The idea that ‘business ethics' picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action. The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct' collective entities. From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential' moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study was prompted by the increasing vulnerability and impoverishment of local fishing folk in Ukerewe District in Tanzania in the midst of the potential of the fishing sector to generate wealth and the many capable actors and stakeholders who can provide essential services and opportunities that can help the fishing folk to overcome their challenges and improve their lot in generating wealth. Taking the view that some forms of poverty have their roots in the moral system of the people, institutions and organisations involved, and considering the call made by Tanzania’s Second National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction to key actors and stakeholders to design and implement interventions that would improve the chances of poor actors to generate wealth, this study aimed to discover what would motivate capable actors and stakeholders in the fishing sector of Ukerewe District to do so. The study asked whether there are ethical values and principles that have the potential to inspire and guide capable actors and stakeholders to reconsider the fate of constrained local actors, and to make a responsible commitment to address their constraining conditions, as well as to determine how these ethical ideas, if any, can be explicated, formulated and implemented. Empirical research was undertaken in Ukerewe District from October 2012 to March 2013. It followed an applied ethics case study methodology, combined with focus groups, life narratives and in-depth individual interviews. Three hundred and ten local actors and stakeholders in the fishing sector of Ukerewe were engaged in progressive stages of critical self-reflection and dialogue within and between particular stakeholder groups. These 310 participants reflected and deliberated on what constituted the poverty of local actors, what it would take to overcome that poverty and what would motivate capable actors and stakeholders to combat that poverty. The collected evidence led to the establishment of the following: First, the fishing sector offers adequate opportunities to invest in and work to generate income and goods to improve socio-economic conditions. Second, local fishing folk fall into poverty because they are constrained from generating wealth. Third, the local fishing folk could improve their capacities to generate wealth and overcome their poverty through expanded opportunities to acquire and use the relevant competence, efficient productive forces and fisheries infrastructure, formal financial credit and insurance services. Fourth, fulfilling institutional and professional obligations, contributing to possible good consequences and preventing possible bad consequences in the life of the local fishing folk, the fishing sector, their own organisations and society, and showing care for, respect to and solidarity with local fishing folk would motivate most capable actors and stakeholders to undertake pro-poor actions in the fisheries sections. Based on what the respondents revealed to value and what they wanted to achieve in their fishing sector, an alternative development ethic, namely the Sufficient Capabilities and Wealth Ethic (SUCAWE), was constructed. The SUCAWE offers insightful and empowering moral resources for self-management and for the management of multiple actors and stakeholders in wealth creation and the combating of poverty. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie het ontstaan uit die toenemende weerloosheid en verarming van die plaaslike vissersgemeenskap van die Ukerewe Distrik in Tanzania te midde van die potensiaal van die visserysektor om welvaart te skep, en die vele agente en belanghebbendes wat in staat is daartoe om noodsaaklike dienste en geleenthede te voorsien wat kan help dat die visserygemeenskap hulle uitdagings oorkom en hulle lot verbeter deur welvaart te skep. Uitgaande van die standpunt dat sekere vorme van armoede wortel in die morele sisteem van die mense, instellings en organisasies betrokke, en met in ag neming van die oproep wat aan sleutelagente en belanghebbendes gerig is met Tanzania se Second National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction om ingrepe te ontwerp en te implementeer wat die kanse sal verbeter van armes om welvaart te skep, het hierdie studie beoog om dit bloot te lê wat vermoënde agente en belanghebbendes in die visserysektor van die Ukerewe Distrik sou motiveer om dit te doen. Hierdie studie het die vraag gestel of daar etiese waardes en beginsels is met die potensiaal om vermoënde agente en belanghebbendes te inspireer en daartoe te lei om die lot van plaaslike agente wat deur armoede beperk word, in heroorweging te neem, en 'n verantwoordelike verbintenis aan te gaan om hierdie beperkende omstandighede aan te spreek, en het ook gepoog om te bepaal hoe hierdie etiese idees, indien enige, blootgelê, geformuleer en geïmplementeer kan word. Empiriese navorsing is onderneem in die Ukerewe Distrik vanaf Oktober 2012 to Maart 2013. Hierin is die metodologie van 'n gevallestudie in toegepaste etiek gevolg, gekombineer met fokusgroepbesprekings, lewensverhale en in-diepte individuele onderhoude. Driehonderd en tien plaaslike agente en belanghebbendes in die visserysektor van Ukerewe is betrek in progressiewe fases van kritiese self-refleksie en dialoog in en tussen spesifieke groepe van belanghebbendes. Hierdie 310 deelnemers het dit wat die armoede van plaaslike agente meebring, ontleed en oorweeg, asook wat dit sou behels om hierdie armoede te oorkom, en wat vermoënde agente en belanghebbendes sou kon motiveer om hierdie armoede te beveg. Op grond van die inligting wat versamel is, kon die volgende bepaal word: Eerstens, die visserysektor bied voldoende geleenthede vir beleggings en werk waardeur inkomste en goedere tot stand kan kom waardeur sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede verbeter kan word. Tweedens, plaaslike vissers verval in armoede omdat hulle beperk word om welvaart te skep. Derdens, plaaslike vissers kan hulle vermoë om welvaart te skep om armoede te oorkom, verbeter deur die geleenthede uit te brei vir hulle om relevante vaardighede, doeltreffende produksiekragte en vissery-infrastruktuur, formele finansiële krediet en versekeringsdienste te bekom en te gebruik. Vierdens, die meeste vermoënde agente en belanghebbendes wat in staat is tot pro-arm optrede in die visserysektor sou daartoe gemotiveer kon word deur institusionele en professionele verpligtinge na te kom, deur by te dra tot moontlike goeie gevolge en moontlike slegte gevolge in die lewe van plaaslike vissers, die visserysektor, hulle eie organisasies en die samelewing te voorkom, en deur sorgsaamheid vir, respek teenoor en solidariteit met die plaaslike vissersgemeenskap te openbaar. Op grond van wat die deelnemers openbaar het oor dit waaraan hulle waarde heg, asook wat hulle graag sou wou bereik in die deel van die visserysektor waarby hulle betrokke is, is 'n alternatiewe ontwikkelingsetiek geformuleer, te wete die Sufficient Capabilities and Wealth Ethic (SUCAWE). Die SUCAWE bied insiggewende en bemagtigende morele hulpbronne vir self-bestuur, asook vir die bestuur van 'n verskeidenheid van agente en belanghebbendes betrokke by die skepping van welvaart en die bekamping van armoede.

This dissertation has three aims: 1. To evaluate several ethical theories about responsibility towards future generations. 2. To construct a theory about responsibility towards future generations. 3. To carry out an ethical evaluation of different nuclear waste management methods. Five theories are evaluated with the help of evaluative criteria, primarily: A theory must provide future generations with some independent moral status. A theory should acknowledge moral pluralism. A theory should provide some normative claims about real-world problems. Derek Parfit’s theory provides future generations with full moral status. But it is incompatible with moral pluralism, and does not provide reasonable normative claims about real-world problems. Brian Barry’s theory provides such claims and a useful idea about risk management, but it does not provide an argument why future generations ought to exist. Avner de-Shalit’s theory explains why they ought to exist; however, his theory can not easily explain why we ought to care for other people than those in our own community. Emmanuel Agius’ theory gives an ontological explanation for mankind’s unity, but reduces conflicts of interests to a common good. Finally, Hans Jonas’ theory shifts the focus from the situation of future generations to the preconditions of human life generally. However, his theory presupposes a specific ontology, which might be unable to motivate people to act. The concluding chapters describe a narrative theory of responsibility. It claims that we should comprehend ourselves as parts of the common story of mankind and that we ought to provide future generations with equal opportunities. This implies that we should avoid transferring risks and focus on reducing the long-term risks associated with the nuclear waste.

<p> Video game studies pertaining to representations of gender, race, culture, and sexuality are commonly discussed in relation to the characters, narrative, or gameplay mechanics. Video game environments are often left out of these discussions as most publications focus on how the environment was created and environmental storytelling. In this pilot study the researcher had participants analyze and discuss three futuristic, dystopian environments that contained alternative ways of representing gender, race, culture, and sexuality. The environments did not have gameplay or character interactions so that the player could focus on the environment. Results indicated that futuristic dystopian environments do not need to rely on stereotypes and harmful depictions to evoke core themes, even if they relate to violence, sex, oppression, or addiction. However, a lack of representation or a “neutral” take on representating gender, race, sexuality, and culture results in world that feels bland, isolated, and unnatural. Additionally, while participants disagreed on certain representations or noticed different aspects of the environments, the researcher found that focusing on “playtesting” just the environment can reveal how certain values, themes, and representations arise out of prop repetition, prop juxtaposition, and even how the player moves physically through the space.</p><p></p>

Need is a concept that carries intuitive appeal in moral decision-making. As it stands, need is relatively under-theorised, given its currency not just in philosophical argumentation but in news coverage, charitable appeals, and political practice. Need claims carry compelling normative force, and they are amenable to widespread support as our most basic needs are some of the things we most transparently share with our fellow human beings. However, how should we understand that normative force? Is need best understood to compel us as a matter of justice? I begin my account by considering the kind of need relevant to the project. I build from an understanding of need as a three-place relation, which is by its nature needing for a purpose. I suggest that morally important needs are those which aim at the objective interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings ('non-arbitrary needs'). Further, I distinguish the existentially urgent subset of those non-arbitrary needs as 'basic needs.' Given this understanding, I consider how basic needs theory relates to its conceptual neighbours. I focus on capabilities as the nearest neighbours, but also comment on wants, interests, and rights. I judge that the theories developed by Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Len Doyal and Ian Gough (needs) benefit from a complementary reading, with each supplementing the other. I then draw from Amartya Sen's early writings on capabilities to ultimately see capabilities and needs as two sides of the same coin. This helps to situate needs theory in relation to a mainstream branch of political theory more generally, and indicates that we can recognise the special significance of needs without eschewing other morally important categories. I then move to establish a scope of justice that allows us to distinguish between duties of justice and other moral duties. If we think that duties of beneficence are weak and optional, whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great deal rides on how we characterise our duties to the global poor. I offer a 'moral enforceability' account, claiming that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable. It is the in-principle enforceability of justice duties which gives them teeth. Returning to need, I then ask how another's need comes to give me a moral reason for action. I canvas a range of existing accounts, many of which furnish important insights. I then propose that it is the morally relevant capacities of the being in need which gives them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. We are morally required to answer this need with responsiveness, as a demonstration of appropriate respect for the sort of being that the human in need is. If this is right, we are morally required to be responsive to need, even if we are not always required to reduce it. Finally, I bring the diverse strands of the foregoing argument together to return to the relationship between need and justice. I consider what a duty of responsiveness might amount to in practice, and suggest that our duties of responsiveness are best thought of as collective duties, grounded in the capacity of the global well-off to contribute. Further, I argue that duties of responsiveness are a matter of justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally enforceable. A wide range of threats to the necessary conditions for human flourishing, and even human life, are on the horizon, and many of these are uniquely collective challenges. The seriousness of those challenges, and the extent to which we have treated our responsibilities to those in need as discretionary in the past, means collective action and problem solving are called for when there are no easy answers.

No description available.

An account of the nature of courage and how it figures in management decisions is developed on the basis of classical and contemporary literature in philosophy and management. The account contains seven elements, including obstacles and tools and a requirement for acting for good. The account is subject to a reality check using content analysis of articles in the business press in Australia, United Kingdom, United States and Hong Kong.

The overall objective of this thesis is to examine in what way ethical theory and ethical analysis can contribute to further understanding of the ethical challenges of the multicultural classroom. Based on the fact that the world is going through a process of globalization and migration, the education-system and daily praxis of teaching is put in front of new ethical challenges. The teacher in the multicultural classroom is on a daily base confronted with various dilemmas regarding for example conflicting duties, universal and conflicting values and citizenship. Martha Nussbaum´s theory of world citizenship is used as an analytical framework for the thesis and student interviews from upper secondary school is used as a complementary perspective to Nussbaum´s theory. The research questions of the thesis are: Can the theory of World Citizenship Education, when structured and analyzed, give guidance for teaching citizenship in a multicultural classroom? Is it a plausible theory confronted with the ethical challenges of the multicultural classroom? In what way can a student perspective from a multicultural classroom try the relevance and present a complementary perspective to the theory of World citizenship education? The theory and the interviews are analyzed and structured out of the research questions and by the three ethical challenges of universal values, conflicting values and sense of belonging. The conclusion of the thesis states that, even though Nussbaum´s theory does have some constraints, it is to a large degree applicable and possible to relate to the ethical challenges of the multicultural classroom and as a guide for teachers. The theory is plausible in some aspects because it presents reasonable arguments on the necessity of educational reform in an interconnected world and because it makes educational proposals of instrumental worth of the teacher. The theory is however not plausible in other aspects because; the universal values presented are to vague and not specified which makes the theory difficult to use in practise, it does not pay enough attention to the conflicting perspective of the ethical challenges in classroom nor the pedagogical importance of social inclusion when discussing conflicting values and finally the theory demonstrates a contradiction regarding how to act as a teacher about sense of belonging and recognising identity of the students. The interviews demonstrate similar but also different responses to the ethical challenges in comparison with the theory. The students recognize the existence of universal values across cultural borders in a similar way as Nussbaum, even though the values put forward are of another character than Nussbaum´s. They do however present a sceptical view towards the idea of a world citizenship and stresses the importance of bringing up discussions about nationhood, migration and belonging without being afraid of breaking any taboos. At the end the thesis presents some practical guidelines for the teacher in the multicultural classroom that follows logical out of the conclusion. The final discussion highlight the fact that the challenges of the multicultural classroom in Sweden will likely continue, and emphasizes the potential of using ethics as an analytical tool for further developing a professional teaching approach.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.