"The rise in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan and Uganda is in no small part, due not only to states' incapacity to protect their own people, but also to a direct attack by states on selected communities, or on insurgent groups. In Sudan, there is a large amount of information pointing to the responsibility of the Sudanese government in the human rights violations committed against the IDPs in Darfur. In Uganda, the majority of the displaced harbour considerable anger towards the government for having forced them out of their homes and then being unable to protect and provide for them, and in many cases being guilty of violations of their rights. The problem is aggravated by the facts that IDPs have no specific set of international instruments or a Convention in their favour, and there is no dedicated UN agency to turn to. The concept of state sovereignty still takes centre stage, and IDPs remain under the 'protection' of their own states, which in many cases are responsible for their plight. International humanitarian assistance is limited to the provision of basic necessities like food, shelter and medicine, while measures that ensure respect for the physical safety and the human rights of IDPs remain inadequate. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement particularise general human rights principles to the situation of the internally displaced, however they have no binding authority, and therefore do not bind states, neither are they enforceable by the IDPs. Currently, reliance is placed upon international humanitarian law and the existing international human rights law, but international humanitarian law only applies in situations of armed conflict. Consequently, this study proceeds from the presumption that the governments of Sudan and Uganda have failed to protect the IDPs within their jurisdictions, hence the need for stronger international protection. The study is aimed at addressing the specific problem of the lack of adequate international human rights protection for the IDPs from the time of displacement, to the time displacement ends. Emphasis of the study is placed on displacements resulting from armed conflicts, because these are the most rampant and most problematic in Africa. Darfur and Northern Uganda are the particular focus of this study because they are the most affected regions in Africa today." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Africa is home to more than 40% of the world’s population of internally displaced persons (IDPs).4 IDPs, according to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement5, are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of – or in order to avoid the effects of – armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural disasters or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2010. / A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Mr. S Tindifa at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda. 2010. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

An emerging literature on rebel groups’ restraint in the use of sexual violence has begun to explore the role of the commander. This study seeks to build on this literature by investigating under what conditions rebel commanders will enforce restraint. I argue that perpetrating sexual violence against civilian communities to which a rebel group has ethnic ties is highly costly for the rebel commander. Thus, commanders will strive to enforce restraint in the use of sexual violence against co-ethnic civilians. However, their ability to enforce restraint, I argue, hinges on the authority and influence they have over their combatants. Hence, I hypothesize that rebel groups with strong commanders are more likely to enforce restraint toward co-ethnic civilians. This argument is examined through unique spatial data on the geographic patterns of rebel sexual violence combined with spatial data on rebel groups’ co-ethnic civilian populations in Africa 1989-2009. Regression analysis finds that rebel groups with strong commanders and ethnic ties are less likely to perpetrate sexual violence against co-ethnics, yet also that groups with weak commanders are more likely to victimize co-ethnics.

The objective of this study is to examine the role of the political élite in the analysis of the causes of conflicts and insecurity as well as the determination of threats to national security in the Third World with particular reference to West Africa using Côte d’Ivoire as a case study. To achieve this aim, the study employed a conceptual framework of national security that highlighted the concept of security and the distinction between the traditional notions and widening views of security as manifested in the post-Cold War approaches to the subject. The differences between the various levels of security, namely national security and state and regime security were examined. A distinction was made between minimal and maximal states on the one hand, and strong and weak states on the other which enabled the application of the concepts to Third World countries, including Africa. The concept of threats and vulnerabilities and how subjective elements of threat assessment blurred the difference between national security and regime security, were also analyzed including the causes of armed conflicts in developing countries and in Africa specifically. Based on these concepts, the study analyzed the political, socio-economic and security conditions of the Ivory Coast in the period before and during French rule, including the post-independence era. The aim of the historical analysis was to highlight the critical role played by the élite in the identification of threats to national security. This role invariably identified with the protection of élite interest or regime security and often reflected a subjective view of threats to security, the management of which created high levels of insecurity leading to the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. The study established that the preservation of élite interests and power is the root cause of conflicts in Africa and West Africa. Subsequently, élite cohesion becomes critical to the security of the state as élite disunity leads to manipulation of objective threats or risks that generates insecurity that not only transcends borders, but also creates a security dilemma for states as well as conditions for irredentism. / Dissertation (MSecurity Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The interest in studying the effects of armed conflict and LGBTs have increased significantly in the last decade. Mainly due to the international recognition and increased reporting of violations against said group. Moreover, previous studies have mainly been within-case studies focusing on the state or rebel groups as the main perpetrators. This paper moves beyond these and explore why LGBTs are targeted to different extents across conflicts. Thus, the paper asks the following research question: "Why is the LGBT community more vulnerable in some armed conflicts than in others?". The paper argues that armed conflict duration fuels militarisation, which increases honour ideology over time. The process results in the polarisation of masculine and feminine ideals. Finally, as LGBTs inherently challenge the gender system, they are targeted by both civilians and the state. Hence, the hypothesis is, “The longer an armed conflict continues, the more vulnerable the LGBT community becomes.”. The paper uses structured focused comparison and data from 63 reports to conduct three within-case analyses and a cross-case comparison to answer the above question. The results and analyses indicate preliminary support for the hypothesis.

Recent research has recognised the complexity of fragmented conflicts; however, debate exists regarding when and how fragmentation hinders peace processes. This study addresses this lacuna, by investigating the conditions under which fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement. Advancing Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework with insights from political parties’ literature, creating a novel causal mechanism, I argue that two conditions affect how fragmentation influences the likelihood of a peace agreement: veto players and outbidding. As veto players can ‘veto’ a peace agreement, a reduction in their number increases the likelihood of a settlement. Where fragmentation increases veto-players, I hypothesise that whether a peace agreement is likely or not, depends on the level of preference divergence, which is dependent on their engagement in outbidding. The hypotheses are tested through a qualitative structured-focused comparison approach, examining the cases of the Philippines (1990-1996), Uganda (1986-1988), Ethiopia (1973-1983), and Afghanistan (1980-1990). Overall, this thesis finds mixed support. Limited support is found for the hypotheses, with half of the cases concurring with expectations. However, the cases also reveal significant support for the mechanisms, although with qualifications, suggesting further refinement is required.

La violence en temps de guerre prend parfois des formes extrêmes. Non seulement les belligé-rants tuent fréquemment un grand nombre de civils, mais leurs atrocités vont parfois au-delà du seul meurtre pour inclure des actes de cruauté tels que la mutilation, le viol, la torture publique ou encore les abus des corps humains. Si des cas individuels de ce type de violence se produisent probablement dans presque tous les conflits et peuvent s’expliquer par la psychopathie, le sa-disme, ou un processus de « barbarisation » inhérent à la guerre, ni la psychologie individuelle ni les conditions propres à la lutte armée ne peuvent expliquer pourquoi l’ampleur de ce type d’actes spécifiques varie d’une organisation sociale à une autre. Dans certains groupes armés, les atrocités extrêmes demeurent des cas isolés. Dans d’autres, cependant, nombre de combattants font de telles pratiques une part intégrante de leur « répertoire de violence ». Comment expliquer cette variation ? Dans cette thèse, je propose une série d’arguments théoriques permettant d’expliquer, au moins en partie, pourquoi la violence en temps de guerre prend parfois la forme d’atrocités extrêmes. Je définis les « atrocités extrêmes » comme des actes de violence caractérisés par une cruauté manifeste et publique. Je soutiens que ces types d’actes émergent souvent dans un contexte de guerre irrégulière ; des conflits caractérisés par une impor-tante asymétrie des capacités militaires, l’utilisation de tactique de guérilla, et, par voie de consé-quence, un contrôle territorial hautement fragmenté. Dans ce contexte, je montre que les atrocités extrêmes découlent souvent de deux proces-sus alternatifs. Le premier processus implique un modèle de prise de décision « du haut vers le bas, » via lequel des dirigeants organisationnels adoptent des tactiques centrées sur la violence extrême à des fins stratégiques. L’objectif premier est souvent de dissuader les civils de collabo-rer avec l’ennemi dans les territoires contestés. Le deuxième processus implique l’émergence d’atrocités extrêmes en tant que « pratique de guerre ». Ici, les techniques de cruauté émergent au niveau des unités militaires, sans découler d’ordres venus d’en haut. Je soutiens qu’une telle émergence est plus probable dans les unités militaires présentant tant un niveau élevé de cohésion sociale qu’une faible discipline. Dans des conditions de guerre irrégulière, ces unités peuvent dé-velopper des normes informelles légitimant la violence extrême comme moyen de venger les pertes au combat. Ces arguments sont développés et testés dans ma thèse à l’aide d’une variété de matériaux empiriques disséminés dans trois articles qui ont été ou seront bientôt soumis pour publication. Le premier article (chapitre 2) définit le concept d’atrocité extrême et utilise des données venant de quatre guerres civiles pour vérifier la plausibilité d’une série d’explications tirées de la littérature sur la violence envers les civils. Le deuxième article (chapitre 3) analyse l’utilisation des décapita-tions par les groupes djihadistes. Je montre que seule une minorité de ces groupes utilise ce type de violence de manière récurrente et que la variation peut être expliquée par le contexte straté-gique dans lequel les organisations mènent leurs opérations et par la nature de leurs liens transna-tionaux. Le troisième article (chapitre 4) se concentre sur l’émergence des atrocités extrêmes en tant que « pratique » au sein des forces de sécurité étatiques, en utilisant l’exemple des mutila-tions commises par les soldats américains au cours de la guerre du Vietnam. Ce cas démontre spécifiquement comment les atrocités extrêmes peuvent se généraliser malgré leur interdiction au niveau du commandement. Enfin, le chapitre 5 montre que les idées théoriques développées dans mes articles ont une application plus large, en utilisant une base de données originale sur les atro-cités extrêmes perpétrées dans les guerres civiles entre 1980 et 2011. / Wartime violence sometimes takes particularly extreme forms. Not only do belligerents frequent-ly kill large numbers of civilians, but violent atrocities sometimes go beyond killing to include acts of overt cruelty such as mutilation, rape, public torture, and the abuse of human remains. While individual instances of such violence likely occur in almost all wars, and might be ex-plained by a certain prevalence of psychopathy or sadism among combatants, or by a process of “barbarization” inherent in war, neither individual psychology nor universal wartime conditions can explain why armed actors seem to vary in the extent to which they perpetrate such violence. In some armed groups, episodes of extreme atrocity remain isolated cases. In others, in contrast, large numbers of combatants appear to adopt such practices as an established part of their “reper-toire of violence.” What explains such variation? In this dissertation, I develop and test a series of explana-tions that help account for variation in the occurrence of “extreme atrocities” within and across conflicts. I define extreme atrocities as acts of physical violence characterized by the public dis-play of overt cruelty, and argue that the occurrence of such violence is closely connected to the context of irregular warfare, that is, of warfare characterized by pronounced asymmetry in mili-tary capabilities and fragmented territorial control. Within this context, I show that there are two common pathways towards extreme atrocity. The first involves a process of “top down” decision making, whereby organizational leaders adopt extreme forms of violence for strategic ends. Among the most important of these is the imperative to deter civilian collaboration with the ene-my in contested territories. Because of the terror they inspire, extreme atrocities can usefully serve this purpose, at least under certain conditions. A second pathway involves the “bottom up” emergence of extreme atrocities among rank-and-file combatants as an unordered “practice of war.” Such emergence, I argue, is more likely in military units with high levels of social cohesion but low levels of discipline. Under conditions of irregular warfare, such units can develop infor-mal norms that endorse extreme violence as a means of avenging combat losses. These arguments are developed and tested in my dissertation using a variety of different empirical material, most of which is presented in three articles that have been or are soon to be submitted for publication. The first article (Chapter 2) defines the concept of “extreme atrocity” and uses violence data from four civil wars to probe the plausibility of a series of explanations of such violence derived from the literature on civilian victimization. The second article (Chapter 3) further develops the idea that irregular warfare creates strategic incentives for the top-down adoption of extreme violence, focusing specifically on the use beheadings by jihadist groups. I show that variation in the use of beheadings among jihadist groups can be explained by a combi-nation of local strategic context and transnational ties. The third article (Chapter 4) focuses on the emergence of extreme atrocity as a “practice” among state security forces, using the example of mutilations perpetrated by American soldiers during the Vietnam war to show how extreme forms of violence can become widespread despite being unambiguously prohibited by military policy. Finally, Chapter 5 shows that the theoretical ideas developed in my articles have broader application. Using original data on extreme atrocities perpetrated in civil wars between 1980 and 2011, I show that the patterns in perpetration of such violence by state security forces and rebel groups are consistent with the theories of top-down adoption and bottom-up emergence of ex-treme atrocity described above. This thesis contributes to our understanding of wartime violence by explicitly theorizing a hitherto neglected dimension of violence, and developing and testing explanations that can ac-count for variation in its occurrence at multiple different levels.

本論文は全ての形態の武力紛争における海上経済戦についての国際法による規律を取り扱う。国際的武力紛争において、海上経済戦は慣習海上経済戦規則に基づく交戦国の一方的行為として、第三国船舶に対する干渉が許容される。他方で、慣習海上経済戦規則はその性質及び慣行から非国際的武力紛争には適用できない。従って、非国際的武力紛争における海上経済戦を既存の法的枠組みにおいて正当化できない。 / This thesis deals with the rule of maritime economic warfare by international law in all forms of armed conflict. In international armed conflict, maritime economic warfare is authorized by customary rule of maritime economic warfare as a unilateral act by belligerent state. On the other hand, customary rule of maritime economic warfare cannot apply to non-international armed conflict because of its nature and practice. Consequently, maritime economic warfare in non-international armed conflict does not justify under the existing legal framework. / 博士(法学) / Doctor of Laws / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

Climate security is a subject that focuses on the relationship between climate change and security. Climate security is a subject that supports the notion that climate change is amplifying existing security threats as climate change is having negative impacts on societies, the natural environment, and development which worsen the situation, especially in regions that already experiencing major challenges. Climate security suggests that climate change causes insecurity by having the capacity to amplify and exacerbate existing tensions or creating new ones which ultimately may lead to armed conflict. This provides the importance to study the subject of climate security since most of the states that are predicted to be most affected by climate change are states that can be classified as volatile and prone to conflict. The thesis focuses on Sudan because the country is experiencing repeated armed conflicts within its borders while also being affected by climate change. This provides the main reason to study Sudan as more research is needed on how climate change is a threat amplifier. As climate change can be a source of insecurity in Sudan, the thesis also focuses on how the UN respond to climate insecurity to mitigate the negative consequences climate change imposes on Sudan. The thesis therefore aims to strengthen the research on how the UN as a multilateral organization responds to climate security. Qualitative method was used to interview four staff members from the UNDP, UNEP, and DPPA-DPO that are stationed both in New York and in Khartoum, Sudan. The results provided the conclusion that Sudan is experiencing internal armed conflicts between groups as an indirect consequence of climate change. The indirect pathways can be summarized as being connected to worsened socioeconomic standards and increased competition between different religious and ethnic groups over decreased natural resources. One main driver of the armed conflicts is also political instability and large amounts of armed groups through the country. This explains repeated and long conflicts that have affected the Sudanese people and hindered development in the country. The results from the interviews concluded that the UN acknowledge that climate change is a source of insecurity in Sudan and that the UN is prioritizing the topic of climate security. The work that the UN is implementing in Sudan have been focusing on climate adaptation to decrease the affects climate change has on Sudan. The interviews resulted in exposing the fact that the UN has experienced challenges to cohesively work with climate security in Sudan, as it has been challenging to work together with multiple UN organizations. Solutions to this challenge have among other things been the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) which has increased cooperation internally. Other prioritized goals the UN has in Sudan is aiding in the establishment of a democratically elected government. The respondents highlighted that the work with climate security has paused since the military takeover in Sudan in 2021. This finding indicates indicates that the UN is having challenges with working in countries that are experiencing repeated political instability.

No description available.