Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2008. / Title from PDF title page; viewed on Dec. 12, 2008. "4 April 2008." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-77).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 31, 2006). "June 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-83). Also issued in paper format.

"A Thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies for completion of graduation requirements." / "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-80).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): James A. Russell. Includes bibliographical references (p.79-83). Also available online.

This thesis examines whether traditional air power theory complements counterinsurgency air power theory in kinetic counterinsurgency operations. The reason being that there is some discrepancy in the theories of how air power can be used in counterinsurgency. Winning a revolutionary war requires a graduated spectrum of violence; whereas, traditionally air power is characterized as only using the kinetic, hard power, end of that spectrum. The purpose is to test Robert Pape’s air power theory of military coercion by denial, motivated by the theory’s agreement with current research of air power in counterinsurgency. This thesis is a comparative case study examining two, similar and successful counterinsurgency operations, Operation Anaconda and Operation Medusa. Findings show that denial is quite prominent when direct support of ground forces occurs; whereas operational and strategic interdiction indicate low or no occurrence. This study strengthens the theory’s applicatory power in a counterinsurgency context, and suggests it can complement current research on counterinsurgency air power in kinetic usage. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

Operation Rolling Thunder was a United States led operation, with the political aims of interdicting and preventing the North Vietnamese support of the South Vietnam rebellion, during the later stage of the Vietnam war. Despite being a superpower, Operation Rolling Thunder failed, and the USA lost the war. In this essay, the air power theorists John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape, and their theories regarding how air power should be used to reach success, are used to analyze this failure. The use of these theories in a parallel manner enables to comprehend empirical sources and in turn recognize anomalies in the decision making and missteps of the American leadership. By keeping the case of Rolling Thunder in focus and thereby try and understand what happened, the aim is to create an understanding for why the potent power of the US Air Force made an inadvertent turn despite exercising air superiority throughout most of the operation. This examination concludes that there were three deciding factors in the American failure, which are: (i) absence of efficient attacks against the North Vietnamese leadership, (ii) lack of correlation between strategy and political aim, (iii) lack of experience and communication within the American leadership.

No description available.

This thesis examines whether NATO’s air operation Allied Force was appropriate to expect concession when compelling the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, or if there were other circumstances to explain the NATO failure of success. I analyse the conditions in accordance with previous research and theories of compellent threats. I find that NATO’s efforts meet the expectations for successive coercion and therefore it has to be other explanations why they failed. I argue that NATO misjudged Milosevic when he did not follow the tacit and expected rules of reaction and behaviour, which explains why the outcome became unpredictable and resulted in failure. To complete the theories of successful compellent threats, I suggest that future research should consider the target states strategic culture and ethnic, cultural and historical heritage as well as the state’s public defense will and leadership.

This study was designed to examine the relationships between the doctrines of Soviet air power and the changes in aviation capability affected through technological advancement. The Study was limited in scope to those changes in aviation technology which have had large scale application, and were examined from a historical perspective.The study was accomplished by dividing Soviet air power into five distinct segments based on existing Soviet administrative divisions. The divisions are as follows: Frontal Aviation, Strategic Aviation, Military Transport/Commercial Aviation, Air Defense Aviation and Naval Aviation. The growth of each segment and the development of its unique role within the structure of Soviet air power, from its earliest beginnings, was examined historically and analyzed for technologically induced change. When the effects of technological change extended across two or more segments of Soviet air power, each segment was analyzed on an individual basis. While the examination of the question failed to yield a clearly definable direct link between the advancements of Soviet aviation technology and the development of the doctrines of Soviet air power, it did reveal a positive correlation between the expansion of the role of Soviet air power and the advances made in aviation technology. Clearly the ability of the Soviet aviation industry to produce ever more capable aircraft has allowed the various segments of Soviet air power to develop ever more challenging doctrines.

Thesis--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. / "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-103).