Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

L’Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) est un consortium britannique formé le 30 mai 1929 et qui prend la suite de la Turkish Petroleum Company qui opérait sur l’ensemble de l’Empire ottoman. Sa mission est de trouver, exploiter et transporter du pétrole brut provenant de ses vastes concessions au profit de ses actionnaires. C’est l’Irak qui se trouve au cœur de l’entreprise pétrolière que les Majors comptent mener au Moyen-Orient, tout au moins à ses débuts. L’IPC exploite à partir de 1925 une concession qui s’étend à l’est du Tigre. En juillet 1938 et en mai 1939, deux de ses filiales, la Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) et la Mosul Petroleum company (MPC), gèrent respectivement les territoires situés au sud et au nord du 33e parallèle. À la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, c’est donc la presque totalité de l’Irak qui est aux mains du consortium britannique pour une durée de 75 ans. Entre 1948, date à laquelle les Majors américaines prennent le contrôle effectif du consortium, et la nationalisation de tous les avoirs de la compagnie en Irak en 1975, l’IPC doit faire face à de profondes mutations, tant en ce qui concerne l’industrie pétrolière que la situation géopolitique du Moyen-Orient. Tandis que le Moyen-Orient devient la première région exportatrice de pétrole au monde grâce aux efforts des Majors, l’affrontement entre le monde arabe et l’État d’Israël exacerbe le nationalisme des pays producteurs de pétrole. De simples pays hôtes percepteurs de redevances, ceux-ci réclament au nom de la souveraineté nationale et de la lutte contre l’impérialisme de contrôler l’action des Majors et de prendre activement part dans l’exploitation de leurs richesses nationales. Ainsi, l’IPC, avec d’autres consortium pétroliers internationaux opérant au Moyen-Orient, se trouve affectée, voire impliquée, dans les choix diplomatiques que les gouvernements occidentaux développent pour prévenir l’instabilité du Moyen-Orient, zone stratégique essentielle pour leur approvisionnement énergétique dans un contexte de guerre froide. / The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is a British company that, in July 1928, succeeded the Turkish Petroleum Company, which held a concession in Iraq. Since its creation, the IPC had been both an emanation of the major Western oil groups and the concrete expression of the oil policy pursued in the Middle East by the major Western powers, the United States, Great Britain and France. It was a petroleum production consortium whose activities were mainly in Iraq. From his creation in 1929 to his nationalization in 1975, IPC associated all of the Western Majors. In 1932 and in 1938, the Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) rounded out this system in the southern part of Iraq. So, on the eve of World War II, the area of the concessions covered all Iraq.Until the 1970s, the concession system governed relationships between operating companies and producing countries. In those agreements, the producing countries did not control the amounts produced, the level of exports, or prices. But, as of the 1950s, the complex oil system implemented by the Majors was threatened by the de-colonization movement. The Soviet threat and the Israeli-Arab conflicts strengthened this increasing instability. So the battle for freeing the Arab nation incorporated the fight against IPC to return Arab oil to the Arabs. The revolution of 14 July 1958, which overthrew Nouri Saïd’s pro-Western government and brought General Abd el-Karim Kassem to power, intensified a constant political desire for re-appropriation of the Iraqi oil economy in the name of Iraq’s development and national sovereignty.

Notre récit commence dans l’Egypte nationaliste des années 1950. Le coup d’Etat mené par Gamal Abdel Nasser et le “Mouvement des Officiers Libres” ouvre la voie à une révolution politique, économique, et socioculturelle, au Caire et dans l’ensemble du monde arabe. Il met alors en place un puissant dispositif médiatique : il fonde la radio la Voix des Arabes, publie La Philosophie de la révolution, et fera très rapidement du journal Al-Ahram la langue de sa révolution. De la guerre de Suez en 1956, à l’union avec la Syrie en 1958, l’Egypte soutiendra alors tous les mouvements de libération nationale jusqu’à la “catastrophe” de 1967, qui signe l’arrêt de mort du nationalisme nassérien. Lorsque le nationalisme laïc n’a pas réussi à restituer la Palestine et la dignité arabe perdues, certains ont cru que c’est la religion qui le fera. Deux modèles antagonistes secouent alors le consensus des années 1960 : au “pétro-islam” saoudien s’oppose désormais un islam chiite inspiré par la Révolution islamique en Iran et prôné par le Hezbollah et son Secrétaire général Hassan Nasrallah. Les années 1980-1990 correspondent aussi à l’introduction des chaînes satellites dans le monde arabe ; au pouvoir mobilisateur de la radio des années 1950, se substitue la force de l’image de chaînes comme Al-Jazeera et Al-Manar. Ainsi, trois décennies après la dernière guerre israélo-arabe, la question de l’identité est exportée sur le front libanais : Nasrallah dit mener, en 2006, “la guerre de la nation contre l’ennemi sioniste”. Comment, à travers leur couverture de la révolution, de la guerre, de la défaite et de la victoire, les médias arabes ont-ils dit l’identité tout au long des soixante dernières années d’histoire ? Comment la radio, la presse écrite, la télévision satellitaire, mais aussi la chanson, les clips et les jeux vidéo ont-ils dit l’arabité? Qu’est-ce que “être arabe” dans le discours médiatique d’aujourd’hui et de quelles manières l’islam politique prôné par les médias contemporains reprend-t-il les anciennes thématiques du nationalisme nassérien ? / Our story starts in the nationalist Egypt of the 1950s. The military coup undertaken by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the “Free Officers Movement” paved the way for a political, economic and socio-cultural revolution in Egypt and the entire Arab world. Soon after, Nasser established a powerful multifaceted media apparatus: he founded The Voices of the Arabs radio station, published The Philosophy of the Revolution, while Al-Ahram was slowly becoming the “tongue” of his revolution. From the Suez crisis in 1956, until the union with Syria in 1958, Nasser’s Egypt supported all anti-colonial liberation movements in the Arab world, until the 1967 defeat that signed the death sentence of pan-Arab nationalism. When secular nationalism couldn’t resuscitate Palestine and the tarnished Arab dignity, some thought that religion could. Two antagonistic models shook the fragile consensus of the 1960s: a Saudi “petro-Islam”, and the more recently emerging Shiite Islam, inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and mainly promoted by Hezbollah and its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The 1980s also correspond to the introduction of the first satellite channels in the Arab world: the power of images on channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar began to substitute radio’s mobilizing discourse of the 1950s. Three decades after the last Arab-Israeli war, the question of Arab identity is exported to the Lebanese front: Hassan Nasrallah says he is leading, in 2006, “the nation’s war against the Zionist enemy”. How did Arab media, through their coverage of revolutions, wars, defeats and victories, take part in the mechanisms of construction of post-colonial identities? How did the radio, the print and the satellite media, the songs, the music clips and the video games all define what is being “an Arab” today? And in which ways, does today’s political Islam, promoted by contemporary media narratives, reclaim the old pan-Arab and nationalist themes?

Este trabalho é fruto de uma reflexão que busca explicações acerca tanto do apogeu quanto do declínio do nacionalismo árabe, na história, mas, sobretudo, em cinco teorias da nação e do nacionalismo, a saber, a de Ernest Gellner, a de Benedict Anderson, a de John Plamenatz, a de Elie Kedourie e, finalmente, a de Anthony Smith. Para tanto, apresentamos, em primeiro lugar, cada uma das abordagens teóricas supracitadas. Em seguida, discorremos sobre o nosso objeto, ou seja, o nacionalismo árabe, de uma perspectiva histórica (origens, auge e declínio). Por fim, procurando teorizar sobre um tema basicamente dominado por historiadores, analisamos o pan-arabismo à luz das referidas teorias e daí tiramos nossas conclusões sobre seu crescimento e sua decadência. / This research is outcome of the thinking that seeks explanations about arab nationalism\'s apogee and decline by the history, but, over all, by the Ernest Gellner\'s, Benedict Andersons, John Plamenatz\'s, Elie Kedourie\'s and, finally, Anthony Smith\'s nation and nationalism\'s theory. For that, first of all, we explain each one of the mention theoretical approach. Soon after, present the arab nationalism in the historical perspective (origins, apogee and decline). Finally, we analyze the research\'s object (pan-arabism or arab nationalism) by the five theory and get conclusions about its zenith and fall.

Este trabalho é fruto de uma reflexão que busca explicações acerca tanto do apogeu quanto do declínio do nacionalismo árabe, na história, mas, sobretudo, em cinco teorias da nação e do nacionalismo, a saber, a de Ernest Gellner, a de Benedict Anderson, a de John Plamenatz, a de Elie Kedourie e, finalmente, a de Anthony Smith. Para tanto, apresentamos, em primeiro lugar, cada uma das abordagens teóricas supracitadas. Em seguida, discorremos sobre o nosso objeto, ou seja, o nacionalismo árabe, de uma perspectiva histórica (origens, auge e declínio). Por fim, procurando teorizar sobre um tema basicamente dominado por historiadores, analisamos o pan-arabismo à luz das referidas teorias e daí tiramos nossas conclusões sobre seu crescimento e sua decadência. / This research is outcome of the thinking that seeks explanations about arab nationalism\'s apogee and decline by the history, but, over all, by the Ernest Gellner\'s, Benedict Andersons, John Plamenatz\'s, Elie Kedourie\'s and, finally, Anthony Smith\'s nation and nationalism\'s theory. For that, first of all, we explain each one of the mention theoretical approach. Soon after, present the arab nationalism in the historical perspective (origins, apogee and decline). Finally, we analyze the research\'s object (pan-arabism or arab nationalism) by the five theory and get conclusions about its zenith and fall.

To a large degree, historical analyses of the Levantine region tend to focus primarily upon martial interaction and state formation. However, perhaps of equitable impact is the chronology of those interactions which are cultural in nature. The long-term formative effect of cultural imperialism and cultural bleed can easily be as influential as the direct alterations imposed by martial invasion. While this study does not attempt to establish comparative causal weight or catalytic impact between these types of interactions, it does contend that the cultural evolution of the Levant has been significantly influenced by external interaction for a period of time extending beyond the Levantine Islamic Expansion. This study presents a chronological examination of the region from the pre-Expansion Period through the Mandate Period, focused upon relevant cultural structures. Specifically, emphasis is placed upon religious, ethnic, and nationalistic identity development, sociolinguistic shifts, and institutional changes within the societal structure. The primary conclusion of this study is that significant evidence exists to support a long-term historical narrative of externally influenced Levantine cultural evolution, inclusive of both adaptive and reactive interactions.

This case study is the first comprehensive analysis of the German Democratic Republic’s activities in South Yemen, the only Marxist state in the Arab World and at times the closest and most loyal ally to the Soviet Union in the Middle East during the Cold War. The dissertation analyzes East German Foreign Policy as a case of Socialist state- and nation-building and in doing so produces one major hypotheses: The case of South Yemen may be considered both, an ‘exceptional case’ and the possible ‘ideal type’ of the ‘general’ of East German foreign policy and thus points to what the GDR’s foreign policy could have been, if it hadn’t been for the numerous restraints of East German foreign-policy-making. The author critically engages with the normative and empirical dimensions of the ‘Limits of Foreign Policy’ by including a constructivist perspective of foreign policy. Apart from the case study itself, the dissertation provides the reader with a thorough overview of forty years of East German foreign policy with a focus on the interests and influence of The Soviet Union as well as the first introduction and methodological approach to East Germany's foreign policy in the Middle East. The empirical side of the analysis rests on archival documents of the German Foreign Office, the German National Archive and the former Ministry of State Security of the GDR. These documents are reviewed and published for the first time and are complemented by personal interviews with contemporary witnesses. The interdisciplinary approach integrates and expands methods of both History and Political Science, applicable to other cases. Conducted research is intended to contribute to academic discourse on South Yemen’s unique history, divided Germany’s role in the Cold War, East German foreign policy, but also the long-term impact of Socialist foreign-policy-making in the Global South which so far has been neglected almost completely in academia. / Graduate / miriam.mueller@fu-berlin.de

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