Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / This dissertation examines combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in infantry and machine gun units at the company level and below to highlight the linkages between the training and professional development of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the army's overall military effectiveness in World War I. Between 1865 and 1918, the growing lethality of the battlefield had forced changes to tactics and formations that placed novel demands on small unit leaders. The proliferation of new weapons in infantry companies and the thinning and extension of formations required junior officers and NCOs able to exercise an unparalleled degree of initiative and independence while also mastering new tactical and technical skills. When the United States entered World War I, the Regular Army was still grappling with how to reconcile its traditional expectations of small unit leadership with the new "skill sets" required of junior leaders in modern warfare. Faced with the need to produce officers and NCOs to lead its rapidly expanding mass army, the regulars improvised a system for identifying, training, and assigning company-level leaders. Unfortunately, the Regular Army's unpreparedness to wage a modern war, and the host of systemic problems associated with raising a mass army, meant that much of the training of these key leaders was so ill-focused and incomplete that the new officers and NCOs were woefully unprepared to face the tactical challenges that awaited them in France. These problems were only compounded when unexpected casualties among officers and NCOs in the summer and fall of 1918 led to a further curtailment in leader training the U. S. Army. The end result of the U. S. Army's failure to adequately train and develop its junior leaders was that its combat units often lacked the flexibility and "know how" to fight without suffering prohibitively high casualties. When the junior leaders failed, faltered and bungled, the AEF's battles became confused and uncoordinated slugging matches that confounded the plans and expectations of the army's senior leaders. The heavy casualties that resulted from these slugging matches further undermined the AEF's effectiveness by reducing the morale and cohesion of the army's combat units and hindering the army's overall ability to learn from its mistakes due to the high turn-over of junior officers and NCOs.

Occupation operations are some of the most resource and planning intensive military undertakings in modern combat. The United States Army has a long tradition of conducting military government operations, stretching back to the Revolutionary War. Yet the emergence of military government operational doctrine was a relatively new development for the United States Army. During the World Wars, the Army reluctantly embraced civil administration responsibilities as a pragmatic reaction to the realities of total war. In the face of opposition from the Roosevelt administration, the United States Army established an enduring doctrine for military government in the crucible of the European Theater of Operations.

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This study explores the under-researched subject of “industrial films” through the analysis of how Ford Motor Company made use of motion pictures to reinforce its political and economic interests during the 1910s and 1920s. In 1914, the automobile company constituted a motion picture department, establishing itself as the largest film producer and distributor in the world in the subsequent years. Just as the famous Model T, Ford films were mass-produced and widely circulated; they praised the ideas of “Americanization” and “Americanism” as a strategy to shape Ford workers, intervene in public opinion against labour unions, and as a method of publicizing the company’s cooperation with the United States government during World War I. Despite the relevance of Ford’s unconventional cinema, distributed for free and exhibited in schools, universities, factories, and movie theaters, it still hasn’t received sufficient attention from scholars, illustrating the necessity of a holistic notion of film history, able to extrapolate the canons of fiction film and theatrical exhibition.

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This thesis proposes to link certain consistent themes in the historiography of interwar and wartime Hungary. Hungary's inability to successfully resolve its minority problems led to the nation's dismemberment at Trianon in 1920 after World War I. This fostered a national Hungarian reaction against the Trianon settlement called the revisionist movement. This revisionist "Trianon syndrome" totally dominated Hungarian politics in the interwar period. As Hungary sought allies against the hated peace settlements of the Great War, Hungarian politics irrevocably tied the nation to the policies of Nazi Germany, and Hungary became nefariously assessed as "Hitler's last ally," which initially stained the nation's reputation after World War II. Although some historians have blamed the interwar Hungarian government for the calamity that followed Hungary's associations with Nazi Germany, this thesis proposes that there was little variation between what could have happened and what actually became the nation's fate in World War II. A new interpretation therefore becomes evident: the injustices of Trianon, Hungary's geopolitical position in the heart of Europe, and the nation's unfortunate orientation between the policies of Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia predestined the nation to its fate in World War II. There was no other choice for Hungarian policy in World War II but the Axis alliance. The historian of East Central Europe faces a formidable challenge in that the national histories of this region are often contradictory. Hungarian historiography is directly countered by the historical theories and propositions of its Czech, Serb, and Rumanian enemies. By historiographical analysis of the histories of Hungary, its enemies among the Successor States, and neutral sources, this thesis will demonstrate that many contemporary historians tend to support the primary theses of Hungarian historiography. Many of the arguments of the Hungarian interwar government are now generally supported by objective historians, while the historiographical suppositions of the Successor States at the Paris Peace Conference have become increasingly reduced to misinformation, falsification, exaggeration, and propaganda. The ignorance of the minority problems and ethnic history of East Central Europe led to an unjust settlement in 1919 and 1920, and by grossly favoring the victors over the vanquished, the Paris Peace Treaties greatly increased the probability of a second and even more terrible World War.

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