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Medidas assecuratórias da efetividade da tutela jurisdicional da probidade administrativaMarcelo Eugênio Feitosa Almeida 09 April 2010 (has links)
A pesquisa refere-se a medidas assecuratórias que proporcionem e garantam efetividade à tutela judicial da probidade administrativa, considerando a concepção de processo como instrumento de uma tutela jurisdicional efetiva e garantidora de resultados, sob pena de tornar a legislação referente ao controle da Administração num cabedal de normas meramente simbólicas. Dentre as técnicas processuais expressamente previstas na Lei de Improbidade Administrativa, Lei n 8.429, de 2 de junho de 1992, há medidas específicas: a indisponibilidades de bens (art 7); o seqüestro de bens (art 16) e afastamento do agente público do exercício do cargo, emprego ou função (art 20, parágrafo único). Todavia, pretende-se demonstrar que, além dessas três medidas específicas previstas na Lei de Improbidade, há outros instrumentos e técnicas processuais adequadas que, aliadas a interpretações que conferem máxima efetividade ao sistema de normas referido, ensejam uma proteção efetiva do Princípio da Morálidade Administrativa / This research refers some measures that provide and ensure effectiveness of legal protection of Administrative probity, considering the proceeding as an instrument of
effective judicial protection, preveting a failing legislation, in other words, a leather standards merely symbolic. Among technical procedures expressly in Improbity
Administrative Law(No. 8429 of 2 June 199), for example: the unavailability of goods (Article 7); asset forfeiture (Art 16 ) and removal of the agent the exercise of public
office, employment or function (Article 20, paragraph), we intend to demonstrate others tools and techniques appropriated, that associated with the interpretations that give maximum effectiveness for our System of Rules, that seeks effectiveness a real protection of the Principle of Administrative Morality
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Medidas assecuratórias da efetividade da tutela jurisdicional da probidade administrativaAlmeida, Marcelo Eugênio Feitosa 09 April 2010 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2010-04-09 / This research refers some measures that provide and ensure effectiveness of legal protection of Administrative probity, considering the proceeding as an instrument of
effective judicial protection, preveting a failing legislation, in other words, a leather standards merely symbolic. Among technical procedures expressly in Improbity
Administrative Law(No. 8429 of 2 June 199), for example: the unavailability of goods (Article 7); asset forfeiture (Art 16 °) and removal of the agent the exercise of public
office, employment or function (Article 20, paragraph), we intend to demonstrate others tools and techniques appropriated, that associated with the interpretations that give maximum effectiveness for our System of Rules, that seeks effectiveness a real protection of the Principle of Administrative Morality / A pesquisa refere-se a medidas assecuratórias que proporcionem e garantam efetividade à tutela judicial da probidade administrativa, considerando a concepção de processo como instrumento de uma tutela jurisdicional efetiva e garantidora de resultados, sob pena de tornar a legislação referente ao controle da Administração num cabedal de normas meramente simbólicas. Dentre as técnicas processuais expressamente previstas na Lei de Improbidade Administrativa, Lei n° 8.429, de 2 de junho de 1992, há medidas específicas: a indisponibilidades de bens (art 7°); o seqüestro de bens (art 16°) e afastamento do agente público do exercício do cargo, emprego ou função (art 20, parágrafo único). Todavia, pretende-se demonstrar que, além dessas três medidas específicas previstas na Lei de Improbidade, há outros instrumentos e técnicas processuais adequadas que, aliadas a interpretações que conferem máxima efetividade ao sistema de normas referido, ensejam uma proteção efetiva do Princípio da Morálidade Administrativa
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Organizações criminosas e corrupção administrativa: a expressão do crime organizado endógeno ( um estudo de caso no município de Itaporanga, estado da Paraíba).Dantas, Joama Cristina Almeida 22 April 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-04-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Organized crime makes up the new face of criminality, the criminal organizations presents
themselves as real companies, adopting business methods aimed at maximizing the benefits
and reducing the risk of their criminal practices, whose agents are professional criminals who
work silently through several running frauds. Given this recent configuration, the
understanding of this criminological organized phenomenon is made by the observation of the
place occupied by the state in criminal relationships, which can serve as a facilitator for the
implementation of the scams, or as birthplace of criminal organizations. On this track, starting
from the analysis of the types of organized crime, this dissertation has the scope to
demonstrate the configuration of a endogenous organized crime through the establishment of
criminal organizations within the state administrative apparatus so as to broaden the vision of
organized crime which is still predominantly restricted to the model of mafia criminal
organization. It thus explores the manifestation of administrative corruption as a inseparable
element of endogenous organized crime, constituting the concerted action of public and
private actors. It s identified that the public bidding sector is a favorable environment for the
endogenous activity of criminal organizations, because it enables the formation of a network
that exchanges benefits and protection between public and private actors through corrupt
practices. In order to prove empirically the manifestation of endogenous organized crime, is
studied a case that occurred on the public bidding sector in the municipality of Itaporanga/PB,
reproduced in several other municipalities in Paraíba, extracted from civil and criminal
proceedings in the 14th Federal Court in Patos/PB. The results of the research point to the
existence of an endogenous organized crime revealed in the concerted action of more than one
public official, usually in unity of purpose with private agents, and in the presence of
administrative corruption. / O crime organizado compõe a nova face da criminalidade, apresentando-se as organizações criminosas como verdadeiras empresas, à medida que adotam métodos empresariais objetivando a maximização dos benefícios e a redução dos riscos das práticas delitivas, cujos agentes são criminosos profissionais, que atuam silenciosamente através da execução de fraudes diversas. Diante desta configuração recente, a compreensão do fenômeno criminológico organizado passa pela observação do lugar ocupado pelo Estado nas relações criminosas, o qual pode servir de facilitador para a execução dos esquemas ilícitos, ou ainda como nascedouro das organizações criminosas. Nesta esteira, partindo-se da análise das tipologias do crime organizado, a presente dissertação tem por escopo demonstrar a configuração de um crime organizado endógeno por meio do estabelecimento de organizações criminosas no aparelho administrativo estatal, de modo a ampliar a visão da criminalidade organizada, ainda predominantemente restrita ao modelo mafioso de organização criminosa. Para tanto, aborda-se a manifestação da corrupção administrativa por constituir elemento indissociável do crime organizado endógeno, perfazendo a atuação concertada de agentes públicos e privados. Identifica-se o setor das licitações públicas como ambiente favorável à atuação das organizações criminosas endógenas, porquanto possibilita a formação de uma rede de trocas de benefícios e de proteção entre agentes públicos e privados através das práticas de corrupção. A fim de comprovar empiricamente a manifestação da criminalidade organizada endógena, estuda-se caso ocorrido no setor das licitações públicas do município Itaporanga/PB, reproduzido em diversos outros municípios paraibanos, extraído de processos cível e criminal em tramitação na 14ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Patos/PB. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam para a existência de um crime organizado endógeno revelado na atuação concertada de mais de um agente público, geralmente em unidade de desígnios com agentes privados, e na presença da corrupção administrativa.
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Why Public Officials Complicit in Corruption? : An Exploratory Study of Doers' Personal Views and Experiences in Central Java, IndoniesiaWidhianto, Agung January 2020 (has links)
Why public officials complicit in corruption? It is absolutely a nagging and antiquated question. This thesis examines the corruption on a micro-scale from those convicted in corruption cases in Central Java Province, Indonesia, more specifically by taking the personal views and experiences of the imprisoned actors into account. Broadly speaking, the problem of corruption is a tantalizing daily issue around Indonesia. Despite the government is highly committed to overcome corruption, it is argued that national corruption eradication efforts have not simply failed to diminish the number of corruption cases, but they - at least until 2019 – failed to impede the deployment of corruption from central to local government levels. Empirically, this study explores corruption from leadership theories to build its own analytical framework of corruption, namely administrative and political corruption. Using narrative analysis methods, this study analyses nine interviews with elective public officials at district and village levels, combined with several secondary techniques. In drawing its conclusions, this study highlights three major findings to understand the failure of government in addressing corruption, each of which is related to 1) critical role of public legitimacy built upon informal norms; 2) strict bureaucratic function built upon formal norms; 3) cleavages between formal and informal norms that encourage public officials to enact one or both types of corruption. Above all, the idea of ‘private gain’ as the central element of corruption cannot be found in this study. Ultimately, this study provides some direction for future research that would suggest academia and policymakers to better understand the corruption in the public sector by taking informal norms into consideration.
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A efetividade das garantias processuais penais e o discurso de combate à corrupção / The criminal procedural guarantees and the anticorruption discourseAndorfato, João Jacinto Anhê 19 February 2018 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2018-02-19 / The recent corruption scandals exposed a old problem. In an emergency agenda, a
punitive movement emerges that does not only occupy the discourses of lay Brazilians,
but also mobilizes our police, judicial and public prosecutorial authorities, who are
moved by public opinion to draw up new strategies and new measures to combat the
problem. Corruption in no way should be tolerated and must be harshly repressed by
society and by the agencies of criminal prosecution. Notwithstandng, combating
corruption or any other crime, however serious it may be the offense and its social
consequences, does not justify the distortion of criminal procedural guarantees that
historically are the foundation of control and limitation in face of the punitive power of
the State. Society must ensure that it is able to discern the excesses of the state's
punitive power and the institutions that exercise it in order to avoid the emergence of
pathologies such as criminal and procedural law of exception in which moral values are
enough to support the criminal sciences: the good becomes a criminal value, the truth a
procedural value and the justice a legal value. The desire for punitiveness sometimes
obfuscates the necessary precautions to legitimize the interventions of the organs of
criminal prosecution, which, in view of the current political crisis, makes it essential to
analyze the idea of Justice from the perspective of criminal procedural lessons, placing
in poles of contraposition the criminal procedural guarantees and the anti-corruption
discourse / Os recentes escândalos de corrupção expôs às escâncaras um antigo problema. Em uma
pauta de emergência, surge um movimento punitivista que não ocupa somente os
discursos dos brasileiros leigos, mas também mobiliza nossas autoridades policiais,
judiciárias e membros do ministério público, que movidos pela opinião pública se
colocam à disposição para traçar novas estratégias e elaborar novas medidas para
combater o problema. A corrupção de forma alguma deve ser tolerada e necessita ser
duramente debelada pela sociedade e pelos órgãos de persecução penal. Contudo, o
combate à corrupção ou à qualquer outra criminalidade, por maior que seja a gravidade
do ilícito e suas consequências sociais, não justifica o desvirtuamento das garantias
processuais penais que historicamente são o alicerce de controle e limitação frente ao
poder punitivo do Estado. A sociedade deve zelar pela capacidade de discernir sobre os
excessos do poder punitivo estatal e das instituições que o exercem, a fim de evitar o
surgimento de patologias como um direito penal e processual penal de exceção em que
valores morais bastam para sustentar as ciências criminais: o bom se torna um valor
penal, a verdade um valor processual e o justo um valor jurídico. O desejo de
punitividade por vezes ofusca as cautelas necessárias para se legitimar as intervenções
dos órgãos de persecução penal, o que, diante da atual crise política, torna
imprescindível a análise da ideia de Justiça sob a perspectiva da dogmática processual
penal, colocando em polos de contraposição as garantias processuais penais e o discurso
de combate à corrupção
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Corrupt Practices - a Soviet Legacy?Neubert, Claudia 16 December 2021 (has links)
Die explorative Studie nutzt qualitative Interviews mit einfachen Bürgern um das Problem der allgegenwärtigen und anhaltenden Alltagskorruption in post-sowjetischen Staaten zu analysieren. Es wird zum einen nach den zugrunde liegenden Einstellungen, Werten und Erwartungen der Klienten gefragt, die diese korrupt handeln lassen, zum anderen wird der Einfluss dieser alltäglichen informellen Praktiken auf Entwicklung und Qualität von demokratischen Institutionen in post-sowjetischen Staaten untersucht.
Die Ergebnisse des ersten Teils legen nahe, dass sich der größte Einfluss auf die Bereitschaft zu korruptem Handeln aus der Kombination der Effekte aus sowjetischem Erbe und rationalem Verhalten, das die Situation als ein Problem kollektiven Handelns interpretiert, ergibt.
Bezüglich der Frage nach der Wirkung von informellen Praktiken und mit ihnen einhergehenden sowjetischen Einstellungen auf die Entwicklung von funktionierenden demokratischen Institutionen zeigt die Studie eine Reihe von problematischen Aspekten auf: Zuvorderst den Vorzug von individuellen vor kollektiven Lösungen sowie den anhaltenden Effekt von informellen Netzwerken, kombiniert mit einer tiefen Abneigung gegenüber dem Staat und einem schwachen Gefühl der eigenen Wirksamkeit. Zusammengenommen bilden diese ein schwerwiegendes Hindernis für politische Partizipation und die Entwicklung eines gesellschaftlichen Gemeinschaftsgefühls. Entgegen der gängigen Forschungs-meinung hat diese Studie also gezeigt, dass bestimmte Formen von Korruption, genauer der besondere Typ der post-sowjetischen informellen Transaktionen, einen negativen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung demokratischer Institutionen haben und die Wirkungsrichtung zwischen Demokratie und Korruption nicht allein von schwachen demokratischen Institutionen zu mehr Korruption zeigt. / The explorative study uses qualitative interviews with ordinary citizens to examine the problem of pervasiveness and persistence of administrative corruption in the Soviet successor states. It analyses the problem on two levels, taking an interest in the underlying attitudes, values and expectations of why clients engage in corrupt transactions, and asking about the influence of these low-level informal practices on the development and quality of democratic institutions in post-soviet states.
Regarding the former, the analysis established the combined effect of Soviet legacy and rational behaviour interpreting the situation as a problem of collective action. These two are the main drivers influencing the readiness for corrupt transactions. They mutually reinforce each other and the highest propensity to act corruptly is found when these two aspects coincide.
The answer to the question whether the lasting impact of informal practices and Soviet attitudinal patterns going along with them conflicts with the development of well-functioning, democratic institutions was clearly affirmative. The study showed that it is particularly a preference of individual over collective solutions and the continued effect of persisting informal networks combined with a deep disregard of the state and a low feeling of agency that pose serious obstacles to the quality of political participation and to the sense of community on the societal level. Contrary to the common argument the study has therefore established that the causality in the nexus between democracy and corruption is not a one-way road leading from weak democratic institutions to higher levels of corruption, but that certain forms of corruption, more precisely the specific type of post-soviet informality, have a negative impact on the development of democratic institutions making causality follow a bidirectional path and constituting a vicious circle of informality.
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