"Thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, for completion of graduation requirements, academic year 2003-4." / "August 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55).

The theories on how to use airpower as coercion are divided between those who advocate strategic bombing and those who advocate support for land operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether Pape and/or Warden´s airpower theories applied on Operation Allied Force can explain how NATO´s air force was used. The result shows that both the Warden´s Enemy as a system and Pape´s Denial strategy can partly explain the outcome. Warden´s 5-ring system is the only variable in the survey assigned with a high variable value; this is because the analysis shows that it is judged to influence the outcome extensively. Parallel attacks occurred at low frequency and have a low variable value. Pape´s theory occurred with high frequency in variable support for the ground forces, however, the analysis shows that no variable value from Pape´s theory received higher variables than the medium. The conclusion is that both theories can explain how NATO used airpower during the operation but to different degrees.

John A. Warden’s theory the enemy as a system has been influential and attributed to large scale victories, such as Operation Desert Storm. It advocates offensive use of air power by parallel attacks on the enemy’s strategic center. While doctrines of small states are dependent and influenced by the military thinking of great power nations, its capacity and necessary priorities for the use of air power may differ. This study examines Warden’s theory through two cases, the Six Day War and the Second Lebanon War. Both relied on air power executed by a small state, Israel. The result show that Warden’s theory can partly explain Israelic victory during the Six Day War, but with substantial differentiations from the theory’s advocation of attacks on the enemy strategic leadership. The findings are ambiguous and neither strengthens nor weakens the theory. The analysis of the Second Lebanon War indicates that air power was insufficient in achieving strategic victory in the war against Hezbollah, even though the execution of the air operation had significant resemblance to Warden’s theory, thus weakening the theory.

Denna magisteruppsats, skriven för Stockholms universitets magisterkurs i historia som ett led iFörsvarshögskolans chefsprogram, har som syfte att beskriva och diskutera svensk luftoperativkrigsplanering 1958-1966 utifrån ett doktrinbegrepp. Någon uttalad luftoperativ doktrin fanns intevid denna tid varför denna får rekonstrueras utifrån en metod där ett antal faktorer beskrivs.Exempel på dessa är högre säkerhetspolitiska och militärstrategiska nivåer, lägre taktiska nivåer,upplevd hotbild, ledning, flygvapnets krigsplanläggning, samverkan med andra försvarsgrenar ochutveckling av nya vapensystem. Källmaterialet består i huvudsak av flygstabens hemliga arkivfrån samma år, vilket inte har studerats tidigare utifrån ett liknande syfte. Vidare problematiserasdoktrinutvecklingen genom att den även diskuteras utifrån olika perspektiv vars värde för ökadförståelse prövas.De konkreta frågeställningarna lyder:- Hur kan flygvapnets luftoperativa doktrinutveckling 1958-1966 beskrivas?- I vilken mån kan denna doktrinutveckling förstås utifrån rationalistiskt respektiveorganisatoriskt synsätt?Utifrån det överordnade säkerhetspolitiska ställningstagandet om alliansfrihet följde ett relativtstarkt försvar och den så kallade svenska linjen. Detta innebar dels ett relativt starkt flygvapen ochdels att flygvapnet kunde utvecklas efter en egen linje, inklusive doktrinärt, men i vilkenutsträckning så skedde har inte undersökts. Dimensionerande för flygvapnet var en sovjetiskinvasion, inkluderande kärnvapenanfall. Kort förvarningstid betonades ofta.Bärande element i Sveriges luftoperativa doktrin 1958-1966 kan kortfattat beskrivas som:- En strävan efter en relativt centraliserad ledning i syfte att kunna kraftsamla i tid och rum.- Ett prioriterat och väl utvecklat defensivt luftförsvarssystem, i huvudsak bestående av stril,luftvärn och jaktflyg som fokuserade på snabba bombplan på hög höjd ochluftlandsättningar, delvis till priset av en inte efterfrågad offensiv jaktförmåga.- En offensiv komponent i ett centralt sammanhållet attackflyg som under perioden i allthögre grad fokuserades mot sjömål vid en kustinvasion, alternativt indirekt samverkan viden gränsinvasion i norr. Tankar på massförstörelsevapen, anfall mot motståndarensbasområden samt direktsamverkande arméunderstöd övergavs under perioden, mensamtidigt utvecklades för framtiden ett nytt lätt attacksystem för den senare uppgiften.- Ett av kärnvapenhotet betingat bassystem som byggde på stor spridning, både på mångabaser och inom dessa, samt som skulle kunna få flygplanen i luften på mycket kort tid.Både ett rationalistiskt och ett organisatoriskt perspektiv har befunnits ge värdefulla bidrag till enökad förståelse för doktrinutvecklingen. Vissa skillnader perspektiven emellan har dockidentifierats. / This essay is written for Stockholm’s University as a part of the advanced level course in Historywhen attending the National Defence College Senior Staff Course. The purpose of the essay is todescribe the Swedish Air Force war planning and Air Power Doctrine during 1958 to 1966. TheSwedish Doctrine was then not formally expressed, and must consequently be reconstructed. Amethod is used that describes a number of factors, including higher levels of political guidanceand orders from the Supreme Commander, lower tactical levels, fighters, Command and Controlsystems and procedures, the threat to Sweden as it was experienced at the time, war planning,cooperation with the Army and Navy and development of new systems. Furthermore this Doctrineis discussed from different perspectives in order to see their contribution to the understanding ofthe complex conception of a Doctrine. The source of information is mainly the Air Staff TopSecret Archives. Neither that archive nor the period 1958-1966 have been examined by historianswith reasonably similar purpose.Starting with the question of how a Swedish Air Operations Doctrine of 1958 to 1966 can bedescribed, this essay comes to the following conclusions:The supreme doctrine of non-alignment resulted in a relatively strong defence and an ambition tobecome as independent as possible regarding weapon systems. This meant a strong Air Force thatcould develop independently, including doctrinaire. Dimensioning for the Air Force was aninvasion by the Soviet Union, including nuclear attacks.With this as a background the Swedish Air Operations Doctrine 1958 to 1966 included thefollowing leading elements:- An aspiration for a relatively centralized command with the purpose to be able to masspower when and where needed.- A prioritized and developed Air Defence System, including air surveillance, tacticalcontrol, fighters and SAM systems, which focused on Soviet fast and high bombers andairborne invasion. Air to air aspects of Offensive Air Operations did not have priority.- The tasks of the fighter-bomber force changed somewhat during the period. An invasionover the Baltic Sea was in focus during the whole period, but in 1958 the range of taskscould include everything from Close Air Support to base attack on the other side of theBaltic Sea, preferably with nuclear weapons which the Air Force pleaded for. 1966 the AirForce completely focused on invasion by sea, with a secondary role of Air Interdiction incase of a ground invasion in the far north. The new trainer, SAAB 105, that was developedduring this period was however designated as a light attack aircraft for CAS.- A very dispersed base system, including the use of roads, considering the nuclear threat,which was designated to get the fighters airborne as fast as possible.Both a rationalistic and an organizational perspective have been found to add elements ofunderstanding to the development of the Doctrine. However have some differences in theircontribution been identified. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08

Thesis (M.S.)--Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 28, 2003). "March 2003." Vita. "AFIT/GOR/ENS/03-04." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-70). Also issued in paper format.

The Swedish armed forces doctrine does not disclose where the knowledge about the use of airpower was acquired. Earlier research supports the fact that doctrine needs to contain theory to support its legitimacy.  The purpose of this study is to examine whether the doctrine contains air power theory. The author believes that increased internationalization may have caused international air power theories to have been integrated in the doctrine.  The research was conducted as a qualitative research of the Swedish air force doctrine documents. The research intended to see if the air power theories of John Warden and Shaun Clark have influenced the doctrine.  The result of this study shows that the ideas of Shaun Clarke had a much higher presence than the ideas of John Warden. The study has shown that the Swedish air force doctrine has theoretical support. The study concludes that internationalizing has affected but not to the point where the Swedish air force blindly copied air power theories without it suiting the Swedish air force.

Les bases aériennes sont des éléments incontournables de la puissance aérienne car sans infrastructures dédiées, l’aviation militaire est inopérante. La répartition géographique des bases aériennes répond à des stratégies politiques, militaires mais également économiques. Elles en sont les traductions spatiales. De fait, organisées en réseaux, les bases aériennes concourent à définir la géostratégie aérienne. L’analyse spatiale et historique du réseau des bases aériennes françaises depuis le début du XXe siècle démontre la place prégnante de ce maillage dans la stratégie française et constitue le reflet de la perception de la France de son espace environnant. D’abord, le réseau illustre, dans la stratégie territoriale française, la prééminence d’une posture défensive du sanctuaire métropolitain, à l’origine d’une « France différenciée » dont le découpage territorial s’effectue selon la répartition des types de bases aériennes. Ensuite, le réseau des bases aériennes extra-métropolitaines, à la différence de sa consœur métropolitaine, n’est pas seulement régi par une stratégie de défense. Dans un premier temps, dans le cadre de sa politique coloniale, la France utilise son réseau comme instrument d’exploration, de contrôle et conservation de territoires ; puis, dans le cadre de sa politique étrangère, elle s’en sert comme d’un moyen de préservation de ses intérêts vitaux dans les pays étrangers et les territoires français d’outre-mer. / Air bases are inescapable elements of air power because without dedicated infrastructures, military aviation is ineffective. The geographical distribution of air bases answers political, military but also economic strategies. Air bases are the spatial translation of these strategies. In fact, air bases organized in networks contribute to define the air geostrategy. The spatial and historical analysis of the French air bases network since the beginning of the XXth century demonstrates the prominence of this web in the French strategy and reflects the French perception of its surrounding space. First the network illustrates the superiority of a defensive posture of the metropolitan sanctuary in the French territorial strategy, at the origin of a “differentiated France” sub-divided according to the distribution of various air base types. Then, the overseas air bases network, unlike its metropolitan counterpart, is not governed solely by a defense strategy. Within the colonial policy framework, France uses its network as instrument of exploration, control and preservation of territories. In addition, within the foreign policy framework, France uses it as of a means of conservation of its vital interests in foreign countries and French overseas territories.

Uninhabited Aircraft Systems (UAS), as a relatively novel technology, was always seen as a tool available and utilized only by rich and developed states. But thanks to globalizations and the fast proliferation of commercially available drones, this platform has already been used by smaller states and also non-state groups, giving them possibilities never seen before. Yet, there is little research on how and why these new actors use UAS to claim their cause. The research question to guide this thesis is how and why do non-state armed groups differ from states when using Uninhabited Aircraft Systems in their military operations? The thesis uses a demand- and supply-side theory, adapted for the proliferation of drones to help answer that question. This theory is tested in a multiple case study involving the United States as a state and the Houthis as a non-state group during the Yemeni crisis, from 2011 to 2022. Through a structured, focused comparison between the cases, indicators from the demand- and supply-side models were used to understand the differences in drone use between different actors. The main findings are that states and non-state armed groups differ in their use of UAS mainly because they have different boundaries (legal and technological), but also for the symbol and status that this platform carries. Finally, it was seen that the theory is not only able to clarify the trends on proliferation, but also the why actors use UAS, with few remarks, but with a need to test it further.

No description available.

John A. Warden III is one the most mentioned air power theoretic of his time.He has written a number of theories concerning air power and the best way to use this to win wars.The author of this paper gives a short resume of what he consider are the central thoughts in John Warden´s theories. These thoughts result in four factors; Enemy as a system, centre of gravity, parallel attack/concentration and finally air superiority. These factors are then being used to inves-tigate if NATO used Wardens theories during the Kosovo war in 1999.The reason for the author to choose the Kosovo war specifically is due to the fact that NATO during the war only used air power as an instrument to get Serbia´s president Milosevic to the negotiation table but also the fact that this would turn out to be quite a challenge for NATO.The conclusion is that out of the four factors only one is traceable throughout the entire operation, and that is air superiority. Regarding the other three factors they can only be found in parts of the operation. / John A. Warden III är en av de mest omskrivna luftmaktsteoretikerna under sin tid. Han har lagt fram ett antal teorier för vad han anser är bästa sättet att använda luftmakt för att vinna krig. I uppsatsen ges en sammanfattning av vad författaren anser vara de centrala tankarna i hans teorier. Dessa utmynnar i fyra begrepp; fienden som ett system, tyngdpunktsbegreppet,parallell attack och kraftsamling samt luftrumskontroll. Dessa begrepp står sedan somutgångspunkt för en fallstudie av NATO:s luftmaktsanvändning under Kosovokriget 1999.Undersökningen syftar till att undersöka om NATO använde sig av John Wardens luftmaktsteorier under kriget.Varför författaren har valt just Kosovokriget beror bland annat på att NATO under kriget enbart använde sig av luftmakt för att få Serbiens president Milosevic till förhandlingsbordet samt att det också visade sig bli en stor prövning för dem.Slutsatsen blev att av de fyra utvalda faktorerna så var det endast en som NATO visade sig foku-sera på under hela operationen, detta var luftrumskontroll. Vad gäller de övriga tre faktorerna finner författaren att NATO använt sig av dessa i stort sett bara under slutskedet av operationen.