The absence of previous research regarding Russia´s use of information warfare has not been able to show if there has been a new way of adapting information warfare alongside the development in the warfare in general. The previous research has established a development in warfare by the means of information technology. This is important to understand as it constitutes an equalizer between small states and great powers in the global arena. At the same time, it is even more important to understand that the development of Russian behavior has implications on warfare in a global perspective. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the conclusions of previous research which predicted a transformation in the warfare and give a new view of the transformation by inspecting Russia´s use of information warfare in modern warfare and probe if there has been a change. Additional purpose of this study is to understand Russia´s way of conduct in modern conflicts and have a better ability of control in forthcoming conflicts. The method used reflects the qualitative case and is constructed as a one-case study with variation in time, using three different conflicts. The analysis is conducted by the means of operational indicators extracted from Libickis theory. The result of the study shows that Russia have changed their way of using information warfare in between all of the three conflicts, and it is not that easy to say that the use of information warfare has changed. It might depend on the situation or the opposite side and how the individual conflict occur. There is no clear answer on that question, but this essay gives a deeper view in the use of information warfare by Russia in modern conflicts.

In modern times, NATO-countries had difficulties defeating insurgency around the globe. Russia on the other hand, succeeded in winning the second Chechen war against insurgents. How could this be? The purpose of this study is to investigate whether Russia’s victory in the second Chechen war can be explained by population-centric theories of counterinsurgency, thus understanding the outcome of the conflict. The result of this study show that Russia followed much of both Galula’s and Trinquier’s theories, but none of the theories could explain the victory. Russia did not share the theories view of the civilians being the key to victory. The conclusion is that if counterinsurgency is carried out without any regards to the civilians, operations can be carried out in a way that makes the situation unsustainable to the insurgents. If artillery and air-bombings are made against the insurgents without caring for the consequences for civilians, victory can be achieved. This could explain why NATO-countries have had difficulties with counterinsurgency due to their population-centric doctrines.

There is a discrepancy in the contemporary debate on how to implement counterinsurgency successfully. The population-centric method appears to be more advocated. To widen the debate, it is of interest to examine the explanatory power in the opposite method: enemy-centric counterinsurgency. Jacquline Hazelton questions the population-centric methods and believes that the use of brute force is more successful.  The study was conducted as a case study with a theory-testing approach, to examine to what extent her theory could explain the outcomes of the Russian counterinsurgency operations in the two Chechen wars. The results show that her theory has a very limited ability to explain these outcomes, due to its high presence in both cases, which weakens her theory. Based on the results and part of the purpose of this essay, it is arguable that it to some extent also weakens the whole enemy-centric method. To be able to draw further conclusions about this, additional studies are required.

There is a discrepancy in today's view of how to succeed with counterinsurgency. On the one hand, we have legitimacy and on the other hand brutality as a method of achieving success the end state goals. The previous research is dominated by legitimacy, to contribute to the research I will examine brutality. Earlier scholars point out the use of brutal methods is required in order to achieve success, which contradicts with most democratic states’ values.  To contribute to the previous research, I will conduct a case study and investigate whether Gil Merom's theory of brutal counterinsurgency can explain the cases of the Second Chechen War and the Iraq War.  The results show that the theory can explain success and loss in counterinsurgency. Which strengthens the brutal counterinsurgency theory. The results of the study show that the use of brutal methods leads to success and thus proves the methods of brutality.