61 |
Did 9/11 Really Change Everything? Combating terrorism in a changed worldShkolnik, Kevin C. 23 April 2008 (has links)
No description available.
|
62 |
九一一事件後美國中亞外交政策之轉變:由地緣政治角度分析呂筱雲, Lu Hsiao-Yun Unknown Date (has links)
論及影響美國外交政策產出的因素,地緣政治一向扮演著重要角色。無論是馬漢的海權論、肯楠的圍堵理論,乃至後冷戰時期布里辛斯基的歐亞大棋盤、杭亭頓的文明衝突論,都是地緣政治學門裡獨到的見解。而地緣政治基本要素—空間、邊界、權力—的交互作用也已然內化於外交政策制訂中,深刻影響美國對外政策走向。冷戰後在缺乏明顯單一的敵對目標、本身又成為超級大國的情況下,美國面對的是更為複雜難測的國際局勢:區域衝突、文化糾葛、全球化進程與波折、世界經濟體系萎縮等等問題,外交政策維護國家利益的功能也隨之彰顯。
本研究以911事件為轉捩點,觀察美國對中亞五國外交政策的調整,分析導致政策轉變的地緣因素與動機。本研究指出,中亞地區在蘇聯解體之後,政治局勢長期呈現真空狀態,基於能源安全的考量,中亞豐富的油氣資源是吸引美國聚焦於此區的關鍵。輸油管道計畫提供政治框架讓美國影響力得以介入,而反恐作戰則正式讓美國勢力進駐此一政治真空帶。中亞五國位處具有重大地緣政治意義的心臟地帶,但獨立時間尚短,國內民主建制、經濟發展未臻完備,伊斯蘭基本教義派與分離主義是導致此區紛擾不斷的主因。美國藉由反恐合作,對此區提撥大量經濟挹注與軍事協助,中亞五國的重要性在911事件之後陡升,美國也成為此區優勢領導者。簡言之,美國在911事件後更加強對區域穩定的關注,全面揚棄冷戰時代的圍堵思維,採取主動的先發制人戰略,企圖在中亞掌握政治、經濟主控權,鞏固國家安全與保障美國在此區的國家利益。
|
63 |
American Arms Sales to Iran and Power Politics in the Middle EastAryanpur Kashani, Khosrow 12 1900 (has links)
This thesis examines and evaluates the questions involved in American arms sales to Iran and Egypt. The first two chapters outline the historical background and present detailed analyses of Iran's political situations prior to 1968 and United States policy toward it in that period of time. Chapter Three considers the American policies towards Egypt and the United States arms sales to that country.
The main argument of the thesis appears in chapter Four which explains the objectives of Iran's government in buying American arms and the United States government's objectives in selling arms to Iran. Conclusions on the study comprise the fifth chapter.
|
64 |
Politiques canadienne et soviétique lors de la seconde crise de Berlin 1958-1961Rheault-Campeau, Alexis 04 1900 (has links)
La seconde crise de Berlin (1958-1961) est un évènement majeur de la guerre froide. L'hypothèse de notre recherche remet en question le rôle du Canada et les perceptions négatives de l'Occident envers l'URSS durant cette crise. La recherche se divise en trois volets : premièrement, une revue de l'historiographie de la politique canadienne; deuxièmement, une présentation de la chronologie des évènements de la crise de Berlin, l'importance de la diplomatie multilatérale canadienne et la politique nucléaire de Diefenbaker; enfin, un examen de la politique étrangère soviétique. À partir de sources primaires et d'un bilan historiographique,il fut démontré que, durant la crise de Berlin, le Canada a réussi à influencer l'OTAN et à ménager les gouvernements américains et soviétiques. Quant à l'URSS, contrairement à l'image négative que l'Occident en avait, celle-ci a manifesté durant cette crise des intentions pacifiques envers l'Occident, contredisant les interprétations orthodoxes de la guerre froide. / The second Berlin crisis(1958-1961)is a major event of the Cold War. The hypothesis of our research revises the role of Canada and the negative perception of the occidental countries toward USSR during this crisis. This study is divided in three parts : firstly, a historiographical review of the canadian policy toward NATO; secondly, a presentation of the events in regard to the implication of the canadian governement during the Berlin crisis, the importance of the the multilateral canadian diplomacy and the nuclear policy during the Diefenbaker's governement; at last, an examination of the soviet foreign policy. With the help of canadian primary sources, it will be demonstrated firstly that : while the tensions are to their peaks, Canada succeeded to influence NATO and american policy and tried to spare both soviet and american governements. Secondly, soviet and east-german archives showed that the soviet governement manifested during this crisis his pacific intentions, contradicting the most often supported orthodox interpretation of the Cold War.
|
65 |
Truman, "faith-based" diplomatie et ambigüités du Plan Marshall : cas de la France de l'après-guerre / Truman, faith-based diplomacy and ambiguities of the Marshall Plan in France in the Early Cold WarAutran, Jean-Marie 06 July 2015 (has links)
La "Faith-based" diplomatie américaine et les ambiguïtés du plan Marshall : le cas de la France dans l’après-guerre. Le Président Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) affirme dès 1946 que les E.U. doivent s’armer d'une « diplomatie fondée sur la foi » pour encourager la reconstruction spirituelle d'une Europe « déchristianisée » face au communisme. Pour faire barrage au marxisme de l’Union Soviétique, il fallait commencer par la France, vue comme la pierre de voûte spirituelle. Plus que toute autre nation, elle bénéficie avec le plan Marshall d'un puissant soutien financier militaire, économique et d'une conquête des cœurs et des esprits. De multiples agences interviennent dans cette période alors que les Églises américaines redécouvrent cette terre de mission. Généralement articulées autour de la conviction religieuse des Présidents, les initiatives sont relayées sur le terrain par l’engagement d’acteurs privés. Officialisée en 1998 par le président Clinton dans la promulgation de l’Acte international sur la liberté religieuse, cette approche a justifié la ténacité des missionnaires de 1945 à nos jours dans une France catholique religieusement peu diverse. Encouragées par le quatrième Réveil la plupart des missions américaines, églises protestantes historiques, nouvelles religions ou NMR (mormons, adventistes, témoins de Jéhovah etc...) et Évangéliques ont bien accueilli cette opportunité, phase d’introduction pour certaines ou de redémarrage pour d’autres déjà présentes dès le 19ème siècle. Bien que l'entreprise de « nation building » économique et culturelle de la France ait été perçue par l’opinion américaine de l’époque comme l'une des plus décevantes de l’après-guerre, les résultats de la transformation de la société française sont apparus avec un décalage dans le temps. Pouvons-nous alors retracer les sources des mutations transatlantiques des religions d'origine américaine et l’évolution du paysage religieux français aux activités gouvernementales et missionnaires en ce début de la Guerre froide ? / President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) claims in 1946 that the U.S. should advance a "faith-based" diplomacy to encourage the spiritual reconstruction of a “dechristianized” Europe .To stand in the way of a Marxist and Godless Soviet Union, it has to begin with France, seen as the spiritual stone arch. More than in any other nation, the Marshall Plan brings a financial, economic and military support, willing to conquer hearts and minds. Many key governmental agencies are involved in this time period, while American churches engaged in aid relief are rediscovering France as a new mission territory. Usually strongly influenced by the religious conviction of the Presidents, "Faith-based policies” supporting Foreign policies are reinforced on the ground by the engagement of private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Formalized in 1998 by President Clinton as a tool in Foreign policy in the enactment of the Act on International Religious Freedom, this approach justifies the tenacity of missionaries from 1945 to the present day in a secular and catholic France. Encouraged by the Fourth Awakening, most American missions, mainstream Protestant churches, new religions like NRM (Mormonism, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc...) and Evangelicals, welcome this mixed opportunity: a comeback for a few denominations already presents in the 19th century and for others a chance for a fresh beginning. Although the business of "nation building”, the reshaping of the economic and cultural life of France, is perceived by the American public opinion as one of the most disappointing of the post-war, a deeply transformed French society will later emerge. The overlapping of American public and private organizations, of American churches and missionaries lay the groundwork for the radical transformation of a French monolithic religious landscape. Without doubt this can be traced to this short and critical experimental period of the Early Cold War.
|
66 |
Politiques canadienne et soviétique lors de la seconde crise de Berlin 1958-1961Rheault-Campeau, Alexis 04 1900 (has links)
La seconde crise de Berlin (1958-1961) est un évènement majeur de la guerre froide. L'hypothèse de notre recherche remet en question le rôle du Canada et les perceptions négatives de l'Occident envers l'URSS durant cette crise. La recherche se divise en trois volets : premièrement, une revue de l'historiographie de la politique canadienne; deuxièmement, une présentation de la chronologie des évènements de la crise de Berlin, l'importance de la diplomatie multilatérale canadienne et la politique nucléaire de Diefenbaker; enfin, un examen de la politique étrangère soviétique. À partir de sources primaires et d'un bilan historiographique,il fut démontré que, durant la crise de Berlin, le Canada a réussi à influencer l'OTAN et à ménager les gouvernements américains et soviétiques. Quant à l'URSS, contrairement à l'image négative que l'Occident en avait, celle-ci a manifesté durant cette crise des intentions pacifiques envers l'Occident, contredisant les interprétations orthodoxes de la guerre froide. / The second Berlin crisis(1958-1961)is a major event of the Cold War. The hypothesis of our research revises the role of Canada and the negative perception of the occidental countries toward USSR during this crisis. This study is divided in three parts : firstly, a historiographical review of the canadian policy toward NATO; secondly, a presentation of the events in regard to the implication of the canadian governement during the Berlin crisis, the importance of the the multilateral canadian diplomacy and the nuclear policy during the Diefenbaker's governement; at last, an examination of the soviet foreign policy. With the help of canadian primary sources, it will be demonstrated firstly that : while the tensions are to their peaks, Canada succeeded to influence NATO and american policy and tried to spare both soviet and american governements. Secondly, soviet and east-german archives showed that the soviet governement manifested during this crisis his pacific intentions, contradicting the most often supported orthodox interpretation of the Cold War.
|
67 |
Bushadministrationens syn på internationellt samarbete och internationell rätt samt politisk-teoretiska tanketraditioners inverkan på administrationens utrikespolitikHagström, Christoffer January 2007 (has links)
Essay in Political Science, Advanced Course, by Christoffer Hagström “The Bush Administration´s view on international cooperation and international law and political-theoretical traditions influence on the administration´s foreign policy” Supervisor: Jan Olsson The purpose of this paper is to analyze the American foreign policy, particularly with regard to international cooperation and international law. The two following research-questions are used in order to fulfil the purpose: (1) what is the Bush-administrations´s view of of the place for international cooperation and international law in American foreign policy?, and (2) how does the administration´s foreign policy correspond to dominant political-theoretical thought-traditions? The traditions used are: liberalism, realism and neoconservatism. The sources of the study mostly include literature and policy-documents. The author conducts qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the Bush-administration´s policy document National Security Strategy of the United States from March 2006. First the document is summarized based on different criteria followed by categorizations of ideas connected with realism, liberalism and neoconservatism in the document. In the quantative analysis value-words that are appropriate for the various traditions is chosen. The frequency of those words can be seen as indications of the influence of the traditions in the thoughts of the Bush-administration, but is mostly seen as a complement to the qualtative analysis. The main conclusions of the paper are that the Bush-administration most often wish to act according to international law and to cooperate with other actors internationally in the long run, it may even be necessary. In the short run however, it may act outside the parameters of international organizations and international law in order to accomplish foreign policy-goals. Matters related to the security of the American state and people is considered much more important than international cooperation and law. Liberalism seems to be the tradition that has most affected the Bush-administration´s foreign policy. It is followed shortly thereafter by realism and neoconservatism seems to have had the least influence on the the thought-traditions. All of the them has been active in the making of the foreign policy.
|
68 |
The best sin to commit : a theological strategy of Niebuhrian classical realism to challenge the Religious Right and neoconservative advancement of manifest destiny in American foreign policyCowan, David Fraser January 2013 (has links)
While few would deny America is the most powerful nation on earth, there is considerable debate, and controversy, over how America uses its foreign policy power. This is even truer since the “unipolar moment,” when America gained sole superpower status with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. In the Cold War Reinhold Niebuhr was the main theological voice speaking to American power. In the Unipolar world, the Religious right emerged as the main theological voice, but instead of seeking to curb American power the Religious right embraced Neoconservatism in what I will call “Totemic Conservatism” to support use of America's power in the world and to triumph Manifest destiny in American foreign policy, which is the notion that America is a chosen nation, and this legitimizes its use of power and underpins its moral claims. I critique the Niebuhrian and Religious right legacies, and offer a classical realist strategy for theology to speak to America power and foreign policy, which avoids the neoconservative and religious conservative error of totemism, while avoiding the jettisoning of Niebuhr's theology by political liberals, and, the political ghettoizing of theology by his chief critics. This strategy is based on embracing the understanding of classical realism, but not taking the next step, which both Niebuhr and neoconservativism ultimately do, of moving from a prescriptive to a predictive strategy for American foreign policy. In this thesis, I argue that in the wake of the unipolar moment the embrace of the Religious right of Neoconservatism to triumph Manifest destiny in American foreign policy is a problematic commingling of faith and politics, and what is needed instead is a strategy of speaking to power rooted in classical realism but one which refines Niebuhrian realism to avoid the risk of progressing a Constantinian theology.
|
Page generated in 0.1011 seconds