“Making Falsafa in Modern Egypt” is an intellectual and institutional history of a phenomenon in colonial-national Egypt known to participants and observers as the “Islamic philosophy revival.” At the helm of this “revival” was an intellectually and politically diverse group of local scholars—shaykhs trained at Cairo’s venerable al-Azhar mosque-university as well as philosophers and Arabists with doctorates from the Sorbonne and Cambridge—united by a commitment to rehabilitating the legacies of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes), and other classical masters of the philosophical discipline known in Arabic as falsafa. My dissertation excavates the archive of this little-studied Egyptian revivalist movement to offer a situated intellectual history of the production, diffusion, reading, and uses of the Arabo-Islamic philosophical tradition in modern global thought. In so doing, I begin to address the neglected yet consequential question of how and to what end scholars in the Arabic-speaking regions of the Muslim world studied, taught, interpreted, and otherwise engaged their philosophical heritage in the modern era. In tracing the efforts of prominent twentieth-century Egyptian philosophers to reconstitute classical falsafa for modern thought and education, I rely on their published scholarship, conference presentations, personal papers, and articles on politics and education as well as archival records from the institutions where they worked and studied. I show that these scholars (re)made their philosophical tradition into a privileged subject and means of reform, taking its revival to be an essential precondition for Arabs’ modern becoming. By writing revisionary histories and building new archives of falsafa, they redefined its disciplinary bounds and canon as understood in Islamic and European scholarly traditions while also presenting novel genealogies of science, reason, and humanism that provincialized Western philosophy and configured its Islamic counterpart as an alternative universalism. As widely-read international scholars who studied and taught at universities across the Middle East and Europe, meanwhile, they played a crucial role in establishing “Islamic philosophy” as an object of international academic inquiry and a “world tradition.” Whereas the modern reconstruction of the Arabo-Islamic philosophical tradition is generally represented as a project internal to Orientalism driven by Europeans, my dissertation recasts this major hermeneutic enterprise as a chapter in the intellectual history of Islam and the Arab world. By tracing the meaning and making of falsafa in colonial-national Egypt through the works of its local revivers, I begin to document the formative role of colonized Arab and Muslim scholars in the global historical processes, networks, and debates that made their philosophical heritage into one of the most widely-studied thought traditions in the contemporary era.

Islamic Philosophy seems essentially to be a response to the challenge that reached the Muslim world from Greek thought. Various conflicts arose in early Islam from time to time with respect to certain principles in different sects and everyone adapted whatever new form seemed to be conducive to his thought. The conflict between the Muctazilite tradition influenced by rationalism and Ashcarite tradition dominated by 'faith' was virtually set at naught by the chief of the Ashcarites, Abū-Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 A.D.), who found the culmination of tradition in mystical awareness. From the time of al-Ashcarī down to that of al-Ghazālī the Arabs assimilated the fundamentals of Hellenism, and Greek culture caused a vigorous philosophical renaissance represented by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (died A.D. 950) and Abū-cAlī al-Husayn ibn-cAbd-Allāh ibn-Sīnā (A.D. 980-1037). Under the influence of their philosophical thought theology was shaken once more when confronted by the ideas of the Muctazila. Facts and phenomena had no ultimate significance beyond what they presented in experience. Men who were concerned with the refinements of philosophical speculations and the intricacies of metaphysical abstractions were greatly needed to work to the support of the dogmas of Islam and to nullify the conclusions of a philosophy inconsistent with it. When this colossal task appeared to be imperative, the Muslim world found their leader in al-Ghazālī who was capable of withstanding Hellenism and attacking its representatives. In addition to his being a philosopher who wished to counteract the unorthodox tendencies of his hellenising predecessors, al-Ghazālī was an eminent mystic, sufi and original thinker. In the Muslim world he was the great bridge between traditionalism and mysticism, activism and intuitionism. From the days of his youth he possessed an intense thirst for knowledge which persuaded him to study every form of philosophy and religion and to question all whom he met with regard to the nature and significance of their belief. He discussed problems of understanding, value of knowledge, learning, instruction, efficiency and duty. The ruthless iconoclasm practised by al-Ghazālī in destroying the revered images of Greek Philosophy which then held sway over the mind of many Muslims and his efforts to bring about a reconciliation between mysticism and orthodoxy crowned him with the title of Ḥujjat al-Islam.

Cette thèse poursuit une étude de l’ontologie de Dietrich de Freiberg, à la lumière du débat arabo-latine autour de la « distinction réelle » entre l’être et l’essence. L’enjeu principal est de montrer comment la doctrine du maître allemand, défendant vigoureusement les principes de l’ontologie aristotélico-averroïste, s’offre comme alternative aux doctrines ancrées sur la thèse de la distinction réelle de la fin du XIIIème siècle, à l’Université de Paris. La première partie analyse le contexte historique et doctrinal dans lequel s’inscrit la réflexion de Dietrich : d’abord, la critique averroïste à la conception « avicennienne » de l’étant aristotélicien, et ensuite, le premier jalon de la dispute latine, constitué par la critique de Siger de Brabant aux défenseurs de la distinction réelle (parmi eux, Thomas d’Aquin). La deuxième partie étudie, en premier lieu, un des arguments centraux dans la discussion, à savoir, l’argument de l’« intellectus essentiae », et s’occupe ensuite de l’examen de son refus de la part de Dietrich. Finalement, la troisième partie considère l’ontologie de Dietrich dans ses traits fondamentaux, à la lumière de sa vision critique envers les thèses centrales des défenseurs de la distinction réelle. / This thesis pursues a study of Dietrich of Freiberg’s ontology, in the light of the Arabian-Latin debate about “real distinction” between existence and essence. The main concern is to show how the doctrine of the german master, defending strongly the principles of the Aristotelian-Averroïst ontology, offers itself as an alternative to the doctrines fixed on the thesis of real distinction at the end of the XIIIth century, at the University of Paris. The first part analyzes the historic and doctrinal background in which the reflection of Dietrich is placed: first, Averroes’ criticism to Avicenna’s conception of Aristotelian being, and then, the first milestone of the Latin quarrel, constituted by Siger’s criticism to the defenders of the real distinction (among them, Thomas Aquinas). The second part examines, first of all, one of the central arguments in the discussion, namely, the “intellectus essentiae” argument, and then deals with the examination of Dietrich’s refusal of it. Finally, the third part considers the ontology of Dietrich in its fundamental features, in the light of its critical vision regarding the main theses of the defenders of real distinction.

Ce travail examine et analyse les positions d'Avicenne, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot concernant la connaissance des notions premières, à la lumière de leurs arguments pour cette position et de leurs autres engagements théoriques, en particulier aristotéliciens. Chacun à sa façon, ces philosophes affirment que l'étant ou l'existant est ce premier concept. Ils lui donnent une primauté logique, au sens où l'étant est présupposé par nos autres concepts. Ils lui donnent aussi une primauté cognitive, au sens où il est le premier objet à être conçu par l'intellect. / This work reviews and analyzes a view shared by Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus concerning the primary notions, examining their arguments in the light of their other philosophical commitments, especially Aristotelian ones. Each in their own way, these philosophers claim that being is this primary notion. Being has a twofold priority. In the logical order, being is presupposed by all other notions. In the cognitive order, being is the first conceived by the intellect.

Ibn Jumay''s (d. c. 594/1198) commentary on the Canon of Medicine by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) occupies an important place in the history of medicine for it is the first Canon commentary written by a physician and thus stands at the start of a tradition extending over 500 years. In addition, it is a so-far neglected source for our understanding of mediaeval Islamic medicine. The present thesis analyses the commentary with the aims of (1) determining the methods by which the court physician composed his treatise and (2) understanding why Ibn Jumay' undertook to prepare a commentary on one of the most thorough medical compendia of the middle ages. Chapter One presents the biography of Ibn Jumay', reveals that his religion had little impact on his writings and surveys his library which played a pivotal role in the composition of the commentary. Chapter Two investigates Ibn Jumay''s methodology in the entire commentary; it reveals that with his philological and source-critical methods Ibn Jumay' wanted to establish an authoritative reading of the Canon and to demonstrate the high degree of his erudition. Chapter Three focuses on selected passages in the commentary in form of three case studies. Ibn Jumay''s comments on anatomy/dissection, assorted materia medica and headaches demonstrate the court physician’s reverence for ancient authorities and his quest to revive and refine their teachings. Chapter Four contextualises Ibn Jumay''s methods and agenda by comparing them to those of other relevant scholars of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The thesis concludes by arguing that Ibn Jumay''s commentary was part of his revival of the art of medicine and his attempt to gain power in the medical tradition by attaching his name to one of the greatest scholars of his time — the ra'īs Ibn Sīnā.

Cette thèse contient un commentaire et une traduction complète d’un ouvrage polémique peu connu intitulé "La Quintessence des intellects en vue de réfuter les philosophes en matière de science des fondements (Lubāb al-‘uqūl fī al-radd ‘alā al-falāsifa fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl)". L’auteur, Abū al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ al-Miklātī, est un théologien aš‘arite de la deuxième moitié du XIIème siècle et du premier tiers du XIIIème, qui évolue entre le Maroc actuel et l’Andalousie musulmane. Il se situe à un moment clé de l’histoire de la pensée andalouse : celui de la condamnation de la philosophie en général et de celle d’Averroès en particulier. Par les usages variés qu’il fait de l’oeuvre rušdienne, al-Miklātī est un témoin rare à la fois de la réception d’Averroès par ses coreligionnaires et de ce que pouvait être l’opposition théologique que combattait Ibn Rušd. La cible principale de sa réfutation n’est toutefois pas le Cordouan mais bien Avicenne, incarnation à cette période de la falsafa. Al-Miklātī est par là pleinement l’héritier de l’aš‘arisme post-avicennien et l’influence d’al-Ğuwaynī, d’al-Ġazālī et d’al-Šahrastānī est manifeste. Pour mener à bien sa réfutation, al-Miklātī n’hésite pas à se servir d’Averroès, autre grand critique – bien que pour des raisons opposées – du philosophe persan. C’est ainsi que l’auteur de la Quintessence des Intellects reprend la présentation du système avicennien qu’il trouve dans le traité d’Averroès Sur le Premier Moteur, perdu aujourd’hui, nous offrant par là deux passages cruciaux pour la compréhension de la controverse qui opposa ce dernier à Avicenne concernant la preuve de l’existence de Dieu. / This PhD thesis is composed of a commentary and a full translation of a polemic work entitled The Quintessence of the intellects in response to philosophers on the science of principles (Lubāb al-‘uqūl fī al-radd ‘alā al-falāsifa fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl). The author, Abū al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ al-Miklātī, is an Aš‘arite theologian of the second half of the XIIth century, first third of the XIIIth, who evolved between present-day Morocco and Muslim Andalusia. He lives at a key point in the history of the Andalusian thought: that of the condemnation of philosophy in general and Averroes’ philosophy in particular. Through the various uses he makes of Averroes’ works, al-Miklātī is a rare witness of both the reception of the former by his own co-religionists and of the kind of theologians whom he must have been confronting. However, the main target of al-Miklātī’s refutation is not Averroes but Avicenna, who is at the time the incarnation of falsafa. In this sense, al-Miklātī is a true heir of post-Avicennian Aš‘arism and the influence of al-Ğuwaynī, al-Ġazālī and al-Šahrastānī is undeniable. To accomplish his refutation, he does not hesitate to use Averroes, another great critique – though for opposite reasons – of the Persian philosopher. He quotes the presentation of the Avicennian system he finds in Averroes’ treatise On the First Mover, which is lost today, thus offering us two crucial passages for the understanding of the controversy that opposed Averroes to Avicenna on the proof of God’s existence.

La Risala al-adhawiya fi al-ma`ad d’Avicenne, portant sur la question du Retour à la vie une fois la mort survenue, présente un certain nombre de thèses originales par rapport aux autres écrits de ce philosophe. Le Retour ne peut concerner les corps : il est en effet réserver aux âmes dans la mesure où l’essence de l’homme réside dans son âme. Les corps se corrompent définitivement au moment de la mort. Le Coran n’a rien d’un texte démonstratif, il s’agit d’un texte rhétorique visant à susciter chez ses lecteurs le comportement moral approprié. On ne peut donc déduire de l’affirmation coranique répétée selon laquelle les corps reviendront à la vie que les corps seront effectivement ressuscités. Par ailleurs, si dans le monde physique il existe une pluralité d’âmes, c’est uniquement en raison de la multiplicité de la matière corporelle qui les accueille. Si les âmes doivent survivre indépendamment des corps qui assurent leur individuation, comment pourraient-elles exister individuellement ? Il n’y aura pas d’existence individuelle des âmes après la mort, mais un Retour de ces âmes au Principe (l’Intellect Agent, ou, en dernière instance, le Principe Premier, Dieu) dont elles émanent : les âmes se résorbent donc dans leur origine et n’ont plus d’existence séparée. Le Retour est absolu. / Avicenna’s Risala al-adhawiya fi al-ma`ad, dealing with the question of Return to life once death has occurred, comes up with various original theses that do not appear in Avicenna’s other writings. The Return cannot affect the body : it is indeed dedicated to souls inasmuch as the essence of man lies in his soul. Bodies get corrupted once and for all when death occurs. The Quran has nothing to do with a demonstrative text, it is a rhetorical text that aims at provoking in its readers the appropriate moral behaviour. It is therefore impossible to deduce from the repeated coranic assertion saying that bodies will come back to life that bodies will effectively resurrect. If in the physical world there is a plurality of souls, it is only because of the multiplicity of the corporeal matter that receives them. If souls have to survive independently from bodies that allow their individuation, how then could they individually exist ? There will not be any individual existence of souls in the hereafter, but a Return of these souls to the Principle (the Agent Intellect, or, at last, the First Principle, God) from which they emanate : therefore souls resorb in their origin and do not have any separate existence. It is an absolute Return.