Cette étude tente de démontrer la place des zâwiyas et plus particulièrement celle de la ‘Alawiyya dans l’Algérie contemporaine et leur rôle pendant la montée du nationalisme et la lutte de libération. Parler de la persécution et de la réhabilitation de la confrérie ‘Alawiyya (et d’autres) en Algérie durant la période contemporaine, nous amène à traiter des rapports de celle-ci avec : (1) L’administration coloniale : la confrérie était étroitement surveillée par les services de la police des renseignements généraux. La stratégie de la confrérie consistait à rester neutre autant que possible mais elle n’hésitait pas à défendre la préservation de l’identité arabo-musulmane. (2) Le mouvement du réformisme : avec la parution en 1926 de la revue ach-Chihab et l’Association des Oulémas Musulmans Algériens (AOMA) fondée le 5 mai 1931 avec à sa tête le Président Ibn Badis qui contribua à la montée du sentiment nationaliste algérien. (3) Les milieux nationalistes algériens : avec lesquels la confrérie ‘Alawiyya entretenait des relations étroites notamment sous la période du Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA). Les événements du 8 mai 1945 à Sétif précipitèrent la préparation de la Révolution algérienne pendant laquelle le cheikh Mehdi Bentounes joua un rôle actif. (4) Les gouvernements algériens successifs : La confrérie ‘Alawiyya entendait lutter contre la nationalisation des biens habous. Le gouvernement Boumediene mena une vaste campagne de persécution contre le cheikh Mehdi Bentounes et procéda à son arrestation en 1970. La confrérie agissait dorénavant sur le terrain Européen avec le cheikh Khaled Bentounes qui procéda à la création de nombreux projets culturels et de jeunesse et à la reconnaissance de nombreux projets par les instances officielles nationales et internationales. Les persécutions finirent progressivement par marginaliser un courant religieux- soufisme qui était présent en Algérie depuis le début du millénaire. Il eut fallu l’avènement de la montée du fondamentalisme religieux qui aboutit à la guerre civile dite « les années noires » pour que le Gouvernement algérien procède à la réhabilitation des confréries religieuses en Algérie. / This study will attempt to demonstrate the status of zawiyyas, and in particular that of the 'Alawiyya in contemporary Algeria, and their role during the rise of nationalism and the liberation struggle. In our discussion of the persecution and rehabilitation of the 'Alawiyya Brotherhood (and others) in Algeria during the contemporary period we will deal with the links between the 'Alawiyya and: (1) The colonial administration: the Brotherhood was closely watched by the police and intelligence agencies. The strategy of the Brotherhood was to remain neutral insofar as possible, but it did not hesitate to defend the preservation of Arab-Muslim identity. (2) The reform movement, with the appearance in 1926 of the journal ach-Chihab and the Association of Muslim Algerian Ulemas (AOMA) founded the 5th of May 1931 with at its head President Ibn Badis, who contributed to the rise of Algerian nationalist sentiment. (3)Algerian nationalist groups, with which the 'Alawiyya Brotherhood maintained close relations, notably during the period of the Party of the Algerian People (PPA) founded in 1937 by Messali Hadj. The events of 8 May 1945 in Sétif triggered the preparation of the Algerian Revolution during which the Sheikh Mehdi Bentounes played an important role. (4) Successive Algerian governments: the 'Alawiyya Brotherhood decided to come out against the nationalization of « habous » holdings. The Boumedienne government carried out a vast campaign of persecution against Sheikh Mehdi Bentounes and had him arrested in 1970. From that time the Brotherhood became active in Europe with Sheikh Khaled Bentounes, who fostered the creation of numerous cultural and youth-oriented projects which enjoyed official recognition. These waves of persecution little by little marginalized a religious current -Sufism (tasawuf)- which had been present in Algeria from the beginning of the millennium, and which was part of an essential immaterial cultural heritage in Algeria. It took the arrival and the development of religious fundamentalism, resulting in the civil war known as the « Dark Years », for the Algerian government to promote the rehabilitation of the religious Brotherhoods in Algeria.

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O presente estudo tem por finalidade descrever a interação conflituosa entre o nacionalismo árabe e o Líbano entre 1952 e 1967. Nesses anos ocorreu a ascensão do nacionalismo árabe, que teve na figura do presidente egípcio Gamal Abdel Nasser a sua principal liderança. Seu objetivo era promover a luta dos povos de língua árabe contra a dependência tecnológica e dominação econômica e/ou política dos países capitalistas centrais, situados na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte. Bem como desenvolver suas sociedades e combater os setores conservadores internos, aliados dos poderes capitalistas ocidentais e pouco interessados em uma modernização mais profunda ou uma grande melhoria nos padrões de vida das classes populares. O objetivo último dos nacionalistas árabes era a unidade de todos os povos árabes em algum tipo de estrutura estatal. No Líbano a ideia da unidade árabe era mais difícil de realizar, pois uma parcela importante da sua população, os cristãos maronitas, não se viam como árabes e buscaram criar um estado separado para eles no começo do século XX, com apoio de uma potência colonial europeia com quem se identificavam e tinha laços históricos: a França. No entanto, para que o Líbano pudesse existir como estado independente viável economicamente, após a II Guerra Mundial, tiveram os cristão maronitas de entrar em acordo com a população muçulmana, particularmente os sunitas, e aceitar que o Líbano tinha uma face árabe. Esse acordo, conhecido como o Pacto Nacional, garantiu a existência do Líbano e permitiu que este se tornasse um entreposto comercial e financeiro no Oriente Médio, algo desejado tanto por suas elites cristãs (maronita e outras), como pelas muçulmanas. Mas, enquanto o Líbano experimentava um grande crescimento econômico na década de 1950, as suas regiões muçulmanas eram mantida em grande parte alheias a esse crescimento. O resultado foi o seguinte: as populações muçulmanas passaram a questionar a preponderância cristã e viram em Nasser e no nacionalismo árabe um meio para isso. Suas lideranças tiverem que segui-las, enquanto a população cristã, particularmente os maronitas, sentia-se ameaçada. Estas tensões, mescladas às ambições do presidente Camille Chamoun e ao cenário da Guerra Fria, conduziram a guerra civil de 1958. Posteriormente, entre 1959 e 1964, em um governo de unidade nacional, o Presidente Fuad Chehab tentou promover a unidade nacional, fazer investimentos do estado nas regiões muçulmanas, criar um esboço de segurança social e regular o liberalismo desenfreado do país. Seu fracasso parcial e o mau tratamento da população de refugiados palestinos por suas forças de segurança abriu caminho para a grande guerra civil de 1975-1990 / The present study aims at describing the conflicting interaction between Arab nationalism and Lebanon between 1952 and 1967. Those years was the rise of Arab nationalism, which had the figure of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser your primary leadership. His goal was to promote the struggle of the Arabic speaking people against technological dependence and economic domination and / or policy of the central capitalist countries located in Western Europe and North America. As well as developing their societies and combat domestic conservative sectors, allies of Western capitalist powers and little interested in a deeper upgrade or a major improvement in living standards of the working classes. The ultimate aim of Arab nationalists was the unity of all Arab peoples in some kind of state structure. In Lebanon the idea of Arab unity was more difficult to accomplish, because a significant portion of its population, the Maronite Christians, do not see themselves as Arabs and sought to create a separate state for them in the early twentieth century, with the support of a colonial power European with whom identified themselves and had historical ties: France. However, that Lebanon could exist as economically viable independent state after World War II, Christian Maronites had to come to terms with the Muslim population, particularly the Sunnis, and accept that Lebanon was an Arab face. This agreement, known as the National Pact, ensured the existence of Lebanon and allowed it to become a commercial and financial entrepot in the Middle East, something desired by both her Christian elites (Maronite and other), and by Muslims. But while Lebanon was experiencing great economic growth in the 1950s, its Muslim regions were maintained in large part unrelated to this growth. The result was as follows: Muslim populations began to question the Christian dominance and saw in Nasser and Arab nationalism means for this. Their leaders have to follow them, while the Christian population, particularly the Maronites, felt threatened. These tensions, merged the ambitions of President Camille Chamoun and the scenario of the Cold War, led to civil war in 1958. Later, between 1959 and 1964 in a government of national unity, President Fuad Chehab tried to promote national unity, make investments state in Muslim regions, create an outline of social security and regular liberalism rampant in the country. Its partial failure and poor treatment of the population of Palestinian refugees by its security forces paved the way for the great Civil War 1975-1990

Chapter I of this study of the Arabian Ba'th Socialist Party discusses the evolution of Arab nationalism and concludes that Ba'th was a natural outcome of this evolution; two intellectuals supporting Arab nationalism were Party co-founders Michael Aflaq and Salah Bitar, Part One of Chapter II summarizes their lives to facilitate understanding of their thought and its impact on Ba'th; Part Two examines the Party's first convention (source of the Ba'th constitution), the reasons for it, and the necessity of establishing Ba'th; and Part Three outlines Ba'th ideology and organization. Chapter III analyzes Ba'th's promotion of Syrian-Egyptian union and that union's resultant adverse effect upon Party cohesiveness, The Conclusion discusses the groups into which Ba'th split after 1961 and their new interpretations of Ba'th ideology.

This thesis aims at analyzing the reasons for the insoluble nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The reasons behind the continuation of the conflict are various. However, this thesis mainly concentrated on the ones stemmed from the clash of Arab nationalism and Zionism. This clash basically represents the failure of both sides in making any concession from their territorial attachments which resulted from Arab nationalism and Zionism. Though both nationalisms were constructed on the same founding factors such as religion, territory and culture, Arab nationalists and Zionists gained different positions during the conflict. These positions determined the future of all of the peace processes in the near past. All peace processes that had focused on the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict displayed that any formulation for a last settlement to the conflict should take into consideration the inability of the parties to agree on a territorial compromise and the adoption by both sides of the continuation of the conflict as a political instrument.

During the Arabic cultural renaissance of the nineteenth century known as the nahda, Christian Arabs made a substantial contribution to the development of fiction and journalism. Among these pioneers, Salim al-Bustani, Jurji Zaydan, and Farah Antun were inspired by translations of European fiction to write the first historical novels in Arabic. Their narrations of the Muslim wars of conquest are carefully constructed blends of history and fiction that emphasize the cultural and religious values that Christian and Muslim Arabs hold in common. In their novels, these authors celebrate the historical achievements of the Arabs and seek to inspire a new sense of Arab cultural identity, open to Christians and Muslims alike and based on shared language, history, territory, values, and aspirations for reform. In this way, these authors respond to the sectarian tensions of their time, European imperialism, and the challenges of modernism with ideas that would become central to Arab nationalist discourse in the twentieth century.

O presente estudo tem por finalidade descrever a interação conflituosa entre o nacionalismo árabe e o Líbano entre 1952 e 1967. Nesses anos ocorreu a ascensão do nacionalismo árabe, que teve na figura do presidente egípcio Gamal Abdel Nasser a sua principal liderança. Seu objetivo era promover a luta dos povos de língua árabe contra a dependência tecnológica e dominação econômica e/ou política dos países capitalistas centrais, situados na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte. Bem como desenvolver suas sociedades e combater os setores conservadores internos, aliados dos poderes capitalistas ocidentais e pouco interessados em uma modernização mais profunda ou uma grande melhoria nos padrões de vida das classes populares. O objetivo último dos nacionalistas árabes era a unidade de todos os povos árabes em algum tipo de estrutura estatal. No Líbano a ideia da unidade árabe era mais difícil de realizar, pois uma parcela importante da sua população, os cristãos maronitas, não se viam como árabes e buscaram criar um estado separado para eles no começo do século XX, com apoio de uma potência colonial europeia com quem se identificavam e tinha laços históricos: a França. No entanto, para que o Líbano pudesse existir como estado independente viável economicamente, após a II Guerra Mundial, tiveram os cristão maronitas de entrar em acordo com a população muçulmana, particularmente os sunitas, e aceitar que o Líbano tinha uma face árabe. Esse acordo, conhecido como o Pacto Nacional, garantiu a existência do Líbano e permitiu que este se tornasse um entreposto comercial e financeiro no Oriente Médio, algo desejado tanto por suas elites cristãs (maronita e outras), como pelas muçulmanas. Mas, enquanto o Líbano experimentava um grande crescimento econômico na década de 1950, as suas regiões muçulmanas eram mantida em grande parte alheias a esse crescimento. O resultado foi o seguinte: as populações muçulmanas passaram a questionar a preponderância cristã e viram em Nasser e no nacionalismo árabe um meio para isso. Suas lideranças tiverem que segui-las, enquanto a população cristã, particularmente os maronitas, sentia-se ameaçada. Estas tensões, mescladas às ambições do presidente Camille Chamoun e ao cenário da Guerra Fria, conduziram a guerra civil de 1958. Posteriormente, entre 1959 e 1964, em um governo de unidade nacional, o Presidente Fuad Chehab tentou promover a unidade nacional, fazer investimentos do estado nas regiões muçulmanas, criar um esboço de segurança social e regular o liberalismo desenfreado do país. Seu fracasso parcial e o mau tratamento da população de refugiados palestinos por suas forças de segurança abriu caminho para a grande guerra civil de 1975-1990 / The present study aims at describing the conflicting interaction between Arab nationalism and Lebanon between 1952 and 1967. Those years was the rise of Arab nationalism, which had the figure of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser your primary leadership. His goal was to promote the struggle of the Arabic speaking people against technological dependence and economic domination and / or policy of the central capitalist countries located in Western Europe and North America. As well as developing their societies and combat domestic conservative sectors, allies of Western capitalist powers and little interested in a deeper upgrade or a major improvement in living standards of the working classes. The ultimate aim of Arab nationalists was the unity of all Arab peoples in some kind of state structure. In Lebanon the idea of Arab unity was more difficult to accomplish, because a significant portion of its population, the Maronite Christians, do not see themselves as Arabs and sought to create a separate state for them in the early twentieth century, with the support of a colonial power European with whom identified themselves and had historical ties: France. However, that Lebanon could exist as economically viable independent state after World War II, Christian Maronites had to come to terms with the Muslim population, particularly the Sunnis, and accept that Lebanon was an Arab face. This agreement, known as the National Pact, ensured the existence of Lebanon and allowed it to become a commercial and financial entrepot in the Middle East, something desired by both her Christian elites (Maronite and other), and by Muslims. But while Lebanon was experiencing great economic growth in the 1950s, its Muslim regions were maintained in large part unrelated to this growth. The result was as follows: Muslim populations began to question the Christian dominance and saw in Nasser and Arab nationalism means for this. Their leaders have to follow them, while the Christian population, particularly the Maronites, felt threatened. These tensions, merged the ambitions of President Camille Chamoun and the scenario of the Cold War, led to civil war in 1958. Later, between 1959 and 1964 in a government of national unity, President Fuad Chehab tried to promote national unity, make investments state in Muslim regions, create an outline of social security and regular liberalism rampant in the country. Its partial failure and poor treatment of the population of Palestinian refugees by its security forces paved the way for the great Civil War 1975-1990

The Arab Middle East began indigenous nation building relatively late in the twentieth century. Issues of legitimacy, identity, and conflicts with the West have plagued Arab nations. Arab states have espoused universal ideologies as solutions to the problems of Arab nation building. The two ideologies of Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism provided universal solutions to the Arab states. Both Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism gained validity in political polemics aimed against colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, and the West. Both ideologies promised simple solutions to complex questions of building modern Arab society. Irrespective of ideology, Arab states have always acted in self-interest to perceived external threats. The West has perpetuated universal solutions to Arab nation building through continued intervention in the Middle East. The Arabs perpetuated universal solutions to Arab- nation building as panacea to the problems of becoming modern nations.

This project seeks to explain the aggressive turn in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy after 2011, most drastically exemplified through its 2015 military intervention into Yemen. It does so through a two-case historical comparison between the Saudi interventions in Yemen in 1962 and 2015. Additionally, it compares the nature of internal regime survival strategies within the kingdom during these two distinct time periods of regional revolutionary upheaval: the Nasserist period of the late 1950s to 1960s and the time during and after the Arab uprisings in 2011. It makes the argument that, despite comparable internal and external threats in each time period, Saudi foreign policy is more openly aggressive in the contemporary period as a function of the regime’s ontologically weakened ideological legitimation. Whereas the Nasserist period offered an ontologically distinct threat in the form of a rival state ideology (secular Arab nationalism) that could be strategically co-opted and repressed by the Saudi regime, the Arab uprisings embodied a broader threat. This has included movements that have combined variations of both Islamism and liberal constitutionalism to challenge authoritarianism in the region. It has ultimately been threatening in part because of an ontological similarity to the regime’s own historic use of Islamic legitimacy. Thus, unlike the mediated Saudi approach to the Nasserist threat, the Saudi regime today has opportunistically engaged in an exaggerated aggression abroad as well as more deliberate, open displays of domestic repression at home. / Political Science

This thesis considers the role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in countering Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda directed at British interests in the Middle East and Africa between 1954 and 1963. It argues that the 1956 Suez Crisis and its fallout was the catalyst that drove a significant expansion of IRD's remit and responsibility. From 1956 the department – which up to this point had had a purely anti-Communist function – was given the responsibility of countering the increasing flow of Arab nationalist propaganda emerging from Egypt. The same year, the Communist powers mounted a renewed and concerted effort to culturally and ideologically penetrate Africa. IRD, who to this point had been excluded from directly operating in Africa, began counter-Communist work in the face of stiff Colonial Office resistance. Analysis of IRD in the Middle East has rarely considered events beyond the immediate aftermath of Suez. IRD's work in Africa is almost wholly unexplored. It is a central contention of this thesis that the two regions cannot be viewed in isolation post-Suez. Egypt's standing was buoyed by the propaganda capital of victory over Suez, and Nasser's position as the figurehead of Arab nationalism was assured. In seeking the removal of colonial influence from the Middle East and Africa, Arab propaganda – particularly the Voice of the Arabs programme of Cairo Radio – ties the regions together. Communist and African nationalist propagandists were drawn to Cairo in the wake of the Suez Crisis. The former, building relationships through aid, sought to leverage Cairo's expanding influence to their own advantage. The latter sought facilities and support for their own propaganda efforts. After Suez, IRD sought to manage Egyptian propaganda whilst avoiding direct confrontation, seeking to normalise relations. In Africa, the department sought to build an infrastructure for information work aimed at influencing future leaders, their efforts constrained by the timetable of British decolonisation. In both regions, through developing relationships with local agencies and the BBC, and from initiatives such as the Transmission 'X' news commentary service, IRD continued to address Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda with a flexibility and responsiveness not recognised in the current literature on IRD.