by other, more powerful countries. An examination of Tolkien’s fiction and numerous other sources, including essays and personal letters, suggests that he felt that separate nations should co-exist without imposing on one another, and that the nation taking over others would lose its own identity, whether gradually or suddenly. Despite Tolkien’s efforts to distance himself from what he felt modernity represented, his fiction (whether consciously or not) grapples with the mid-twentieth century ideological conflicts surrounding the nation. The resulting sense of loss and powerlessness underlies much of Tolkien’s fiction and leads him to a concept of the nation as an imperfect protector of culture, tempered by its need to rely on other nations.

The glory of war is dead, and the Great War killed it. Soldierly dignity, heroism, and proper field chivalry; all laid to waste by a single mortar round at Arras. This ethos—a vestige of Greek warrior worship—stood little chance against the trenches. It either drowned in the fecal trench muck at the Somme or staggered back—in tatters, if that—a broken soul; another victim of the so-called “Good Fight.” And there were many victims. An entire generation, even, lost to the trenches. But that’s not even the worst part. The worst part is that home front in England didn’t even get it.

This thesis analyzes the culture of coercive voluntarism in Georgia during the First World War using studies of legislation and vigilance, the press, and the Georgia Council of Defense. Each of the themes studied demonstrates how organizations attempted to coerce support of the US war effort in Georgia. The study focuses on Georgia as a single state rather than simply as part of the South, as most other studies have done. The purpose is to challenge studies that have emphasized resistance only, which presents an incomplete picture of Georgia’s domestic scene during the war. In fact, many elements within Georgia—at the state, local, and citizen level—actively supported the war, often with the same level of intention, if not the same results, as did other areas of the country. Georgia attempted to comply with federal imperatives while preserving its rights as a state.

<p>This dissertation analyzes the history of the press bureau of the German Foreign Office before the First World War. Methodologically, the work tries to locate European international history in a larger political, intellectual, and cultural context by examining German statesmen and their attempts to cultivate a consensus for their policies in the Reichstag and the press from 1890 to 1914. Relying upon official documents, memoirs, personal letters, and published newspaper articles, it argues that the death of the "Old Diplomacy," usually associated with the years after the Versailles Peace Treaty, actually began as early as 1890. This development caused German statesmen after Bismarck's dismissal to invent new ways of building public support for their policies through the creation of what is labeled here the "Bülow-Hammann System" of public relations. Eschewing Bismarckian methods of compulsion, this new system cultivated personal connections with journalists from trusted newspapers who would toe a government line for inside information. The system initially worked well to meet the new openness of the international milieu after 1890. But eventually these methods failed to stem criticism on the nationalist right and socialist left after 1909, when Germany's position vis-à-vis France, Britain, and Russia greatly deteriorated. As a result, more modern methods of dealing with public opinion had to be developed in Germany after 1914--the dissemination of outright propaganda and the use of modern press conferences--to cultivate support for governmental policies.</p> / Dissertation

While historians have gone to great efforts in studying the belligerent powers during the First World War, very little attention has been paid to such neutral powers as Spain. Several European nations declared neutrality in 1914, but many strayed from this course in favor of active belligerence. Spain, however, remained neutral for the war's duration; thus, this thesis examines and explores the nature of Spanish neutrality during the First World War. Spain's decision to adhere to a neutral policy required serious consideration as it had to weigh the consequences and advantages of intervention; however, military and economic weakness, as well as diplomatic isolation pushed Spain towards neutrality. Some hoped by abstaining from involvement, their country would emerge at the war's end as the arbiter of peace, enabling Spain to regain prestige and reestablish itself as a major continental power. However, neutrality proved to be a difficult undertaking because Spain could not escape the hardships and effects of a continental war. As domestic crises enveloped the country, a divided public aligned itself into Francophiles and Germanophiles. Escalating domestic issues became exacerbated by diplomatic conflicts resulting from the German submarine warfare campaign, which challenged Spain's neutrality policy. Thus, Spain found itself in a precarious position during the war. While recognizing the necessity to maintain neutrality, it suffered serious consequences for its decision. It did not emerge from the war as an arbiter of peace, but suffered diplomatic humiliation over its failure to overcome the German submarine threat. The government's focus on foreign policy led its leaders to ignore the growing domestic discontent, which further destabilized an already unsteady government. As a result, governments rose and fell as all proved incapable of resolving Spain's ever-increasing problems. The case of Spain in the First World War demonstrates that neutrality is not necessarily the safe course that many believe, as no country can fully escape the effects of war. As a neutral, Spain faced incredible difficulties. The government's neutrality policy kept Spain out of the war, but the regime faced the significant consequences of this decision including its ultimate demise.

The 1909-1918 era can be regarded as the formative years of MI5, as it developed from a small counter-espionage bureau into an established security intelligence agency. MI5 had two main roles during this period; counter-espionage, and advising the War Office on how to deal with the police and the civilian population, particularly aliens. Most of the existing literature tends to focus on the development of MI5 as a whole and pays little attention to the six individual branches that constituted MI5 by the armistice. Recently released MI5 documents in The National Archives (rnA) make it possible to examine MI5 at the micro level and set out the intimate workings of its six branches. The study examines the evolution of MI5 from its formation in October 1909 to the end of the First World War in November 1918, paying particular attention to three questions. First, what did a map of the structure of the MI5 organisation look like and "how" did it develop during these years? Secondly, "why" did it develop as it did? Thirdly, "how effective" was MI5 throughout this period? MI5 began as a one-man affair in 1909, tasked with the limited remit of ascertaining the extent of Gemlan espionage in Britain and an uncertain future. By the armistice MI5's role had expanded considerably and it had begun to develop into an established security intelligence agency, with 844 personnel spread over six branches covering the investigation of espionage, prevention, records, ports and travellers, overseas, and alien workers. This study suggests that the main driver of these developments, if one key factor can be singled out, was the changing perception of the nature of the threat posed by German espionage. However, because some within official circles equated all forms of opposition to Government policy with support for Germany, increasing attention also began to be paid to the possibility that industrial umest, pacifists and others who opposed the Government might actually be being directed by a German "hidden hand". From 1917 onwards MI5's development was driven by a conviction that it had defeated German espionage, such that Germany had switched its efforts to promoting Bolshevism and other forms of umest in order to undermine British society. However, MI5's activities were restricted to investigating if there was really any enemy influence behind such things, while Special Branch was to focus on labour unrest generally. This study makes an original and useful contribution to knowledge in three noteworthy respects. First, it sets out probably the most detailed description of MI5's organisational structure available. Secondly, it poses the stimulating question of "how to measure" the effectiveness of a counter-espionage agency? Thirdly, it suggests that, contrary to claims that Vemon Kell was an "empire builder" who wanted a greater role in labour intelligence, Kell felt it appropriate that MI5's activities should be restricted to the investigation of cases of peace propaganda and sedition that arose from enemy activities and did not actually want MI5 to assume a broader role in labour intelligence at that time.

Public health officials and social reformers grew concerned over the prevalence of gonorrhea and syphilis following World War I. The initiatives put in place by authorities to control the spread of venereal disease lacked any concern for women’s health and sought to control their newly found independence and mobility. This thesis examines public health policies related to venereal disease control from 1920-1945 and how these regulations affected women in the United States. Laws and social reform measures such as pre-marital blood tests, the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, and the use of quarantining prostitutes during World War I and World War II were passed by government officials to ensure the future of America as a fit fighting force of men, placing women’s health concerns last in its race for domination. Women essentially were marked as the diseased dangers to America’s health.